Bargaining issues in Europe:
comparing countries and industries

edited by
Maarten van Klaveren and Kea Tijdens

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WageIndicator

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Table of contents

Preface

This book is a result of the WIBAR project. The full meaning of the WIBAR acronym clearly announces the goal of the project: *WageIndicator* support for trade union BARgaining in Europe. The project ran from August 2006 – July 2007. We are grateful to the European Commission, supporting the project as part of its Industrial Relations and Social Dialogue Program, Budget Heading 04030301, Nr 2006/VP001/10017[1]. The WIBAR team consisted of Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Nuria Ramos Martin, Wim Sprenger, and Anna Dragstra (project organizer).

In the preparatory phase of the project, from August 2006 to March 2007, the team produced in total 20 reports, based on choices made at a Brussels trade union seminar in September 2006. Six reports addressed themes judged important for national trade unions, the ETUC and the European industry federations: working time; low pay; training; older workers; collective bargaining coverage; and work-related stress. A seventh report contained conclusions and recommendations, and the reports numbered 8-20 treated the six themes mentioned above for 13 industries. These reports were discussed at the WIBAR Conference which took place from April 18–20, 2007 in Amsterdam. The conference participants represented international trade union bodies as well as national confederations and single unions from eight EU member states. Additional meetings with trade unionists were held in Brussels and Oxford. After these meetings, the reports have been finalized and transformed into chapters for this book. An introductory chapter and a chapter on the *WageIndicator* web-survey and data were added.

We are grateful to all those who contributed to this book: trade unionists as well as fellow-researchers of University of Amsterdam/AIAS and STZ consultancy & research. Special thanks are due to Theo Bouwman and Ria Hermanussen, both STZ, for their conference activities. We are also in-

[1] Sole responsibility lies with the University of Amsterdam/AIAS. The European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information in this particular or in any other publication or communication.

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Amsterdam, October 2007

1. Introduction

Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens

1.1. Benchmarking international managerial practice

The main goal of this book is to support trade union bargaining in Europe. Although simply written, the expression 'union bargaining in Europe' can imply several meanings. With the current wave of internationalization of trade and production in mind, the reader may at first sight focus on the European coordination of collective bargaining on the union side. Yet, this perspective carries the danger of ignoring the bargaining processes that still (have to) go on at national level. Thus, supporting union bargaining may also need to relate to collective bargaining within countries, be it at national, industry or firm levels, whilst keeping an eye on conditions in other European countries. This introduction aims to throw some light on developments influencing the relationship between these various perspectives and levels. As a starting point we consider the various ways and means of international benchmarking.

Most informed trade unionists throughout Europe would probably point to the new wave of globalization, internationalization and Europeanization[2] as posing the first and foremost challenge to the union movement. Indeed, in the 'old world' the social consequences of the on-going liberalization and internationalization of trade, foreign direct investment, capital movements and international labour migration are inextricably linked with the consequences of the formation of the European internal market and of the single currency area, the Eurozone. Until recently the expansion of trade and foreign direct investment was concentrated in and between three global regions, the European, American and Japanese blocks. Hence, globalization primarily had to be variously understood as regionalization, "glocalisa-

[2] Van den Berghe (2003, 14) calls this the fifth wave of relocation, commencing after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989).

tion"[3], or "triadisation".[4] In the years to come the integration of China and India in global capitalism will change this picture fundamentally. The rise of these countries will put hundreds of millions of medium- and high-skilled but relatively low cost workers at the disposal of multinational enterprises (MNEs). The lower costs of many of these workers being directly linked to the inferior individual and trade union rights to which they are entitled.[5]

At the same time across a broad range of industries sheltered national markets are rapidly diminishing in importance. For a majority of firms the reality of international competition is characterised by the pressure of global relocation, advancing information and communication technologies (ICT), reductions in tariffs agreed in successive WTO rounds, the homogenization of consumer tastes and branding, and short-term share price considerations. Moreover, internationalization cannot be separated from the growing dominance of shareholder capitalism and speculative capital movements. The Europeanization and internationalization of trade and production, including benchmarking international management practice and the exploitation of shareholder-value policies, has given rise to escalating levels of market uncertainty and to the permanent reorientation of company policies in accordance with short-term goals.[6]

For quite some time, management in MNEs has been driving the cross-border articulation of local bargaining outcomes of various subsidiaries often through 'coercive comparisons' of labour costs, working practices and performance.[7] More recently, encouraged by EU-wide production and marketing strategies and by improved ICT, many MNEs have introduced management systems and structures in order to compare, benchmark and diffuse 'best practices' across locations in different EU member states. In doing so, they followed a number of US and British MNEs, who by the 1980s appeared to have elaborate systems of corporate control in operation through budget-setting and monitoring systems.[8] These structures and systems can have major spill-overs for industrial relations and benchmarking may well

[3] Ruigrok & Van Tulder, 1995.
[4] Hoffmann *et al*, 2002, 2; Marginson & Sisson, 2004, Ch. 2.
[5] Galgóczi, 2007.
[6] A.o. Hoffmann, 2007.
[7] Arrowsmith & Marginson, 2006, 246.
[8] Coates *et al*, 1992.

exert downward pressure on Human Resources Management (HRM) practices and working conditions in host countries.[9] Most benchmarking seems to start from the strategies and practices shaped in the country of origin, especially if they are deeply rooted in the industrial relations institutions of that country.[10] On the other hand, a Dutch study pointed to the penetration achieved by Anglo-Saxon HR practices in Netherlands-based MNEs.[11]

Recently some authors have pointed to a second development challenging unions throughout Europe, namely, the 'tertiarization' of the economy. The accelerating processes of internationalization and deindustrialization and consequent effects on patterns of production, distribution and consumption are radically changing the outlook of the service or tertiary sector at large. The expansion of commercial and public services (retail; hotels, restaurants, catering; care), with many low-qualified jobs and a high level of women's employment, goes hand in hand with the growth of ICT-related services containing mainly highly-qualified male jobs – yet, both parts tend to be lowly unionized.[12]

Symbolic of this development may well be the rise of the US-based retail giant Wal-Mart, currently the largest profit-making company in the world, employing more than 1.5 million workers around the globe. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that this company can be regarded as both "the template business setting the standards for a new stage in the history of world capitalism", and the successor to US Steel, General Motors, IBM and Microsoft as templates of previous stages.[13] An American industry specialist has argued that "Wal-Mart has become the most powerful, most influential company in the world".[14] The company's organizational resources as manifested in the US market are channelled into a dual strategy: first of all, exerting hard control over factor inputs, including control over supplier firms in national markets and over international supply chains and secondly

[9] Martin & Beaumont, 1998; Sisson *et al*, 2003; Edwards *et al*, 2007.
[10] Arrowsmith & Marginson, 2006, 259-260.
[11] Van der Meer *et al*, 2004.
[12] Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2000; Boeri et al, 2001.
[13] Lichtenstein, 2006, 4.
[14] Fishman, 2006, 5.

maintaining the ability to move rapidly and autonomously in response to changes in market conditions.[15]

In the slipstream of Wal-Mart's and other forerunner companies, buyer-driven supply chains are speeding up the integration of local labour, consumers and suppliers into the global market, putting heavy pressure on local networks to maintain or develop competitive advantage and to acquire sufficient external capital.[16] Global management consultants are instrumental in benchmarking and ploughing back experience in retail supply chain management[17] to manufacturing and other commercial services, like to the automotive[18] and ICT industries.[19]

Wal-Mart also poses direct challenges to unionism, as the giant retailer is notorious for more or less subtle union-busting practices.[20] This is of course just one example of the vulnerability of organised labour in the commercial service sector. The broader challenge to European unions here derives from the fact that the workforce all over Europe is becoming ever more diversified, in socio-economic, demographic, ethnical, gender, and cultural terms. Responding to the growing diversity of its potential constituency and the related differentiation in employment relations raises potent questions for unions concerning their recruitment practices and services.[21] Nevertheless, the actual forms of tertiarization cannot be ignored as the spread of global chains integrating Far East production facilities, work as catalysts on these differentiation processes. They reinforce the conclusion drawn by Hoffmann *et al*[22] that the commercial service sector remains the Achilles heel for both organized labour and the European corporatist welfare states.

A third major challenge for European trade unions is related to the undermining of the Taylorist / Fordist mass-production paradigm, by flexible markets and technologies, and the resulting wave of changes in work organisation and industrial relations systems. In the last two decades influen-

[15] Christopherson, 2007, 453.
[16] Hoffmann, 2006.
[17] Cf. Cohen & Roussel, 2004.
[18] Cf. Wad, 2005.
[19] Cf. Schipper & Haan, 2005.
[20] Ortega, 1998; Bair & Bernstein, 2006.
[21] Leisink, 1997; Hoffmann *et al,* 2002.
[22] Hoffmann *et al,* 2002, 90.

tial streams of both European and US research have announced the era of post-Fordist models of work organisation. Socio-technical systems design, using terms such as high performance work organisations (HPWO) or systems (HPWS), emphasise employee participation in decision-making, enhanced skills, training, functional flexibility and teamwork in the quest for the competitive 'mutual gains enterprise', With enhanced organisational performance and greater employee autonomy and social cohesion these 'high road' forms of organisation are supposed to be competitive in global markets, delivering faster, better products, unleashing creativity and generating new knowledge and unique selling points.[23] It remains to be seen whether the distribution of gains from HPWO between capital and labour is more even than those from the organisational forms now regarded as outdated. It should be noted though that quite some research illustrates how HPWO relies primarily on the intensification of labour, thereby challenging workers' interests and their well-being.[24]

The emergence of the HPWO concept seems to have two major implications for the European trade union movement. First, an HPWO confers different means of social interaction to that of the classical production line, especially in conjunction with the spread of HRM practices and tools. Typically HR practices have restructured employment relationships within HPWO's using multiple (and often highly individual) contractual forms.[25] HRM strategies here may also impact significantly on worker representation and participation, by undermining the commitment of workers to unions and works councils. At the same time, the development of value chains fragmenting production over many countries and the rise of complex processes of outsourcing and subcontracting have deepened global labour competition. All of this adds up to the 'fracturing of collectivism'.[26] Secondly and by contrast, 'high road' approaches also have the potential to contribute substantially to maintaining the competitiveness of locations, companies and countries with relatively high wage levels. They may form the basis of

[23] Cf. Van Eijnatten, 1993; EC, 1997; Appelbaum *et al*, 2000.
[24] Cf. Thompson, 2007.
[25] Hyman, 2007, 15.
[26] Gallie *et al*, 1998; Thompson & McHugh, 2002.

forward-looking industrial policy strategies at industry and national levels, aimed at the need to provide sustainable growth and employment.[27]

More than ever 'policies of diversity'[28] are of relevance for the European trade union movement, as well as for European governance in general. Firstly, we have already pointed to the growing differentiation in the potential union constituency. Secondly, we should note, following the development of HPWO's and their related management strategies, that outcomes in terms of working conditions will be rather heavily determined at company and workplace levels. Consequently, these outcomes are considerably less predictable and show wider variation at industry level than, for example, those concerning pay, as our results concerning work-related stress presented in Chapter 8 will confirm. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that, beneath a surface of stability, new modes of governance are developing alongside older forms in the industrial relations systems of many EU member states.[29]

In all member states where industry bargaining still predominates, higher-level collective agreements have widened the scope for additional bargaining at company level. In many countries the scope of collective bargaining itself has increased, taking into consideration more qualitative issues such as new forms of working time, parental leave, life-long learning, and gender equality. Moreover, multi-employer bargaining increasingly includes compensation for welfare cuts, where state reforms have tended to lower benefits for classical worker risks such as sickness, invalidity and unemployment.[30]

Given the on-going internationalisation processes, it often seems that many escape route or 'exit options' are available for MNEs. Certainly, in subsidiaries of internationally competing MNEs, workers' representatives are confronted rather frequently with this type of threat. Raess for instance, recently found in large German metal firms that "exit threats are an extremely pervasive part of employer strategy".[31] Nonetheless, other research such as

[27] Galgóczi, 2007, 91-92.
[28] Scharpf, 2002.
[29] Visser, 2005.
[30] Hoffmann *et al,* 2002, 33; Visser, 2005, 297.
[31] Raess, 2006, 62.

the analyses set out in various ETUI(-REHS) publications has shown throughout the EU that company- and workplace-based power structures related to trade unions, works councils and progressive political parties do matter for the regulation of global economic and political processes. Quite often these structures prove to be decisive for the success or failure of the local operations of globally active firms. Basically, in the 'European model' the consequences of competitive pressures are mediated by labour market institutions, legal provisions, and politics. Admittedly this mediation system is porous but examples do show that the exit options of employers can be mitigated, frustrated or turned down by coordinated European, national and industry bargaining, and last but not least by the countervailing power of workers' representation in the workplace.[32]

The internationalization of investment and trade hardly comprises a rectilinear process. It is interesting to note the growing number of 'failures' in foreign direct investment. Another part of the Wal-Mart story is telling here: the case of Wal-Mart's withdrawal from the German market in 2006. Obviously in this case the firm's benchmarking of potential competitive advantage did not work out. After 10 years of trying , Wal-Mart's 'path dependency' or 'action logic' continued to clash with the German regulatory environment, notably the country's land use regulations, as well as with the structure of German wholesale and retail trade, not forgetting the vested wholesale intermediaries and customers' habits of engaging in price averaging and buying in various stores. Wal-Mart also refused to adopt German collective agreements, thus rejecting the cooperative and consultative nature of German industrial relations and violating basic social norms. The US firm was unable to 'get to scale' and to exercise the network power it was used to in its home country. Finally, Wal-Mart's shareholders lost patience.[33]

[32] A.o. Foden *et al*, 2001; Hoffmann *et al*, 2002; Galgóczi *et al,* 2006.
[33] Christopherson, 2007, 454-462.

1.2. Benchmarking for Social Europe

The big issue concerning 'Social Europe' is clearly whether 'market-correcting' policies can be effective in strengthening labour market and other institutions as well as the power structures mentioned earlier over 'market-making' policies. For trade unionists this is a 'headache' dossier. Since the early days of European integration, many commentators have stressed the cleavage between the strong and successful drive for economic integration and much more hesitant social policy measures.[34] Social integration is lagging far behind the degree of economic integration despite the official obligation for creating social cohesion and preserving the European Social Model (ESM).[35] The introduction of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the Stability and Growth Pact widened this 'fundamental asymmetry'[36], leaving wage flexibility and flexibility concerning labour markets and social security as the main national adaptation mechanisms. Alongside this corset is the mantra of mainstream economists namely: avoiding negative shocks to demand, adopting restrictive fiscal policies, and a heavy supply-side orientation.[37] The new orthodoxy of the European Central Bank is further narrowing the room for demand-oriented employment creation policies.[38]

In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, hopes were rising for a stronger 'Social Europe' project, fuelled by the adoption, in 1989, of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers.[39] This Charter is still mentioned in the preamble of the European Union Treaty, confirming the attachment of the member states to the fundamental social rights as defined in the Charter and in the second paragraph of Treaty art. 136. This provision states that the European social policy should have as objectives "the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonization while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour (…..)".

[34] Grahl & Teague, 2003, 407.
[35] Jacobi, 2003, 17.
[36] Scharpf, 2002.
[37] Gill, 2001; Teague & Donaghey, 2003.
[38] Visser, 2005.
[39] Kirton-Darling, 2003, 18-19.

Yet, due particularly to the opposition of the UK government, the Community Charter was not able to gain legally binding status. Therefore, the Charter is seen rather more as a declaration of intent, although the fundamental social rights proclaimed in it are considered to be an inherent part of the 'acquis Communitaire'.[40] Moreover, as we will elaborate in Chapter 4, the provisions of the Treaty do not apply to pay, although cooperation measures between member states can be based on the related field of social inclusion.

Next, trade unionists pinned their hopes on the strengthening of the European Social Dialogue (ESD), recognized in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty social protocol and finding its way into the social chapter of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. The ESD opened up the possibility for the social partners to conclude agreements on issues of social policy and to request the European Commission to submit such agreements to the Council as proposed directives: new, 'soft' forms of regulation.[41] Since the mid 1990s a number of agreements did develop at sectoral level, albeit mainly in areas linked to the public sector and subject to market liberalisation (telecom, postal services, railways, etc.).[42] Various impediments to the development of the ESD can be identified. The first is the diversity across countries with respect to national industry boundaries and the structures and traditions of industrial relations, including representative structures. At this level especially employers' organisation remains weak. National affiliates of European employers' associations, for example, are often not mandated to address social issues. Unlike the ETUC, the European employers' association UNICE has no sectoral dimension to its structure.[43] On the union side, the extent of 'vertical integration' and the authority of national federations differs widely across movements in the various member states.[44] A second factor frustrating the ESD lies in the rather narrow social agenda of the EU and the exclusion in advance of pay issues. Hence, the Commission is much more constrained than are national governments in its capacity to pull employers and unions into the dialogue. The unions, too, lack the ways and means to force

[40] Fuchs, 2004.
[41] Marginson, 2005, 513.
[42] Geyer, 2000, 101; De Boer *et al*, 2005, 58-60. In construction and transport, growing labour mobility across EU member states also plays a role in pushing agreements. Here, sector-specific legislation at EU level has developed too.
[43] Arcq *et al*, 2003; Marginson, 2005, 519.
[44] Marginson, 2005, 324; De Boer *et al*, 2005, 54.

the employers' associations to the bargaining table. Under these conditions the latter, judging that the ESD for them has no distinct added value, often retain their 'power of non-decision'.[45]

Arguing along these lines, Marginson concludes that the sector level represents a weak link in EU's emerging multi-level framework of industrial relations. This matters because, according to the author, "the significance of the weak link lies in the competitive pressures on sector-based bargaining arrangements in the different member states (which) threaten to set in train a downward spiral of wages and conditions, largely unconstrained by any robust European-level bi- or tripartite coordinating framework."[46] Yet, Marginson seems to neglect some of his more positive points in assessing the second main track of industry-level industrial relations developing at European level: cross-border coordinated bargaining.[47] Other than the sectoral ESD, this emerging form of bargaining coordination which includes wage issues is driven forward by the union movement alone, and mainly focuses on industries exposed to international competition.[48]

Both bottom-up and top-down dynamics can be seen here. Bottom-up coordination is encompassing unions from two or more neighbouring countries, including the cross-sectoral 'Doorn' initiative and a number of interregional networks at industry level in metalworking, construction and chemicals. Top-down, the 1998 European Metalworkers' Federation (EMF) adoption of a EU-wide bargaining coordination rule for wage and working time negotiations provided a template for various initiatives from other European industry federations. Moreover, following the 1999 ETUC Congress special resolution on the 'Europeanization of Industrial Relations', the Confederation adopted its own European guideline for coordinated collective bargaining in December 2000.[49] Subsequently, as can be seen in our Chapters 3 to 8, the ETUC has developed substantive demands both aiming at influencing EU decision-making and stimulating coordinated bargaining. These demands cover a broad range of issues, like working time, the position of the

[45] Leisink, 2002; Jacobi, 2003, 19; De Boer *et al*, 2005, 55.
[46] Marginson, 2005, 512.
[47] Cf. Marginson, 2005, 532-537.
[48] Marginson, 2005, 523, 534.
[49] Sisson *et al*, 2003, 19-20; Marginson, 2005, 524-534.

low-paid, training and lifelong learning, the labour market position of women and older workers, and the improvement of working conditions.

For the time being, quite a number of problems remain in coordinating cross-border union bargaining in the EU, first of all there are the complications stemming from the variety of institutions, focal points and coordination patterns in the member states. Where wage bargaining is at stake, differences in payment structures, tax and social security systems as well as variations in purchasing power complicate pay comparisons across countries.[50] Second, the asymmetry between the focal points of union and employer cross-border coordination activities, at industry and company level respectively, grows in importance. On the one hand, the cross-border benchmark and diffusion practices of MNEs mentioned earlier continue to proliferate while on the other hand European Works Councils (EWCs) offer institutional frameworks for the conclusion of transnational company agreements.[51] A final and crucial point is enforceability; it cannot be forgotten that bargaining coordination initiatives remain essentially based on the voluntary commitment of the affiliated unions.[52]

1.3. Comparing countries and industries

Under the prevailing conditions, challenges to the European social model have tended to place trade unionists on the defensive, leaving many union members with growing scepticism about the European project.[53] Furthermore, the EU's 2004 and 2007 enlargements have made essential social goals even harder to meet. The available evidence shows that the workforces of the new member states are not only exposed to lower pay levels, but also to inferior working conditions[54], and most of the new member states have to cope with low union densities, low collective bargaining rates and a lack of industry institutions, resulting in a 'representation deficit'.[55] The evidence we will present in this book for Poland and Hungary by and

[50] Schulten, 2004.
[51] Marginson, 2005, 536.
[52] Cf. Schulten, 2003, 131.
[53] Waddington, 2005, 520.
[54] Vaughan-Whitehead, 2005.
[55] Kohl & Platzer, 2003, 103-107; Waddington, 2005, 526.

large confirms this worrisome picture. The employer-driven pleas for the removal of so-called rigidities from the labour market and reductions in the employers' contributions in maintaining the welfare state are ever present.[56] Yet, for Western Europe the statement of Hoffmann *et al* that thus far internationalization has hardly any *direct* influence on the national welfare state and industrial relations systems seems defendable.[57]

We may conclude that within the EU the nation state remains highly relevant as a unit of study and comparison regarding data on social aspects, thus delivering the basic justification for our efforts to compare across countries. Data from the following nine EU member states has, wherever possible, consistently been reported and compared in this book:

- Belgium
- Denmark
- Germany
- Hungary
- Finland
- the Netherlands
- Poland
- Spain
- the United Kingdom

Our second major choice, to gather industry data and compare across industries, also needs justification. Our first argument is that the social consequences of the dominant forces of competition, notably the exposure to international competition and capital flows, can be best understood analytically at the industry level. This holds already in general,[58] and definitely for the nine countries analysed here. Our second argument is that in a number of countries this also holds for the main instrument: collective bargaining for trade unions. As we will show in Chapter 7, in six out of 'our' nine countries industry-level bargaining is very or moderately dominant. Overall, at this level both sides of industry have a high degree of interest representation, resulting in collective agreements that are comprehensive in their

[56] Waddington, 2005, 519.
[57] Hoffmann *et al*, 2002, 26-27.
[58] Cf. Porter, 1998: "The particular industry (….) is where competitive advantage is won or lost" (xiii).

coverage of the labour market, thus making them an essential feature of Europe's social model.[59]

In this book we have studied 13 industries and compared them, again wherever possible, across the nine countries just indicated. Based on the international NACE classification,[60] these are:

- A-B Agriculture, fishing, hunting, forestry
- C-D Mining, Manufacturing
- E Electricity, gas and water supply (Utilities)
- F Construction
- G Wholesale and retail trade
- H Hotels, restaurants and catering
- I Transport, storage and communication
- J Financial intermediation (Finance)
- K Other commercial services
- L Public administration and defense
- M Education
- N Health care and social work
- O-Q Other community and personal services

As Sisson and Marginson rightly point out, "Comparisons have been the lifeblood of collective bargaining, the levels of pay and conditions of workers in the same union or company or sector being especially prominent".[61] This book offers a wide variety of comparable data, covering nine countries, 13 industries and six bargaining issues. This analysis may well to stimulate developing the practice of comparison into benchmarking: originally a management technique but increasingly being used by national governments, EU institutions and trade unions. It has been noted that new methods of benchmarking are taking root in EU-wide union bargaining initiatives.[62]

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[59] Kittel, 2002.

[60] For union policy-making new economic configurations, like (partly virtual) value chains or systems, inter-organisational networks, corridors and clusters, under certain conditions can be more relevant (Cf. Van Klaveren, 2002). Yet, national and international statistics do not cover their development, and so following the 'classical' NACE distinction is always the next best solution.

[61] Sisson & Marginson, 2002, 204.

[62] Marginson, 2005, 535.

The authors believe that the data as presented in the next chapters will underpin such methods, and will contribute to more targeted and appropriate trade union bargaining: at national level throughout the EU, EU-wide coordinated, as a union input in the ESD, and in EU decision-making elsewhere.

2. The *WageIndicator* web-survey and data

Kea Tijdens

2.1. Introducing the *WageIndicator* websites

The data used in the analyses in this book stem from the *WageIndicator* web-survey. This survey is held at all *WageIndicator* websites, currently operational in 20 countries (see Table 2.1). In total, these countries employ over 40 websites. Some countries have one website only; others have more than one, for example bilingual countries. Eight countries have extra websites for women. Other countries have extra websites for specific groups in the labour market, such as ICT staff or health care workers. All websites employ the same web-survey in the native language(s). More countries may join in the future. In this book, we will use data from nine countries, notably Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Germany (DE), Hungary (HU), Finland (FI), the Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Spain (ES), and the United Kingdom (UK). In the tables in this book we will use the abbreviations for these nine countries.

Table 2.1. WageIndicator *countries and their starting year*

Since	Websites in EU countries	Websites outside EU	#
2001	Netherlands		1
2004	Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Finland, Poland, United Kingdom		8
2005	Hungary, Italy	Brazil, India, S-Korea, S-Africa	14
2006		Argentina, Mexico, USA	17
2007		China, Russia, Sweden	20

A *WageIndicator* website includes content about work and employment issues. It has a so-called *Salary Checker*, which is its most important part. This web-tool provides free, reliable information on average wages earned in an occupation in a country, taking into account individual factors such as age, education or region. In most countries, salary indications are available for 50 to 500 occupations. If a country has more than one website, all web-

sites employ the same *Salary Checker*, which in bilingual countries is adapted to the language. In addition, some countries employ gross-net checkers, life-time earnings checkers, minimum wage checkers, and the like. These tools all contribute to attracting visitors.

The websites generate major web-traffic. In 2006, they received jointly almost 8 million unique visitors. For 2007, the total number of visitors is expected to be between 10 and 12 million. The *Salary Checker* is the major attraction. Worldwide, people have a great desire for information about wages, as the numbers of visitors as well as their emails show. Transparency about occupational wages is in most countries limited, although this information is critical in informing individuals' decisions about education, mobility, occupational choices, wage negotiations, and the like. In addition, the websites are deeply rooted in the Internet, because many other websites link to *WageIndicator* websites. This is due to the fact that *WageIndicator* has a well developed marketing strategy, including cooperation with major players on the Internet for attracting web-traffic. In most countries *WageIndicator* websites are easily found in the most important search engines. *WageIndicator* produces a quarterly electronic newsletter, distributed to 60,000 subscribers. Web-visitors can subscribe to this free newsletter.

Technically, the *WageIndicator* websites, web-surveys and *Salary Checks* are developed, managed and maintained in the Netherlands. They are hosted on three server hotels in the Netherlands, the USA and India. Its open source Content Management System (CMS) allows for easy updating websites by national web managers. Its Questionnaire Management System (QMS) is a database with a Source questionnaire with all questions in English and country-specific questionnaires in the national languages. The QMS also allows for downloading questionnaire-related information.

Since 2004, the project website [www.wageindicator.org] has played an important role in disseminating information about the project. It offers sections such as 'about us', publications, research lab, web workers lab, events, projects, and partners. From the research lab section an introduction to the dataset, questionnaires and codebooks can be downloaded.

2.2. Funding and ownership of *WageIndicator*

In 2004, thanks to a 3-year European Commission 6th Framework grant for the WOLIWEB project (nr 506590), similar websites could be launched in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom, aiming to collect survey data on work and wages that was otherwise not available. In 2005 and 2006, as a result of two 3-year grants from the Netherlands Development Aid Fund for the GLOBAL I and GLOBAL II projects, websites were launched in Brazil, India, South Africa, South Korea, Argentina, and Mexico. The grant aimed at surveying the informal labour markets as well as the impact of multinational enterprises on local labour markets. In 2006, with the benefit of a grant from the European Social Fund, a website was launched in Hungary, as part of a program to activate policies for closing the gender wage gap. In September 2006, in the USA a website was launched, thanks to funding from the Harvard Law School Labor & Worklife Program. In February 2007 the US team started a website in China in cooperation with Renmin University in Beijing.

The *WageIndicator* concept is owned by the non-profit *WageIndicator* Foundation, established under Dutch law in 2003. The Foundation is dedicated to labour market transparency by providing accurate wage and wage related information. Its mission statement reads:

> *"Share and compare wage information. Contribute to a transparent labor market. Provide free, accurate wage data through salary checks on national websites. Collect wage data through web-surveys."*

Its founders are the Amsterdam Institute of Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS) of the University of Amsterdam, the Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions (FNV), and the Dutch career website Monsterboard. They make up the Board of Supervisors. The Foundation manages the subcontracting companies for web-programming and for data and questionnaire management, as well as companies specialising in web design and in web journalism. The Foundation supervises and supports the national teams, mostly consisting of web managers and researchers. AIAS is responsible for the scientific part of the survey and the dataset.

Web marketing is complicated but critical in attracting web-visitors. The marketing policy of *WageIndicator* unfolds along several lines. First, the information presented with the *Salary Check* and at the web pages must offer

high quality. Second, visitors must trust both the information provided and when volunteering their data in the survey. Trust is ensured through cooperation with universities, (con)federations of trade unions such as UNI, FNV, DGB, and TUC, the ILO in some other countries, or career sites. Third, cooperation with web-based partners is critical. Current cooperation includes major web-portals, such as UOL (Brazil), and Microsoft's MSN portal in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Fourth, cooperation with media groups or publishing houses with a strong Internet presence is of paramount importance. Current cooperation includes major daily newspapers in Spain, USA, the Netherlands, Germany, and other countries. Fifth, cooperation exists with job sites, for example in South Korea, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, and other countries. In addition, in some countries national websites cooperate with temp agency sites or with employment agency sites.[63] Sixth, all national teams aim for free publicity.[64] Finally, as noted earlier, each country has at least one website, but sometimes more. All these websites offer different content and look-and-feel, but the *Salary Check* and the web-survey are similar.

2.3. The *WageIndicator* web-survey

All *WageIndicator* websites employ a web-survey. The initial web-survey was designed by the University of Amsterdam, and was later adapted for worldwide use. All websites in all countries use the same web-survey in their native language(s). All *WageIndicator* websites invite their visitors to complete the web-survey. The message is: we gave you a free wage benchmark, please share some data and time in return. Survey respondents can win a prize. Note that it is not required to complete the survey in order to be provided with wage information. On the contrary, visitors may play around endlessly with the *Salary Checker*, and are not obliged to complete any survey questions. Between 1 and 10 out of every 100 visitors do complete the survey, which takes on average 20 minutes. Given the millions of web visitors, large numbers indeed complete the web-survey. In 2006, the result

[63] See for up-to-date information: www.wageindicator.org/main/Partnersworldwide/onlinepartners.
[64] See the results at www.wageindicator.org/main/WageIndicatorgazette/inthepress.

was more than 165,000 submitted and valid questionnaires. For 2007, the total is expected to be over 175,000. The data from the web-survey are used for the computations underlying the *Salary Checker*. The dataset is used for research and publications such as this book.

It has always been a strong *WageIndicator* policy that survey respondents should be treated respectfully. They should enjoy completing the questionnaire and never end up with a feeling that they occupy a lousy job. Comments left behind after filling up the questionnaire and the emails received are living proof that this approach is recognized, appreciated and successful.

The target population of the web-survey is the labour force, including job seekers and workers in the informal economy. Distinct groups within the target population navigate differently through the questionnaire. Parallel questions are used to address specific groups. Thus, workers in dependent employment will find questions partly different from those for the self-employed, the unemployed, the trainees, or the students with a job on the side. This routing is important, because otherwise the rare groups in the surveyed population are likely to dropout during questionnaire completion. The unemployed, for example, find questions about their work in the past tense, the self-employed get different questions about their earnings, students about their current education and trainees about their internship.

The questions are clustered in logical groups, providing a sense of order for respondents and making it easier for them to recall experiences and express their views. They are divided into six sections, as Table 2.2 shows. Each section ends with questions about attitudes and opinions regarding the topics addressed. This combination of factual and attitudinal information makes the survey unique. Additionally, the web-survey employs unique, tailor-made search trees for questions such as 'What is your occupation?' or 'In what industry do you work?', allowing for detailed coding of the occupations and industries according to the international classifications ISCO and NACE respectively. A limited number of questions are obligatory, notably those needed for the calculation of hourly wages, for the *Salary Checker,* for the weighting of the dataset, or for the routing. To some extent the questionnaire varies across countries, because it includes a limited number of country-specific questions.

Table 2.2. Topics in the questionnaire

Section	Topics
A	YOUR OCCUPATION employment status, education, industry, occupation, training
B	YOUR PLACE OF WORK firm characteristics, branch and firm size, percentage female, MNE, workplace characteristics, departmental staffing levels, cooperation, collective bargaining coverage, IT-use at the workplace, attitudes towards IT-adaptation
C	YOUR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY employment record, years of experience total, with current employer and in current job, career break, job search
D	YOUR WORKING HOURS working hours, overtime, timing of work, shift work, working time preferences
E	YOUR EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND SALARY employment contract, wages, payment period, fringe benefits, bonuses, and wage perceptions
F	PERSONAL QUESTIONS age, gender, ethnic background, country of birth, region, marital status, household composition, children's age, division of household chores, job and life satisfaction

2.4. Tackling the selectivity of the volunteer web-survey

Apart from its many advantages, the *WageIndicator* questionnaire has one major flaw: it is a volunteer web-survey. Thus, individuals select themselves for the survey. Therefore, the data are not representative for the population, i.e. the labour force. Selectivity is threefold. The first selectivity is associated with Internet access: in many countries this access is rather limited, mostly to groups of better educated people.[65] Second, the individual's selection of a *WageIndicator* website may be related to his/her interest in wages, job mobility or occupational choices, and therefore also be related to the key variable. Third, once visiting the *WageIndicator* website, self-selection into the web-survey may be related to his/her availability of time, satisfaction with the website or altruism to contribute to the project, all factors which may be related to the key variable.[66]

[65] The Internet penetration rates (users in percentages of total population) per September 2007 vary for the nine countries from 30% in Poland and Hungary, via 44% in Spain, 49% in Belgium, 61% in Germany, 62% in Finland and the UK, to 69% in Denmark and 73% in the Netherlands (www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm#europe).

[66] De Pedraza *et al*, 2007.

WageIndicator employs a few strategies to cope with the volunteer sample. First, marketing is primarily aimed at large and disperse groups within the target population. In addition, special efforts are undertaken to reach sub-populations, such as women or elderly workers. Second, special questions in the questionnaire address rare groups in the labour force, as they are assumed to have higher drop out rates. The third strategy compares aggregate socio-demographic data from the national datasets with the same data from national labour force surveys. This results in weights that can be used on the data analyses. Fourth, the *WageIndicator* survey asks several questions similar to those asked in major representative surveys, such as the USA Labor Force Survey or the European Survey on Working Conditions. For the volunteer *WageIndicator* data, adjustments can be developed, using the micro data of these representative surveys. Finally, a full reference survey is foreseen in the Netherlands in 2008, which aims at investigating the bias in the convenience sample and at developing adjustments controlling for the self-selection effects in the national *WageIndicator* sample. These strategies are assumed to lead to a minor bias and to a sample good enough to use for sound statistical analyses.

Although the *WageIndicator* web-survey is a volunteer survey, for two reasons we have not weighted the sample used for the analyses in this book. First, compared to the means of demographic variables known from other sources the sample variable means do not deviate to a large extent. The most underrepresented groups are found in rather small marginal groups, for example workers with a part-time job of less than 10 hours per week. Weighting to correct for these groups will hardly affect the means of the variables under study. Second, no weights are as yet available for Hungary. So the choice was to weight and thus exclude Hungary or not to weight and to include Hungary. The choice has been made in favour of the latter.

2.5. Ensuring the quality of the data

It is sometimes assumed that a web-survey cannot be taken seriously, because the Internet is associated with one-second-a-page visitors, who have neither time nor patience to complete a 20-minute questionnaire. From the consistency of the data, however, it can be concluded that this hardly applies to the *WageIndicator* web-survey (Tijdens, 2007). The non-response per item is mostly below 5 percent. From the respondents' emails and their

comments at the end of the questionnaire, it can be determined that the vast majority of the respondents answer the questions with great care. Some even report that they enjoyed completing the questionnaire.

The traditional way of testing the quality of a questionnaire is a pilot study to identify potential problems with the survey's design while there is still time to fix them. In this respect, continuous volunteer web-surveys offer two advantages. Questions can be adapted while the survey is running, and the test population is much larger than usual in any other survey mode. The *WageIndicator* web-survey has profited greatly from the email feedback of visitors. When needed, the survey questions were adapted accordingly.

To ensure that hourly wages are calculated properly, the *WageIndicator* questionnaire inquires into working hours in detail, notably:

- contractual weekly working hours when an employment contract applies in which working hours are agreed;
- minimum and maximum weekly hours or annual hours in case of flexible, on call or annualized hours;
- usual weekly working hours in cases where no working hours are agreed, for example for self-employed, or when the employment contract does not include agreed working hours, or in cases where working hours are agreed but the usual hours differ from the contractual hours;
- standard weekly working hours at the workplace, for part-timers or flexible workers only;
- waged hours per week applying to the most recent wage; these are checked against the reported contractual and usual hours, as well as controlled for paid overtime hours.

The questionnaire also goes in detail into wages of employees, notably:

- payment mode, i.e. cash, on a bank account/cheque or in kind, or a mixture, in case the respondent is in dependent employment;
- performance related pay, i.e. if a basic payment, what is the share of the total wage; in case at least 20% of the total is a basic payment, the reported pay is assumed to be representative for the respondent's usual earnings;

- most recent gross and/or net wage, its pay period ranging from 1 hour to 1 year, the allowances and bonuses included and additional contributions in kind;
- annual income in case the respondent is self-employed or a family worker, and whether the income is earned in 12 months or less.

For the quarterly data-releases a full program of testing both waged hours and the reported wages and pay periods is conducted, checking for extreme values. Only after these checks are the hourly wages calculated.

2.6. Data selection

This report is primarily based on data from the *WageIndicator* web-survey covering nine EU member states for which sufficient data has been gathered: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK. At this moment, sufficient data are lacking for Italy, although this member state is included in the *WageIndicator* project. Where appropriate, we will confront the *WageIndicator* outcomes with those of other statistical sources, such as the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) of the European Foundation in Dublin.

Table 2.3. Number of quarterly observations in the web-survey, restricted to employees, breakdown by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
2004/4	1884	0	0	7281	0	10705	0	390	740
2005/1	1735	0	0	4442	0	11583	670	4576	2140
2005/2	3252	32	2554	15977	0	11695	1176	1893	1998
2005/3	1911	22	660	5373	0	7108	583	593	1656
2005/4	4301	90	1159	7250	0	15842	1427	1390	2940
2006/1	2562	1298	1049	14422	0	9904	929	1497	6015
2006/2	1480	476	6646	6395	2212	6428	631	1093	4338
2006/3	1365	234	2803	11960	2333	13445	748	2351	3125
2006/4	1102	162	2458	5973	258	6650	554	1190	4020
2007/1	670	70	802	2626	2990	6000	91	808	1432
Total	20262	2384	18131	81699	7793	99360	6809	15781	28404

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

The *WageIndicator* dataset is growing continuously on a quarterly basis. In this book, we used the data collected between September 2004 and March 2007. The analyses are restricted to employees only. Hence, respondents who never had a job, self-employed, own-account workers, freelancers, or family workers or working for family business have been excluded from this book. The selection we have used includes 89% of the total sample for the nine member states. Table 2.3 shows the quarterly numbers of completed questionnaires for employees, with a breakdown for the nine countries included in this book. Incomplete questionnaires are not included in the dataset.

3. Working time

Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Nuria Ramos Martin

3.1. Introduction

This chapter will treat six working time issues related to the more specific ETUC spearheads in this field, which are mostly also related to debates concerning the EU Working Time Directive (WTD). After an introduction of the general legal framework at EU level, the data selection and the general *WageIndicator* results (section 3.2), we go into the length of the working week as such (3.3), the individual opt-out (3.4), the annualisation of hours (3.5), overtime payment (3.6), on-call work (3.7) and shift work (3.8). In section 3.9 we finally present conclusions. In treating each issue we will discuss first the current legal framework as well as the state of the debate at EU level, and where relevant also at national level. Second we will present and analyse the statistical evidence.

Detailed figures on working hours' arrangements and on working hours and overtime payment by industry and country are presented in the Appendix.

3.2. General framework and results

General legal framework

The length of working time is a fundamental element of the employment contract, to be defined as the period of time during which the worker is bound to carry out his activities or duties. The limitation of daily working time is a longstanding union demand. As long ago as 1919, the very first international Convention of the ILO on working conditions established the eight-hour working day and the 48-hour maximum working week.

The EU has acknowledged the necessity to regulate working time at European level in several legal instruments. The European Social Charter of 1961 obliges member states to ensure "reasonable daily and weekly working hours", and progressively to reduce the length of the working week,

while the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000) declares that "every worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours". In an attempt to provide a level playing field for all member states regarding this central element of the contract of employment, the EU institutions adopted Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993. This Directive laid down a set of rules concerning the maximum duration of the working week, meal breaks, minimum daily and weekly rest periods, paid holiday entitlements, and duration and conditions of night work and shift work. Working time was defined as "any period during which the worker is working, at the employer's disposal and carrying out his activity or duties, in accordance with national laws and/or practice". Working time is placed in opposition to rest periods, the two being mutually exclusive. In 2003, this directive was repealed by Council Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (WTD). The WTD introduced no amendments in the provisions concerning the definition of working time and the setting of maximum weekly working time. The main changes related to the extension of the derogations of the maximum weekly working time and to the setting up of the reference periods used to calculate maximum weekly working time.

The provisions of the WTD reflect the difficulties of the attempt to regulate working time at EU level. Due to the clashing interests and divergent approaches across the member states, including the influence of deeply rooted national institutional arrangements[67], the WTD constitutes an intricate legislative text. In its first part, it sets up imperative rules governing working time but the provisions of its second part manage to deprive these of their full effect. It allows very extensive derogations from the general rules "by means of collective agreements or agreements concluded between the two sides of industry at a lower level", and even by consent of the individual employee.

The WTD concerns the protection of workers against the health and safety risks of long and irregular hours. Therefore, the base is Article 137 of the European Community Treaty allowing the Community to adopt legal meas-

[67] Cf. Bosch, 2001.

ures in order to support and complement the activities of the member states with a view to improving the working environment to protect workers' health and safety.[68] Finally, it is worth noting that the extensive catalogue of exceptions and derogations applicable to the general regime set up by the WTD has led to the approval of special provisions on working time for certain sectors of employment, including transport activities,[69] mobile workers in civil aviation, rail workers, seafarers, and doctors in training. Recently, the Commission has presented proposals for revising the WTD, which have caused considerable debate. As proposals and debate mainly regard the issues concerning the length of the working week, we will treat (the debate on) these proposals in section 3.3.

General results

Table 3.1 presents an overview of the working hours arrangements by country, of the 95% of the employees in the *WageIndicator* sample that have indicated their employment contract includes a number of hours agreed with the employer. An overwhelming majority of the respondents, between 72% (the Netherlands) and over 91% (Poland), stipulated they worked on a full-time, hours per week basis. Compared to the official national statistics,[70] full-time workers are nearly everywhere over-represented in the *WageIndicator* figures, most heavily in those of the Netherlands (23%points), the UK (17%pts), Denmark and Germany (both 14%pts), but also in Finland (8%pts), Poland (7%pts), Spain and Belgium (both 5%pts). Only for Hungary the official and *WageIndicator* full-time shares are exactly the same.

The share of part-time hours per week arrangements varies widely, from less than 4% in Finland to 15% in Belgium and over 21% in the Netherlands. The share of flexible hours' arrangements in our sample is remarkably high, notably in Hungary, Denmark, Finland and Belgium, but also in

[68] The UK (Conservative) government firmly opposed the 1993 WTD, including its legal base in the EC Treaty as a health and safety issue. In March 1996 the European Court of Justice rejected all the British complaints (Geyer, 2000, 88).

[69] Directive 2002/25/EC; for the mobile road transport sector, this Directive supplements the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (OJ L 370, 31.12.1985, 1–7) that had already laid down the maximum daily driving time and the minimum duration of the rest periods.

[70] Derived from EC, 2006.

Germany, Spain and the UK. The shares of the other categories of arrangements will be treated in due course, under the relevant headings.

Table 3.1. Distribution over working hours' arrangements by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
Full-time hours pw	73%	74%	81%	80%	73%	72%	91%	77%	77%
Part-time hours pw	15%	6%	4%	8%	3%	21%	4%	6%	7%
Annualised hours	1%	4%	2%	3%	3%	1%	0%	4%	1%
Flexible hours	10%	12%	10%	8%	19%	4%	3%	9%	9%
Opt-out fr. WTD			0%						5%
On call work	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	2%	0%
Other	1%	2%	2%	2%	2%	1%	0%	2%	1%
Total %	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total N	14,711	2,111	16,333	75,754	507	90,107	5,879	13,257	26,017

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: only employees whose employment contract includes a number of working hours*

3.3. Length of the working week

Legal framework and debate

The length of the working week is at the heart of the working time controversy between governments, employers' associations and the trade union movement in the EU.[71] This debate has been stimulated by the proposals of the European Commission for revising the WTD.[72] The objectives of these Commission proposals are two-fold. First, to take into account the European Court of Justice (ECJ)'s case law, notably in the SIMAP[73] and JAEGER[74] cases, which held that on-call duty performed by doctors when they are required to be physically present in the hospital must be regarded as working time. Second, to review some of the provisions of the 2003 Directive on the possibility of not applying the maximum weekly working time (48

[71] Keune, 2006a, 13.
[72] *Proposal for a Directive* COM (2004) 607 final, amended by the *Proposal for a Directive* COM (2005) 246 final.
[73] ECJ Judgment of 3 October 2000.
[74] ECJ Judgment of 9 September 2003.

hours) if the worker gives his agreement to carry out such work (the opt-out provision). The main amendments of the Commission proposal regard:

- introducing definitions of 'on-call time' and 'inactive periods of on-call time'. In the new system time spent on-call that is not worked would not be counted as working time, with compensatory rest granted within 72 hours;
- extending the reference period for calculating the 48-hour maximum weekly working time from four to 12 months;
- conditions for applying the opt-out from the provisions relating to maximum weekly working time.

The Commission has responded with a further proposal to the amendments proposed by the European Parliament (EP) regarding the WTD revision.[75] Some EP amendments have been accepted: the addition of a reference to the compatibility between work and family;[76] the aggregation of hours in cases involving several employment contracts; the clarification that compensatory rest time should be granted within a reasonable period; the clarification of how the member states can work out the extension of the reference period for calculating the maximum weekly working time to 12 months, and an explanation concerning the validity of opt-out agreements signed prior to the entry into force of the new WTD.

The ETUC in its resolutions about the reform of the WTD has strongly opposed the Commission's proposals. Conversely, the ETUC aligns with the EP ideas of phasing out the opt-out provision, introducing a reference to the need for reconciling the work and family life of working parents, and recognizing on-call time as working time, in line with the rulings of the ECJ. Concerning the possible extension of the reference period to calculate maximum working time, the ETUC demands that the existing four-month reference period remains in place. It is the ETUC's opinion that longer

[75] The European Parliament derived its first-reading opinion on 11 May 2005 (8725/05).

[76] This amendment was also promoted by the ETUC considering that a limit on working time is vital to enable working parents to combine job and family life, and allow women to exploit their full potential in the workplace - one of the key elements of the EU's Lisbon Strategy for Growth. A reference to the relevance of achieving the conciliation of work and family life is especially necessary in order to give a comprehensive approach to this issue as required by the right to have a family life, consecrated by art. 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

reference periods should be allowed only on the basis of collective bargaining, or providing that additional legal safeguards and conditions that guarantee information and consultation of workers as well as adequate protection of their health and safety are implemented.

The new legislative proposal concerning working time is currently under discussion in the Employment and Social Council of the EU, in which the member states are represented. After several Council meetings, (the latest at the time of writing on November 7, 2006), the member states have not reached agreement on the WTD revision. The ETUC called this failure a bad signal for European workers.[77] The key issue still to be resolved concerns the opt-out provision and the possible phasing out of its use. Concerning this opt-out provision there are two extreme positions in the Council: on the one hand, those member states calling for freedom of choice, stressing the need for economic growth and hence asking for the opt-out provision to be preserved. On the other hand, there are those who feel that extending the reference period for calculating weekly working time to one year gives enough flexibility to allow a definite end to the opt-out. The Commission has tried to satisfy these two approaches by fixing a time limit for the opt-out that could be extended. Yet, many member states have expressed doubts about the absence of objective criteria for extending that time limit. Regarding the question of how to treat inactive periods of on-call time, member states are concerned about two types of problems: first, the problems in the health sector and second, problems arising from the fact that many employees have several work contracts simultaneously. The deadlock here continued in the first six months of 2007.

We now go into the EU regulative framework concerning maximum weekly working time. According to art. 6 WTD, this maximum should be limited by means of laws, regulations or administrative provisions or by collective agreements or agreements between the two sides of industry to an average working time for each seven-day period, including overtime that does not exceed 48 hours. Yet, exceptions and derogations to this general rule are admitted in several cases:

[77] ETUC, 2006d.

- when, on account of the specific characteristics of the activity concerned, the duration of the working time is not measured and/or predetermined or can be determined by the workers themselves (this provision has been interpreted restrictively by the ECJ[78]);
- doctors in training, for a transitional period of five years from 01.08.2004 plus one additional year, if necessary because of special difficulties in meeting the responsibilities imposed by the WTD; at the end of this transitional period the ceiling will be 48 hours per week;
- when an employer has obtained the worker's agreement to work more than 48 hours over a seven-day period. In this case, the WTD explicitly forbids any kind of victimisation of the worker who is not willing to give his agreement to perform such work. In addition, the Directive contains recording and information obligations of the employer concerning all workers who carry out such work.

Results on length of the working week

In Table 3.2 we present the *WageIndicator* outcomes on average working hours per week according to contract, broken down by country (excluding Hungary, because of the lack of sufficient data) and industry. In Table 3.3 we do the same for the average usual working hours per week. The longest average working week according to contract is the Polish one with 39.2 hours, the longest average actual working week is the German one at 39.8 hours, followed by the Polish and Spanish jointly, and the British. The figures indicate quite long usual working weeks, especially taking into account that they also include part-timers. Out of 13 industries, Germany has the longest actual hours in seven industries, Poland in three, Spain in two, and the UK in one.

In most countries the total average usual hours is only slightly above that of hours according to contract, except for Germany (1.2 hours more) and, to a lesser degree, Belgium (0.8 hours) and Spain (0.5 hours). These figures suggest that in these three countries working overtime is more widespread than elsewhere. In Germany, the gap between actual and contractual hours

[78] ECJ Judgment of 7 September 2006.

is largest (2 hours or more) in other community services, education, and health care.

Table 3.4 shows something of what is behind the averages of Table 3.3, by presenting *WageIndicator* data on usual weekly working hours grouped in three categories, again with a breakdown by country and industry. The highest share in the long working hours' category is not to be found in the UK, but in Hungary (but bear in mind the small sample!), followed by Germany. Here 40.1% of the Hungarian and 22.5% of the German respondents usually worked over 40 hours and, despite the provisions of the WTD, even 19.3% and 7.4% respectively worked over 48 hours. In the UK, 18.2% of respondents indicated they had a usual working week of over 40 hours, and 6.4% over 48 hours; the latter figure is considerably lower than official UK surveys indicating a level of 11-13% in 2004-05.[79] Both Spain (18.7% over 40 hours, 7.5% over 48 hours) and Poland (17.7% respectively 5.9%) show figures of the same magnitude. In Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, and notably in Denmark the incidence of excessive long working weeks is considerably lower. From the 13 industries included, Germany shows the largest incidence of long working weeks (over 40 hours usually) in six industries, Hungary in 3 industries, the UK in two, and Poland and Spain each in one industry. If, for the sake of comparability with Table 3.2., we leave out Hungary, Germany has the largest incidence of over 40 hours' weeks in seven industries (construction, finance, other commercial services, public sector, education, health care, other community services), whilst the UK (agriculture, transport), Spain (manufacturing, utilities) and Poland (hotels and restaurants, wholesale and retail) all have the largest incidence of long working weeks in two industries.

Overall, the five industries showing the highest incidence of long usual working weeks across the nine countries are, in this order, hotels, restaurants and catering; agriculture; transport and communication; construction, and manufacturing. In some countries other industries show up with quite

[79] The IES study for DTI (Kodz *et al*, 2003), based on the WERS 1998, concluded to 11% of employees reporting that they usually worked more than 48 hours/week; Kersley *et al*, 2006, found, based on WERS 2004 evidence, the same share. However, a TUC brochure as of November 2006 states that the numbers of those working over 48 hours/week are steadily falling, from 4.0 (16.6%) in 1998 to 3.3 million (13.1%) in 2005 (based on LFS micro-data: TUC, 2006).

long working weeks, like finance in Hungary, other commercial services in Germany, and utilities in Spain.

In Table 3.5 we have left out those employees who are not compensated for extra hours, i.e. whose hourly salaries are assuming long working hours. This group turns out to be comparatively large in Belgium, Germany, Spain, and the UK. Yet, in the end the picture does not differ that much from that derived from Table 3.4. Hungary (36% over 40 hours weekly) tops Germany (18%), Poland (14%), the UK (14%), Denmark (13%) and Spain (12%), the latter making up the second country category, with Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands the third one with low shares of long working weeks. The relative share of long working weeks in the various industries remains about the same too, though the excessive long working weeks in the Polish and the German hotel and restaurant sectors (both 28% over 40 hours) are particularly striking. Outside the five industries with the longest working weeks identified earlier, the long (but compensated) weeks in German public administration (23%) and education (19%) are remarkable.

Table 3.2. Average working hours according to contract, breakdown by country and industry

	BE	DK	FI	DE
Agriculture	36.5	37.0	38.7	39.0
Manufacturing	37.6	36.8	38.9	38.6
Utilities	37.9	37.2	38.7	39.1
Construction	38.5	37.2	39.2	39.9
Wholesale/retail	36.2	36.0	36.0	38.5
Hotels, rest., cat.	35.5	36.1	36.7	40.2
Transp, commun.	38.0	38.3	39.0	40.0
Finance	35.9	34.9	37.8	38.8
Other comm.serv.	37.1	35.8	37.9	39.1
Public admin.	37.0	36.1	37.0	38.3
Education	32.4	36.0	35.1	36.6
Health care	34.1	35.2	37.7	37.1
Other	35.2	37.5	36.9	37.8
Total	36.6	36.9	37.8	38.6

	NL	PL	ES	UK
Agriculture	37.8	41.3	39.5	40.8
Manufacturing	37.7	40.1	39.8	39.0
Utilities	38.1	40.4	38.9	38.3
Construction	38.9	40.5	40.3	39.8
Wholesale/retail	36.0	40.3	38.8	37.4
Hotels, rest., cat.	35.7	41.1	38.7	40.2
Transp, commun.	39.2	40.5	39.2	40.5
Finance	36.2	39.5	38.8	36.8
Other comm.serv.	37.3	39.3	39.3	38.3
Public admin.	35.8	39.1	37.4	36.9
Education	34.4	32.9	34.3	35.2
Health care	31.1	38.9	37.4	35.8
Other	34.5	38.0	37.3	37.2
Total	36.3	39.2	38.8	38.0

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 3.3. Average usual working hours, breakdown by country and industry

	BE	DK	FI	DE
Agriculture	39.4	37.1	38.6	40.2
Manufacturing	37.9	36.9	39.0	39.3
Utilities	37.0	37.6	38.8	39.6
Construction	39.4	37.6	39.4	40.9
Wholesale/retail	37.4	36.8	36.0	39.6
Hotels, rest., cat.	38.1	35.8	36.8	41.2
Transp, commun.	38.1	38.7	39.5	41.0
Finance	35.9	33.8	38.1	39.7
Other comm.serv.	37.8	36.6	38.0	40.5
Public admin.	36.8	36.1	37.2	39.2
Education	34.0	34.1	35.1	39.1
Health care	36.5	35.7	37.7	39.1
Other	37.0	37.0	36.9	39.5
Total	37.4	37.1	37.9	39.8

	NL	PL	ES	UK
Agriculture	37.8	41.2	40.6	41.4
Manufacturing	38.1	40.4	40.6	39.4
Utilities	38.8	40.9	39.7	38.7
Construction	39.2	41.0	41.1	40.1
Wholesale/retail	35.9	40.7	39.8	37.7
Hotels, rest., cat.	34.8	41.0	39.7	40.5
Transp, commun.	40.0	40.7	40.3	40.8
Finance	36.3	39.3	39.2	37.2
Other comm.serv.	37.3	39.5	39.7	38.6
Public admin.	35.9	39.0	37.2	37.2
Education	34.4	32.3	34.4	35.6
Health care	30.8	39.2	37.6	35.8
Other	34.3	37.9	37.5	37.2
Total	36.4	39.3	39.3	38.3

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 3.4. Distribution over three categories of usual working hours per week, breakdown by country and industry

	Agri	Manu	Util	Const	Sale	Hotel	Transp
Belgium							
0-40 hrs	78.7	88.6	87.1	83.0	88.9	84.5	83.4
40.1-48 hrs	13.5	7.4	10.0	8.6	7.0	7.5	9.2
48.1-99 hrs	-	4.1	-	8.4	4.1	8.1	7.5
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	89	4,859	210	1,146	2,059	322	1,365
Denmark							
0-40 hrs	92.2	96.3	96.8	95.1	92.7	89.4	88.3
40.1-48 hrs	-	2.9	-	-	-	-	5.9
48.1-99 hrs	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.7
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	103	591	31	203	151	47	488
Finland							
0-40 hrs	75.3	92.7	89.1	91.3	91.6	90.3	86.1
40.1-48 hrs	20.8	5.2	-	5.9	6.3	5.3	5.4
48.1-99 hrs	-	2.1	-	2.7	2.1	4.4	8.5
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	154	4,087	46	691	1,339	453	1,009
Germany							
0-40 hrs	73.7	80.7	80.2	70.2	76.0	66.5	74.5
40.1-48 hrs	17.9	13.6	13.8	21.1	16.1	18.1	13.1
48.1-99 hrs	8.4	5.6	6.0	8.7	7.8	15.4	12.4
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	430	24,771	2,428	4,970	7,274	1,556	4,203
Hungary							
0-40 hrs	-	52.6	57.9	58.3	47.1	-	51.3
40.1-48 hrs	-	24.1	-	-	25.5	-	25.6
48.1-99 hrs	-	23.3	-	27.8	27.5	-	-
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	9	116	19	36	51	9	39

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 3.4 (Continued) Distribution over three categories of usual working hours per week, breakdown by country and industry

	Finan	Busi	Public	Edu	Health	Other	Total
Belgium							
0-40 hrs	91.4	87.2	91.8	92.7	93.0	88.2	88.4
40.1-48 hrs	5.9	9.7	5.7	4.8	4.6	7.4	7.5
48.1-99 hrs	2.7	3.1	2.6	2.5	2.4	4.4	4.2
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	1,221	3,327	1,044	565	2,196	930	19,650
Denmark							
0-40 hrs	93.8	96.5	97.3	96.8	95.5	90.7	93.5
40.1-48 hrs	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.2
48.1-99 hrs	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.3
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	32	172	110	62	134	108	2,293
Finland							
0-40 hrs	94.5	92.8	95.8	92.6	94.5	92.0	92.4
40.1-48 hrs	3.6	4.8	2.8	5.1	4.2	5.4	5.0
48.1-99 hrs	1.9	2.4	1.4	2.3	1.3	2.6	2.5
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	676	3,314	1,410	780	1,989	909	16,878
Germany							
0-40 hrs	79.8	76.5	76.4	73.4	82.3	77.5	77.5
40.1-48 hrs	14.0	14.4	20.4	20.3	11.1	13.7	15.1
48.1-99 hrs	6.3	9.1	3.2	6.3	6.7	8.7	7.4
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	4,959	12,718	4,614	2,634	6,424	2,386	80,217
Hungary							
0-40 hrs	38.7	70.0	67.3	-	80.4	69.6	59.9
40.1-48 hrs	38.7	-	-	-	-	-	20.8
48.1-99 hrs	22.6	-	-	-	-	-	19.3
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	31	110	49	13	46	46	586

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 3.4. (Continued) Distribution over three categories of usual working hours per week, breakdown by country and industry

	Agri	Manu	Util	Const	Sale	Hotel	Transp
Netherlands							
0-40 hrs	82.1	89.8	87.0	88.4	90.0	89.7	81.1
40.1-48 hrs	10.0	6.0	7.3	6.0	6.2	4.8	6.7
48.1-99 hrs	7.8	4.2	5.7	5.6	3.8	5.4	12.2
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	1,405	16,335	509	5,823	9,697	3,475	6,637
Poland							
0-40 hrs	79.3	81.2	82.2	74.7	73.0	62.5	78.3
40.1-48 hrs	-	12.0	14.8	14.0	17.3	24.0	15.4
48.1-99 hrs	-	6.7	-	11.2	9.7	13.5	6.3
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	29	963	135	356	915	96	351
Spain							
0-40 hrs	74.3	79.5	77.5	70.7	76.0	73.3	80.2
40.1-48 hrs	14.6	11.7	15.2	15.5	13.7	13.5	11.3
48.1-99 hrs	11.1	8.8	7.2	13.8	10.3	13.3	8.4
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	144	1,998	276	1,064	1,310	505	987
UK							
0-40 hrs	62.9	80.7	84.2	76.1	77.4	67.8	70.2
40.1-48 hrs	23.3	13.3	9.2	14.7	15.9	16.9	16.9
48.1-99 hrs	13.8	6.0	6.6	9.3	6.7	15.2	12.9
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	159	4,119	272	1,479	2,744	1,010	1,742

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 3.4. (Continued) Distribution over three categories of usual working hours per week, breakdown by country and industry

	Finan	Busi	Public	Edu	Health	Other	Total
Netherlands							
0-40 hrs	93.9	93.1	96.0	91.1	97.4	93.8	91.3
40.1-48 hrs	3.1	4.1	2.2	7.1	1.6	3.5	4.8
48.1-99 hrs	2.9	2.8	1.7	1.8	1.0	2.7	3.9
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	4,776	15,950	6,259	3,600	9,828	3,488	90,035
Poland							
0-40 hrs	83.9	84.4	91.5	92.2	84.8	88.8	82.3
40.1-48 hrs	13.8	10.8	6.9	4.0	10.4	6.7	11.8
48.1-99 hrs	2.3	4.7	1.6	3.8	4.7	4.5	5.9
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	478	1,138	669	529	316	223	6,375
Spain							
0-40 hrs	85.0	80.9	92.8	93.2	88.5	85.0	81.3
40.1-48 hrs	9.7	13.1	4.7	4.0	6.2	8.1	11.2
48.1-99 hrs	5.3	6.0	2.5	2.8	5.3	7.0	7.5
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	928	3,390	1,039	708	791	645	14,098
UK							
0-40 hrs	86.2	83.3	86.3	89.2	90.5	84.6	81.7
40.1-48 hrs	9.0	10.7	11.1	5.6	6.3	11.5	11.8
48.1-99 hrs	4.8	6.0	2.6	5.2	3.2	3.9	6.4
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	1,924	5,799	1,690	1,637	2,315	1,106	26,363

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 3.5. Distribution over three categories of usual working hours per week, breakdown by country and industry, only of employees who are compensated for extra hours, either in cash or in time

	Agri	Manu	Util	Const	Sale	Hotel	Transp
Belgium							
0-40 hrs	90.3	95.1	91.5	88.9	95.9	94.1	89.8
40.1-48 hrs	-	3.6	-	6.1	3.3	-	6.9
48.1-99 hrs	-	1.2	-	4.9	-	-	-
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	31	1,892	71	407	788	119	403
Denmark							
0-40 hrs	-	93.3	-	86.7	93.3	-	63.2
40.1-48 hrs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
48.1-99 hrs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	3	15	1	15	15	4	19
Finland							
0-40 hrs	77.3	96.1	91.7	96.1	96.6	96.6	94.4
40.1-48 hrs	22.7	3.1	-	3.1	3.0	-	3.0
48.1-99 hrs	-	0.8	-	-	-	-	2.6
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	88	2,906	36	482	886	297	660
Germany							
0-40 hrs	77.7	85.3	84.0	74.9	82.1	71.9	80.9
40.1-48 hrs	19.1	12.1	12.6	20.3	14.6	20.0	12.6
48.1-99 hrs	-	2.7	3.4	4.8	3.4	8.1	6.5
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	220	13,795	1,402	2,364	3,496	630	1,937
Hungary							
0-40 hrs	-	53.8	-	64.7	50.0	-	73.3
40.1-48 hrs	-	23.1	-	-	-	-	-
48.1-99 hrs	-	23.1	-	-	-	-	-
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	1	52	4	17	22	5	15

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees who are compensated for extra hours, either in cash or in time.*

Table 3.5. (Continued) Distribution over three categories of usual working hours per week, breakdown by country and industry, only of employees who are compensated for extra hours, in cash or in time

	Finan	Busi	Public	Edu	Health	Other	Total
Belgium							
0-40 hrs	97.1	94.6	95.5	94.8	95.6	94.5	94.6
40.1-48 hrs	2.4	4.7	3.4	-	3.4	4.1	4.1
48.1-99 hrs	-	-	-	-	0.9	-	1.3
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	418	1,083	355	135	1,193	345	7,240
Denmark							
0-40 hrs	-	100.0	-	-	-	-	83.3
40.1-48 hrs	-	-	-	-	-	-	13.0
48.1-99 hrs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N		12	7	2	11	4	108
Finland							
0-40 hrs	99.4	96.7	97.9	98.4	95.4	96.2	96.3
40.1-48 hrs	-	2.6	1.8	-	3.9	2.7	3.0
48.1-99 hrs	-	0.7	-	-	0.6	-	0.7
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	476	2,123	909	440	1,573	627	11,503
Germany							
0-40 hrs	85.3	83.2	77.4	81.2	84.9	83.7	82.9
40.1-48 hrs	13.1	12.6	20.4	16.3	10.2	13.7	13.7
48.1-99 hrs	1.6	4.2	2.2	2.5	4.8	2.5	3.4
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	2,784	5,623	3,138	1,189	4,099	1,107	41,784
Hungary							
0-40 hrs	-	71.0	-	-	78.6	68.4	63.7
40.1-48 hrs	-	-	-	-	-	-	18.9
48.1-99 hrs	-	-	-	-	-	-	17.4
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	3	31	13	5	14	19	201

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees who are compensated for extra hours, either in cash or in time.*

Table 3.5. (Continued) Distribution over three categories of usual working hours per week, breakdown by country and industry, only of employees who are compensated for extra hours, in cash or in time

	Agri	Manu	Util	Const	Sale	Hotel	Transp
Netherlands							
0-40 hrs	88.2	94.2	90.9	92.4	94.7	93.8	87.9
40.1-48 hrs	8.8	4.2	6.4	4.9	4.2	3.6	5.5
48.1-99 hrs	3.0	1.6	2.7	2.7	1.0	2.6	6.6
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	773	8,994	298	3,140	5,138	2,039	3,522
Poland							
0-40 hrs	-	83.3	82.4	75.0	82.4	60.9	79.1
40.1-48 hrs	-	12.4	16.2	17.0	13.9	28.3	16.5
48.1-99 hrs	-	4.2	-	-	-	-	-
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	9	402	68	100	238	46	139
Spain							
0-40 hrs	82.9	87.7	84.3	79.1	88.5	81.0	92.1
40.1-48 hrs	-	8.7	14.5	10.7	8.1	10.3	5.4
48.1-99 hrs	-	3.6	-	10.2	3.4	8.7	-
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	35	503	83	206	296	126	241
UK							
0-40 hrs	64.4	84.1	88.9	80.0	84.5	76.6	72.9
40.1-48 hrs	30.1	13.4	8.7	13.1	12.1	16.3	18.2
48.1-99 hrs	-	2.5	-	6.9	3.4	7.1	8.9
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	73	1,575	126	550	1,298	406	774

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees who are compensated for extra hours, either in cash or in time.*

Table 3.5. (Continued) Distribution over three categories of usual working hours per week, breakdown by country and industry, only of employees who are compensated for extra hours, in cash or in time

	Finan	Busi	Public	Edu	Health	Other	Total
Netherlands							
0-40 hrs	97.1	95.8	97.7	95.1	98.2	96.1	95.0
40.1-48 hrs	1.9	2.9	1.4	3.9	1.0	2.9	3.3
48.1-99 hrs	0.9	1.3	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.7
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	2,701	8,303	4,361	1,499	7,153	2,008	49,929
Poland							
0-40 hrs	93.1	88.6	95.4	93.3	82.5	93.4	86.3
40.1-48 hrs	-	8.5	-	-	-	-	10.4
48.1-99 hrs	-	2.8	-	-	-	-	3.2
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	130	386	259	224	126	76	2,203
Spain							
0-40 hrs	92.7	85.5	96.9	94.4	93.1	91.2	88.4
40.1-48 hrs	-	12.5	-	-	-	-	8.4
48.1-99 hrs	-	2.0	-	-	-	-	3.2
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	96	614	256	107	203	136	2,902
UK							
0-40 hrs	94.0	88.7	88.7	96.1	93.7	89.9	86.9
40.1-48 hrs	4.9	8.7	10.3	3.0	4.7	8.6	10.1
48.1-99 hrs	-	2.6	-	-	1.5	-	3.0
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	714	2,139	968	669	1,420	513	11,225

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees who are compensated for extra hours, either in cash or in time.*

3.4. The opt-out

Legal framework and debate

According to the Commission's proposal for a revised WTD, the individual opt-out from the 48 hours weekly working time would remain possible but be subject to stricter conditions than before to prevent abuse. According to this proposal, the possibility of using an individual opt-out shall be expressly laid down by collective agreement or agreement between the social partners at the appropriate level or by national law. The elimination of the individual opt-out from the text of the WTD is one of the amendments proposed by the EP to the Commission's original revision proposal. The Commission in its amended proposal has not accepted that suggestion, but it has explored a possible compromise solution to this question that is dividing the co-legislators. In this sense, the Commission suggests that the possibility for member states to allow an exception to the applicability of the maximum weekly working time should be permitted only for a period not exceeding three years from the date of the new WTD, with a possible extension of this period for reasons relating to their labour market arrangements to be granted by the Commission. In addition to previous requirements, the amended proposal provides that the use of the individual opt-out should be subject to a validity period of one year, renewable and that, in any event, no worker should work more than 55 hours in any week,[80] unless the collective agreement or agreement concluded between the social partners lays down otherwise.

The position of the UK is crucial here. In 1998, the Blair government transposed the former WTD into UK law as the Working Time Regulations. However, in doing so it made use of nearly all derogations, including the opt-out provision. More recently, Blair hardened his position on the WTD, which he has described as being one of the worst pieces of European legislation. The UK government, following business interests rather than union

[80] The 65 hours' maximum working week originally proposed by the Commission has been reduced in subsequent proposals after being strongly rejected by the ETUC.

arguments, has been pivotal in blocking the revision of the WTD.[81] Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that the position of the UK with regard to the WTD has changed as a result of Gordon Brown replacing Tony Blair as Prime Minister in the summer of 2007.

The abusive use of the opt-out possibility by the UK has caused concerns to arise. The main problems relate to the lack of guarantees for the effective protection of the worker signing an individual opting-out agreement: the lack of awareness of the employee, the imposition of the employee's consent to the opt-out agreement as a prerequisite for entering into an employment relationship, and the impossibility of withdrawing that consent at a later stage. In the current debate the real effectiveness of the recourse to the individual opt-out provision is at stake. Many British employers, including their primary association, the CBI, seem to believe that the individual opt-out provides for operational flexibility and is a necessary tool to run a business efficiently. In the British TUC and ETUC's opinions, however, "Far from boosting British competitiveness, long-hours working leads to reduced productivity and poor management".[82] An argument supporting this claim runs that the use of individual opt-outs is disadvantageous for UK business as it results in the absence of collective bargaining processes over the reorganisation of working patterns; thus, inefficient practices are perpetuated.[83] Indeed, a number of studies suggest that long working hours go together with low productivity and high staff turnover, while shorter working hours are linked to increased internal business flexibility and greater productivity.[84] Moreover, the TUC argues that there are a number of other factors, specific to the UK labour market, that combine to make the impact of ending the individual opt-outs relatively modest.[85]

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81 Exell, 2006, 275.

82 ETUC, 2006c.

83 Barnard *et al*, 2003a, 2003b.

84 See a.o. Kodz *et al*, 2003, 147-190; ILO, 2004; European Commission, 2005d.

85 One out of three of those UK employees who work more than 48 hours per week are only working 1 or 2 extra hours per week; up to a million UK employees would continue to be exempt from the 48- hour limit (largely senior managers and professionals); and if the opt-out goes then it is certain that the deal will include increasing the reference period for averaging the 48-hour limit from 17 weeks to 52 weeks. This would exclude about 1.5 million UK long hours workers from the coverage of the 48-hour week, since they do not sustain their excessive working time over the full year (TUC, 2006, 2).

We may conclude that using the opt-out clause is a lazy catch-all to avoid modernizing work organization, and can well contribute to low productivity. An alternative to this model is to enact an EU legislative framework that promotes the modernization of working time arrangements in combination with an average reduction of working time. The generalization of best practices focusing on innovation, productivity and working time re-adjustment can provide enhanced flexibility to both companies and workers and, at the same time, contribute to sustainable economic development and growth.[86] We will treat the issue of reference periods in section 3.5.

Results on the opt-out

Questions on whether individuals have signed an individual opt-out from the WTD are only asked in Finland and the United Kingdom, because in 2004, when the survey was designed, this possibility was only relevant in these two countries. Table 3.1 already revealed that the UK is the sole country with a considerable share of opt-outs: 4.5% of the workers with agreed hours.[87] The Finnish share is negligible. Table 3.6 presents more detailed data for the UK. In comparison to all employees in that country, those with opt-out contracts are far more often male (77% versus 50%), they are on average older (38 versus 36 of age), they are less often covered by a collective agreement (20% versus 29%), and they are more likely to work in larger firms. Details of the firm size reveal that opt-out is far less common in firms up to 20 employees and in firms with more than 1,000 employees. Educational levels do not differ across the two groups.

[86] Cf. inspiring examples presented at an ETUC conference, November 2005: Pillinger, 2006.

[87] This is lower than often noticed in the UK, but figures concerning the incidence of workers having signed an opt-out vary widely. Recently in the House of Lords a DTI report was cited stating that 66% of those employees usually working over 48 hours per week had *not* signed an opt-out, indicating an over-all incidence of less than 5% (Minutes, 2006).

Table 3.6. Personal characteristics of all employees and employees with an opt-out contract in the UK

	% male	Average age	% covered by coll. agreem.	Average firm size locality	Average educa-tion level*	Average usual working hrs	Average contract working hrs
UK employ-ees	50%	35.8	29%	50-100 empl.	3.9	38.0	37.7
UK employ-ees with opt-out	77%	38.1	20%	100-500 empl.	3.9	44.1	44.1
Significant difference	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: UK employees whose employment contract includes a number of working hours.*
Note: ** ranging on a level 0=No education to 6=PhD.*

More detailed analysis shows that those who have opted out are overrepresented among older workers (8% among the 55 of age or older); elementary occupations (14%), plant and machine operators and assemblers (11%), and by industry in mining (10.5%), construction (7%), hotels and restaurants (7%), and transport, storage and communication (9%).

Table 3.6 reveals that, in comparison to all UK employees, both the average contractual and usual working weeks are much longer for those who have signed an opt-out. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the vast majority (82%) of the UK respondents indicating they work more than 48 hours per week have not signed the opt-out.[88]

3.5. Annualised hours

Legal framework and debate

The issue of the annualisation of working hours is linked with that of reference periods, although not necessarily those laid down in the WTD. According to article 16 WTD, member states may lay down: a. for the applica-

[88] Melis *et al*, 2007.

tion of the maximum weekly working time, a reference period not exceeding four months; b. a reference period with regard to the duration of night work (different than the standard one of 24 hours), in consultation with the social partners or giving them this option by means of collective agreements. Nevertheless, derogations to the maximum length of night work and of the reference periods set up in the WTD are admitted in many cases. Some of the derogations are due to geographical reasons like the distance to the worker's place of work or to the worker's residence; others are related to the type of activity carried out, as in the case of security and surveillance activities intended to protect property and persons or in the case of activities involving the need for continuity of service or production, such as hospital care, naval and air transport, agriculture, gas, water and electricity supply, or press and information services. In addition, derogations are allowed where there is a foreseeable surge of activity, particularly in agriculture, tourism, postal services and in railway transport. Finally, the rules regarding reference periods are not applicable in case of occurrences due to unusual and unforeseeable circumstances or accident. The WTD states that all these derogations may not result in the establishment of a reference period exceeding six months, or, in the case of a collective agreement, twelve months.

In the proposal for a revised WTD the Commission proposes that member states will be given the possibility to extend the standard reference period for calculating the average working week of 48 hours from 4 months to up to 12 months, provided they consult the two sides of industry. The ETUC considers that this change would be likely to bring about unilaterally imposed longer and more irregular hours for many workers, without the protection of collective bargaining.[89] Thus, the ETUC has called upon the Commission to make a proposal to "allow for more flexibility in working time, especially with regard to annualised working hours, only on the basis of collective agreement".[90]

[89] ETUC, 2003b.
[90] ETUC, 2005b.

Results on annualised hours

Table 3.7 shows an overview of the average contractual working hours per week for those having agreed annualised hours, and the share of those having agreed annualised hours in the *WageIndicator* sample, per country (excl. Hungary and Poland) and per industry. Those having agreed annualised hours have reported their annual working hours. For the calculation of the weekly working hours, it is assumed that they all have a 48-working week year.

It is interesting to analyze the differences between actual average working hours per week (Table 3.2) and the average working week of those with annualised hours. We can divide the seven member states for which we have sufficient data into three groups:

- two countries in which those with annualised hours have a shorter working week than the average full-time week in all industries, varying across industries from 2-12 hours; this applies to Belgium and Finland;
- one country with a wider difference between those with annualised hours and the average full-time week, varying across industries from 11-25 hours: Denmark, most likely to be attributed to the Danish unemployment benefit legislation;
- four countries in which the working week of those with annualised hours is sometimes shorter than the average actual week and sometimes longer, with differences depending on the industry, varying from 5 hours shorter till over 8 hours longer: Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. Longer working hours in case of annualization can notably be found in German and Dutch construction, Dutch and British transport, Spanish finance and other commercial services, the public sectors of all four countries, and the British health care sector.

Table 3.7. Average contractual working hours per week for employees with annualised hours and percentage of employees with annualised hours, breakdown by country and industry

	Agricul-ture	Manu-factur-ing	Utilities	Con-struction	Whole-sale /retail	Hotels/ rest.	Transp. comm
Belgium							
Hours per week	-	32.7	-	-	-	-	-
% Annualised hrs	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark							
Hours per week	-	34.0	-	-	-	-	37.9
% Annualised hrs	-	2.5	-	-	-	-	2.9
Finland							
Hours per week	-	37.5	-	-	36.2	-	40.1
% Annualised hrs	-	2.6	-	-	0.3	-	1.1
Germany							
Hours per week	38.7	38.6	38.5	41.1	38.9	40.4	41.0
% Annualised hrs	3.6	1.8	3.3	2.1	2.2	3.1	13.1
Netherlands							
Hours per week	38.8	42.8	-	46.4	35.1	39.1	47.7
% Annualised hrs	2.4	0.4	-	0.2	1.0	2.0	0.6
Spain							
Hours per week	-	39.8	39.6	39.4	38.7	38.9	37.4
% Annualised hrs	-	4.8	5.5	1.8	3.2	5.3	6.3
United Kingdom							
Hours per week	-	41.6	37.9	-	42.8	-	41.9
% Annualised hrs	-	2.3	4.2	-	0.5	-	3.3

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees*
Note: *Only cells with more than 4 observations are included*

Table 3.7. (Continued) Average contractual working hours per week for employees with annualised hours and percentage of employees with annualised hours, breakdown by country and industry

	Finance	Comm. services	Public sector	Educa-tion	Health care	Other
Belgium						
Hours per week	-	38.6	-	-	32.2	-
% Annualised hrs	-	0.4	-	-	1.3	-
Denmark						
Hours per week	-	37.3	-	36.8	-	-
% Annualised hrs	-	6.1	-	25.0	-	-
Finland						
Hours per week	-	38.4	38.9	36.9	38.0	-
% Annualised hrs	-	1.3	0.9	13.1	3.1	-
Germany						
Hours per week	38.3	38.8	40.8	37.4	38.6	37.4
% Annualised hrs	1.6	2.0	1.8	3.0	1.9	2.2
Netherlands						
Hours per week	36.0	39.3	37.8	38.0	36.2	38.2
% Annualised hrs	1.4	0.4	1.4	5.3	2.5	1.2
Spain						
Hours per week	39.5	40.8	39.5	35.4	37.5	38.7
% Annualised hrs	2.5	2.2	3.4	2.0	8.6	3.4
United Kingdom						
Hours per week	36.8	40.0	39.5	38.6	42.6	41.5
% Annualised hrs	1.3	0.5	1.0	4.6	1.0	0.8

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees*
Note: *Only cells with more than 4 observations are included*

Table 3.8 reveals that in the seven member states involved those with an annualized hours' contract are predominantly male, except for the Netherlands. These workers are on average around 40 years of age, and especially working for medium-sized firms. Except for Belgium, the collective bargaining coverage of the group with annualised hours is higher than the national averages, sometimes considerably like in the cases of the UK and Germany (see Table 7.2).

Table 3.8. Personal characteristics of employees with annualised hours, breakdown by country

	Percentage male	Average age	Coll. barg. coverage	Average firm size locality
Belgium	51%	37.6	71%	50 - 100
Denmark	64%	43.2	93%	20 - 50
Finland	54%	41.7	-	50 - 100
Germany	75%	39.2	77%	200 - 500
Netherlands	37%	39.4	87%	50 - 100
Spain	69%	36.7	83%	50 - 100
United Kingdom	66%	40.8	62%	100 - 200

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees with annualised hours.*

3.6. Overtime payment

Five overtime arrangements are recorded in the *WageIndicator* web survey, ranging from overtime being paid as normal hours plus overtime premium to no compensation at all for overtime hours. Table 3.9 shows that in Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom the latter arrangement is most common. In Belgium, Finland, Germany, Hungary and the Netherlands time-off in lieu for overtime hours is most common, and in Denmark that is the case with overtime being paid plus overtime premium.

Table 3.9 also shows the average contractual working hours per arrangement. Employees whose overtime hours are not compensated work the longest contractual hours per week, except for Belgium, Finland and Hungary. It seems quite likely this group consists mainly of professionals and higher managerial layers, whose hourly salaries assume long working hours. The group being paid overtime premium (group 1) shows also relatively long working hours. The group with overtime being paid as normal hours

Table 3.9. Distribution over overtime payment arrangements and average contractual working hours by arrangement, breakdown by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU
1 Overtime paid as normal hours plus overtime premium	5%	30%	31%	8%	39%
2 Overtime paid as normal hours	7%	7%	6%	5%	10%
3 Time-off in lieu for overtime hours	44%	27%	44%	42%	29%
4 Partly paid, partly compensated with time-off in lieu	13%	18%	11%	14%	0%
5 Not compensated	32%	18%	8%	31%	22%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	10,978	218	13,085	62,483	7,169
Average contractual working hours					
1 Overtime paid as normal hours plus overtime premium	37.4	37.1	38.5	38.7	40.0
2 Overtime paid as normal hours	35.4	32.5	34.1	38.5	40.1
3 Time-off in lieu for overtime hours	35.3	37.0	37.6	37.7	40.0
4 Partly paid, partly compensated with time-off in lieu	36.4	37.0	37.9	37.9	40.8
5 Not compensated	36.9	39.9	37.6	39.9	40.0

	NL	PL	ES	UK
1 Overtime paid as normal hours plus overtime premium	9%	17%	20%	22%
2 Overtime paid as normal hours	15%	7%	6%	14%
3 Time-off in lieu for overtime hours	33%	29%	16%	21%
4 Partly paid, partly compensated with time-off in lieu	19%	6%	6%	4%
5 Not compensated	26%	41%	52%	38%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	72,034	3,935	6,867	19,181
Average contractual working hours				
1 Overtime paid as normal hours plus overtime premium	38.1	38.8	38.6	38.3
2 Overtime paid as normal hours	34.2	34.8	36.8	34.2
3 Time-off in lieu for overtime hours	35.2	39.3	38.2	36.9
4 Partly paid, partly compensated with time-off in lieu	35.5	39.6	38.5	37.0
5 Not compensated	38.4	39.8	39.1	38.6

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees whose employment contract includes a number of working hours.*

(group 2) has on average the shortest working week, except for Belgium, Germany and Hungary. Employees with time off in lieu for overtime hours (group 3) have a comparatively short working week too.

3.7. On-call work

Legal framework and debate

As already indicated in Section 3.2, several rulings of the European Court of Justice have established that on-call working time, when the employee must be available in the workplace, should be regarded as working time. The fact that the ECJ has stated in the case Jaeger that the definitions included in the WTD cannot be freely interpreted by the member states implies that the Community terminology used to define the different categories of workers deserves attention.

The amended proposal for a Directive of the EP and of the Council amending Directive 2003/88/EC concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time[91] introduces a definition of 'on-call work' as "the period during which the worker has the obligation to be available at the workplace in order to intervene, at the employer's request, to carry out his activities or duties and which is determined in accordance with the terms laid down in the relationship or employment contract applicable to the worker". The Commission proposal for revising the WTD includes the introduction of a new category of on-call time, the 'inactive' part of on-call time. This is the time the worker, although available for work at his place of employment, does not carry out his duties. This will not be counted as working time, unless otherwise stipulated by national law or collective agreement. The proposal also specifies that compensatory rest would not have to be granted immediately, but within 72 hours. Furthermore, with regard to an amendment to the proposal of the EP, the Commission pointed out that because it shares the concerns of the EP with regard to the health and safety of workers who are regularly on-call, it has added a provision to ensure that inactive

[91] COM (2005) 246 final.

periods of on-call time are not taken into account with regard to the daily and weekly rest periods.[92]

The ETUC considers that excluding on-call duty in the workplace from working time could undermine existing collective agreements. It could also have a far-reaching and disastrous impact on work organization in many sectors, i.e. hotels and restaurants or public services (firemen, police) that could potentially be excluded for working hours' rules. In this area, the ETUC demands proposals that promote balanced solutions on the basis of collective bargaining, and guarantee workers the rights to adequate rest periods and to conciliation of working and family life.[93]

Results on on-call work

In the *WageIndicator* survey the issue of on-call work or sleeping shifts, as it is called in the Netherlands, is only asked in the Netherlands, because when the survey was drawn the teams from other countries indicated that such a shift did not exist in their country. In the Dutch sample sleeping shifts are rather rare, and mainly occur in health care (0.5% of all employees in this sector), and to a lesser extent elsewhere in the public sector (0.1%) and in transport and communication (0.04%).

3.8. Shift work

In the member states shift work is mostly regulated by national legislation and collective agreements, except for some aspects covered by the EU regulative framework described above. Table 3.10 presents an overview of the incidence of shift work and work on irregular hours (self-defined), based on the *WageIndicator* data. The data are available for four out of the nine countries under study. Looking at countries, the incidence is highest in Denmark

[92] This rectification on the part of the Commission is highly relevant in the sense that, otherwise a time while the employee is actually at the disposal of the employer, would be considered as rest time. That possibility is manifestly unfair.

[93] ETUC, 2005a.

(32%), closely followed by Belgium and the Netherlands. The Spanish share (16%) is much lower.[94]

Looking at industries, in all countries the incidence of working shift or irregular hours is highest in the hotel and restaurant industry, followed by the health sector (second in three out of four countries, third in one country) and transport and communication (third in three countries, second in one country). In all four countries, construction ranks lowest.

Table 3.10. Percentages of employees working shift or irregular hours, breakdown by country and industry

	BE	DK	NL	ES
Agriculture	18%	26%	12%	13%
Manufacturing	31%	36%	20%	20%
Utilities	23%	19%	18%	16%
Construction	16%	9%	6%	5%
Wholesale/retail	33%	18%	31%	20%
Hotels, rest., cat.	51%	54%	67%	40%
Transp, commun.	35%	51%	35%	28%
Finance	18%	10%	9%	6%
Other comm.serv.	20%	21%	9%	8%
Public admin.	24%	18%	24%	17%
Education	32%	22%	20%	7%
Health care	49%	41%	54%	31%
Other	26%	20%	29%	16%
Total	30%	32%	26%	16%
N	18,406	2,346	86,210	15,546

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

We now pay attention to the incidence of regular work in the evenings as well as on Saturdays and Sundays, although strictly speaking this is not shift work. Table 3.11 shows the shares of those regularly working in the evening, broken down by country (except for Poland) and industry. The average share is particularly high in Spain (67%), presumably due to climatic reasons. Hungary, the Netherlands, Belgium and UK rank in the middle,

[94] Our Spanish figure is about the incidence of shift work in Spain as found in the 2005 Eurostat Labour Force Survey (LFS), but our figures for Belgium and Denmark are much higher than the LFS outcomes (The LFS produced no data for the Netherlands) (EC, 2006, 50).

whereas Denmark, Finland and Germany rank at the bottom. Looking at industries, the hotel and restaurant sector shows the highest scores in all countries, taken into account that no percentages are available for Denmark. In the public sector, evening work is not frequently seen: it has in most countries the lowest proportion of employees working in the evening. In Hungary, utilities, agriculture and education reveal high scores of regular evening work. In construction, evening work is also uncommon, except for Spain, where evening work ranks high.

Table 3.11. Percentages of employees regularly working in the evening, breakdown by country and industry

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	ES	UK
Agriculture	30%	-	-	-	27%	36%	72%	32%
Manufacturing	38%	21%	25%	26%	45%	41%	66%	32%
Utilities	34%	-	-	26%	36%	36%	67%	37%
Construction	28%	13%	6%	19%	32%	28%	76%	21%
Wholes/retail	30%	34%	42%	26%	36%	42%	74%	36%
Hotels, rest.,	55%	-	54%	53%	66%	71%	65%	63%
Transp, comm.	46%	34%	29%	32%	57%	54%	63%	43%
Finance	26%	-	11%	26%	32%	35%	58%	25%
Comm.serv.	38%	37%	20%	35%	46%	37%	77%	29%
Public admin.	26%	-	12%	17%	37%	35%	36%	23%
Education	49%	-	27%	51%	39%	47%	59%	34%
Health care	48%	31%	31%	41%	47%	48%	51%	41%
Other	46%	20%	32%	43%	46%	53%	72%	42%
Total	38%	28%	25%	30%	44%	43%	67%	34%
N	17,752	266	2,977	1,313	7,478	90,327	13,407	23,766

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 3.12 shows the incidence of those regularly working on Saturdays, except for Germany and Poland, broken down by country and industry. The picture derived from these figures resembles that concerning shifts. When comparing countries, Hungary (43%) takes the lead in working Saturdays, followed by the Netherlands, Denmark, the UK and Belgium. The Finnish and Spanish shares are the lowest.

Not surprisingly, in six out of seven countries the hotel and restaurant industry shows the highest incidence of regular work on Saturdays, followed in five out of seven countries by wholesale / retail. Health care reveals the highest incidence of Saturday work in Denmark, and the sector ranks third

in Belgium, Hungary, and Spain. Working Saturdays is most uncommon in construction: in almost all countries this industry ranks lowest. Finance also reveals low percentages of Saturday work.

Table 3.12. Incidence of regularly working on Saturdays, breakdown by country and industry

	BE	DK	FI	HU	NL	ES	UK
Agriculture	30%	-	-	56%	45%	26%	31%
Manufacturing	20%	16%	10%	40%	23%	14%	19%
Utilities	20%	-	-	39%	16%	15%	25%
Construction	15%	12%	4%	42%	18%	10%	15%
Wholes/retail	44%	45%	43%	55%	48%	43%	49%
Hotels, rest.,	63%	50%	57%	71%	71%	65%	64%
Transp, comm.	30%	27%	26%	56%	40%	24%	37%
Finance	17%	-	3%	21%	12%	15%	18%
Comm.serv.	18%	15%	9%	38%	15%	11%	16%
Public admin.	17%	-	6%	31%	20%	16%	13%
Education	23%	-	6%	29%	17%	7%	12%
Health care	42%	65%	25%	47%	40%	30%	33%
Other	33%	20%	-	41%	44%	26%	34%
Total	26%	29%	16%	43%	30%	20%	26%
N	18,647	270	3,093	7,498	95,458	13,954	26,472

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Finally, Table 3.13 presents the incidence of those regularly working on Sundays, broken down by country (again except for Germany and Poland) and industry. The country pattern resembles that concerning regular work on Saturdays, with Hungary taking the lead (33%), followed by Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK, whereas Belgium, Finland, and Spain show the lowest figures.

Again, in six out of seven countries the hotel and restaurant industry shows the highest incidence (whereas for Denmark due to insufficient data, no percentages can be given). In five countries, health care is in second position. The construction and finance industries jointly rank lowest in most countries.

Table 3.13. Incidence of regularly working on Sundays, breakdown by country and industry

	BE	DK	FI	HU	NL	ES	UK
Agriculture	9%	-	-	43%	15%	11%	20%
Manufacturing	12%	11%	8%	29%	12%	8%	13%
Utilities	16%	-	-	34%	14%	10%	19%
Construction	4%	8%	3%	21%	6%	2%	6%
Wholes/retail	10%	30%	12%	27%	14%	8%	29%
Hotels, rest.,	52%	-	41%	60%	60%	53%	54%
Transp, comm.	20%	17%	21%	48%	26%	18%	27%
Finance	3%	-	1%	16%	4%	3%	5%
Comm.serv.	10%	19%	6%	33%	9%	6%	10%
Public admin.	12%	-	5%	29%	18%	12%	11%
Education	13%	-	5%	26%	13%	3%	10%
Health care	33%	53%	22%	43%	39%	21%	29%
Other	20%	0%	13%	32%	24%	14%	25%
Total	14%	21%	10%	33%	18%	10%	17%
N	18,581	270	3,096	7,490	95,147	13,916	26,104

Source: WageIndicator data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.

3.9. Conclusions

The analyses of the length of the working week show that the variation in average working time is larger across industries than across countries. Out of 13 industries, Germany has the longest usual working hours in seven industries, Poland in three, Spain in two, and the UK in one. The incidence of extremely long working weeks, here defined as 48 hours or more, is especially found in Germany, Hungary, Poland, Spain and the UK, and to a a small extent in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands. Across countries, five industries reveal the highest incidence of long usual working weeks: hotels, restaurants and catering; agriculture; transport and communication; construction, and manufacturing. The transport industry in particular also shows high figures of working 48 hours or more in countries with an otherwise low incidence of long hours, like Finland and the Netherlands. Obviously competition at industry level is crucial here. The length as well as the extent of fluctuation and predictability of operating hours relates closely to the competitive forces deployed mainly at industry level, and to the remaining loopholes in regulation.

This section shows figures on the major topics of discussion concerning issues related to the EU Working Time Directive (WTD), notably annualised hours, flexible hours, the opt-out from WTD and on-call work. The figures of the *WageIndicator* reveal that of these four issues, flexible hours are most common, with Hungary and Denmark taking the lead. Annualised hours are noted in Denmark, Germany, Hungary and Spain. The opt-out from WTD is seen mainly in the UK, and to a very minor extent in Finland. On-call work remains relatively low in all countries: below 2%.

The WTD discussion has its focus on the opt-out discussion fuelled by the UK administration. The data analyses indeed reveal that almost one out of twenty in the dependent UK labour force has signed an opt-out employment contract. Within this group, working hours are considerably longer than among UK employees at large. Employees who have opted out are overrepresented among older workers, elementary occupations, plant and machine operators and assemblers, and by industry in construction, hotels and restaurants, and transport and communication.

In almost all nine countries under study, overtime work is primarily compensated by time off in lieu. Therefore, in addition to contractually agreed flexible working hours, the flexibility in working time is to a large extent achieved by mechanisms of overtime compensation.

4. Low pay

Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Nuria Ramos Martin

4.1. Introduction

Wages are at the heart of the employment relationship, both in individual employment contracts and in collective agreements. Wages are negotiated by individual employers and employees or by social partners. Within the EU, the persistence of low pay has been recognized as a major social problem and although the EU cannot force member states to adopt Statutory Minimum Wages (SMW's), there may be ways to develop European minimum wage policies.

Section 4.2 of this chapter deals with EU policy-making concerning low pay and related debates. Section 4.3 concentrates on the SMW. In section 4.4 we present available evidence on the incidence of low pay from sources other than the *WageIndicator* data. We are especially lucky to be able to use the final drafts produced for a large research project on Low Wage Work in Europe, running from 2004-07 commissioned by the New York-based Russell Sage Foundation (RSF), in which AIAS (for the Netherlands jointly with STZ consultancy & research) participated. Section 4.5 treats the position of the minimum wage in the national industrial relations and legislative frameworks of nine EU member states, using *WageIndicator* data. Finally, section 4.6 presents outcomes of the analyses based on this data with a closer look at the characteristics of the low paid employee.

4.2. EU and low pay: the debate

One of the key objectives of the Lisbon Strategy of the European Union was to secure more and better jobs, as well as fighting social exclusion and poverty. These objectives have often been closely linked: employment ('Jobs, jobs, jobs') is often claimed to be the best form of protection against poverty. However, this does not hold for all EU citizens. At the turn of the century, the problem of the 'working poor', familiarized by studies from the Anglo-Saxon countries, was recognized at European level. 1999 data at EU

level showed that 14% of the self-employed and 6% of employees and civil servants had to be classified as poor[95]. Poverty among employed people turned out to be higher in the Southern European member states, France, and the UK.[96]

Low-paid workers not surprisingly face a high risk of working poverty, although the dynamics of mobility into and out of poverty complicate the picture. What remains is the issue of persistent poverty and the need for a particular policy response. EU figures showed that in the course of the 1990s about 60% of the active poor continued to be in that situation or even became inactive poor in the next three years.[97] As we will show in this chapter, the incidence of low pay in a number of EU member states is large and persistent. Moreover, recently off-shoring/outsourcing, 'wage dumping' and 'regime competition' may cause growing uncertainties of continued employment throughout the EU, notably in certain industries, occupations and regions. The issue of low pay tended to have faded away in the 1990s,[98] but these are convincing reasons to reinvigorate the attention of EU policy makers, the European trade union movement and the general public towards the problem.

In the EU policy making on the issue of low pay is rather complex. For example, art. 137.5 of the European Community Treaty explicitly states that the provisions of this article shall not apply to pay. This means that the EU cannot adopt any kind of harmonizing legislative measure introducing a minimum wage for all member states. This particular competence remains totally at the national level. However, according to the second paragraph of the provision mentioned above, cooperation measures can be adopted in the related field of social inclusion. Moreover, the EU member states are bound by the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers signed in Turin in 1989.

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95 Which, following the EU risk of poverty threshold, means earning less than 60% of the median equivalent household income.

96 Pena-Casas & Latta, 2004.

97 'Active' means being employed in the basic year during at least six months. Cf. Pena-Casas & Latta, 2004, 26.

98 Cf. the 1989 European Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (the 'Social Charter'), the 1993 European Commission opinion on equitable wages and the 1997 progress report of the Commission [Cf. www.eirofound.eu.int/2002/08/study/tn0208101s.html].

Against the backdrop of a continuously large incidence of low wages and the danger of 'wage dumping', the low pay issue is of particular importance to the trade unions. Theirs is not an easy task. In collective bargaining, two major goals are often at stake. First, increasing the lowest wages faster than the average wage is a key objective of many unions. Second, most trade unions set targets for what they consider to be a socially acceptable level of minimum pay.[99] Because of the major differences in purchasing power between countries and prevailing national conditions, union policies have to be grounded basically on national conditions and wage levels. Nevertheless, ideas have been developed concerning a European minimum wage policy. The Community Charter of 1989, containing the principle that every job must be paid a fair remuneration, could open the door for such a policy. In 2005, a German-French-Swiss research group published theses in this regard , proposing that every European country be obliged to gradually raise its minimum wage, to a level of at least 50% --and, in the future, 60%-- of national average earnings (the so-called Kaitz index). Following this proposal, such a European minimum wage policy could make a concrete contribution to the development and strengthening of a European Social Model, which has as a fundamental principle that wages paid to every dependent employee will enable a decent life and financial independence.[100] One has to be aware of the fact, as we will indicate, that the value of the Kaitz index for all EU member states in our sample in 2004 remained below 50%.

It is interesting to note that various international union federations are actually undertaking campaigns to tackle low pay. For example, at its February 2006 meeting, the EPSU executive endorsed the idea of such a campaign. This would include a political campaign on SMW rates and a coordinated campaign of collective bargaining targeting minimum wages in collective agreements. In its 2006 resolution on collective bargaining coordination, the ETUC Executive Committee stressed that the situation of low wage earners remains a concern. The ETUC called upon affiliates to pay specific attention to fighting low pay and poverty wages by developing 'solidaristic' wage bargaining strategies.[101]

[99] Keune, 2005, Section 4.
[100] Schulten *et al*, 2006, 371 ff.
[101] ETUC, 2006b.

4.3. The Statutory Minimum Wage

The issue of a legally binding or statutory minimum wage is playing a major role in every debate throughout Europe concerning low pay. The SMW can act as a powerful instrument of sustaining living standards and combating poverty, especially if in many countries it determines a number of social benefits, like pensions, unemployment benefits, disability benefits, and maternity allowance. SMW legislation is far from new: it had already been introduced at the end of the 19th century in Australia and New Zealand. In the second half of the 20th century, an increasing number of countries introduced SMW's setting a general nation-wide minimum wage level. Here, the USA played a leading role by introducing, in 1938, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.[102] In 1970, the ILO adopted Convention no. 131 concerning minimum wage fixing.[103]

Actually, 20 of the 27 EU member states have a SMW. Of these countries, the UK and Ireland did not introduce such standards until 1999 and 2000 respectively. The Scandinavian countries Denmark, Sweden and Finland as well as Germany, Austria, Italy and Cyprus until recently have relied on collective agreements to ensure minimum wage protection. Currently, however, the idea of a legally binding minimum wage has increasingly become an issue in some of these countries, for example in Germany and Sweden.[104] The development of the SMW is greatly influenced by the countries' institutional settings and political developments. Four ideal-typical systems can be identified (although in practice combinations of the four can be traced)[105]:

[102] Schulten, 2006a, 6-7.
[103] Article 1, 1: 'Each Member of the ILO which ratifies this Convention undertakes to establish a system of minimum wages which covers all groups of wage earners whose terms of employment are such that coverage would be appropriate'.
[104] Schulten, 2006a, 8 ff; Funk & Lesch, 2005; Eirofound, 2005.
[105] Schulten, 2006a, 10 ff.

1. purely political systems, like that prevalent in the USA;
2. institutionalized consultation processes where employers' associations and trade unions are involved, like in most EU member states;
3. systems in which the national minimum wages are negotiated at national level by employers and unions, and subsequently made law by the state as in Belgium, Greece, and some new member states;
4. systems in which SMW's are index-linked: the Netherlands, France, and Poland are examples. In the Netherlands, notably, governmental decisions can deviate from automatic increases.

In countries with a SMW, union strategies to improve low pay generally focus first of all on this minimum wage, although sometimes minimum wage scales substantially above the SMW level are agreed in collective agreements. This is common practice in, for example, France, Spain and the Netherlands. In 2002-05, in most countries with a SMW analyzed by ETUC and ETUI-REHS, its growth was equal to or higher than inflation. Mostly the real value of the minimum wage was safeguarded and increased. Since 2002, minimum wage growth has been particularly strong in the new member states as well as in Ireland and the UK.[106] On the other hand, in the Netherlands at the same time the SMW has been lagging behind both inflation and the development of the median wage.[107]

Table 4.1 gives an overview of the recent values of SMW's for those countries where these are applicable, in the left hand column in national currencies and in the right hand column after correction for differences in household purchasing power. The so-called PPS[108] shows that the real SMW levels in Poland and Hungary are about one-third of the (rather uniform) SMW level in the four North-western European countries.

[106] Keune, 2005, Section 4.
[107] Salverda *et al*, 2007, Chapter 3.
[108] Purchasing power standard (PPS) is an artificial common currency used to neutralise the effects of differences in price levels between countries, taking into account the final consumption expenditures of households.

Table 4.1. Monthly SMW's in selected EU member states, January 2006, in national currencies and using PPS, in €

	National currency (NAC)	Using PPPs (PPS)
Belgium	1,234	1,184
Netherlands	1,293	1,210
United Kingdom*	1,269	1,202
France	1,218	1,128
Spain	631	722
Hungary*	247	401
Poland*	234	379

Source: *Eurostat*, Statistics in focus, *2006/9, Minimum Wages 2006*
Note: ** via exchange rate (not PPP) converted in €*

4.4. The incidence of low pay

We have to differentiate between four indicators of low wages and poverty:

- the (EU) risk of poverty threshold is set at the point where household incomes are less than 60% of the median equivalent household income;
- the factual national minimum wage standards for individual workers, mostly the SMW;
- the factual lowest wage scales in collective agreements for individual workers;
- the (EU) threshold definition of 'low pay' or 'low wage' which for individual workers is set at two-thirds of the national median gross hourly wage.

The indicators 2 and 3 are results of intricate processes in which trade unions nearly always play pronounced roles, be it directly through wage bargaining, or by exerting political pressure, or through a combination of both. The indicators 1 and 4 are statistical outcomes aimed at measuring and benchmarking the incidence of poverty i.e. low pay across countries, industries, gender, occupations, and age groups.[109]

The European Commission indicated for 2000 that already in the EU15 15.1% of all employees working at least 15 hours per week earned less than

[109] See on the definition issue: Pena-Casas & Latta, 2004, 5 ff. On benchmarking: Salverda, 2005.

two-thirds of the median wage: this amounted to over 20 million people.[110] Moreover, although reliable figures are lacking, the expectation seems justified that the incidence of low pay in the 12 new member states is substantially higher.[111] Indications are that those earning the SMW or less among full-time employees are a substantial proportion of the workforce in some of these countries. According to *Eurostat*, such shares were under 3% in the Netherlands, Spain and the UK in 2005 but between 3 and 8% in Hungary and Poland.[112]

Table 4.2 shows the 1995 and 2000 incidence of low pay for the seven countries from the 'old' EU included in the *WageIndicator* data, plus Italy and France. When observing three-year moving averages, it emerges that in the second half of the 1990s there has been rather little variation in the overall incidence of low pay. As the table shows, in 2000 the highest incidence was in the UK (also among the EU15), the lowest in Denmark and Italy. The Spanish figures show a marked decline in this period, while the Netherlands experienced the same amount of increase.

Table 4.2. Low-paid employment (share below 2/3 median wage threshold) in selected EU member states, 1995 and 2000

	1995	2000
Belgium	13.4	12.2
Denmark	9.0	8.6
Finland	-	10.8
Germany	14.3	15.7
Netherlands	13.3	16.6
Spain	18.9	15.6
United Kingdom	20.9	19.4
Italy	10.4	9.7
France	15.8	15.6
EU15	15.6	15.1

Source: *EC, Employment in Europe 2004, 168 (based on the European Community Household Panel, UDP version December 2003).*

[110] EC, 2004a, 167 ff.
[111] Cf. Vaughan-Whitehead, 2005.
[112] Eurostat, 2006a.

Statistics on low-paid employment published by the EU thus far hardly allow for detailed divisions and, moreover, are rather outdated. We are able to fill this gap at least partly by adding and analyzing statistics from two other sources. Of course, this first and foremost applies to *WageIndicator* data. Second, as already stated we have used the results of the project on Low Wage Work in Europe, running from 2004-07 and commissioned by the RSF. The RSF researchers applied the same low wage threshold as the EU does: two-thirds of the national median gross hourly wage. The RSF outcomes include detailed analyses, partly on a national and partly on an industry level, for five EU member states: Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and France – thus, except France, four countries also represented in the *WageIndicator*. Using these results and integrating them with *WageIndicator* data enables us to present recent figures, including interesting and policy-relevant breakdowns, and to trace developments over time.

Looking at the personal characteristics of employees, three groups show by far the largest shares of low-pay: women, low skilled, and youngsters.[113] It is striking that in 2001, on average, low pay in the EU15 was twice as high for female employees as for male ones. This difference was particularly marked in the UK (14.4%points) and the Netherlands (12.7%pts), and low in Finland (3.2%pts) and Denmark (4.6%pts). Second, the over-all incidence among the low skilled[114] was 2.5 times as high as for the high skilled; this difference was highest in Denmark (21.5%pts), and lowest in the Netherlands (7.2%pts) and Finland (9.4%pts). Third, the low pay incidence in the EU15 was particularly high (39.9%) for young employees aged 16-24.[115] Considering industries, 40% of those working in hotels/restaurants remained under the low pay threshold as well as 26% of the employees in wholesale and retail trade, against 11% in manufacturing. As we will see, the national data presented below will by and large confirm these outcomes.

Table 4.3 shows a more recent overview of the incidence of low pay for the five EU member states researched in the RSF project, based on calculations

[113] EC, 2004a, 168 ff.

[114] Which corresponds with less than the second stage of secondary education (ISCED 0-2).

[115] Even though those working in paid apprenticeships and under special training schemes are excluded.

on various national datasets. The over-all figures per country come close to those of Table 4.2, except the figure for France.

Of course, it is the relative level of the national minimum wage that matters. Recently, Schulten in the reader he co-edited for the ETUI-REHS argues that in most member states minimum wage regulations are insufficient to counter the growing phenomenon of the 'working poor' ie where wages are below the threshold value of 50% of the average national (monthly) wage. Such wage levels whether in manufacturing or services must be viewed as 'poverty wages'.[116] Following the figures presented concerning the Kaitz index, in 2004 from the 18 EU member states only Ireland reached that threshold (exactly).[117] Table 4.4 shows the figures for the countries under scrutiny here.

[116] Schulten, 2006a, 17.

[117] Schulten, 2006a, 18. Other figures, based on the EU Structure of Earnings Survey, indicate that for 2002 SMW's in France (62%) and Greece (51%) were also above the 50% threshold (Kalina & Weinkopf, 2006, 7).

Table 4.3. Incidence of low pay (under 2/3 median wage threshold, gross hourly wages, headcount) in five EU member states

	Denmark (2002)	Germany (2004)	Netherlands (2002)	UK (2005)	France (2002) X
Total workforce - 2005	8.5 (2002:8.5)	20.8 (2004:20.8)	17.6 (2002:16.9)	22.1	12.7 (2002:12.2)
Men	6.4	12.6	13.6	15.1	8.0
Women	10.7	29.6	21.0	26.6	17.0
under age 25 (DK, FR: age 26)	35.0	42.3*	61.0	49.4	26.1
age 25-64	4.8	11.0*	8.2	16.0	10.9
(only) secondary education	15.0	42.1**	30.8	32.7	21.9/12.7**
manufacturing	4.6	9.1	11.0	13.0	6.2
services	9.1	27.5****	16.0	29.0	13.6
of which retail	23.3	42.0	45.0	49.0	18.4
of which hotels	21.0		26.0	59.0	20.4
full-timers		17.7	10.0	14.0	8.9
part-timers		21.1*****	28.2	42.5	27.1-30.7

X *hourly wages excl. social contributions*
* *2003, only full-time*
** *unskilled*
*** *no diploma/only lower secondary*
**** *excluding household and personal services (32.1%)*
***** *excluding marginal part-time (mini-jobs) (85.8%)*
Sources:
Denmark: *calculations Aarhus Business School (ABS) on CCP/IDA data*
Germany: *calculations Institut Arbeit und Technik (IAT) on GSOEP employee panel data*
Netherlands: *calculations AIAS / SEO (University of Amsterdam) on CBS/LSO microdata*
UK: *calculations NIESR on ASHE dataset*
France: *Enquete Emploi*
Calculations for age groups and industries supported by Eurostat *and* Groningen GGDC industry database *figures*

Table 4.4. Monthly SMW's as percentage of the average gross national monthly wage in industry and services, 1995 and 2004, in selected EU member states[118]

	1995	2004
Belgium	52	46
Netherlands	48	46
Hungary	31	41
Spain	42	38
United Kingdom	-	38
Poland	41	36

Sources: *1995: Funk & Lesch, 2005;*
2004: Schulten, 2006a, 18 (based on European Commission figures).

Table 4.4 shows that from 1995 to 2004 the position of the minimum wage (earners) deteriorated relatively in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland, while it improved in Hungary.

4.5. Minimum wages in nine countries

Belgium

In Belgium, minimum wages are largely determined by collective bargaining at national (cross-industry), industry and company levels, covering about 90% of the workforce. Wages are automatically adjusted to keep up with price inflation; since 1994, the Belgian employers have refused additional increases. The minimum wage system is enshrined in the Belgian Constitution, laying down the right to 'a fair level of pay' (art. 23). The current regulations date back to a cross-industry agreement concluded on February 10, 1975, within the framework of the bipartite National Labour Council and introducing a monthly minimum wage for all private sector employees over age 21. This agreement was declared legally binding by

[118] On the basis of ETUC Questionnaires 2004 and 2005, Keune (2005, Section 4) mentions a substantially higher 2004/05 figure (53%) for Hungary, and 37% for both Spain and the UK. Yet, Neumann (2005) mentions for Hungary, based on figures of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 36% in January 2004. For Spain, Recio (2006, 162) mentions 29% for 2004. For the UK, the UK Institute of Fiscal Studies mentions 40% for 2004 (Burgess, 2006, 47n).

royal decree and thus has force of law. In 1991, minimum youth wages were introduced from the age of 15 on, starting at a level of 64% of the adult minimum wage. In practice, minimum wages agreed at industry level are mostly significantly above the national minimum wage, although one has to keep in mind that after 1990 average wages rose nearly 20% over the minimum wage rise. Recently, there has been little public discussion about the national minimum wage system in Belgium.[119]

Based on a threshold derived from Belgian National Institute of Statistics figures applied on *WageIndicator* data, we were able to calculate a low-wage incidence among adult employees in Belgium for 2005 of 18%.[120]

Denmark

In keeping with the Scandinavian tradition, Denmark has no SMW legislation, and low-wage regulation is mainly based on collective bargaining. Like in Finland, Sweden and Norway, minimum wage floors are laid down in nearly all collective agreements. Bargaining coverage in the private sector is 77% and in the public sector 100% (figures 2002). Thus, the lack of minimum wage floors can mainly pose problems in the private sector. Yet, neither Danish practitioners nor experts widely advocate the introduction of a SMW; on the contrary, there seems to be a near-consensus about its negative impact among the social partners' organizations.[121]

Denmark is known for its highly compressed wage structure, and thus the share of low-pay workers is comparatively low: in 2002, 6.4% of the male employees and 10.7% of the females fell into the low pay category, resulting in an over-all figure of 8.5%. The groups with an almost universally high low-pay incidence also show up in Denmark, although in an international perspective their shares are relatively low: in 2002, the incidence of low pay among those with (only) secondary education was 15%, in the age group 18-25 was 35%, in the retail industry was 23% and in hotels 21%. Denmark also has a reputation for its very flexible labour market. Indeed,

[119] Schulten, 2006b, 90-5.
[120] Like for all countries analyzed here, controlled for working hours based on OECD figures [www.swivel.com/data_sets].
[121] Lismoen, 2006, 272.

only 30% of the low-paid remained as low-wage workers in the following year.[122]

Calculations on *Wageindicator* data, based on the low-wage threshold used in the RSF research project, led to a low-wage incidence among adult Danish employees for 2005 of 10%. In line with earlier results, this was the second lowest share of the eight countries analysed. However, this finding is based on a small number of observations (136 adults). Therefore, we also calculated the Danish share under the low-wage threshold for 2006 (corrected for wage increases in 2006[123]). This revealed a low-wage incidence of 14%.

Finland

Since the early 1970s, Finland has had a minimum wage system based on collective agreements. Members of the employers' associations are obliged to follow the collective agreement signed by their respective association. Normally, collective contracts have *ergo omnes* applicability, meaning that non-organised employers have to observe these collective agreements as well in their area of employment. Bargaining coverage is about 90% and, including *erga omnes* applicability, it is 100% even in industries like retail and hotels/restaurants. In 2003, in these sectors respectively 4.3% and 1.5% of staff on monthly salaries received the minimum wage. The minimum wages normally follow the general wage increases achieved in the collective agreements. There are no demands for setting a SMW in Finland.[124] Considering the collectively agreed minimum wages in the retail industry and in hotels and restaurants, the Kaitz index (minimum : average monthly wages) in Finland in March 2005 was at the comparatively high level of 52-53.5%.[125]

Calculations on *Wageindicator* data starting from on the low-wage threshold mentioned in the sources used above, resulted in a low-wage incidence among adult Finnish employees for 2005 of only 6%: the lowest share out of the nine countries.

[122] Westergaard-Nielsen, 2007.
[123] Source: Danish National Bank [www.nationalbanken.dk].
[124] Lilja, 2005.
[125] Lilja, 2005; *Eurostat.*

Germany

For many years in Germany the strongly held view was that wages and working conditions should be dealt with directly by the social partners. As a result, the country does not have a SMW. More recently though, the system of collective bargaining has had a declining impact and bargaining coverage is going down (1998: 76% of all workers were covered, 2004: 68% were covered). Moreover, as we have already indicated, since 1998 Germany has been confronted with an expansion of low-wage sectors. If minimum wages are collectively agreed, they vary according to sectors and regions, and in some cases the lowest agreed wages turn out to be significantly less than € 6 hourly. Based on the content of collective agreement, classical low-wage sectors are hotels/restaurants, agriculture, hairdressing, the clothing industry and, depending on the region, retail.[126] Not surprisingly, the German food, hotel and restaurant workers' union (NGG) and the services workers' union Verdi have come out strongly in favour of a national SMW.[127] Recently the DGB confederation has started campaigning for a SMW amounting to €7.50 per hour.[128] The German population, including conservative voters, seems largely supportive of the introduction of a SMW.[129]

In Germany, however, SMW's do exist for specific branches. They are based on regulations introduced to implement the EU Directive on the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. The first branch-specific minimum wage was introduced in January 1997 in the main construction industry. The social partners negotiated further minimum wages for employees in the electrical engineering industry who work on construction sites and for workers in the roofing industry in the same year. Until quite recently, there were four branches with this kind of sector-specific minimum wages: the main construction industry and three related

[126] Bispinck & Schaefer, 2006, 336 ff.
[127] Bispinck & Schaefer, 2006, 360.
[128] See www.mindestlohn.de. In July 2006, the Institute for Work and Technology (IAT) published the findings of a study on the effects of the introduction of a €7.50 per hour SMW. This study found that about 4.6 million employees (14.6%) would then be entitled to a pay rise. Labour costs would rise by €10 - €12 billion. This would, however, also positively affect the tax income of the state and the social security system, which would receive additional contributions (Kalina & Weinkopf, 2006).
[129] *DW-World.de* (Deutsche Welle), 12.06.2007.

industries.[130] In June 2007, the German government coalition partners reached a compromise in which the minimum wage protection was extended to another 10-12 (sub)sectors. However, the coalition partner SPD regards this as "in no way a major breakthrough" and announced that "the political discussion will continue".[131]

Calculations based on 2003 figures show a share of low-pay workers among full-time employees (monthly income) of 17.3% for West Germany and 19.5% for East Germany (calculated with their respective thresholds), resulting in an average for Germany of 17.7%. The same 'risk groups' pop up again: the low-wage incidence among women was nearly 30%, among 'regular' part-timers 21% (but among marginal part-timers or mini-jobbers 86%), among those with (only) secondary education just over 30%, and among those aged under 25 42.8%. From 1995 onwards, a slight increase in the low pay incidence among women was visible, but the share among men nearly doubled. The 2003 figures confirm the picture derived from the collectively agreed wage scales, with a high incidence in business services (27.5%) as well as in household and personal services (32.1%). With 36% under the low-pay threshold, employees of SMEs (1-19 employees) are heavily over-represented.[132]

Calculations on *Wageindicator* data based on the low-wage threshold used in the RSF research project (corrected for wage increases in 2005[133]) led to a low-wage incidence among adult German employees for 2005 of 12%, thus lower than the figures cited above.

Hungary

The SMW was introduced in Hungary in 1991, starting at a level of 36% of average gross earnings (Kaitz index). Although quite low in terms of living standards, it emphasised the aim of the first freely elected government to accompany the transition to a market economy with social policy measures. Since then, the SMW is set yearly by government decree after the tripartite National Interest Reconciliation Council has concluded an agreement. The

[130] Source: EIRO.
[131] *DW-World.de* (Deutsche Welle), 19.06.2007.
[132] Calculations on GSOEP employee panel: Bosch & Weinkopf, 2007, Chapter 1.
[133] Source: WSI Tarifarchiv.

SMW is of paramount importance for Hungarian workers considering the low bargaining coverage: 14% covering the private sector and state-owned enterprises. The Kaitz index gradually fell to 29% in 2000, before consecutive governments in the course of 2000 and in 2004 lifted the value considerably, from HUF 25,500 in 2000 to HUF 65,500 in 2006; consequently the latest available Kaitz ratio, that for 2004, at 41% was substantially higher. These hikes have enlarged the reported employers' use of loopholes in the SMW regulation, like the use of piece-rates, reporting workers as part-timers while leaving their actual working hours unchanged, and increasing forms of undeclared work.[134]

Calculations on *Wageindicator* data based on the low-wage threshold derived from the source cited above (and corrected for wage increases[135]) led to a low-wage incidence among adult Hungarian employees for 2006 of 29%. This is comparatively high, and also 9%points higher than the earlier seemingly reliable figure concerning the Hungarian share under the low-wage threshold we found, namely, 20% for 1995. [136]

The Netherlands

In 1969, a Dutch SMW was established by law, applicable for all employees aged 24-64, but as early as 1970 the lower limit was reduced to 23. Finally, in 1974 the minimum wage for youngsters was introduced with its long tail (35% for age 15, up to 85% at age 22), after the lengthy opposition of employers. Since the mid 1970s, many social benefits have been linked to the SMW. An adjustment mechanism has been created with both economic and political components. The economic component since 1991 has seen automatic indexation at regular half-yearly intervals linked to the average trend in collectively agreed pay. Whilst from a political perspective the Dutch government is authorized to refrain from this index-linking under certain conditions. From 1979 until the late 1990s, successive administrations followed highly restrictive minimum wage policies, leading to a growing gap between the average agreed wage scales and the adult SMW. Substantial rises in the relative level of the SMW in the years from 1997 to 2002 were

[134] Neumann, 2005.
[135] Source: EIRO.
[136] Rutkowski, 1997.

virtually undone in 2003-2005. Over the long term, recipients of the Dutch SMW have suffered significant losses in their purchasing power.[137] Following Statistics Netherlands, in December 2005 126,800 male employees (3.3% of the male workforce) and 157,500 women (5.0%) were paid below or equal to the SMW.[138]

Traditionally, the lowest wage scales laid down in collective agreements were substantially higher than the SMW, both for adults and for youth wages. In 1993, the government started to press for lowering the ratio between collective agreed scales and SMW. Under this pressure, social partners joined in the Labour Foundation (StAr) recommended introducing lower wage scales in collective agreements. Indeed, the average of the lowest scales in all major agreements as a proportion of adult SMW fell from 112 in 1994 to 102 in 2004. Yet, the real scales in which more than a few workers can be found start on average 6% above SMW.[139]

In 2002, the share of employees under the low-wage threshold was 16.9% in the Netherlands, growing to 17.6% in 2005 (head-count). Calculations on Statistics Netherlands micro-data show a smaller gap between the incidence for men and women than EC/Eurostat data does, but with 7.3%pts (2002) the difference is still considerable. The industry low-wage pattern shows the usual suspects, notably retail and hotels. The gap between full-timers and part-timers is substantial, especially if one keeps in mind that the Netherlands embraced relatively early the principle of *pro rata* pay for part-timers. In 2004, the low-wage incidence among those working less than 12 hours per week was quite high (49%), followed by the incidence among those working 12-20 hours (27%).[140]

Calculations on *WageIndicator* data based on the 2004 low-wage threshold (corrected for wage increases[141]) revealed a higher low-wage incidence among adult Dutch employees for 2005 than cited above for 2004: 23%.

[137] Salverda *et al*, 2007, Chapter 3; Schulten, 2006b, 97 ff., 113.
[138] CBS, *Statline (EWL statistics).*
[139] Dept. of Social Affairs and Employment, 2005.
[140] Salverda *et al*, 2007, Chapters 2-4.
[141] Source: CBS, *Statline (CAO lonen index).*

Poland

During the Communist era, the Polish state-decreed minimum wage constituted the basic wage for full-time entry-level workers. After 1990, the basic principle adopted was that there should be a single, universal minimum wage for all employees irrespective of their professional skills or work experience. The 2002 Minimum Wage Act stipulates that the tripartite Economic and Social Committee is responsible for negotiating the minimum wage rate for the next year. If this committee fails to reach an agreement, the Labour Minister sets the rate independently. Moreover, a strict indexation procedure was introduced, based on the inflation forecast for the coming year. It did not take into account productivity trends, although they are key indicators for all other aspects of wage policy. Yet, in July 2005, the Polish parliament approved a new indexation rule, stating that the SMW will be calculated by adding 66% of the GDP growth rate to the inflation forecast, until the Kaitz index has reached the level of 50%. This may well give a firm boost, because the 2004 Kaitz level was as low as 41%. In that year, 4.2% of all Polish employees were on the minimum wage.[142]

Based on a threshold derived from the Polish Central Statistical Office[143] and *WageIndicator* data, we were able to calculate a low-wage incidence among adult employees in Poland for 2005 of 27%. This was nearly 10%points higher than the comparable Polish figure we found for 1995: 17.3%.[144]

Spain

The SMW was introduced in Spain under the Franco regime, partly as a means of controlling wage costs and partly to strengthen the regime's political legitimacy. The transition to a democratic government led to the Workers' Statute, passed in 1980. Art. 27 of this Statute redefines the SMW principles, stipulating that the SMW shall be reviewed by the government yearly following consultations with both sides of industry, and taking account of inflation and productivity trends as well as the overall health of the economy. Over time the SMW has come to be used as a reference point for

[142] Kohl & Platzer, 2006, 192-195; Funk & Lesch, 2005.
[143] In this respect we are grateful to Magda Andrałojć, University of Economics Poznan.
[144] Rutkowski, 1997.

a growing number of welfare benefits. In fact this is the SMW's main importance in Spain as its influence on wage policy is marginal.[145]

The real value of the Spanish SMW rose sharply during the 1970s, but since the beginning of the 1980s it has fallen more or less continuously. Actually, its value is 20% lower than in 1980, representing a significant fall in the standard of living of all those who are dependent on the minimum wage. At the same time, the Kaitz index has fallen by 10%pts. Even in low wage industries like the clothing industry and hotels and restaurants, this index is actually under 50%. In June 2004, shortly after being elected, the Zapatero administration reaffirmed its commitment to raise the SMW. In order to achieve this, the unions have supported the idea of breaking the link between the minimum wage and welfare benefits.[146]

Based on a 2004 threshold derived from official Spanish statistics[147] and applied to *WageIndicator* data, we calculated (corrected for wage increases[148]) a low-wage incidence among adult employees in Spain for 2005 of 11%. Although the fall of this incidence that could be traced between 1995 and 2000 may have continued afterwards, this 2005 share is quite low. It may be partly attributed to the over representation of high-educated employees (53%) in the Spanish *WageIndicator* sample.

United Kingdom

In the UK, the Blair government introduced the National Minimum Wage (NMW) as a SMW in 1999. Prior to this (with mostly tacit government support) mainstream unionism relied on collective bargaining for setting wages, working hours and working conditions. From 1979 on, the Thatcher government withdrew support, contributing to the erosion of collective bargaining in the UK. Even the bipartite Wages Councils which had traditionally set 'wage floors' for low paying and weakly organized sectors, were abolished. In the private sector bargaining coverage fell from some 50% in 1980 to 20% in 2004. Under such conditions, the campaign for a

[145] Recio, 2006, 151-56, 164-70.
[146] Recio, 2006, 156-64, 171-2.
[147] In this respect we are grateful to José-Ignacio Antón Pérez, Departamento de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Salamanca.
[148] Source: EIRO.

SMW came to be supported by the TUC confederation and the Labour Party. Finally, after that Party's landslide victory in the 1997 general elections, the CBI, the employers' association, accepted the SMW. It definitely helped that along with the NMW, the Low Pay Commission was created and employers were formally included into the process of introducing the minimum wage. Thus, the initial (low) hourly rate of GBP 3.60 was the outcome of negotiations between employers and unions in the Low Pay Commission.[149]

No automatic mechanism is in existence for regularly raising the NMW; the government sets its level following recommendations of the Low Pay Commission. In 2003-06, the NMW was ratcheted up to the median wage. Negative effects on economic growth can hardly be detected, whilst in contrast advantageous improvements to work organisation have been identified. In a declaration on September 28, 2006, the ETUC argued that there was no automatic trade-off between competitiveness and the European social dimension, referring among other things to the introduction of the SMW in the UK and Ireland: "Despite claims to the contrary, both the UK and Ireland have continued to enjoy a growing economy and a booming jobs market. In the UK in particular, one fifth of business responded to the minimum wage by improving work organisation and making it more productive".

Calculations by the British RSF team using 2005 figures resulted in a UK over-all incidence of low-pay workers of 22.1%: the same as the 2002 level, which was the turning point of a long-term growth pattern observable from 16% in 1981 onwards. It seems that in the years 2001-05 the incidence of low pay among men went up and among women down, though in 2005 the gender gap remained 11.5%pts. Since 1981, the proportion of the low-paid nearly doubled among full-time men, diminished among female full-timers and grew substantially among part-timers, males as well as females. In the last two decades the low wage incidence grew among all age groups, but mostly among the 16-24 of age (49% in 2005).[150]

[149] Burgess, 2006, 27 ff.
[150] Lloyd *et al*, 2007, Chapters 1, 2.

Through calculations on *WageIndicator* data based on the low-wage threshold used in the RSF research project, we found a low-wage incidence among adult employees in the UK for 2005 of 16%.

4.6. A closer look at employee characteristics

Calculations on the *WageIndicator data* for nine countries allow us to elaborate section 4.4, and trace the low-wage incidence for five employee characteristics: gender, industries, working hours/week, age group, and educational level: see Table 4.5. All figures used concern gross hourly adult wages and relate to 2005, except those for Denmark (2005 *and* 2006) and Hungary (2006).

In general, the national averages vary compared to the official statistics presented earlier in Tables 4.2 and 4.3: those of Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands based on the *WageIndicator* data show higher levels, those of Finland, Germany, Spain and the UK are lower. Yet, as we will show the patterns for the employee characteristics remain highly relevant and are largely in line with those from other sources.

The shares by gender confirm the fact that the low-wage incidence for female employees is much higher than that for males: in Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK it is about twice as high, while the differences in the other three countries are lower but still considerable.

The distribution of low pay over the 13 industries is also of interest. We ranked the low wage incidence by industry per country, with the lowest incidence on top. The resulting ranking is fairly consistent across countries. Over all, finance, public administration, education and utilities are the four sectors showing the lowest incidence of low-paid, with the exception of utilities in Finland (the highest incidence!), public administration in Poland and to a lesser extent in Belgium, and education in the UK. Manufacturing, construction, transport and communication, and other commercial services generally maintain positions in the middle of the spectrum. Other community services and health care tend to be in the lower ranks, health care quite pronounced in Belgium and Poland. Three industries can consistently be found at the bottom: hotels/restaurants/catering, wholesale/retail, and agriculture. The hotels/restaurants/catering industry has the doubtful honour of

Table 4.5. Incidence of low pay (under 2/3 median wage threshold) in nine EU member states, detailed shares per category, 2005 (Denmark 2005-2006, Hungary 2006), adults aged 21 and over

	BE		DK 2005-06		FI		DE		HU	2006
Total	18%		14%		5%		12%		29%	
By gender										
Male	12%		12%		4%		9%		25%	
Female	26%		20%		7%		18%		32%	
By industries (13, incl. ranking per country)										
Agriculture	38%	12	18%	4	5%	6	24%	12	55%	13
Manufacturing	12%	2	12%	3	4%	3	9%	5	33%	9
Utilities	14%	3	-	-	14%	13	6%	2	23%	5
Construction	19%	6	9%	1	8%	10	15%	8	36%	10
Wholesale/retail	30%	11	28%	7	12%	11	22%	11	47%	11
Hotels, rest., cat.	45%	13	-	-	13%	12	48%	13	55%	12
Transp, commun	19%	6	12%	2	7%	8	15%	8	19%	4
Finance	8%	1	-	-	2%	2	5%	1	6%	1
Other comm.serv	17%	5	27%	6	4%	3	12%	6	24%	6
Public admin.	19%	6	-	-	1%	1	8%	3	18%	2
Education	14%	3	-	-	4%	3	8%	3	19%	3
Health care	20%	10	20%	5	7%	8	15%	8	25%	7
Other	19%	6	-	-	6%	7	14%	7	27%	8
By working hours / week										
0-40	18%		13%		5%		11%		29%	
40.1-48	14%		15%		12%		16%		19%	
48.1-99	21%		35%		29%		22%		33%	
By age group										
< 25 yr	46%	5	55%	5	20%	5	38%	5	44	5
25-34 yr	20%	4	20%	4	6%	4	13%	4	32	4
35-44 yr	14%	3	13%	2	4%	3	9%	2	29	3
45-54 yr	11%	1	9%	1	2%	1	9%	2	26	2
>=55 yr	11%	1	15%	3	2%	1	8%	1	21	1
By educational level										
low	28%		16%		9%		19%		53	
middle	23%		13%		4%		12%		25	
high	12%		12%		2%		6%		6	
Sample size										
N	11,025		136		4,293		32,668		4,142	

Source: WageIndicator *data 2005, for Hungary 2006. Selection: employees.*

Table 4.5 (Continued) Incidence of low pay (under 2/3 median wage threshold) in nine EU member states, detailed shares per category, 2005 (Denmark 2005-2006, Hungary 2006), adults aged 21 and over

	NL		PL		ES		UK	
Total	23%		27%		11%		16%	
By gender								
Male	16%		23%		8%		12%	
Female	31%		30%		16%		21%	
By industries (13, incl. ranking per country)								
Agriculture	30%	10	47%	12	26%	13	50%	13
Manufacturing	19%	6	21%	4	9%	3	13%	5
Utilities	11%	2	16%	2	10%	6	5%	1
Construction	18%	4	24%	6	9%	3	10%	2
Wholesale/retail	39%	12	35%	8	20%	11	27%	11
Hotels, rest., cat.	47%	13	58%	13	20%	11	40%	12
Transp, commun	28%	9	24%	6	9%	3	14%	7
Finance	18%	4	16%	1	6%	1	13%	5
Other comm.serv	21%	8	20%	3	12%	10	12%	4
Public admin.	10%	1	39%	9	6%	1	11%	3
Education	16%	3	21%	4	6%	1	15%	8
Health care	19%	6	44%	11	11%	7	18%	9
Other	34%	11	40%	10	11%	7	18%	9
By working hours / week								
0-40	23%		26%		9%		14%	
40.1-48	26%		34%		16%		21%	
48.1-99	32%		33%		27%		28%	
By age group								
< 25 yr	64%	5	50%	5	31%	5	34%	5
25-34 yr	22%	4	26%	4	13%	4	15%	3
35-44 yr	15%	3	21%	3	6%	1	12%	1
45-54 yr	14%	2	14%	2	6%	1	15%	3
>=55 yr	12%	1	12%	1	6%	1	13%	2
By educational level								
low	33%		41%		17%		21%	
middle	29%		41%		15%		25%	
high	11%		23%		7%		9%	
Sample size								
N	44,204		3,662		7,767		8,380	

Source: WageIndicator *data 2005, for Hungary 2006. Selection: employees.*

4.7. Conclusions

The outcomes presented in this chapter contribute to the body of knowledge on low pay in various ways. First, they support the evidence that across countries the incidence of low pay remains considerable among females, young adults, and low educated workers. Second, we could expand this evidence beyond EU member states, for which this already had been found, to other countries: Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Poland, and Spain. Third, our calculations reveal that the share of low hourly wages goes up considerably with working hours in all nine countries studied. The data show a low pay incidence of over 20% for those usually working 48 hours per week or more. Fourth, we could rank the low pay incidence by industry, resulting in a ranking that is consistent across countries. In the lower ranks the usual suspects pop up. Three industries can nearly always be found at the bottom: hotels/restaurants/catering, wholesale and retail, and agriculture. Moreover, as we will show in the course of this book these three industries show an accumulation of workers' problems besides pay. Notable here are problems with working time and training for wholesale and retail combined with quite low collective bargaining coverage, and high scores on work-related stress for the hotel and restaurant industry. .

Especially for the workers in these 'industries at the bottom', the idea may be worthwhile pushing that each EU member state to which it concerns, be obliged to gradually raising its minimum wage to a Kaitz index level of at least 50%. This calls for initiatives notably of governments and the European Commission. Yet, this does not deprive the European union movement from its own responsibilities. The unions should continue to put employers, national administrations and the EU machinery under pressure through coordinated wage bargaining. Such activity could take the form of coordinated cross-border bargaining initiatives, be it cross-sectoral or sectoral, as well as of more action orientated forms of consciousness-raising combined with wage demands across countries aiming at specific low-wage industries or occupations. An example was the International Justice for Janitors Day (June 15), on which the UNI Global Union yearly focused on social justice for cleaners and security workers. From 2005 onwards, German and Dutch unions have been using this framework to pursue joint demands for a basic

gross hourly wage of €10 for cleaners.[151] Union structures allowing articulation between these various levels are central to ensure that this range of activities is connected and mutually reinforced.[152]

[151] See www.internationaljusticeday.org; www.igbau.de; www.fnvbondgenoten.nl.
[152] Cf. Waddington, 2005, 536.

5. Training

Wim Sprenger, Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens, Nuria Ramos Martin

5.1. Introduction

Recently the importance of training, related to both vocational training and lifelong learning, has been emphasized in various EU declarations and documents. The re-launched Lisbon strategy has reinforced the goal of turning the EU into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. One of its objectives is the transformation of education and training throughout Europe. Yet, current national strategies and policy measures in this field vary widely in scope and intensity, especially if it concerns low-skilled and older workers.

Section 5.2 indicates the contours of the European training landscape, by providing information on EU policies, on the ETUC views on training, and, based on the European Working Conditions Surveys, on some trends in training in the EU. Section 5.3 deals with the relation between collective bargaining and training. In Section 5.4 we present the outcomes of our analyses on *WageIndicator* data related to training, by overviews across countries and industries, and by a closer look at employee characteristics: gender, age, educational levels, and employment contracts. Finally, we explore the relationship between provided and self-paid training, linking the various training categories with employee characteristics (5.5).

5.2. EU and training: debate and facts

EU training policies

The training systems in the European Union vary considerably across countries. According to Article 150 of the European Community Treaty, "(…) the Community shall implement a vocational training policy which shall support and supplement the action of the Member States while fully respect-

ing the responsibility of the Member States for the content and organisation of vocational training." This means that EU policies concerning training should focus on providing conditions for cooperation and exchanging practices between the member states, while preserving the rights of the member states concerning the content and organisation of their training systems.

In the context of the original Lisbon strategy, in 2001 the Ministers of Education of the Member States adopted a report on the future objectives of education and training systems to be achieved by 2010.[153] A year later, the Education Council and the Commission endorsed a 10-year work programme, called Education and Training 2010. This programme integrates all actions in the fields of education and training at the European level, including vocational education and training. In November 2002, the Education Ministers of 31 European countries and the European Commission adopted the so-called Copenhagen Declaration on enhanced cooperation in European vocational education and training. This declaration implies a political mandate to prioritize education and training policies at EU level. The three major goals to be achieved by 2010 are:

- to improve the quality and effectiveness of EU education and training systems;
- to ensure that they are accessible to all;
- to open up education and training to the wider world.

In order to achieve these goals, thirteen specific objectives have been formulated, covering the various types and levels of education and formal, non-formal and informal training, all aiming at lifelong learning. Systems have to improve on all aspects, such as teacher training, basic skills, integration of ICT, efficiency of investments, language learning, lifelong guidance, flexibility of the systems to make learning accessible to all, mobility, and citizenship education. In November 2003, the European Commission adopted a Communication presenting an interim evaluation of the implementation of the Education and Training 2010 programme, calling for accelerated reforms in the years to come and for a stronger political commitment to achieve the Lisbon goals. [154] It was the basis of a 2004 Joint Interim

[153] Council of the European Union, 2001.
[154] EC, 2003a.

Report of the Council and the Commission on the implementation of the detailed work programme, emphasising that the EU must catch up with its main competitors in terms of investment and develop comprehensive strategies to make lifelong learning a reality. [155]

The need for the provision of stimulating lifelong learning received special attention in the context of the Copenhagen process. The aim is to strengthen the European dimension of information guidance and counselling services, enabling citizens to make better use of the available vocational learning opportunities. The idea is to make it possible to link together and build on learning acquired at different stages of life, in both formal and non-formal contexts. The priorities for enhanced cooperation in this area are built on those of the Commission's 2001 Communication on making a European area of lifelong learning a reality,[156] followed by the Council resolutions on lifelong learning (June 2002) and on lifelong guidance (May 2004).

The 2006 Joint Interim Report of the Council and the Commission included reporting on the progress under the Education and Training 2010 work programme[157]. It pointed out that particular attention had to be given to improved monitoring of the implementation of lifelong learning strategies, better information, and exchanges of experiences regarding the use of the EU financial instruments to support education and training development. The report underlined that, although many member states have developed lifelong learning strategies, those strategies remain imbalanced. They focus on either employability or re-engaging those who have become alienated from the systems. Little attention has been paid to older and low skilled workers' learning opportunities. The overall conclusion was that progress concerning social inclusion is too slow and that the pace of reforms needed to be speeded up. In December 2006, the European Ministers of Vocational Education and Training, the European social partners and the European Commission issued a revision of the priorities and strategies of the Copenhagen process in order to enhance the European cooperation in this field.

[155] OJ C 104 of 30.04.2004.
[156] EC, 2001b.
[157] OJ C 79 of 01.04.2006.

The support of the member states for European cooperation was secured earlier in vocational training than in the field of education, as is shown by the creation of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training CEDEFOP in 1975 and the Leonardo da Vinci programme in 1994. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that in order to facilitate the mobility of workers within the EU territory, the EU has developed the Europass-Training initiative allowing training skills acquired in member states different from the one of origin to be registered in a personal document.

It is worth noting that the European Parliament's Commission of Employment and Social Affairs wants to improve the employability of workers, while special attention is devoted to innovation and technological development and to new sectors of employment.[158] The EP commission aims at expanding and improving investments in human capital by setting up efficient strategies for lifelong learning in accordance with the European agreements, such as adequate incentives and mechanisms to divide the costs between governments, enterprises and individuals aiming substantially to diminish the amount of school dropouts. The commission also advocates better accessibility to primary, secondary and higher vocational education as well as more continuous learning at the workplace during the whole life cycle, especially for low skilled and older workers.[159]

The ETUC and training

The ETUC is rather pessimistic about the actual developments in training. In its document "The coordination of collective bargaining 2007" it stresses the need to promote an equivalent rights approach in different fields among which training "(….) making sure a-typical workers have access to social security, holiday (pay), training and lifelong learning". Given globalisation, the European confederation stresses that labour market institutions need to ensure upwards flexibility and upward mobility of workers.

The ETUC emphasises that a modern labour market provides access to training for all workers and that the European labour market scores badly on this issue: "In practice, however, business is under-investing in training

[158] Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, 2005a.
[159] Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, 2005b.

while the access to training is almost blocked for those who are most in need of it (low-skilled workers, older workers, long-term unemployed, temporary workers)". The ETUC points to the more than 70% of workers who do not receive any training paid for or provided by their employers, and has to conclude that in the EU15 the trend in training is negative. Following up on the EMF 2005 initiative for a common demand on the right to training of five days a year for each worker, the ETUC plans to engage with affiliates in order to see whether such a common demand would also be possible on the ETUC level. The first step to be taken is gathering data from the member unions on the situation of training provided by enterprises in their country and industry. The ETUC in particular draws members' attention to industry and/or intersectoral agreements which correct the market failure and business underinvestment in training by obliging all firms to contribute to social partner funds which have training of workers as an objective with a special focus on groups at risk in the labour market.[160] Partly building on the common initiatives to be discussed in section 5.3 and partly on own research among affiliates, the ETUC is pushing for more initiatives in the field of lifelong learning in combination with mobility at national, industry and local levels.[161]

Training in Europe: some trends

In most European countries formal education, provided by the state, is targeted towards future entrants to the labour market, namely, youngsters, and sometimes re-entrants. Depending on their educational systems, countries either have strictly separated education and labour market policies, or organise education mostly in combination with work. Yet, governments of the member states do not invest large amounts in education and training for workers with the exception of training activities for unemployed or for those with an otherwise weak labour market position. In 2003, the EU15 member states spent in total nearly €26 billion on the training of unemployed workers and special target groups. This amounted to almost 40% of their total labour market policy expenditure, the other 60% being used for

[160] ETUC, 2006a.
[161] ETUC, 2007.

employment incentives, integration of disabled workers, direct job creation and start-up initiatives.[162]

Workers with a paid job enjoy less public spending or facilities to keep up with changes at work. They are dependent on training courses for adults offered by local authorities or commercial suppliers. In the main these are either paid for by themselves and carried out in their own time, or are activities provided, paid and organised by their employers. Conditions in those training facilities provided by companies vary widely: from training offered freely and in working-time through to provisions where workers (partly) have to pay themselves and/or attend courses in their own time .

A comparison of the results of the fourth European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), carried out in 2005, with its predecessors shows that access to training in Europe has not improved and since 1995 the levels of training have not increased.[163] In 2005, 26% of all respondents in the EU27 had undergone training paid by the employer in the previous year,[164] plus about 5% paid by the worker.[165] These figures include the self-employed. When focussing on the dependent workforce, the share of training solely paid by the employer is at 29% slightly higher.[166] The detailed EWCS results show that:

- country averages of the share of those with training paid by the employer in the previous year varied from 53% (Finland) and 51% (Sweden), through 41% for Belgium, 39% in the UK, 36% in Denmark, 32% in the Netherlands, 26% in Poland, 25% in Germany, to 19% in Spain and 16% in Hungary (and 8% in Bulgaria);
- over-all differences by gender remain small: 25% of the male respondents received employer-paid training in the previous year, against 27% of the women;

[162] Eurostat, 2005.
[163] Parent-Thirion *et al*, 2007, 48; Fourth EWCS Resume, 2007, 1.
[164] Parent-Thirion *et al*, 2007, Annex 3: Statistical tables, q28a_1. In the EU15 this share was, with 27%, only slightly higher.
[165] Parent-Thirion *et al*, 2007, Fig. 5.14.
[166] Parent-Thirion *et al*, 2007, Annex 3: Statistical tables, q28a_1.

- those aged 25-39 received more training (29%) than workers under 25 of age (21%) and those aged 40-54 (27%), and a lot more than those aged 55 and over (19%);
- workers with a higher educational level received more training: only 10% of those with a primary level of education received training over the previous year compared to 41% of those with third-level education;[167]
- workers in public administration (44%), education and health care (both 42%) received about twice as much training as those working in the private sector (21% on average, with 24% for manufacturing);[168]
- most training is given to workers on permanent contracts (31%), though the difference with those on fixed-term contracts (29%) is small; workers with a temp agency contract (18%) or with no contract (11%) receive substantially less training;[169] moreover, part-time workers receive in the EU27 5%-points less training than their full-time colleagues;[170]
- if training is provided, the average number of paid training days per year is low: 60% received between one and five days and 20% between six and ten days of training.[171]

It is worthwhile investigating the job-skills match, as is done in the fourth EWCS. Do workers perceive that their duties correspond well with their skills and do they feel under-skilled ('need further training') or over-skilled ('have the skills to cope with more demanding duties')? In the EU27 a small majority (52%) stated that job and skills correspond well, 35% reported they felt over-skilled and 13% reported they felt under-skilled. The feeling of being over-skilled varied widely between countries, without a clear pattern. Among the countries covered in this book, the UK has the highest score here (43%), followed by Hungary (41%), while only 22% of the Finnish respondents felt over-skilled. The scores of the other countries remained in between. Women felt slightly less over-skilled than men (2%pts), and workers aged 55 and older slightly less than the younger age categories.[172]

[167] Fourth EWCS Resume, 2007, 6.
[168] Parent-Thirion *et al*, 2007, Table 5.3.
[169] Fourth EWCS Resume, 2007, 6.
[170] Parent-Thirion *et al*, 2007, Table 5.3.
[171] Fourth EWCS Resume, 2007, 6.
[172] Parent-Thirion *et al*, 2007, Annex 3: Statistical tables, q27.

The industry variations are rather limited. Unfortunately, due to a change in the questioning these figures are not comparable with previous EWCS outcomes.

5.3. Collective bargaining and training

The relation between training of workers and collective bargaining is not a simple one. Collective bargaining can pave the way for:

- training incentives such as remuneration after completion/exams,
- training facilities such as payment, time, and supply of training,
- training levels necessary for special jobs and occupations,
- training rights,
- recognition of received training on the job.

The decisions as to which workers will follow training courses, under which conditions and with what implications for pay, job mobility and future training perspectives are primarily taken by shop floor managers and supervisors. Nevertheless, collective agreement clauses about training may make quite some difference for the conditions in which training practices are embedded.

It is often assumed that collective agreements foster continuous training and encourage participation in such training. Research only partially confirms this assumption. Unions in a number of EU member states have managed to negotiate training agreements, but not always for all categories of workers and neither have they always been able to ensure their implementation. It is clearly a mistake to regard training as an inherently non-adversarial issue in industrial relations.[173] Various empirical evidence points in this direction. Mytzek-Zühlke for example analysed for 1999 the differences between the vocational training activities of companies in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the UK, discovering that only 32% of employees in German companies employing 10 or more workers participated in continuous training, compared with 61% in Sweden, 53% in Denmark, and 49% in the UK. Collectively agreed measures to foster continuous training had a large effect on

[173] Heyes, 2007, 243.

participation rates in the UK. In Germany, company agreements encouraged continuous training significantly, whereas industry agreements showed no effects.[174]

A study of German companies revealed that in 2004 84% of them offered continuous training.[175] About 56% of the employers questioned, however, noted the increasing need for continuous training. More than two-thirds of them argued that such training was also or in particular a responsibility of employees. They wanted their employees to become more proactive in relation to continuous training efforts in order to protect their own employability. Here the dilemmas of continuous training are reflected. Is training a general necessity for which employers and workers should be jointly responsible, or is it part of firms' HR strategies, leaving the challenge to individual workers?

In 2006, this last dilemma gave rise to a conflict between the German IG Metall union and employers. Both parties stressed the importance of continuous training for the future of workers and German enterprises: the Confederation of German Employers' Associations (BDA) referred to it as "a future assignment for companies, but also for employees, to ensure competitiveness, innovative capabilities and employability". However, discord started when it came to implementing this principle. IG Metall opted for industry-wide collective agreements committing employers to determine their labour needs and discuss continuous training schemes with their employees. The BDA in contrast, argued that companies need continuous training schemes allowing for fast and individual adjustments in an ever-changing environment. The latter would enable companies to exert their autonomy in decision-making processes with regard to continuous training in order to manage training at company level.[176]

Without industry-wide agreements the risk of low accessibility of training for less privileged groups of workers may increase. This was clearly illustrated by the SERVEMPLOI project, monitoring the progress of women working in the retail and finance industries of eight member states: Den-

[174] Cited in Vogel, 2006.
[175] The Cologne Institute, 2005.
[176] Vogel, 2006.

mark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK (1998 - 2001). In both industries, women in junior positions met considerable difficulties to be trained in the use of information technology. This was clearly in contrast to the fact that the organisations these women worked for were quickly progressing in this direction with retailers using computerised check-outs linked with supply-chain management, while in finance women were increasingly working with integrated IT systems. The researchers found training to vary considerably across countries, ranging from arrangements in Germany with vocational training schemes offering adequate preparation, to the UK and Spain with large shares of women receiving no training at all. In all countries, however, on-the-job training and 'shadowing' the work of other employees was commonplace. The project revealed a trend towards decreasing levels of training, with certain types of apprenticeship and vocational training no longer being offered to women in junior positions.[177]

Despite disputes at national and industry levels, the European social partners have taken responsibility to stimulate and co-ordinate common activities in this field. In May 2006 they presented their evaluation report on four years of joint activities to promote the lifelong development of competences and qualifications in Europe. Both parties agreed that the development of competences is essential if Europe is to become the most competitive, knowledge-based economy in the world. Therefore they adopted a framework of actions on lifelong learning, identifying practical tools for the social partners to use at national, industry and company levels. In 2006, they conducted a comprehensive evaluation in which over 350 social partners' initiatives were monitored. 108 of these initiatives aimed at identifying skill needs, 89 at finding ways to validate competences, 53 at informing and guiding companies or workers, and 100 at mobilising resources efficiently. Over 70 initiatives concerned companies' good practice examples and 280 comprised social partners' initiatives at industry or national levels. It was decided to build on this work for the work programme 2006-2008.[178]

[177] Webster *et al*, 2001.
[178] European Social Partners, 2006.

5.4. Training according to *WageIndicator* data

Training across countries

In this Section we will use data from the *WageIndicator* survey to investigate worker experiences concerning recent training. The survey includes three questions on training:

- *How much training have you received, paid for or provided by your EMPLOYER, over the past year in order to improve your skills?* The answer-set ranges from None, 1 - 2 days, 3 - 6 days, 1 - 4 weeks, 1 - 3 months, 3 - 6 months, 1/2 - 1 year, to 1 year or more, with an item to tick I don't know. No data are available for Denmark and the UK.
- *How much training have you paid for YOURSELF over the past year in order to improve your skills?* Here the answer-set is similar to the previous question. No data are available for Denmark, Finland and the UK.
- *How often do you find training for your job would be worthwhile?* The answers can be ticked on a five-point scale, ranging from Never (1) to Daily (5), with an item to tick Not applicable. No data are available for Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Poland and the UK.

The first two questions jointly cover the same question as put forward in the EWCS; the third reveals more about training attitudes and expectations of individual employees, irrespective of their actual training situation.

As for the training provided by the employer last year, from Table 5.1 it can be seen that the majority of employees in Finland (67%), Belgium and Poland (both 62%) and the Netherlands (61%) receive such training. In Hungary and Germany this share includes just over half of the workers (52%, respectively 51%), and in Spain a large minority (43%). These figures are considerably higher, from 14%pts for Finland to 29%pts for the Netherlands, than the scores found by the EWCS 2005 on exactly the same question, though the ranking of the countries remains the same. Along with low pay, training is the issue for which we found differences of this magnitude in outcomes between the *WageIndicator* and other European data sources. We tend to attribute these differences to a self-selection effect: visitors to the *WageIndicator* most likely will have a larger drive to progress in their job i.e. to be trained than representative samples of the respective workforces. This may have been particularly the case for Spain.

In five out of seven countries about two-thirds of the employer-provided training lasted less than one week per year, except for Poland (three-quarter) and Spain (half). For about 20% (in Poland 15%) of those receiving such training, this lasted 1-2 weeks, and another 10-20% got 3 weeks or more of training (except Spain, with a share of 30%). The Netherlands, Poland and Spain reveal the highest percentages of employees receiving training during the substantial training period of at least one month. When looking at average training length, that of Germany is lowest; this may be seen as the other side of the vast investments in the dual learning system in Germany. In Finland, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain, average employer-provided training lasts slightly above 5 days per year.

Table 5.1. Incidence and average of employer-provided training days last year, breakdown by country

	BE	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES
No training	38%	33%	49%	48%	39%	38%	57%
Training	62%	67%	51%	52%	61%	62%	43%
of which 1 – 2 days	19%	22%	16%	19%	18%	22%	9%
3 – 6 days	24%	23%	21%	14%	21%	21%	12%
1 – 2 weeks	12%	13%	10%	10%	10%	9%	9%
3 – 4 weeks	4%	4%	3%	5%	5%	5%	5%
1 – 2 months	1%	2%	1%	4%	2%	2%	2%
2 months or more	2%	2%	1%	-	4%	3%	5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	19,000	3,143	12,893	480	88,721	571	14,172
Mean nr of days	4.4	5.1	3.3	4.1	5.7	5.2	5.9
Standard dev.	8.6	9.8	7.2	7.8	11.3	10.7	12.9

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: The average number of training days includes the individuals with no training.

As for self-paid training in the last year, Table 5.2 reveals that one third of the Polish and the Spanish employees followed such training, about twice as many as the Dutch and the Belgians. The Germans and the Hungarians remain in between. The high Spanish outcome seems to be the other side of the relatively low training rates in Spain. Moreover, training courses of at least one month are much more common in Spain, covering one out of six employees at large and two-thirds of those enjoying self-paid training. On

the other hand, the duration of the self-paid training followed by the Hungarians is particularly short: 1-2 days for half of those paying by themselves. Thus the impressive average length of the self-paid training in Spain (over 11 days) contrasts starkly with the short average of that training in Hungary (less than two days), with the other four countries ranged in between. In three countries (Spain, Hungary and Denmark) the average duration of self-paid training exceeds that of employer-provided, in the other three countries it is the other way around.

Table 5.2. Incidence and average of self-paid training days last year, breakdown by country

	BE	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES
No training	81%	74%	79%	83%	65%	67%
Training	19%	26%	21%	17%	35%	33%
of which 1 – 2 days	5%	8%	10%	5%	7%	3%
3 – 6 days	4%	6%	4%	3%	8%	3%
1 – 2 weeks	3%	4%	3%	2%	5%	4%
3 – 4 weeks	2%	2%	1%	2%	4%	3%
1 – 2 months	1%	1%	3%	1%	3%	3%
2 months or more	5%	6%	-	5%	9%	17%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	10,242	12,630	436	47,374	552	6,025
Mean nr of days	3.7	4.4	1.8	3.6	7.5	11.7
Standard dev.	12.0	12.8	6.2	12.1	16.4	20.7

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: *The average number of training days includes the individuals with no training.*

Table 5.3 clarifies the incidence of the various forms of training: (only) employer-provided, (only) self-paid, combined employer-provided and self-paid, and no training at all. The percentages receiving only employer-provided training vary from 50% in Belgium and 49% in the Netherlands to 20% for Spain. As for self-paid training, Spain takes the lead with 17%; in contrast, Belgium (6%) and the Netherlands (5%) show the lowest shares. Concerning the combination of employer-provided and self-paid training Poland scores remarkably high (24%), followed by Spain (16%), with Belgium, the Netherlands and Hungary at the bottom. The available figures indicate that there are two mechanisms at work here. First, although we do

not suggest a simple trade-off between the two forms of training, it can be assumed that where considerable numbers of employees cannot rely on employer-provided training, they will turn to self-paid training. Second, our data for all countries suggest that employees receiving employer-provided training also tend to follow more self-paid training.

Table 5.3. Incidence of employer-provided, self-paid, combined employer-provided/self-paid and no training last year, breakdown by country

	Only employer-prov. training	Only self-paid training	Both empl. + self-p. training	No trai-ning	Total
Belgium	50	6	12	32	100%
Germany	37	12	14	37	100%
Hungary	40	8	12	40	100%
Netherlands	49	5	12	34	100%
Poland	37	11	24	28	100%
Spain	20	17	16	48	100%

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

The results of the survey question on employees' opinions of the value of training for the job are presented in Table 5.4. The table shows that Spanish employees value training by far highest among the five countries compared. Belgian and Dutch employees are comparatively sceptical about the value of training; their Finnish and British colleagues remain in between.

Table 5.4. Percentages of employees finding training for their job would be worthwhile and average scores by country

	BE	FI	NL	ES	UK
Never worthwhile	14%	7%	16%	9%	12%
Sometimes worthwhile	26%	23%	30%	12%	22%
Regularly worthwhile	34%	33%	34%	20%	27%
Often worthwhile	19%	27%	16%	25%	24%
Daily (always) worthwhile	7%	10%	4%	34%	15%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	18,234	3,152	81,778	14,074	493
Mean (1=never, .. , 5=daily)	2.8	3.1	2.6	3.6	3.1
Standard deviation	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.2

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Training across industries

After presenting the frequencies by country for the three survey questions at stake, we now present differences across industries. Table 5.5 gives an overview of the shares of workers reporting to have received training from their employer last year, compared by country and industry. (Hungary and Poland are not included because the relatively small sample sizes do not allow for a breakdown by industry). Although countries differ significantly in the incidence of employer-provided training, large similarities can be observed in the ranking of industries. In all five countries the shares of employees receiving employer-provided training are highest in utilities, finance, the public sector, and education. Five industries, agriculture, hotels/restaurants/catering, construction, wholesale/retail and transport and communication, consistently reveal the lowest shares.

The average numbers of employer-provided training days across industries and countries are presented in Table 5.6. Here the ranking of industries is somewhat less consistent across countries. Again, finance and the public sector (though except Spain) are on top, but health care scores lower on training days than in Table 5.5 on training incidence and in utilities the scores for Finland and Germany are quite mediocre. Yet, again construction, hotels/restaurants/catering and wholesale/retail show relatively low scores. The training gap of these three industries with others is large because of the combination of low training incidence and low amounts of training days. This time the ranking of agriculture varies across countries. Striking here is the low ranking on number of training days of the education sector in Belgium, Germany and Spain.

Table 5.6 provides a breakdown by industry as for the incidence of employees' self-paid training. Here, education ranks first in the four countries covered, followed by health care. The latter industry is also amongst the highest ranking in Table 5.5 concerning employer-provided training, but the other three forerunners, the public sector, finance and utilities, now show lower rankings, finance notably in Belgium and utilities in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. A simple trade-off between received and self-paid training courses does not seem to be observable: industries with the lowest amounts of self-paid days are dispersed between countries, and on this issue no general pattern across industries emerges.

Table 5.8 shows the high number of self-paid training days in Spain: in each industry these are two to three times higher than in the other three countries. The table also shows that the industry rankings according to numbers of self-paid training days vary widely across countries. Only education scores consistently high, but, for example, health care shows a more varied ranking than in Table 5.7.

The combinations of the incidence and the amounts of self-paid days also vary considerably. A combination of low rankings shows up for agriculture in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, for manufacturing in the Netherlands, for utilities in Germany and Spain, for construction in Belgium and the Netherlands, for wholesale/retail in Belgium and Spain, for the hotel and restaurant sector in Germany and Spain, and for transport and communication in Germany.

Table 5.9 shows the average opinions (on a 5-point scale) of employees on whether training would be worthwhile, including the industry ranking. These opinions are clearly most positive in Spain and Germany. Within countries they show only limited variations by industry: except for Finland, the differences between the highest and lowest scores are maximum 0.5%points. The rankings by industry show a dispersed pattern. On average, employees from other commercial services value training fairly high, and so do utility workers in four countries (except Germany) as well as agricultural workers in Finland and Germany. Workers in hotels/restaurants/catering everywhere value training least, followed by those in wholesale/retail (except for Germany). Construction workers from all five countries, too, value training rather low.

We checked whether opinions on training differed between those who experienced training in the previous year and those who did not. Do workers value training more if they are more familiar with it? In Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands the average scores 'training would be worthwhile' of those with employer-provided training were slightly above those who did not get that training, in Spain they were equal. In Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain the opinions of those with self-paid training ranked also above those with no self-paid training, with 0.3, 0.2 and 0.2%points respectively. As could be expected, in these three countries those with self-paid training clearly showed on average the most positive opinions.

Table 5.5. Incidence of employer-provided training, i.e. employees having received at least one day of training last year and their ranking across industries from highest to lowest incidence, breakdown by country and industry

	BE		FI		DE	
	incidence	ranking	incidence	ranking	incidence	ranking
Agriculture	52%	10	0%	13	26%	13
Manufacturing	59%	8	60%	8	50%	7
Utilities	79%	1	88%	2	59%	4
Construction	47%	12	53%	12	36%	11
Wholesale/retail	51%	11	59%	9	44%	10
Hotels, rest., cater.	41%	13	54%	11	28%	12
Transport, comm.	56%	9	57%	10	47%	9
Finance	76%	2	90%	1	69%	1
Other comm.serv.	66%	6	67%	7	52%	6
Public sector	76%	3	86%	3	68%	2
Education	70%	5	74%	5	58%	5
Health care	74%	4	77%	4	59%	3
Other	64%	7	68%	6	50%	8
Total	63%		67%		51%	
N	19,000		3,143		12,893	

	NL		PL		ES	
	incidence	ranking	incidence	ranking	incidence	ranking
Agriculture	42%	12	60%	7	34%	10
Manufacturing	55%	9	59%	9	42%	8
Utilities	80%	1	79%	1	56%	2
Construction	55%	10	55%	10	31%	12
Wholesale/retail	51%	11	68%	3	34%	11
Hotels, rest., cater.	42%	13	20%	13	29%	13
Transport, comm.	56%	7	50%	11	51%	4
Finance	75%	3	76%	2	59%	1
Other comm.serv.	65%	6	68%	4	43%	7
Public sector	79%	2	60%	8	55%	3
Education	71%	5	61%	5	48%	5
Health care	71%	4	47%	12	45%	6
Other	55%	8	61%	6	38%	9
Total	61%		62%		43%	
N	88,721		571		14,172	

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 5.6. Average days of employer-provided training and their ranking across industries from highest to lowest days, breakdown by country and industry

	BE		FI		DE	
	av. days	ranking	av. days	ranking	av. days	ranking
Agriculture	6.3	3	6.8	2	5.1	1
Manufacturing	6.6	2	7.6	1	4.6	2
Utilities	2.8	12	0.0	13	4.0	3
Construction	4.2	7	5.4	3	3.8	4
Wholesale/retail	5.0	4	5.0	6	3.4	5
Hotels. rest.. cater.	3.9	8	5.3	4	3.3	6
Transport. comm.	8.7	1	3.9	10	3.2	7
Finance	4.3	5	4.4	9	3.2	8
Other comm.serv.	4.2	6	4.8	7	3.0	9
Public sector	3.6	9	5.0	5	2.9	10
Education	3.3	10	4.6	8	2.9	11
Health care	3.1	11	3.1	12	1.9	12
Other	2.7	13	3.7	11	1.9	13
Total	4.4		5.1		3.3	
N	19,000		3,143		12,893	

	NL		PL		ES	
	av. days	ranking	av. days	ranking	av. days	ranking
Agriculture	8.7	3	9.0	1	7.9	2
Manufacturing	10.4	1	2.8	10	6.3	6
Utilities	3.5	12	2.7	11	4.6	11
Construction	5.6	6	6.7	2	5.3	9
Wholesale/retail	6.0	5	6.2	5	5.9	7
Hotels. rest.. cater.	4.8	9	4.4	9	5.5	8
Transport. comm.	8.7	2	5.6	7	8.4	1
Finance	5.3	7	6.4	4	6.3	5
Other comm.serv.	5.3	8	5.6	6	6.7	4
Public sector	6.3	4	2.4	12	7.2	3
Education	4.0	11	5.3	8	4.2	12
Health care	4.2	10	6.4	3	5.1	10
Other	3.1	13	0.2	13	3.7	13
Total	5.7		5.2		5.9	
N	88,721		571		14,172	

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 5.7. Incidence of self-paid training and their ranking across industries from highest to lowest incidence, breakdown by country and industry

	BE		DE		NL	
	incidence	ranking	incidence	ranking	incidence	ranking
Agriculture	19%	6	21%	10	14%	11
Manufacturing	17%	10	25%	7	14%	12
Utilities	19%	7	19%	13	15%	10
Construction	15%	12	30%	4	12%	13
Wholesale/retail	15%	11	21%	11	15%	9
Hotels, rest., cater.	20%	5	21%	12	18%	7
Transport, comm.	17%	9	26%	6	17%	8
Finance	14%	13	31%	3	22%	2
Other comm.serv.	22%	3	28%	5	20%	5
Public sector	18%	8	24%	8	20%	4
Education	27%	1	40%	1	22%	1
Health care	23%	2	36%	2	20%	3
Other	21%	4	23%	9	20%	6
Total	19%		27%		17%	
N	10,266		12,765		47,374	

	PL		ES	
	incidence	ranking	incidence	ranking
Agriculture	60%	2	44%	2
Manufacturing	32%	8	30%	10
Utilities	35%	6	26%	12
Construction	32%	9	30%	9
Wholesale/retail	39%	5	23%	13
Hotels, rest., cater.	33%	7	28%	11
Transport, comm.	21%	13	30%	8
Finance	29%	12	33%	7
Other comm.serv.	30%	10	34%	6
Public sector	29%	11	39%	5
Education	61%	1	52%	1
Health care	43%	4	43%	3
Other	50%	3	43%	4
Total	35%		33%	
N	552		6,025	

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 5.8. Average days of self-paid training and their ranking across industries from highest to lowest days, breakdown by country and industry

	BE		DE		NL	
	av. days	ranking	av. days	ranking	av. days	ranking
Agriculture	3.0	13	1.3	13	2.5	12
Manufacturing	3.3	12	4.1	8	2.7	11
Utilities	3.4	10	3.7	10	3.7	8
Construction	3.4	8	4.5	7	2.2	13
Wholesale/retail	3.5	7	3.6	11	3.3	10
Hotels. rest.. cater.	3.4	9	3.6	12	4.0	6
Transport. comm.	4.1	5	4.0	9	3.3	9
Finance	3.3	11	5.5	2	4.9	2
Other comm.serv.	4.1	4	5.7	1	4.3	5
Public sector	4.3	2	4.9	5	4.6	3
Education	4.2	3	5.3	3	4.9	1
Health care	3.6	6	5.0	4	3.9	7
Other	4.7	1	4.9	6	4.5	4
Total	3.7		4.4		3.6	
N	10,266		12,765		47,374	

	PL		ES	
	av. days	ranking	av. days	ranking
Agriculture	11.7	3	15.6	2
Manufacturing	7.6	7	10.6	8
Utilities	11.3	4	10.1	10
Construction	6.9	8	11.5	7
Wholesale/retail	7.9	6	7.5	13
Hotels. rest.. cater.	12.2	2	9.3	11
Transport. comm.	4.9	12	9.0	12
Finance	4.3	13	10.4	9
Other comm.serv.	6.1	10	12.7	5
Public sector	5.9	11	12.2	6
Education	14.8	1	19.3	1
Health care	8.4	5	13.5	4
Other	6.5	9	14.7	3
Total	7.5		11.7	
N	552		6,025	

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 5.9. Average scores on opinions whether training for the job would be worthwhile and their ranking across industries from highest to lowest average, breakdown by country and industry

	BE		FI		NL	
	av. opinion	ranking	av. opinion	ranking	av. opinion	ranking
Agriculture	2.8	7	5.0	1	2.4	12
Manufacturing	2.8	6	3.0	9	2.6	7
Utilities	2.9	2	3.8	2	2.7	3
Construction	2.7	11	3.0	10	2.6	8
Wholesale/retail	2.6	12	3.0	12	2.5	10
Hotels, rest., cater.	2.5	13	2.8	13	2.3	13
Transport, comm.	2.7	9	3.1	6	2.5	11
Finance	2.8	3	3.4	3	2.7	6
Other comm.serv.	2.9	1	3.2	5	2.8	1
Public sector	2.8	4	3.0	7	2.7	4
Education	2.7	10	3.0	8	2.7	5
Health care	2.8	8	3.3	4	2.7	2
Other	2.8	5	3.0	11	2.6	9
Total	2.8		3.1		2.6	
N	18,234		3,152		81,778	
Standard dev.	1.1		1.1		1.1	

	ES		UK	
	av. opinion	ranking	av. opinion	ranking
Agriculture	3.8	2	2.3	13
Manufacturing	3.6	7	3.0	8
Utilities	3.8	3	3.5	1
Construction	3.6	8	3.2	3
Wholesale/retail	3.4	13	3.1	5
Hotels, rest., cater.	3.4	12	2.7	12
Transport, comm.	3.7	5	3.0	7
Finance	3.6	9	2.9	11
Other comm.serv.	3.7	4	3.1	4
Public sector	3.6	6	3.0	6
Education	3.6	10	3.0	9
Health care	3.8	1	3.5	2
Other	3.5	11	3.0	10
Total	3.6		3.1	
N	14,074		493	
Standard dev.	1.3		1.2	

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: *Opinions run from 1=never to 5=daily*

5.5. A closer look at employee characteristics

The *WageIndicator* data allows us to go more into detail on a series of other differences than those across industries. What about the training incidence for men and women, younger and older workers, lower and higher educated, or for employees on or without permanent employment contracts? We already noted the outcomes the fourth EWCS (2005), indicating that women received slightly more employer-provided training than their male colleagues, workers aged 25-39 more than youngsters and older workers, and higher educated much more than lower educated. In order to compare these outcomes with ours based on the *WageIndicator* data, we broke up the average number of training days employees got during the previous year for a number of individual characteristics: see Table 5.10.

The gender differences in our data show a less favourable picture for female workers than emerges from the EWCS 2005: in four out of five countries the employer-provided training incidence for women is lower than that for men. In Finland it is equal, and here too the average number of training days is slightly higher for women. The latter also holds for Spain. In Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands the negative outcomes double.

Although we use slightly different age categories, the *WageIndicator* outcomes concerning age broadly resemble those of the EWCS 2005: the youngest and the oldest categories receive less training than those in between, measured by incidence as well as by length. Yet, the underlying country patterns varied. In Belgium and the Netherlands, the 25-34 of age are best off, in Finland on the other hand the better off are those aged 45 and older, while in Germany and Spain the patterns concerning incidence and length vary: in Germany the incidence of employer-paid training grows with age while the number of training days fall, a pattern that, though less systematically, also shows up in Spain.

Most striking are our outcomes concerning educational levels. Fully in line with the EWCS outcomes, in all five countries the incidence and the number of employer-paid training days are clearly lowest for the lower educated, and highest for the high educated. On average both the incidence and the length of training for the high educated are over 1.5 times as large as those for the low educated.

The same kind of consistent differences, though not of this magnitude, can be seen when looking at employment contracts: in all five countries the workers on permanent contracts showed a higher incidence as well as more training days than their colleagues without such contracts.

In Table 5.11 we present the same information for those with self-paid training. As regards gender, the figures clarify that in all four countries female workers invest much more in self-paid training than males. Even if the incidence is the same, for example in Belgium and the Netherlands, women on average take substantially more self-paid training days than men.

As for age, the parallels with the patterns in employer-paid training are strong. The incidence is highest among youngsters in the Netherlands and Belgium, while it grows more or less with age in Germany and Spain. Here, the length of self-paid training falls with age along the same pattern. Considering educational levels, the same mechanisms seem more or less to be working here as regards employer-paid training. Everywhere the incidence of self-paid training is higher among the high educated than among the low educated, but in Germany the score for the middle educated is highest. In Belgium and Germany the length of training is highest among the middle educated too, while the Netherlands and Spain show more training days with more education.

As regards employment contracts our results are quite remarkable. Those without a permanent contract consistently display a higher incidence of self-paid training as well as a higher number of days of this kind of training than those with a permanent contract. Obviously the first group tends to invest more in training by themselves.

Besides the supply of facilities or possibilities to use continuous training, a decisive factor for the incidence and length of training may well be the value workers attach to training. Like Table 5.9, Table 5.12 shows the average opinions on whether training would be worthwhile, based on a 5-points scale, but this time broken down for personal characteristics. A comparison of Table 5.12 with Tables 5.10 and 5.11 reveals that the large variations in incidence and length of training, both employer-provided and self-paid, only partly seem to be linked with variations in opinions concerning training. Table 5.12 reveals small differences in attitudes between men and women. In some instances, like for educational level, variations in opinions are even opposed to the direction of variations in the actual use of training.

Table 5.10. Percentages of employer-provided training last year and average number of training days, breakdown by country and by gender, age, education, and employment contract

	BE		FI		DE		HU	
Gender								
Male	66%	4.9	67%	5.0	53%	3.5	52%	4.3
Female	59%	3.8	67%	5.3	49%	3.0	51%	3.8
Age								
< 25 yr	58%	5.9	50%	3.0	44%	3.7	44%	6.5
25-34 yr	65%	5.1	65%	5.0	51%	3.5	54%	4.2
35-44 yr	63%	4.1	67%	5.2	52%	3.1	57%	3.2
45-54 yr	62%	3.6	74%	6.3	51%	3.3	47%	4.5
>=55 yr	57%	3.2	76%	5.2	49%	2.9	47%	2.9
Education								
Low educ.	43%	3.0	58%	4.5	40%	2.8	41%	4.3
Middle educ.	58%	4.2	70%	5.4	51%	3.4	45%	3.1
High educ.	71%	4.9	79%	5.8	64%	3.9	58%	4.6
Permanent Contract								
No	52%	4.7	54%	3.5	40%	2.7	39%	4.2
Yes	64%	4.4	69%	5.4	53%	3.4	53%	4.1

	NL		PL		ES	
Gender						
Male	64%	6.2	64%	5.5	46%	5.9
Female	57%	5.1	61%	4.9	38%	5.9
Age						
< 25 yr	50%	5.9	56%	3.7	31%	5.0
25-34 yr	63%	6.0	64%	5.7	42%	6.1
35-44 yr	63%	5.7	63%	5.2	47%	6.0
45-54 yr	63%	5.1	63%	5.0	46%	5.6
>=55 yr	56%	4.2	50%	4.5	48%	4.7
Education						
Low educ.	48%	4.6	43%	3.4	31%	3.8
Middle educ.	60%	5.7	62%	5.0	38%	5.2
High educ.	70%	6.4	83%	10.1	50%	7.1
Permanent Contract						
No	47%	4.7	61%	4.4	33%	4.4
Yes	64%	5.9	63%	5.5	46%	6.4

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 5.11. Percentages of self-paid training last year and average number of training day, breakdown by country and by gender, age, education, and employment contract

	NL		PL		ES	
Gender						
Male	17%	3.0	32%	5.3	32%	9.9
Female	17%	4.4	39%	9.8	35%	13.7
Age						
< 25 yr	18%	4.9	33%	7.5	27%	11.1
25-34 yr	17%	4.0	36%	8.3	35%	13.2
35-44 yr	17%	3.5	30%	5.9	31%	10.0
45-54 yr	17%	2.4	46%	5.2	31%	8.8
>=55 yr	16%	1.7	33%	9.2	35%	5.4
Education						
Low educ.	11%	2.2	14%	0.6	19%	5.8
Middle educ.	17%	3.9	5%	1.0	28%	10.1
High educ.	21%	4.0	39%	8.3	43%	15.2
Permanent Contract						
No	20%	5.0	36%	9.5	37%	14.1
Yes	17%	3.3	35%	6.6	32%	10.8

	NL		PL		ES	
Gender						
Male	17%	3.0	32%	5.3	32%	9.9
Female	17%	4.4	39%	9.8	35%	13.7
Age						
< 25 yr	18%	4.9	33%	7.5	27%	11.1
25-34 yr	17%	4.0	36%	8.3	35%	13.2
35-44 yr	17%	3.5	30%	5.9	31%	10.0
45-54 yr	17%	2.4	46%	5.2	31%	8.8
>=55 yr	16%	1.7	33%	9.2	35%	5.4
Education						
Low educ.	11%	2.2	14%	0.6	19%	5.8
Middle educ.	17%	3.9	5%	1.0	28%	10.1
High educ.	21%	4.0	39%	8.3	43%	15.2
Permanent Contract						
No	20%	5.0	36%	9.5	37%	14.1
Yes	17%	3.3	35%	6.6	32%	10.8

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 5.12. Average opinion on whether training would be worthwhile, breakdown by country and by gender, age, education level, and employment contract

	BE	DK	FI	NL	ES
Gender					
Male	2.9	3.5	3.1	2.7	3.7
Female	2.7	3.7	3.1	2.6	3.5
Age					
< 25 yr	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.5	3.4
25-34 yr	2.9	4.0	3.1	2.7	3.7
35-44 yr	2.8	3.5	3.2	2.6	3.7
45-54 yr	2.7	3.6	3.2	2.6	3.6
>=55 yr	2.6	3.8	3.1	2.4	3.2
Education					
Low educ.	2.6	3.6	3.1	2.4	3.6
Middle educ.	2.7	3.5	3.1	2.6	3.7
High educ.	2.9	3.8	3.1	2.7	3.6
Permanent contract					
No	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.7	3.6
Yes	2.8	3.7	3.1	2.6	3.6

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: *Opinions run from 1=never, .. , 5=daily*

The determinants of employer-provided training

Which employees receive employer-provided training? The young, the well-educated, men or women , those with a permanent contract or working in large firms, or the public sector employees? We undertook analyses to detect the most important determinants. Table 5.13 shows the likelihood of an employee receiving employer-provided training, controlling for all these explanatory factors. Due to data limitations our analyses have been restricted to six countries.

As for gender, the table shows that in five out of six countries, male employees are more likely to receive employer-provided training. Hungary is the exception: here female employees are more likely to receive this type of training. Yet, the effect is not statistically significant. As regards age, the countries are very much alike too. In some countries a significant age effect can be found, but it is extremely small.

Concerning educational level, the six countries reveal a very similar pattern too. In all countries, the middle and higher educated employees are more likely to receive employer-provided training compared to lower educated

employees. The chance of receiving this training for the higher educated varies from 158% more than the low educated in Hungary to 269% more in Belgium .

As for having a permanent contract, the findings across the countries are again very much alike. In all countries, the chance of receiving this employer-provided training is higher for employees with a permanent contract than for employees with a fixed term contract, ranging from 26% higher in Hungary to 98% higher in Finland.

As regards firm size, the findings are even more consistent than for any of the other factors. For every increase in firm size, the chance of receiving employer-provided training is higher within a range of 14% to 21% across the six countries.

Concerning industry, the findings in each country are compared to those of the manufacturing industry in that country, to provide a common reference point in the analyses. Compared to manufacturing, in all countries employees in the finance industry, in public administration and in health care are more likely to receive employer-provided training. In five out of six countries – the Netherlands being the exception – employees in the construction industry have higher chances to receive this type of training. The remaining industries reveal mixed patterns.

In summary, in these analyses the effects of each individual factor discussed so far were controlled for the remaining factors. The analyses show that educational level is by far the most important factor determining someone's chances on employer-provided training, followed by the 'permanent contract' factor. Firm size is of major importance too: larger firms offer more employer-provided training. Finally, female employees are less likely to receive training from their employer. Our findings confirm those of the ECWS findings, even though these findings were based on average scores and not on multivariate analyses, in which the effects are controlled.

Table 5.13. Explaining the incidence of employer-provided training by country

Country	BE			FI			DE		
	B	Sig	Exp(B)	B	Sig	Exp(B)	B	Sig	Exp(B)
Gender [0=M, 1=F]	-0.397	***	0.67	-0.172		0.84	-0.198	***	0.82
Age	-0.005	**	1.00	0.010	*	1.01	-0.001		1.00
Education low (REF)		***			***			***	
Education middle	0.561	***	1.75	0.394	***	1.48	0.328	***	1.39
Education high	0.990	***	2.69	0.833	***	2.30	0.734	***	2.08
Perm. contract [0=N,1=Y]	0.532	***	1.70	0.682	***	1.98	0.609	***	1.84
Firmsize [1,10]	0.137	***	1.15	0.192	***	1.21	0.155	***	1.17
Manufacturing (REF)		***			***			***	
Construction	-0.290	***	0.75	-0.040		0.96	-0.347	***	0.71
Wholesale/retail/ hotels	0.015		1.02	0.455	***	1.58	-0.010		0.99
Transp, commun.	-0.086		0.92	0.048		1.05	-0.034		0.97
Finance	0.667	***	1.95	1.979	***	7.24	0.645	***	1.91
Other comm.serv.	0.321	***	1.38	0.398	***	1.49	0.314	***	1.37
Public admin.	0.861	***	2.36	1.546	***	4.69	0.878	***	2.41
Education	0.634	***	1.89	0.857	**	2.36	0.522	***	1.69
Health care	0.852	***	2.34	1.303	***	3.68	0.805	***	2.24
Other industry*	0.394	***	1.48	0.683	***	1.98	0.204		1.23
Constant	-1.143	***	0.32	-1.636	***	0.19	-1.637	***	0.19
N in Analysis	18642			3110			12093		
Not incl. (miss-ing)	1620			15021			69606		
Chi-square	1879.33			381.30			1417.37		
df	15			15			15		
Sig.	0.000			0.000			0.000		
-2 Log likelihood	15338.24			670.73			103431.59		

Source: *WageIndicator data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: ** Other community, social and personal service activities, including activities for households.*

Table 5.13. (Continued) Explaining the incidence of employer-provided training by country

Country	HU			NL			ES		
	B	Sig	Exp(B)	B	Sig	Exp(B)	B	Sig	Exp(B)
Gender [0=M, 1=F]	0.059		1.06	-0.438	***	0.65	-0.209	***	0.81
Age	-0.005		1.00	-0.005	***	1.00	0.003		1.00
Education low (REF)					***			***	
Education middle	0.012		1.01	0.399	***	1.49	0.316	***	1.37
Education high	0.455		1.58	0.680	***	1.97	0.745	***	2.11
Perm. contract [0=N,1=Y]	0.233		1.26	0.652	***	1.92	0.432	***	1.54
Firmsize [1,10]	0.144	***	1.16	0.138	***	1.15	0.133	***	1.14
Manufacturing (REF)					***			***	
Construction	-0.490		0.61	0.082	*	1.09	-0.284	***	0.75
Whole-sale/retail/hotels	-0.042		0.96	0.044		1.04	-0.170	*	0.84
Transp, com-mun.	-0.478		0.62	0.036		1.04	0.348	***	1.42
Finance	1.367	*	3.92	0.869	***	2.38	0.583	***	1.79
Other comm.serv.	-0.075		0.93	0.419	***	1.52	-0.030		0.97
Public admin.	0.196		1.22	0.892	***	2.44	0.450	***	1.57
Education	-0.026		0.98	0.668	***	1.95	0.173		1.19
Health care	-0.034		0.97	0.732	***	2.08	0.157		1.17
Other industry*	-0.218		0.80	0.158	***	1.17	-0.022		0.98
Constant	-0.895		0.41	-0.969	***	0.38	-1.636	***	0.19
N in Analysis	470			83890			13703		
Not incl. (missing)	7323			15470			2078		
Chi-square	42.77			8816.37			1127.38		
df	15			15			15		
Sig.	0.000			0.000			0.000		
-2 Log likelihood	607.936			103431.59			17613.84		

Source: *WageIndicator data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: ** Other community, social and personal service activities, including activities for households.*

5.6. Conclusions

Bargaining for better training facilities and provisions in Europe will have to be differentiated according to countries, industries, personal characteristics of workers, and workers' use of training facilities. Agriculture, hotels/restaurants/catering, construction and wholesale/retail are notable in that they show up as industries with low rates of employer-provided training. The training gap with other industries is large because of the combination of low training incidence and few training days. It may be interesting for unions to have a closer look at good practices in industries with a high training incidence, like finance and the public sector.

The shares of those receiving only employer-provided training are highest in Belgium and the Netherlands and lowest in Spain, while for self-paid training these relationships are reversed. The available figures indicate that there are two mechanisms at work here. First, although we do not suggest a simple trade-off between the two forms of training, it may well be assumed that where considerable numbers of employees cannot rely on employer-provided training, they are inclined to turn to self-paid training. Second, our data for all countries suggest that employees receiving employer-provided training tend to follow more self-paid training.

The value employees attach to training often seems a decisive factor. The high incidence as well as the long duration of self-paid training in Spain is consistent with the fact that Spanish employees value training by far the highest in the five comparable countries. In contrast, the comparatively low incidence of such training in Belgium and the Netherlands combines with relatively low values attached to training in these countries. It is also interesting to note that in three out of five countries the average scores for 'training would be worthwhile' of those with employer-provided training were above those who did not get that training. Similarly, in most countries the opinions of those with self-paid training scored higher than those with no self-paid training.

6. Older workers

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6.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the position of older workers. Recently a major problem throughout the EU has arisen concerning the general orientation of age regulations which appear to be dominated by 'restrictional' or 'punishing' approaches to the employment of older workers. By contrast, incentives to help older workers to improve their employability remain scarce. Many employers tend to solve the 'age problem' by trying simply to get rid of their older workers, thereby avoiding the need to develop smart, socially responsible age policies. The *WageIndicator* data allow us to investigate the issue from the perspective of older workers. What is their position, what are their perceptions and what do they see as perspectives and objectives? In section 6.2 we go into general trends. Section 6.3 looks at the EU legal framework on age discrimination. In section 6.4 we return to the relationship between collective bargaining and older workers. In section 6.5 we present and analyse relevant *WageIndicator* results.

6.2. General trends

Europe's working population is ageing. In almost all EU member states, due to a general rise in life expectation and smaller cohorts of youngsters entering the labour market, the average age of employees is rising. A recent OECD report showed that since 1970 most OECD countries have experienced a rise in the proportion of older people aged 50-64 in gainful employment, with the notable exception of Hungary, Poland and Turkey. However, in many countries this reflects increases in the labour market participation (employment) rates since the mid-1990s, following declines in

the 1970s and 1980s. These two decades witnessed strong tendencies for many workers in European countries to withdraw from the labour market after the age of 55.[179]

In the European Union, one of the Lisbon goals is to have reached in 2010 an employment rate of older workers throughout the EU of 50%. In 2006, the employment rate of those aged 55-64 in the EU25 had risen to 43.5% from 36.9% in 2000. The 2006 rates vary widely across the member states: from 69.6% in Sweden, 60.7% in Denmark, 57.4% in the UK and 54.5% in Finland (these nations thereby fulfilling this particular Lisbon goal), through 47.7% in the Netherlands, 48.4% in Germany and 44.1% in Spain, to a group of countries with low rates for the 55-64 of age, including Hungary (33.6% in 2006), Belgium (32.0%) and Poland (28.1%).[180] Of course, the national employment rates for older workers are closely related to the respective withdrawal or exit ages. In 2005 the median exit ages in the EU25 were 60.7 for men and 59.4 for women. Roughly speaking half of all men retire before they reach 61, half of women before the age of 60. The national medians ranged from 63.9 for men and 63.3 for women in Sweden, 63.8/60.3 in the UK and 62.2/60.1 in Denmark at the top end, with a group close to the EU25 averages including Germany (61.6/59.9) and the Netherlands (60.5/59.3), to Belgium (57.9/56.8) and Poland (57.0/55.2) at the bottom end. Comparing the 2005 figures with those of 1998 reveals that the median exit ages for both men and women increased in 18 out of 23 member states for which data were available, sometimes considerably as in Hungary and Finland. Yet, in 1998-2005 exit ages for both sexes fell in five countries, notably in Belgium, Italy and, quite strongly, in Poland.[181]

In recent years, a number of EU member states have taken policy measures to increase the exit age, including pension reforms, financial incentives for employers to keep older workers in their workforce, awareness raising initiatives (Austria, Germany, UK), and equal treatment legislation (a EU directive) and implementation measures in some member states, as in the UK and the Netherlands.[182] Obviously between 1998 and 2005 such meas-

[179] Keese, 2006, 30.
[180] Eurostat, 2007b.
[181] Based on Eurostat, 2007a, 2-3.
[182] Taylor, 2006.

ures have slowed down or even reversed the tendency to work shorter hours as employees approach retirement. This seems to be true in the case of women, but is not as clearcut in the case of men. In 2005 for the EU-25 as a whole the proportion of women aged 55-59 working under 30 hours per week was 2.5%points smaller than in 1998, while for those women aged 60-64 it was only 0.9%pts larger. Yet, for men aged 55-59 the proportion in the EU25 working less than 30 hours increased over this period by 1.2%pts and for those aged 60-64 by 2.6%pts. For this older age group seven countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK) showed an even larger rise.[183]

Governmental policies regarding retirement age and financial incentives are mostly not welcomed by the employees in these age groups. In the Netherlands employees aged 50 and over revealed a strong preference for early retirement and this most likely applies to other EU member states. More than 80% of the employees in a representative Dutch survey in 2003 did not want to continue working until the age of 65, whereas only 6% reported to be willing to do so. Only a small group (4%) was inclined to continue working after age 65. Employees tend to prefer early retirement if they judge their expected income levels after retirement to be sufficient, if they are in poor health, if they have physically heavy working conditions, if they face technological and organisational changes in the workplace, or if their partners and supervisors push them towards early retirement. All employees in the survey showed a high preference for gradually declining working hours before full retirement and more than half of them in the survey showed a preference for agreements with their employer to adjust working hours.[184] Yet, as we will show, EU rules on age discrimination reduce the possibilities for such regulations.

Employers too mostly do not wholeheartedly welcome governmental policies regarding retirement age and financial incentives. A recent Dutch study revealed that 76% of employers in the Netherlands associated an ageing workforce with rising wage costs. In addition, a majority of employers perceived older workers as an age group with considerable sick leave and a

[183] Eurostat, 2007a, 5-6.
[184] Henkens & Van Solinge, 2003, 26.

high resistance to change.[185] Although changes are on the way, similar attitudes may still be dominant among employers in most other member states.[186]

The definitions of 'older workers' and 'age policies' can be the subject of heated debates. It is obvious that policies and bargaining practices limiting the issue to the actual stock of older workers (aged 55 and over) depart from a (too) short time horizon. The limitations of such approaches have been emphasized in pleas for a more inclusive way of dealing with the problem of ageing by promoting structural, life-time investments that will result in incentives for a larger and more active participation of older workers.[187]

The EU legal framework on age discrimination

Already in 1980 the European Court of Justice acknowledged that "the general principle of equality (...) is one of the fundamental principles of Community law".[188] Nevertheless, during most of its history the EC legal framework merely tackled discrimination on grounds of sex and nationality. More recently, the prohibition of discrimination has been extended to cover other grounds: race and ethnic origin, religion and beliefs, disability, sexual orientation and age. Since 2000, EC law prohibits discrimination on grounds of age. Article 13 of the European Community Treaty includes a broad, but limited, catalogue of grounds of discrimination against which the EU has competence to approve legislation.[189] The Framework anti-discrimination Directive[190] constitutes an important landmark on the development of the principle of equality at EU level. In the case of discrimination on grounds of age, however, the protection granted is limited and restricted to the field of employment and occupation.[191]

In the case of distinction on grounds of age, the paradox, common to all equality judgements but especially obvious here, is that those measures that

[185] Henderikse *et al*, 2007.
[186] Cf. Keese, 2006; Loretto & White, 2006.
[187] Naegele *et al*, 2003.
[188] ECJ judgment of 8.10.1980.
[189] Waddington, 1999.
[190] Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, 16–22.
[191] Thüsing, 2003.

are potentially discriminatory for a group of workers are, at the same time, favouring another group, also characterised by age. In an attempt to come to terms with this paradox,[192] the EC anti-discrimination legislation does not establish an absolute rule of equality of treatment on grounds of age. On the contrary, sometimes a maximum age for access to employment, promotion, etcetera, is permitted as long as the measure in question can be objectively justified. In this sense, there are frequent differences in treatment affecting older workers as regards professional promotions, mobility decisions, changes in the working conditions, and collective redundancies in the case of financial crisis or restructuring of the undertaking. According to European law, these differences do not need to be discriminatory in all cases.

The EU prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age applies to all aspects of the employment relationship, from selection processes to working conditions and termination of contracts, covering also self-employed, union and professional organisations' membership and activities, and professional and vocational training. Article 3.4 of the Framework Directive, however, allows member states to exclude the armed forces from the scope of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age and disability.

Differences in the treatment of workers based on age arguments are not banned by the Framework anti-discrimination Directive. Its Preamble states that differences in treatment in connection with age may be justified under certain circumstances and therefore require specific provisions that may vary in accordance with situations in member states. It is therefore essential to distinguish between justified differences in treatment, in particular by legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and discrimination which must be prohibited.[193] Article 6 of the Directive even includes a range of differences of treatment that are allowed. Until December 2006, member states had the possibility to opt not to apply the prohibition of age discrimination in their national legal frameworks but after that date this prohibition must be in force.

Despite large-scale derogations, the Framework anti-discrimination Directive has had major implications. Important here was the judgement of the

[192] Considered unsuccessful by Fredman, 2003.
[193] Paragraph 25.

European Court of Justice in the Mangold case.[194] Although agreeing that the vocational integration of unemployed older workers was a legitimate employment policy aim, a German legislative provision which authorised, without restriction, the conclusion of fixed-term contracts of employment once the worker had reached the age of 52 was declared discriminatory on grounds of age. Here the Directive clearly influenced national policy-making and legislation.

The European Commission did more than produce a Directive. From 2001-2006 the EC ran a Community Action Programme against discrimination, promoting policy measures against all sorts of discriminatory treatments, including discrimination against older workers. Such activities may be the first steps to meet the criticism of EU law specialists, arguing that prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age is not enough and that some sort of positive action is also required here. Suggestions put forward include mandatory company planning to promote a diverse workforce; special training programmes addressed to elderly workers; career planning and personal aid; and the alleviation of social security contributions for elderly workers in order to counterbalance the supposed higher labour cost of those workers.[195]

In 2005 and 2006 the European Parliament (EP) clarified its position on older workers. The EP Commission of Employment and Social Affairs stressed the necessity of positive action, to keep older workers in employment or to re-employ older workers; it also advocated greater flexibility in the choice of pension arrangements.[196] Modern pension and health systems should respond to changing societal needs to stimulate longer careers and to discourage early retirement. Working conditions should facilitate active aging, through an attractive range of part-time jobs on a voluntary basis and possibilities for gradual retirement.[197] The EP commission suggested a paradigm shift of work and aging: (healthy) older workers should be regarded as a benefit to society instead of as an economic threat.[198]

[194] ECJ judgment of 22.11.05.
[195] Cf. Blanpain, 2005.
[196] EP Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, 2006a.
[197] EP Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, 2005.
[198] EP Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, 2006b.

Since 1980, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has been monitoring the position of older workers on the labour market. The ILO advocates a Code of Conduct to combat ageism and the 'natural' bias against older workers thatleads to social exclusion and non-employment. "Up to now, older workers have been the losers in the labour markets as a result of official employment policies and labour market measures. (…) The widely used strategy of 'early retirement' is virtually a 'hidden non-employment' approach."[199]

6.3. Collective bargaining and older workers

To make the Lisbon strategy work, the ETUC believes "top priority should be given to women and older workers' participation in the labour market, and helping workers to deal with the impact of globalisation".[200] The European confederation regrets that access to training programmes at company level is still very much restricted to those who have a fairly high level of qualifications and access remains practically impossible for some other groups including older workers. According to the ETUC the main responsibility for the implementation of lifelong learning within companies lies with the social partners. Collective bargaining is seen as being the ideal procedure for identifying the conditions that are conductive to the promotion of access to lifelong learning and to the development of the qualifications and skills for all employees, in particular for underprivileged groups such as older workers.[201]

The ETUC makes a plea for new policies, enabling older workers to opt for a gradual and active end to their careers. A culture of forward-looking age management within companies must be developed, where the options of gradual leaving whilst taking account of the arduous nature of the work are used. These measures allowing for a combination of retirement and employment must become widespread. In order to tackle labour shortages, the ETUC considers it fundamental to invest more and better in developing the competences and qualifications of, amongst others, older workers. A new

[199] Samorodov, 1999, 5.
[200] ETUC, 2006a.
[201] ETUC, 2005b.

perspective must be developed: the growing numbers of older people cannot be regarded simply as a burden for society but rather as a means of support for the younger generations, thus developing intergenerational transfers and contributions.[202]

In most member states issues related to the ageing workforce are on the bargaining table. On this issue, unions find themselves often in defensive positions, both at industry and company level, in particular as they represent cohorts of older workers, often substantial and loyal parts of their constituencies, in which young workers are growingly under-represented.[203] Here, the discussions focus on retirement and pre-retirement age, retirement and pre-retirement finance schemes, job quality for older workers, training and special training schemes to keep up with changes and innovation, and special working time regimes.

6.4. Older workers according to *WageIndicator* data

An age typology

Based on an age typology distinguishing five generations of workers, drawing on *WageIndicator* data gathered in the Appendix the following patterns across eight countries and 13 industries can be traced:

- *the starting generation (under 25)* is mostly the 4th or 5th cohort in size, with 21 exceptions in 104 observations: everywhere in the hotel and restaurant industry the starting generation makes up the third or second largest group; this is also the case in wholesale and retail in most countries (Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the UK), in finance in some countries in (Poland and the UK), in other commercial services (Poland, Spain and the UK), and in other community services (the Netherlands and the UK). Notably in hotels and restaurants and in wholesale / retail (part-time) the jobs of the starting generation frequently enable those workers also to participate in further and higher education;

[202] ETUC, 2005c.

[203] Visser (2006, 47) calls the decline of union density among the young "a rather universal research finding".

- *the starter generation (25 – 34)* is by far the largest, with again 21 exceptions in 104 observations: four in agriculture (Finland, Germany, Hungary, and the UK), some in manufacturing (Belgium, Hungary), transport (Germany, Hungary, UK) and most in public services (Belgium, Finland, Germany, Hungary and Spain), where the middle generation is leading in numbers. Hungary shows a much 'older' labour market pattern than the other countries, especially in manufacturing, utilities and in wholesale/retail;
- *the middle generation (35-44)* is second largest in most countries, 21 exceptions in 104 observations, notably in manufacturing (largest in Belgium), transport (largest in Germany, Hungary, and the UK), wholesale and retail (third in Hungary and Poland), hotels and restaurants (third in Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK), public services (largest in Belgium, Finland, Germany and Spain), education (largest in Finland), and health care (largest in Finland and Germany);
- *the senior generation (45-54)* is mostly the third largest cohort, with 34 exceptions in 104 observations: exceptions in agriculture (second in Belgium, Finland and Poland, largest in Hungary), manufacturing (largest in Hungary), utilities (largest in Finland and Hungary), wholesale and retail (second in Hungary, and fourth in Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK), hotels and restaurants (fourth in all countries), and finance (first in Hungary). Public services have a higher share of seniors in Finland, Germany, and Hungary; in education Finland and especially Hungary have older workforces than the other countries;
- *the exit generation (55-64)* is the smallest in the labour market, be it with 34 exceptions in 104 observations, like in manufacturing (fourth in Finland and Hungary), utilities (a.o. third in Hungary), construction (fourth in Belgium, Finland and Hungary), and transport (fourth in Germany, Hungary and the UK). About two-thirds of the difference in size in the *WageIndicator* data between the senior and exit generations can be explained by the smaller shares of the oldest generation in the workforces of the eight countries[204], one-third of the difference has to

[204] We calculated for the eight member states that their joint workforce aged 55-64 was about 55% of that aged 45-54 (Based on Eurostat, 2006b, and detailed LFS results: http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/employment/info/data/eu_lfs/index.htm).

be attributed to lower representation of the latter in the *WageIndicator* data. Their less intensive orientation to the labour market may also play a role here.

Given the pressure to keep the exit generation longer in the labour market, the middle and the senior generations might well be the strategic ones to focus on in future-oriented collective bargaining. Moreover, in the hotel and restaurant industry, in wholesale/retail and in other commercial services a special focus on the starting generation seems rewarding, against the backdrop of the overrepresentation of youngsters: many of whom will enter the labour market via these industries.

A closer look at industry, gender, education and contracts

Table 6.1 reveals the average age for the nine member states (now including Denmark) by industry. According to this table, Denmark has the oldest workforce, followed by Hungary with Poland being consistently the youngest. In Denmark, Hungary and the UK average ages vary to a larger extent across industries than elsewhere, but there too differences can be striking. For example in Finland, the average age in the public sector is slightly over 43, whereas the average is only 34 in hotels and catering. In Poland employees in utilities are on average over 38, against 29 in the hotel and restaurant industry. The average ages are highest in utilities (no. 1 in Denmark, Hungary, Poland and the UK), the public sector (no. 1 in Belgium, Finland and Spain), and education (highest average in Germany and the Netherlands).

The data allow us to go into more detail in other employee characteristics. As for educational level, Table 6.2 shows that this level is lowest for the exit generation, in four countries: Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK. In four other countries (Finland, Denmark, Hungary and Spain) the youngest generation shows the lowest figures. Most likely their relatively low educational level is due to the fact that a large proportion of them is still in education. Surprisingly, in Poland the aged 45-54 show the lowest educational average. As could be expected, the generation of the 25-34 of age consistently displays the highest educational level, with the exception of Poland, where the exit generation enjoys this honour.

Concerning gender, the same table shows that large majorities of the exit generation are male in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands and

Spain, whereas this generation in Finland and Hungary contains a small majority of females. Poland and the UK take a middle position with about one-third of those over 55 years of age being female.

As for employment contracts, as could be expected, the starting generation has the lowest share of permanent contracts, ranging from 38% in Poland to 85% in the UK. In five countries (Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain) the share of employees with permanent contracts grows regularly with age. The exit generation has the lowest incidence of non-permanent contract (except for Belgium and Hungary, where the senior generation scores just 1%point lower). Among the oldest generation over 90% of the employees have permanent contracts, with the exception of Denmark (84%). The differences across countries for this oldest age cohort are minor compared to those differences for the youngest generation.

Table 6.1. Average age, breakdown by country and industry

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU
Agriculture	35.8	43.1	40.6	37.2	43.8
Manufacturing	38.3	45.6	37.5	37.6	40.7
Utilities	35.5	48.4	41.9	38.4	44.2
Construction	36.8	44.2	38.0	37.1	39.1
Wholesale/retail	37.0	38.3	34.7	36.2	37.4
Hotels, rest., catering	35.4	38.3	33.7	34.2	34.9
Transport, commun.	37.2	46.8	36.9	38.4	41.7
Finance	37.5	39.4	37.6	36.1	39.7
Other comm.services	34.6	41.9	35.6	35.5	41.0
Public sector	39.3	47.4	43.2	39.4	41.9
Education	37.9	45.3	40.7	39.5	44.0
Health care	37.5	44.5	39.5	38.1	41.6
Other	37.0	47.3	38.2	37.7	42.5
Total	37.1	44.6	37.8	37.2	40.9
Stand.dev.	9.8	11.2	10.2	9.2	11.1
N	20,108	2,384	18,126	81,512	7,782

	NL	PL	ES	UK
Agriculture	33.6	31.5	34.0	37.8
Manufacturing	36.8	32.5	35.6	37.9
Utilities	36.5	38.3	36.4	38.6
Construction	35.6	31.7	33.5	36.9
Wholesale/retail	33.7	29.4	33.2	34.6
Hotels, rest., catering	31.0	28.9	32.7	32.5
Transport, commun.	36.3	31.6	35.8	38.5
Finance	34.4	30.1	37.0	32.9
Other comm.services	34.1	29.6	32.2	33.9
Public sector	37.7	31.4	40.0	37.9
Education	38.4	35.2	37.1	38.5
Health care	36.7	34.7	36.6	38.1
Other	33.9	33.7	34.5	33.9
Total	35.4	31.6	34.8	36.0
Stand.dev.	10.0	8.0	8.5	10.6
N	99,041	6,803	15,761	28,182

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 6.2. Average educational level, percentages of females and percentages of employees with permanent contracts by age group, breakdown by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU
Mean educational level (1=low, .. , 3=high)					
< 25 yr	2.4	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.7
25-34 yr	2.6	2.2	2.0	2.2	2.0
35-44 yr	2.4	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9
45-54 yr	2.2	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9
>=55 yr	2.2	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.1
Percentage females					
< 25 yr	54%	46%	57%	54%	60%
25-34 yr	45%	40%	50%	39%	53%
35-44 yr	41%	33%	56%	32%	56%
45-54 yr	35%	27%	62%	31%	60%
>=55 yr	23%	19%	57%	22%	52%
Percentage with permanent contract					
< 25 yr	76%	64%	61%	71%	85%
25-34 yr	92%	88%	81%	83%	91%
35-44 yr	96%	92%	91%	90%	94%
45-54 yr	96%	90%	94%	91%	95%
>=55 yr	95%	84%	97%	91%	94%

	NL	PL	ES	UK
Mean educational level (1=low, .. , 3=high)				
< 25 yr	2.0	2.5	1.9	2.3
25-34 yr	2.3	2.8	2.5	2.6
35-44 yr	2.1	2.6	2.3	2.3
45-54 yr	2.0	2.4	2.1	2.3
>=55 yr	1.9	2.5	2.3	2.1
Percentage females				
< 25 yr	63%	62%	52%	64%
25-34 yr	52%	55%	46%	54%
35-44 yr	41%	51%	34%	46%
45-54 yr	42%	55%	26%	47%
>=55 yr	27%	37%	19%	39%
Percentage with permanent contract				
< 25 yr	61%	38%	49%	85%
25-34 yr	78%	68%	71%	91%
35-44 yr	88%	83%	85%	92%
45-54 yr	91%	88%	92%	91%
>=55 yr	94%	89%	96%	91%

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Future perspectives on employment, retirement and mobility

The *WageIndicator* survey contains some questions on employees' expectations about their future employment. Table 6.3 shows that in the seven countries in which this question was posed, with the exception of Finland, only minorities of the starting generation expected to be with their current employer in the next year. In most countries the expectation to remain with the same employer were highest in the exit group, except for Poland, where they were higher among the seniors (63 %, against 54% among the exits). On the other hand, the shares of 'don't know' answers (*I do not know if I will be with my employer next year*) were lower among the exit generation (8-28%), than among youngsters (21-44%), the starting generation (20-44%) and the middle generation (19-48%). The expectations of the seniors came closer to those of these groups than to the expectations of the exit generation (14-42%).

For four countries we can trace the details of employees' expectations. Table 6.4 shows that in Belgium, Germany and the UK four out of five employees aged 45 and over expect to be working with their current employer next year, predominantly in the same position. In Belgium, Germany and the UK 15-18% and in the Netherlands 24% of the employees expect not to be working with their current employer next year, mostly because they expect to be with another employer and to a lesser extent because they expect either to be dismissed, or their contract to expire or for the business of their employer to go broke. In all countries less than 1% of the employees in this age group expect not to be working because they will either be caring for children next year, will take (early) retirement, will be self-employed, will face health problems, or will undertake further training or study. A small category, ranging from 1.5 to 3.5%, does not know what to expect from the near future.

Table 6.3. Percentages of employees expecting to work next year with their current employer, breakdown by country and age

	BE	FI	DE	NL	PL	ES	UK
Age < 25 yr							
No	21%	20%	18%	17%	31%	24%	21%
Yes	50%	50%	60%	40%	40%	33%	53%
Don't know	29%	30%	21%	43%	30%	42%	26%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Age 25-34							
No	15%	13%	16%	16%	21%	18%	17%
Yes	54%	62%	63%	40%	41%	40%	58%
Don't know	32%	24%	21%	44%	38%	42%	26%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Age 35-44							
No	9%	9%	12%	13%	15%	12%	12%
Yes	61%	69%	68%	39%	46%	53%	65%
Don't know	30%	22%	19%	47%	39%	35%	23%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Age 45-54							
No	5%	5%	9%	9%	11%	5%	9%
Yes	73%	77%	76%	49%	63%	64%	67%
Don't know	21%	17%	15%	42%	25%	30%	23%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Age >=55							
No	12%	8%	8%	12%	-	9%	8%
Yes	77%	82%	83%	60%	52%	73%	73%
Don't know	12%	10%	9%	28%	-	17%	19%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	11,204	13,812	43,271	52,747	2,514	6,293	22,064

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees. Only cells with more than 9 observations are included.*

Table 6.4. Percentages of employees 45+ indicating their detailed expectations working with their current employer next year, breakdown by country

	BE	DE	NL	UK
Working with employer, of which	83.1	82.1	72.5	79.1
… in the same position	70.5	-	57.1	58.4
… promoted to a higher position	7.9	-	12.0	16.3
… in another position	4.0	-	2.8	4.0
Not working with employer, of which	15.3	16.1	24.1	18.6
… with another employer	4.8	8.4	9.6	11.6
… caring for children	-	0.2	0.2	0.2
… taking (early) retirement	0.5	0.1	0.6	0.3
… self-employed or in a family business	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.7
… health problems	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1
… undertaking further training or study	0.2	0.6	0.7	1.0
… dismissed	1.3	2.4	1.7	0.2
… contract expired	1.3	1.6	2.5	0.9
… business will go broke	0.8	0.1	0.4	0.2
… reason not specified	3.0	1.5	6.9	3.2
Don't know	1.5	1.8	3.5	2.3
Total%	100	100	100	100

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees aged 45+.*

Older workers and collective bargaining coverage

As for the relation between age and collective bargaining coverage, no previous comparable studies are available. Our data reveal that the self-perceived coverage rates on average are higher for older employees than for their younger colleagues: see Table 6.5. In most countries collective bargaining coverage is higher in each successive age category. The variations between the coverage rates for the oldest and the youngest age cohorts fall into two groups. Large differences can be noticed in Denmark, Hungary, Germany, Poland and the UK, ranging from 22%points to 18%pts. Spain and Finland take middle positions with differences of 12 respectively 9%pts, whereas the difference is quite small in Belgium and the Netherlands. It has to be noted that these outcomes may reflect a major potential problem for unions. The larger the 'age gap' in collective bargaining coverage, the more difficult it will be for union bargainers to successfully unite and cover all age categories. In the end this could lead to segmented and non-inclusive bargaining practices.

Table 6.5. Percentages of employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement, breakdown by country and age

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
< 25 yr	79%	72%	85%	53%	54%	83%	8%	64%	18%
25-34 yr	74%	77%	85%	51%	61%	74%	8%	67%	23%
35-44 yr	77%	86%	90%	59%	72%	77%	23%	74%	32%
45-54 yr	81%	89%	91%	66%	74%	84%	37%	76%	37%
>=55 yr	80%	90%	94%	73%	75%	86%	30%	77%	37%
Total	77%	86%	88%	58%	69%	78%	14%	71%	29%
Diff.*	2%	18%	9%	20%	21%	3%	22%	12%	18%
N	14,125	2,205	2,835	72,591	6,983	90,928	1,997	12,565	23,911

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: ** This reflects the difference between the coverage rates between the oldest and the youngest age groups.*

Table 6.6. Incidence of low pay (under 2/3 median wage threshold), breakdown by country and age, 2005 (Denmark 2005-2006, Hungary 2006)

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
21-25 yr	46%	51%	20%	38%	57%	64%	50%	25%	34%
25-34 yr	20%	18%	6%	13%	46%	22%	26%	11%	15%
35-44 yr	14%	13%	4%	9%	42%	15%	21%	7%	12%
45-54 yr	11%	9%	2%	9%	40%	14%	24%	6%	15%
>=55 yr	11%	15%	2%	8%	31%	12%	18%	5%	13%
Total	18%	14%	5%	12%	42%	23%	27%	10%	16%
N	11,039	1,831	4,296	32,715	4,146	44,269	3,692	13,928	8,399

Source: WageIndicator *data 2005, for Hungary 2006, for Denmark 2005-2006. Selection: employees.*

Table 6.7. Total measure of work-related stress (mean of five factors, 1=no stress, ... , 5=extreme stress), breakdown by country and age

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	ES	UK*
< 25 yr	2.9	3.2	3.1	3.0	2.8	3.1	2.8	3.1
25-34 yr	3.1	3.3	3.1	3.0	3.1	2.9	3.3	3.7
35-44 yr	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.0	3.6	2.9	3.3	3.8
45-54 yr	3.1	3.0	3.2	3.0	3.4	2.9	3.2	3.7
>=55 yr	3.0	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.0	2.8	3.0	3.6
Total	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.0	3.3	2.9	3.3	3.7

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: *all indicators range from 1=never to 5=daily*
Note: ** for the UK average of three factors*

Older workers and low pay

Table 6.6 shows the incidence of low pay as defined in Chapter 4 namely, the share of the workforce earning less than two-thirds of the national median gross hourly wage. A first conclusion is that low pay is particularly an issue for youngsters, defined here as those aged 21-25. Second, in all countries except Denmark, Poland and the UK the shares of low-paid decline regularly with age. Third, one may conclude that low pay is not a dominant threat for older workers. Yet, this should not be taken to imply that the danger of a low income after leaving work does not exist for them (our data does not allow us to explore this), nor does the low incidence of low pay among the exit cohort reflect a high share of those retiring after the age of 55: in most countries the senior generation shows about the same low pay incidence as the exit category.

Older workers and work-related stress

Physically exhausting work is more common among younger workers, in particular among those between 25 and 34. Levels of physically exhausting work are lower for workers over 54 of age. There may be two, non-excluding explanations. Those with high levels of physically exhausting work may have withdrawn from the labour market before the age of 55, most likely going into disablement schemes. In addition, older workers are more likely to have changed jobs within or across companies towards jobs with less physically exhausting work.

Similarly, in mentally stressful jobs the oldest cohort seems to be among the less stressed groups of workers. This may be because a selection process in individual perceptions has taken place with many older workers considering their jobs not to be extremely stressful. Against this backdrop, it is telling that scores of the senior generation are closer to the average levels of mental strain than those of the exit generation.

Older workers are underrepresented among those performing jobs at high speed. However, here the differences between the age cohorts are not that large and the results across countries vary. Equally, the share of workers stating that they are not be able to perform their tasks in the allocated time does not differ that much across age groups. Work to tight deadlines is concentrated in the age groups between 25 and 44. Yet, again the differences across age groups are not large. The incidence of monotonous tasks is high-

est among younger groups; workers aged 45 and over experience somewhat less monotony in their jobs.

Using an over-all measure for work-related stress (see Chapter 8), Table 6.7 shows that in most countries the age group 55 and over reveals the lowest stress levels, except for Belgium and the UK, both countries where the youngest generation experienced lower stress levels.

Older workers and training

From other research we know that one of the problems for older workers is the lack of training. Although we use a somewhat different age division, the *WageIndicator* outcomes as presented in Table 6.8 concerning age broadly resemble results of the fourth EWCS (2005): the youngest and the oldest categories received less training than those in between, measured by incidence as well as by length of training. In most countries, the age group 25-34 receives the most training, in a few other countries it is the age group 35-44. Finland is the exception. Here employees age 55 and over report most

Table 6.8. Percentages of employees reporting employer-provided training last year and average number of training days, breakdown by country and age

	BE	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES
Employer-provided training							
< 25 yr	58%	50%	44%	44%	50%	56%	31%
25-34 yr	65%	65%	51%	54%	63%	64%	42%
35-44 yr	63%	67%	52%	57%	63%	63%	47%
45-54 yr	62%	74%	51%	47%	63%	63%	46%
>=55 yr	57%	76%	49%	47%	56%	50%	48%
Total	63%	67%	51%	52%	61%	62%	43%
Number of training days							
< 25 yr	5.9	3.0	3.7	6.5	5.9	3.7	5.0
25-34 yr	5.1	5.0	3.5	4.2	6.0	5.7	6.1
35-44 yr	4.1	5.2	3.1	3.2	5.7	5.2	6.0
45-54 yr	3.6	6.3	3.3	4.5	5.1	5.0	5.6
>=55 yr	3.2	5.2	2.9	2.9	4.2	-	4.7
Total	4.4	5.1	3.3	4.1	5.7	5.2	5.9
N	18,982	3,143	12,893	480	88,647	571	14,155

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: *The average number of training days includes the individuals with no training.*

frequently having received employer-provided training last year, but the average length of training is highest in the age group 45-55. In Spain, employees in the oldest age group also report the most training, but here the difference with the adjacent age group is very small. In this country, the length of training for the oldest employees is shorter compared to all other age groups.

Table 6.9 presents the same type of information as Table 6.8, but for those with self-paid training. The patterns concerning self-paid training are rather similar to those concerning employer-paid training. The age group with the highest incidence of self-paid training varies across countries, but the length of self-paid training is longest in the youngest age group, and it consistently falls with age. Section 5.5 clarified that in all countries workers taking self-paid training are on average younger than both those with training received from the employer and those with a mix of employer-provided and self-paid training. Notably in Spain the differences are large. Given the smaller share of the two younger cohorts in the labour market, this reflects that employees under age 35 depend more on self-paid training. Counteracting this tendency may become a major bargaining theme for the union movement.

Table 6.9. Percentages of employees reporting self-paid training last year and average number of training days, breakdown by country and age

	BE	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES
Self-paid training						
< 25 yr	19%	23%	23%	18%	33%	27%
25-34 yr	20%	27%	21%	17%	36%	35%
35-44 yr	17%	25%	24%	17%	30%	31%
45-54 yr	18%	28%	18%	17%	46%	31%
>=55 yr	15%	27%	19%	16%	-	35%
Total	19%	26%	21%	17%	35%	33%
Number of training days						
< 25 yr	5.0	6.5	2.9	4.9	7.5	11.1
25-34 yr	4.6	5.6	1.8	4.0	8.3	13.2
35-44 yr	3.1	3.6	2.0	3.5	5.9	10.0
45-54 yr	2.8	2.7	2.0	2.4	5.2	8.8
>=55 yr	1.6	1.7	0.2	1.7	9.2	5.4
Total	3.7	4.4	1.8	3.6	7.5	11.7
N	10,242	12,630	436	47,374	552	6,025

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: *The average number of training days includes the individuals with no training.*

Section 5.2 already provided information about the survey question on employees' opinions that training for the job would be worthwhile. In Table 6.10 the results are broken down by age group. Except for Finland, the average scores on this question are lowest for the exit generation, followed by the starting generation. For the oldest generation, this may well be the result of employer policies discouraging participation in training combined with their own low(ered) aspirations.

Table 6.10. Average scores of employees finding training for their job would be worthwhile, breakdown by country and age

	BE	FI	NL	ES	UK
< 25 yr	2.7	2.7	2.5	3.4	3.0
25-34 yr	2.9	3.1	2.7	3.7	3.0
35-44 yr	2.8	3.2	2.6	3.7	3.2
45-54 yr	2.7	3.2	2.6	3.6	3.1
>=55 yr	2.6	3.1	2.4	3.2	2.8
Mean (1=never, .. , 5=daily)	2.8	3.1	2.6	3.6	3.1
N	18,234	3,152	81,778	14,074	493

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: *Opinions run from 1=never, .. , 5=daily*

6.5. Conclusions

The category of older workers can be divided into the senior generation (45 – 54) and the exit generation (55 and older). In all eight countries for which we analysed the age typology, the latter group is substantially smaller than the other age cohorts, including the senior generation. Despite changing arrangements and pressure to discourage early retirement, the exit generation at work still seems to be characterised by the 'survival of the fittest'. In their cohort those who stay in work after the age of 55 make up the majorities (in Denmark, Finland and the UK) and minorities (small in Hungary, Belgium and Poland). They enjoy relatively favourable working conditions as measured by the fact that the incidence of low pay, long working hours, non-permanent contracts and work-related stress is lower for the exit group and mostly also for the senior category than for the younger generations. Older workers also enjoy comparatively high collective bargaining coverage. Our data confirm the existing evidence that training is the exception:

employers obviously generally hesitate to invest in training for those aged 55 or older, though this is less clear for Finland and Spain.

We have to conclude that substantial groups of older workers are still pushed from the labour market or are using opportunities for early retirement, leaving a group of older workers active who are rather well off regarding their scores on most of our issues. Against this backdrop and in order to effectively protect future cohorts of older workers, union bargainers may well have to focus on pursuing the interests of younger generations of workers more explicitly in collective arrangements, rather than pushing the interests of the remaining groups of older workers.

7. Collective bargaining coverage

Kea Tijdens, Maarten van Klaveren

7.1. Introduction

In this chapter we explore a number of issues concerning collective bargaining and its coverage. We have to make clear that this chapter does not explore the impact of collective bargaining coverage on wages and other terms of employment. It concentrates on collective bargaining coverage as such, explores the extent of coverage in a number of EU member states, and aims to understand which factors influence the likelihood of an individual employee being covered by a collective agreement. The chapter aims to contribute to the understanding of collective bargaining coverage by using employee survey data, based on the *WageIndicator* web-survey from nine EU member states. Thus far this approach has hardly been tried in a European context. Collective bargaining coverage is typically studied at aggregated levels of analyses, as part of the national industrial relations systems, using data provided by the bargaining parties. The use of micro data on self-perceived collective bargaining coverage is not common either within or across countries.

Section 7.2 provides an overview of collective bargaining levels and rights. Section 7.3 treats some measurement problems encountered in our approach using micro data. Section 7.4 presents the main results of our efforts, analyzing coverage rates by gender, age, industry and firm size. Section 7.5 goes into employees' opinions. Until now, little is known about the value employees place on being covered by a collective agreement. High correlations may be expected between actual coverage and positive attitudes towards coverage. This section aims to extend knowledge in this field too.

7.2. Collective bargaining coverage: major issues

According to the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU, adopted by the European Council in Nice (2000), "workers and employers, or their respec-

tive organisations, have, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels" (Art. II-88). In 18 out of the 27 EU member states, the right to collective bargaining is explicitly or implicitly secured by the national Constitution. Out of the nine member states studied in this chapter, this is the case for Finland, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Spain, but not for Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK. Laws on collective agreements are in force in Belgium (1968) and the Netherlands (1927), and basic agreements between central trade unions and employers' associations in Denmark (going back to 1899), leaving the UK as the only member state without any statutory regulation for collective bargaining.[205]

Negotiations over wages and working hours form the core of collective bargaining in EU member states. Collective bargaining is certainly of great importance for wage-setting processes, yet the extent to which individual wages are dependent upon collective agreements is not straightforward and differs widely across countries. Apart from wages and working conditions, collective agreements in many EU member states cover a growing range of issues, including 'collective goods' like vocational training arrangements. So far, cross-country comparisons on the content of collective agreements have been performed on a small-scale only, mainly because collecting, reading and comparing agreements is extremely time-consuming. In most countries, electronic databases are lacking in this field; this even holds for national libraries where some of these documents can be found. The European Foundation in Dublin has partly been able to cover this gap by its EIRO database and has attempted a number of comparative studies. The contents of collective agreements remain largely beyond the topic of this chapter.

It is widely accepted that bargaining can be distinguished at three, not necessarily mutually exclusive, levels. *Economy-wide* or *national* bargaining is a bipartite or tripartite form of negotiation between union confederations, central employers' associations and government agencies. It aims at providing a floor for basic-level bargaining on the terms of employment, often taking into account macroeconomic goals. *Sectoral* or *industry* or 'interme-

[205] Schulten, 2005; Keune, 2006b.

diate' bargaining aims at the standardization of the terms of employment in one industry. Sectoral boundaries do not necessarily match the sectors measured in industry classifications, and the range of industrial activities covered may change over time. Joint national and industry bargaining is called multi-employer bargaining. The third bargaining level involves the *company* and/or *establishment:* this, by definition, is single-employer bargaining. Collective bargaining at industry and company/establishment levels is the responsibility of employers' and employees' organizations.[206]

The data sources on collective bargaining used by ETUI-REHS, the European Foundation and Eurostat come primarily from national correspondents. Therefore, a relatively good insight is available as to how specific industrial relations systems relate to collective bargaining. These data show that bargaining levels vary widely across EU member states. Table 7.1 gives recent indications of the importance of various bargaining levels in the nine countries covered by our *WageIndicator* data. Industrial relations are far from static, yet it can be noted that in the last decade changes in the importance of levels remain rather limited, a major exception being the significant decline in multi-employer bargaining in the UK.[207]

Table 7.1. Importance of collective bargaining levels and indicative share of workforce covered by collective agreements in nine EU member states, 2003

	National	Sector	Company	Coverage
Belgium	***	**	*	91-100%
Denmark	*	***	**	81-90%
Finland	***	**	*	81-90%
Germany	-	***	*	61-70%
Hungary	***	*	*	31-40%
Netherlands	*	***	*	81-90%
Poland		*	***	41-50%
Spain	**	**	**	81-90%
UK	-	-	***	31-40%

Source: *Keune, 2006b, 6, 13*
Note: **** very dominant, ** moderate dominant, * not dominant, - absent*

[206] Bispinck, 2004.
[207] Brown *et al*, 2003.

The table shows that collective bargaining primarily takes place at the national level in Belgium, Finland, and Hungary, primarily at industry level in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, and primarily at company level in Poland and the UK. The three levels are about equally important in Spain. Yet, the measure used here relates more to the level of *centralisation* than to a second aspect of bargaining that is also important, namely, *coordination*, which is possible by tripartite or bipartite co-operation at national level, within the employers' associations and within the union movement.[208] At times the influence of tripartite co-operation is substantial in six countries: Belgium, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. Such national co-operation is normally covert or indirect in Germany but is virtually absent in Denmark and the UK.[209]

In advance of Section 7.4, we have to touch upon the relationship between collection bargaining coverage and union membership. Due to mandatory extension and enlargement provisions regarding collective agreements, collective bargaining coverage is substantially higher in many countries than the national union density rates. This is notably the case in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain, and outside this group of nine EU member states in France and Italy. Extensive extension practices exist in Belgium, and more limited practices in Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. In marked contrast, extension is not practiced, at least not in the private sector, in Denmark and the UK.[210]

7.3. Collective bargaining coverage: measurement issues

Calculations of bargaining coverage rates, defined as employees covered by a collective agreement as a proportion of all employees, are hampered by a number of difficulties. The first problem relates to the number of employees covered by an agreement, the second to the number of employees potentially able to be covered. This section discusses these measurement difficulties.

[208] OECD, 1997, 70-71; Keune, 2006b, 10-11.
[209] OECD, 1994, 175; Schulten, 2005, Table 4.
[210] Keune, 2006b, 12.

Measuring collective bargaining coverage in individual surveys

Regardless of its importance for wage setting and working conditions, the coverage of collective agreements is rarely questioned in individual surveys, as the 2005 inventory of European *WageIndicator* countries indicated.[211] Only in Germany and the Netherlands are regular surveys carried out that ask individuals whether or not they are covered by a collective agreement. In the UK, the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS), undertaken at wider intervals, calculates collective bargaining coverage rates based on both individual managers' and individual employees' answers at workplace level.[212] A review of Europe-wide surveys also revealed little attention to this issue. For example, neither the EWCS asks this question,[213] nor does the European Community Household Panel (ECHP[214]). In consequence, only a few comparative analyses are known regarding these collective bargaining variables, using German and British data.[215]

The *WageIndicator* questionnaire does ask respondents whether they are covered by a collective agreement. Considerable effort has been devoted to designing the relevant survey questions, because posing questions about collective agreement coverage is difficult. The key question is whether the respondent's organization is covered by a collective agreement. It should be noted that even if the answer is positive here the individual respondent still may not be covered. This was confirmed by the *WageIndicator* partners in Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands.[216] In addition, some country questionnaires have one, two or even three follow-up questions, further probing the level and content of the agreement.

[211] Dribbusch *et al*, 2005.
[212] Kersley *et al*, 2006, 19.
[213] Parent-Thirion *et al*, 2007, Annex 6.
[214] ECHP, codebook Wave 8, 2001.
[215] Ellguth & Kohaut, 2004; Gürtzgen, 2005; Schnabel *et al*, 2005.
[216] Keune (2006b, 8) states that countries in which employees who belong to the parties signatory to the agreement are covered by the agreement, indeed include Finland, but also Germany and the UK. On the other hand, among the countries in which all employees working for an employer that is covered by an agreement fall under the agreements, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain are included. We question the inclusion of Denmark and the Netherlands in the latter group.

Measuring the potential labour force eligible to coverage

Any calculation of national coverage rates needs to recognise that, in a number of countries, some employees are excluded from the right to conclude collective agreements. Hence, it is important to differentiate between the *unadjusted* coverage rate, defined as the ratio of employees actually covered to all employees, and the *adjusted* coverage rate, defined as the ratio of employees actually covered to the potential number of employees who could, in principle, be covered as determined by the formal provision of bargaining rights. The adjusted rate is a better measure of the diffusion of collective bargaining. Moreover, it shows the relative importance of collective bargaining compared with individual contracts as an alternative mode of bargaining. As the OECD points out, identifying the potential domain of collective bargaining implies the difficult task of disentangling the groups of employees with bargaining rights from those without.[217] In the case of the *WageIndicator* data, the *adjusted* coverage rate cannot be calculated, because the information needed typically cannot be collected by means of a survey. Hence, the *WageIndicator* data show the *unadjusted* coverage rate.

7.4. Collective bargaining coverage: results

This section explores the determinants of collective bargaining coverage, related to the characteristics of individuals measured through the *WageIndicator* data. It first of all details the dependent variable, namely, collective bargaining coverage rates. Second, it explores to what extent these rates vary across employee characteristics such as gender, age and trade union membership, and across firm characteristics, notably industry and firm size. Third, we investigate the determinants of collective bargaining coverage rates, using country-specific logistic regressions.

Collective bargaining coverage rates

The variable indicating collective bargaining coverage is present in the dataset for all the countries under study. However,, from the fourth quarter of 2005 onwards, in Finland and Poland this question was no longer asked

[217] OECD, 1994, 172.

in the survey. In Finland this was because all workers are covered by national agreements and some in addition are covered by a firm agreement. So, in fact, it does not make much sense to ask for bargaining coverage in Finland. In Poland, on the other hand, the questionnaire was regarded as being too long by respondents and therefore some questions had to be deleted, among which was the collective bargaining coverage question. We decided to perform the analyses including Finland and Poland, but have restricted our analysis to the data generated between the fourth quarters of 2004 respectively 2005.

The outcomes on collective bargaining coverage first of all reveal that remarkably high proportions of respondents obviously do not know whether they are covered by a collective agreement. As Table 7.2 shows, this is notably the case in Belgium and Spain. In Belgium the over-all 'Don't know' share is 25% and in Spain 17%. In UK, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands, the percentages citing 'Don't know' are 9 to 10%; in Denmark it is 6%. Though the importance of collective bargaining for wage setting is widely recognized among researchers and practitioners, these figures suggest that substantial minorities of employees may have no knowledge of the significance of collective bargaining since they are not aware of whether or not they are covered by a collective agreement. The Belgian and Spanish figures suggest there may be some relationship with the (rather) high level of centralisation of collective bargaining in those two countries, although the score for Poland, with a decentralised bargaining system, is also considerable.

If we leave out the 'Don't knows' and the 'Not applicables', the shares of employees covered by a collective agreement are shown in the second panel of the table. It shows that collective bargaining coverage is lowest in Poland with 14%, followed by UK with 29%. It is highest in Finland and Denmark with 88% respectively 86%.

Table 7.2. Collective bargaining coverage rates by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
No	16%	13%	10%	38%	28%	20%	71%	24%	63%
Yes	56%	81%	79%	52%	62%	72%	11%	58%	25%
Dk*	25%	6%	9%	9%	9%	7%	12%	17%	10%
Na**	3%	0%	1%	1%	0%	1%	6%	1%	2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Without don't know and not applicable									
No	23%	14%	12%	42%	31%	22%	86%	29%	71%
Yes	77%	86%	88%	58%	69%	78%	14%	71%	29%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: ** Dk = Don't know*
*** Na = Not applicable*

As explained previously, collective bargaining coverage can be measured in several ways. Table 7.3 presents the shares of the various types of agreements across countries. Here, the prime measure is whether the respondent's firm is covered by a collective agreement, either a company or an industry agreement. The third column indicates whether the individual respondent is covered by the agreement that applies to the company. Column 4 indicates whether the agreement that applies to the respondent's firm is an industry agreement. Finally, the fifth column gives an indication whether the agreement is aiming at working conditions too. Compared to Table 7.1, which is based on reports from bargaining parties, the self-perceived coverage percentages for Finland and Denmark are within the expected range. Coverage is slightly lower than expected in Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and the UK, and is definitely lower in Belgium. Coverage is much lower than derived from the bargaining parties for Poland, but much higher than expected in Hungary. This last result may be due to the fact that the paper-based Hungarian survey was in part performed by union members acting as interviewers.

Moreover, Table 7.3 shows that in the two countries where a company agreement does not necessarily mean that the individual respondent is also covered by that agreement, the difference in Denmark is negligible, but in the Netherlands a 6%points difference results. It also shows that, where applicable, approximately two-thirds of the reported agreements in Finland are industry agreements, four-fifth in Germany, and less than half in the Netherlands. Finally, one may conclude that, where applicable, about half of

Table 7.3. Collective bargaining coverage rates by country, breakdown by type of agreement

	Coverage Table National data*	Individual's company is covered by collective agreement**	Individual is covered by collective agreement	Individual's company agreement is industry collective agreement	Individual's company agreement aims at working conditions
Belgium	91-100%	77%			
Denmark	81-90%	86%	85%		
Finland	81-90%	88%		55%	
Germany	61-70%	58%		41%	
Hungary	31-40%	69%			58%
Netherlands	81-90%	78%	72%	32%	
Poland	41-50%	14%			7%
Spain	81-90%	71%			
UK	31-40%	29%			15%

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: ** From Table 7.1*
*** From Table 7.2.*

the agreements in Poland and UK include working conditions, whereas this is the case for almost two-third in Hungary.

Employee characteristics: gender, age and trade union membership

As for gender, a 1990 OECD study covering eight countries revealed no clear pattern: the coverage rate for men was lower in two OECD countries (Australia, Norway), higher in four (Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the USA) and equal to that of women in two countries, the UK and Portugal.[218] Our data reveal gender differences of 3%pts or less in six out of the nine EU member states. In the Netherlands the coverage rates are exactly the same, Hungary shows slightly higher rates for women, whereas four countries (Belgium, Finland, Spain, UK) reveal slightly higher rates for men. In the remaining three countries the coverage rate is clearly higher for men: in Poland the difference is 6%pts, whereas in Denmark and Germany differences go up to 7 respectively 9%pts.

[218] OECD, 1994, 183.

As for age, no comparable studies are available. Our study shows that coverage rates on average are higher for older employees than for the younger generations. This is the case in all countries in the study, and may imply a warning for trade unionists. Major age differences can be seen in Poland, where only 6% of the employed under age 30 were covered, against 35% of those aged 50 and over. The German, Hungarian, British, Danish and Spanish figures show a similar, though somewhat less pronounced pattern. The Belgian, Finnish and Dutch outcomes reveal smaller age differences.

Table 7.4. Collective bargaining coverage rates by country, breakdown by gender, age, and trade union membership

	Male	Female	Age <30	Age 30-39	Age 40-49	Age >=50	Union member	Non member
BE	78%	76%	75%	75%	80%	80%	81%	75%
DK	88%	81%	75%	80%	89%	90%	-	-
FI	90%	87%	85%	88%	91%	92%	90%	82%
DE	61%	52%	51%	54%	63%	71%	80%	51%
HU	68%	70%	57%	66%	75%	75%	72%	31%
NL	78%	78%	78%	74%	81%	85%	90%	74%
PL	17%	11%	6%	14%	34%	35%	56%	8%
ES	71%	70%	66%	70%	76%	77%	79%	67%
UK	30%	27%	21%	27%	36%	37%	78%	13%

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Union members are assumed to have higher bargaining coverage rates than non-members. Table 7.4 shows that this is the case in all eight countries for which we have sufficient data. We found the most marked differences in the UK, where 78% of union members are covered and only 13% of non-members, giving a difference of 65%pts. Other research has shown that bargaining coverage and trade union recognition at company level are strongly linked in the UK.[219] Poland, Hungary and Germany also reveal large differences in this respect, though with 29-48%pts they are smaller than the UK gap. Differences in coverage rates in the Netherlands and Spain are in the 12-16%pts range, whereas with 6-8%pts the differences in Belgium and Finland remain low.

[219] Grainger, 2006.

Firm characteristics: industry and firm size

Table 7.5 shows that the self-perceived collective bargaining coverage rates vary considerably across industries. In particular the 'other commercial services' category which includes, among others, real estate and renting business, reveals the lowest coverage in almost all countries. In most countries utilities show a high coverage, as does the public sector, education, and health care. For 1990, the OECD concluded for ten countries that coverage rates were higher in the public sector than in the private sector, although higher coverage tended to be accompanied by substantive restrictions in bargaining rights, including the right to strike.[220] In our study the public sector also shows high coverage rates, particularly when utilities are included.

As for industries within the private sector, the OECD study of 13 countries, showed a wide variation in coverage rates across countries. The study concluded that the coefficient of variation tended to be considerably higher in countries characterized by single-employer bargaining and lower in those with multi-employer bargaining.[221] Our outcomes in Table 7.5 confirm this tendency, showing a high variation across industries in countries with predominantly single-employer bargaining, notably in Poland and the UK.

As the rankings show, low coverage (seen from the perspective of the respective countries) is widespread across countries in six industries. In part these are the usual suspects: agriculture, wholesale/retail, and hotels/restaurants/catering, who also show a high share of low paid workers (see Chapter 4) but they are joined by three other industries, construction (except for Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands), other commercial services, and other community and personal services (except for Belgium and Poland). Middle positions are taken by manufacturing, transport/ communication (except for Hungary and Poland, where they rank first and second respectively), and finance (although this sector scores a no. 1 position in Spain and a second position in Belgium).

[220] OECD, 1994, 181. The public sector was defined as public administration, health, education, social services, and other public activities such as postal services and transport.

[221] OECD, 1994, 182.

Table 7.5. Collective bargaining coverage rates and their ranking across industries by country, breakdown by industry

	BE		DK		FI		DE		HU	
	rate	ranking	rate	ranking	rate	ranking	rate	ranking	rate	ranking
Agriculture	72%	8	86%	9	.		55%	8	69%	6
Manufacturing	82%	5	90%	7	91%	5	63%	6	77%	4
Utilities	90%	2	97%	2			72%	3	90%	2
Construction	70%	9	91%	6	90%	6	46%	12	47%	11
Wholesale/retail	65%	12	70%	11	84%	9	48%	11	41%	12
Hotels, rest., catering	69%	11	64%	12	87%	8	54%	9	32%	13
Transport, commun.	81%	6	92%	5	88%	7	70%	4	91%	1
Finance	88%	3	87%	8	96%	3	77%	2	65%	7
Other comm.services	65%	13	60%	13	82%	10	29%	13	53%	10
Public sector	69%	10	97%	1	96%	2	85%	1	58%	8
Education	83%	4	93%	4	95%	4	69%	5	77%	3
Health care	90%	1	93%	3	97%	1	63%	7	72%	5
Other community serv.	78%	7	82%	10	77%	11	49%	10	54%	9

	NL		PL		ES		UK	
	rate	ranking	rate	ranking	rate	ranking	rate	ranking
Agriculture	88%	7			68%	8	25%	7
Manufacturing	80%	8	18%	6	73%	7	22%	9
Utilities	89%	6	59%	1	79%	4	57%	3
Construction	92%	4			56%	13	11%	12
Wholesale/retail	79%	10	4%	10	62%	11	14%	10
Hotels, rest., catering	93%	3			62%	12	6%	13
Transport, commun.	79%	9	27%	2	76%	6	39%	5
Finance	71%	11	6%	9	89%	1	27%	6
Other comm.services	46%	13	8%	8	63%	9	14%	11
Public sector	97%	1	9%	7	85%	2	83%	1
Education	89%	5	23%	3	76%	5	59%	2
Health care	95%	2	21%	4	79%	3	43%	4
Other community serv.	69%	12	19%	5	63%	10	24%	8

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

As for firm size, the OECD study revealed that in 1980 and 1990 in all six countries under study the coverage rate increased with firm size.[222] This finding is unequivocally confirmed in our study where Table 7.6 shows that in all countries coverage rates increase with firm size. Examining five countries, the OECD study confirmed the hypothesis that differences in coverage rates by firm size are expected to be highest in countries characterized by single-employer bargaining and with an absence of extension practices. Thus, based on the *WageIndicator* data we expected recently reported differences in coverage by firm size to be highest in the UK and Poland. Yet, this did not prove to be the case. For Germany and Hungary the differences between small and large firms are highest, although for Poland and the UK they are still considerable. The figures point to special problems for the German and Hungarian unions concerning the smallest companies and at general bargaining problems for the Polish and the UK union movements.

Table 7.6. Percentage of employees, covered by a collective agreement (CBC or Collective Bargaining Coverage), breakdown by firm size categories and country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
1 - 10	60%	71%	76%	22%	20%	68%	6%	62%	9%
10 - 20	64%	81%	88%	28%	38%	70%	9%	66%	15%
20 - 50	67%	90%	90%	35%	59%	72%	10%	68%	19%
50 - 100	79%	90%	93%	47%	67%	78%	12%	74%	23%
100 - 200	85%	95%	95%	56%	76%	82%	16%	77%	29%
200 - 500	88%	96%	92%	69%	80%	85%	17%	83%	37%
500 - 1000	91%	93%	95%	76%	86%	88%	18%	83%	43%
1000 - 2000	91%	95%	96%	81%	78%	92%	38%	85%	50%
2000 - 5000	94%	91%	89%	85%	97%	88%	36%	85%	54%
5000 or more	94%	97%	95%	89%	94%	89%	35%	89%	52%

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

[222] OECD, 1994, 183.

Determinants of collective bargaining coverage

So far, we have reviewed the variation in coverage rates for the single factors age, gender and union membership, and for the firm characteristics industry and firm size. The findings show that age and firm size particularly reveal large differences in collective bargaining coverage rates. To investigate the joint impact of these determinants on collective bargaining coverage rates, we performed regression estimations per country, as shown in Table 7.7. The table shows the coefficients, significance levels and odds ratio, thus the chance for an individual employee of being covered by a collective agreement. Hence, for each determinant we estimate the likelihood of collective bargaining coverage, taken into account the effects of the other determinants. For the analyses of the impact of industry, the utilities industry has been recoded into the manufacturing industry, the agricultural industry into 'other services industry', and the hotels and restaurant industry into the wholesale and retail industry, all due to too few observations in the particular industry in some countries.

As for gender, the table shows that in four countries, Belgium, Hungary, the Netherlands and Spain, the chances of female employees being covered by a collective agreement, are 7 to 13% higher and in Hungary even 21% higher compared to men. In the remaining five countries, the pattern is reversed. Here, the chance that a male employee is covered is between 7 and 31% higher.

Regarding age, in Belgium and the Netherlands no effect is found. In Germany, Spain and UK, for every extra year of age the chance of an employee being covered is 1% higher. In Finland, this is 2% and in Denmark, Hungary and Poland it is 3%. Thus, in the latter countries, compared to an employee of 20 years of age, the chance of someone of 53 years being covered is two times higher.[223]

Concerning union membership, in the UK the chance of union members being covered is almost 18 times higher than for non members (1794%). In Poland, the chance is 8 times higher, followed by Hungary with 6 times. In Germany it is almost 3 times, and in the Netherlands slightly over 2 times. In Belgium, Finland and Spain, it is below 2 times, whereas in Denmark no effect was found.

[223] ((53-20=33)*.03%)+1=2.0

As for firm size, in all countries an effect is found. The larger the firm, the more often the employee is covered by an agreement. Effects vary from 15% for Poland to 57% for Hungary per firm size category. The remaining countries are somewhere in between. Thus, in Hungary, compared to an employee in a workplace with up to 10 workers, an employee in a workplace of 5,000 or over has a seven times higher chance of being covered by an agreement.[224]

Looking specifically at industries, manufacturing industry was taken as the reference group and all other industries compared with it. In Denmark, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands, employees in the construction industry more often have a collective agreement, whereas the opposite holds true for the remaining countries. Only in Germany and the Netherlands, do we find that employees in the wholesale and retail industry, including the hotels and restaurants, more often have a collective agreement compared to manufacturing industry. In all other countries, the opposite holds true. In Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Spain and the UK employees in the transport and communication industry are more often covered by a bargaining agreement, whereas for the remaining countries the opposite holds true. In Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Spain and the UK, employees in the finance industry are more often covered by a collective agreement. In the remaining three countries the opposite holds true. In all countries employees in the other commercial services are less often covered by a collective agreement compared to coverage in manufacturing. In Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and the UK employees in public administration are more often covered by a collective agreement, whereas in the remaining three countries the opposite holds true. In all countries except for Poland, employees in education are more often covered by a collective agreement, compared to coverage in manufacturing in these countries. In all countries employees in health care are more often covered by a collective agreement, compared to coverage in manufacturing in these countries. In contrast, with the exception of Belgium, Germany, Hungary and UK, employees in other services are far less often covered by a collective agreement, compared to the coverage in manufacturing industry.

[224] (10*.57%)+1=6.7

Table 7.7. Explaining collective bargaining coverage rates by country, 2004 – 2007

Country	BE			DK			FI		
	B	Sig	Exp(B)	B	Sig	Exp(B)	B	Sig	Exp(B)
Gender [0=M. 1=F]	0.095		1.10	-0.248		0.78	-0.367	*	0.69
Age	0.004		1.00	0.029	***	1.03	0.016	*	1.02
Union member [0=N.1=Y]	0.315	***	1.37				0.656		1.93
Firmsize [1.10]	0.290	***	1.34	0.344	***	1.41	0.231	***	1.26
Manufacturing (REF)									
Construction	-0.268	**	0.76	0.661	*	1.94	0.439		1.55
Whole-sale/retail/hotels	-0.414	***	0.66	-0.722	**	0.49	-0.088		0.92
Transp. commun.	-0.075		0.93	0.383		1.47	-0.105		0.90
Finance	0.492	***	1.64	0.090		1.09	1.634	**	5.12
Other comm.serv.	-0.665	***	0.51	-1.256	***	0.28	-0.579	**	0.56
Public admin.	-0.764	***	0.47	1.472	*	4.36	1.146	**	3.14
Education	0.522	**	1.69	0.634		1.88	0.603		1.83
Health care	0.871	***	2.39	0.858	*	2.36	2.020	***	7.54
Other industry	0.122		1.13	-0.052		0.95	-0.603	*	0.55
Constant	-0.141		0.87	-0.359		0.70	0.383		1.47
N in Analysis	11105			2149			2379		
Not incl. (missing)	9157			235			15752		
Chi-square	1212.2			260.3			153.3		
df	13			12			13		
Sig.	0.000			0.000			0.000		
-2 Log likelihood	10244.9			1421.6			1437.4		

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: *The large numbers of missing values are due to the fact the don't knows and the not applicables have been excluded in the analyses; in Finland and Poland the survey question on collective bargaining was asked only in 2005*
Note: ** Other community, social and personal service activities, including activities for households.*

Table 7.7. (Continued) Explaining collective bargaining coverage rates by country

Country	DE			HU			NL		
	B	Sig	Exp(B)	B	Sig	Exp(B)	B	Sig	Exp(B)
Gender [0=M. 1=F]	-0.072	**	0.93	0.188	**	1.21	0.065	**	1.07
Age	0.014	***	1.01	0.025	***	1.03	-0.002		1.00
Union member [0=N.1=Y]	1.083	***	2.95	1.762	***	5.82	0.855	***	2.35
Firmsize [1.10]	0.397	***	1.49	0.454	***	1.58	0.216	***	1.24
Manufacturing (REF)									
Construction	0.325	***	1.38	-0.149		0.86	1.257	***	3.52
Wholesale/retail/ hotels	0.166	***	1.18	-0.547	***	0.58	0.420	***	1.52
Transp. commun.	-0.011		0.99	1.321	***	3.75	-0.157	***	0.85
Finance	0.525	***	1.69	-0.090		0.91	-0.646	***	0.52
Other comm.serv.	-1.089	***	0.34	-0.491	***	0.61	-1.597	***	0.20
Public admin.	1.368	***	3.93	-0.420	**	0.66	1.383	***	3.99
Education	0.731	***	2.08	0.856	***	2.35	0.650	***	1.92
Health care	0.355	***	1.43	0.305	*	1.36	1.367	***	3.92
Other industry	0.112		1.12	0.131		1.14	-0.053		0.95
Constant	-2.435	***	0.09	-4.131	***	0.02	0.439	***	1.55
N in Analysis	49685			6914			63,007		
Not incl. (missing)	32014			879			36,353		
Chi-square	17263.1			2078.6			99360		
df	13			13			13		
Sig.	0.000			0.000			0.000		
-2 Log likelihood	49614.1			6457.6			12271.7		

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: *The large numbers of missing values are due to the fact the don't knows and the not applicables have been excluded in the analyses; in Finland and Poland the survey question on collective bargaining was asked only in 2005*
Note: ** Other community, social and personal service activities, including activities for households.*

Table 7.7. (Continued) Explaining collective bargaining coverage rates by country

Country	PL			ES			UK		
	B	Sig	Exp(B)	B	Sig	Exp(B)	B	Sig	Exp(B)
Gender [0=M. 1=F]	-0.099		0.90	0.123	*	1.13	-0.146	**	0.86
Age	0.028	*	1.03	0.010	**	1.01	0.007	**	1.01
Union member [0=N.1=Y]	2.146	***	8.55	0.413	***	1.51	2.887	***	17.93
Firmsize [1.10]	0.134	**	1.14	0.181	***	1.20	0.247	***	1.28
Manufacturing (REF)									
Construction	-19.388		0.00	-0.636	***	0.53	-0.462	***	0.63
Wholesale/retail/ hotels	-0.507		0.60	-0.330	***	0.72	-0.112		0.89
Transp. commun.	0.506		1.66	0.060		1.06	0.587	***	1.80
Finance	-0.733		0.48	1.149	***	3.16	0.458	***	1.58
Other comm.serv.	-0.217		0.80	-0.408	***	0.66	-0.326	***	0.72
Public admin.	-1.377	**	0.25	0.640	***	1.90	2.672	***	14.47
Education	-0.260		0.77	0.118		1.12	1.567	***	4.79
Health care	0.138		1.15	0.285	*	1.33	0.893	***	2.44
Other industry*	-0.160		0.85	-0.245	*	0.78	0.375	**	1.45
Constant	-3.451	***	0.03	-0.113		0.89	-3.681	***	0.02
N in Analysis	739			9,696			17,102		
Not incl. (missing)	6,070			6,085			11,302		
Chi-square	6809			15781			28404		
df	13			13			13		
Sig.	0.000			0.000			0.000		
-2 Log likelihood	248.8			832.6			7959.4		

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: *The large numbers of missing values are due to the fact the don't knows and the not applicables have been excluded in the analyses; in Finland and Poland the survey question on collective bargaining was asked only in 2005*
Note: ** Other community, social and personal service activities, including activities for households.*

7.5. Employees' opinions about collective bargaining coverage

Do employees think that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement, regardless of whether they are covered or not? In Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK this question was asked all the time in the *WageIndicator* survey; in Finland, it was asked only from April until September 2005. The question was not asked at all in Hungary, Poland and Denmark. As a consequence of the different regimes of wage-setting, the phrasing of theis particular survey question was slightly different across countries.

Our general findings on employees' opinions about collective bargaining, do not point to large cross-industry differences, but mainly to cross-national differences: see Table 7.8. On the one hand, in the UK not even half of all employees responding agreed with the statement that it is important to be covered by an agreement (44%). In Spain, on the other hand, 90% of the employees agreed with the statement. Yet, these differences become less marked if we look solely at those employees employed by companies covered by collective agreements (the rows 'Covered' in the table). In all of the five comparable countries (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK) at least three quarters of all covered employees attached importance to collective agreements. In the UK, for example, this share is 84% against 23% in companies not covered by collective agreements, and in Germany 76% against 46% in non-covered companies. Thus, it appears that employees not covered by collective agreements mostly attach considerably less value to being covered by such an agreement. The exception here is Spain, where the differences are small and even 85% of the employees working in non-covered companies perceive collective agreements to be important.

With only one exception (Finnish health care), at industry level employees covered by collective agreements attach more value to these agreements than those who are not covered. Spain is also the country with the smallest cross-industry differences in perceiving collective agreements as being important (maximum 9%points) followed by Finland (20%pts). Both abso-

lute and relative differences between industries are highest in the UK, followed by Germany and the Netherlands.

In Finland, Germany and Spain the support for collective bargaining is highest in the public sector, while in Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and again Spain, health care takes the lead. In education too, support for collective bargaining is high everywhere. In Belgium and the Netherlands other commercial services showed the lowest scores, in Germany the lowst score was in finance and in Spain wholesale and retail / hotels and restaurants, (although there was still considerable support for collective agreements here). In the UK manufacturing and other commercial services jointly scored lowest.

Of course, it is interesting to compare these outcomes with the actual bargaining coverage rates. We do so in Table 7.9 by country and industry. The shaded cells show the industries where the importance of being covered by a collective agreement is higher than the actual coverage.

In Spain and the UK, the positive levels of employees' opinion regarding the importance of being covered by a collective agreement is considerably higher than the actual coverage rate, respectively 19%points and 17%pts, In Germany employees' opinions were higher by 7%pts. Coverage rates and opinions are about equal in Belgium and Finland. By contrast in the Netherlands the coverage rate is higher than the opinion level (-7%pts). Considering industries, the pattern follows the national outcomes: in all 13 Spanish industries the share of those agreeing that it is important to be covered was higher than the actual coverage rate. In the UK this was so in 12 industries, with the exception of the public sector. In Germany this is the case in eight industries, in Belgium in six, in Finland in three, and in the Netherlands in only one industry. Across countries, the largest difference in favour of the opinion was found in wholesale and retail, followed by other community and social services; hotels, restaurants, catering; other commercial services; and health care. The public sector is the only industry with an overall slightly negative score of those agreeing with the importance of being covered by a collective agreement compared to the joint actual coverage rates.

7.6. Conclusions

The outcomes presented in this chapter allow us to explore strong and weak points of collective bargaining in nine EU member states from a trade union viewpoint. Starting with the weaknesses, a first disquieting aspect for the union movement may well be our finding that a remarkably high share of respondents obviously does not know whether they are covered by a collective agreement. Relying on the evidence of Table 7.1, it may be assumed that in Belgium, Denmark and Finland substantial percentages of those answering 'Don't know' do in fact have a collective agreement. If the 'don't knows' and the 'non applicables' are left out, the collective bargaining coverage rates we found are lower than those presented in Table 7.1 for six countries and were particularly marked for Belgium and Poland.

As for employee characteristics, some of our findings may sound warnings for the union movement too. First, in three countries (Denmark, Germany, Poland) coverage rates are clearly higher for men than for women. Second, coverage rates are higher for older employees than for the younger generations, and these differences are pronounced in Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Poland and the UK. In combination with the low union densities of younger workers we already touched upon in Chapter 6, this may hamper trade unions defending of the interests of the next generations of workers. Third, in all countries coverage rates increase with firm size. The figures presented point to special problems for the German and Hungarian unions concerning the interest representation of workers in small companies as well as at general bargaining problems for the Polish and the UK union movements.

On the positive side for trade unions, there is a strong relationship between high coverage rates and high union densities. Yet, a reservation should be made here: this relationship may only hold true as long as union density does not become too low, i.e. does not drop into a danger zone. A related point, favourable for unions, may well be found in the broad support expressed by respondents from most countries for the view that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement. If we look at the employees of companies covered by collective agreements, it turns out that in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK at least three quarters of these employees attach importance to collective agreements. Moreover, for Bel-

gium, Germany, Spain and the UK the levels of employees' opinions for most industries regarding the importance of being covered are higher than the actual coverage rates. These findings may provide a stimulus for the union movement across the EU to continue investing in modernising collective agreements and in advertising their advantages for workers.

Table 7.8. Percentage of the employed agreeing that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement, breakdown by country, coverage categories (Covered/Not covered) and industry

		BE	FI	DE	NL	ES	UK
Manufacturing	Covered	82%	88%	74%	75%	89%	78%
	Not covered	66%	81%	48%	45%	82%	19%
	Total	78%	87%	65%	70%	87%	37%
Construction	Covered	79%	92%	78%	82%	89%	81%
	Not covered	65%	50%	53%	46%	81%	16%
	Total	74%	85%	67%	80%	87%	28%
Wholesale/retail/hot	Covered	80%	86%	76%	83%	88%	80%
	Not covered	69%	86%	56%	51%	84%	26%
	Total	76%	87%	68%	78%	87%	39%
Transport, commun.	Covered	83%	90%	78%	80%	93%	86%
	Not covered	68%	65%	47%	48%	88%	27%
	Total	78%	84%	68%	73%	91%	55%
Finance	Covered	81%	90%	65%	78%	96%	81%
	Not covered	59%	60%	30%	39%	84%	17%
	Total	77%	89%	57%	66%	94%	39%
Other comm. services	Covered	75%	86%	68%	73%	90%	78%
	Not covered	52%	75%	30%	30%	84%	18%
	Total	65%	83%	43%	50%	88%	30%
Public sector	Covered	88%	94%	89%	86%	95%	89%
	Not covered	68%	89%	56%	52%	91%	32%
	Total	81%	94%	84%	84%	94%	80%
Education	Covered	91%	86%	81%	88%	94%	85%
	Not covered	74%	75%	63%	52%	90%	32%
	Total	84%	85%	75%	84%	92%	68%
Health care	Covered	94%	93%	84%	92%	95%	90%
	Not covered	80%	100%	67%	76%	92%	42%
	Total	92%	93%	78%	91%	95%	67%
Other	Covered	88%	91%	82%	83%	94%	85%
	Not covered	71%	44%	49%	54%	89%	30%
	Total	82%	80%	66%	75%	92%	48%
Total	Covered	83%	89%	76%	80%	92%	84%
	Not covered	64%	74%	46%	38%	85%	23%
	Total	79%	87%	64%	71%	90%	44%
N	N	16536	3037	72075	67508	12874	21541

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 7.9. Percentage of employees covered by a collective agreement (CBC) and difference between CBC and percentage of employees agreeing that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement (AGR), breakdown by country and industry. The shaded cells indicate that the employees' opinion in favour of collective bargaining is higher than the actual bargaining coverage.

	BE		FI		DE	
	CBC	CBC-AGR	CBC	CBC-AGR	CBC	CBC-AGR
Manufacturing	83%	-5%	91%	-4%	64%	1%
Construction	70%	4%	90%	-4%	46%	21%
Whole-sale/retail/hotels/rest	66%	11%	85%	2%	49%	19%
Transport, commun.	81%	-3%	88%	-4%	70%	-1%
Finance	88%	-10%	96%	-6%	77%	-20%
Other comm.services	65%	0%	82%	1%	29%	14%
Public sector	69%	12%	96%	-3%	85%	-1%
Education	83%	1%	95%	-10%	69%	6%
Health care	90%	2%	97%	-4%	63%	15%
Other	77%	5%	77%	3%	50%	16%
Total	77%	0%	87%	-2%	64%	7%

	NL		ES		UK	
	CBC	CBC-AGR	CBC	CBC-AGR	CBC	CBC-AGR
Manufacturing	80%	-13%	73%	14%	24%	13%
Construction	92%	-14%	56%	31%	11%	16%
Whole-sale/retail/hotels/rest	83%	-6%	62%	25%	12%	26%
Transport, commun.	79%	-8%	76%	16%	39%	15%
Finance	71%	-6%	89%	5%	27%	12%
Other comm.services	46%	2%	63%	25%	14%	16%
Public sector	97%	-15%	85%	10%	83%	-3%
Education	89%	-6%	76%	15%	59%	9%
Health care	95%	-5%	79%	16%	43%	24%
Other	74%	-1%	64%	28%	24%	23%
Total	71%	-7%	90%	19%	45%	17%

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

8. Work-related stress

Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens

8.1. Introduction

One of the key objectives of the EU Lisbon Strategy is to secure more and better jobs, as well as continuing to fight social exclusion and poverty. Furthermore, the European Commission has stated, "Quality is at the heart of the European social model. It is a key element in promoting employment in a competitive and inclusive knowledge economy".[225] Thus the link between 'quality' and 'knowledge society' on the one hand and better jobs and workplace rights on the other is definitely challenging and distinctively European as well.

In the last decade work-related stress has aroused a lot of interest across Europe. According to the 2000 EWCS and the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work in Bilbao it was, after back pain, the second most common work-related health problem, affecting 28% of the workers in the then 15 member states of the EU.[226] Work-related stress has been associated with a diverse range of negative health outcomes.[227] We will argue that work-related stress is closely connected to other issues in the wider field of the quality of work.[228] Thus, Section 8.2. provides a short overview of the EU debate concerning this wider field. Section 8.3 goes into the regulations and the quality of work that is relevant for limiting work-related stress. As we will see, national legislation and national agreements between the social partners are relevant here. Section 8.4 deals more precisely with definitions of work-related stress. A major source besides the *WageIndicator* survey is

[225] EC, 2001a, 2.
[226] Bouwman, 2002.
[227] EF, 2006, 2.
[228] In EU documents sometimes called 'quality *in* work' (cf. EC, 2001a, 2003b); the older usual denomination, derived from Scandinavia, is 'quality of working life', while the current American expression is 'job quality'.

the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) of the European Foundation, of which the fourth wave has just been published.[229] Section 8.5 presents results of calculations concerning quality of work and work-related stress, based on both sources.

8.2. The EU debate on the quality of work

Prior to the Lisbon Declaration, the European Commission explored the relation between 'more and better jobs' and related this to the modernization of work organisations. This followed the first debates where the high levels of unemployment in Europe were connected with the Europe-wide dominance of inflexible, Taylorist forms of work organisation.[230] Consequently, in 1997 the Commission's 'Green Paper on Partnership for a new organization of work' appealed for change towards the flexible firm and away from mass production. It emphasised the importance of and linkages with issues like flexibility and social security, life-long learning, payment systems, and equal opportunities. The Green Paper made it clear that the unions have a key role in developing new forms of work organisation.[231] Thereafter, in 1998 the European Employment Strategy (EES) was created, basing Employment Guidelines on four pillars: stimulating employability, adaptability, entrepreneurship and equality. In 2000 in Lisbon a set of concrete goals and indicators was added to the EES, and the 2003 Employment Guidelines revision formulated three overarching goals: full employment, quality of labour and productivity, and social inclusion.

After the Lisbon Summit, European policy-makers reconfirmed the 'more and better jobs' goal at various occasions, as in the conclusions of the Spring 2004 European Summit which claimed "Delivering more and better jobs is the most urgent issue to be addressed over the coming year".[232] In the 2005 Commission's guidelines for growth and jobs linked a number of employment guidelines with the 'better jobs' goal: improving quality and productivity at work; promoting a life-cycle approach to work; enhancing

[229] Parent-Thirion *et al*, 2007
[230] Bouwman, 2004.
[231] EC, 1997; Van Klaveren *et al*, 1997.
[232] Presidency Conclusions, 2004, 6.

work attractiveness; promoting flexibility combined with employment security and reducing labour market segmentation, all the while expanding and improving investment in human capital.[233]

In 2001, under the Belgian presidency, the Commission published a Communication focusing on the goal of promoting quality in work. One of its aims was to establish a broad, coherent set of indicators. Quality in work was described as a relative and multi-dimensional concept, including a) objective characteristics related to employment (both of the job and of the wider work environment); b) worker characteristics; c) the match between worker characteristics and job requirements, and d) the subjective evaluation of these characteristics by the worker. This description seemed to open the door for the deliberate choice of indicators concentrating on objective job characteristics as well as on the match ('fit') between worker and job characteristics. This would have allowed assessment of the structural basis of opportunities to improve jobs and to limit health risks in work organisations, following the seminal work of Robert Karasek .[234] Yet, after concluding that "There is no standard or agreed definition of quality in work in the academic and expert literature", the Commission ended up in proposing a 'coherent and broad' set of indicators, within two dimensions covering 10 main elements of quality in work[235]:

- under dimension I, characteristics of the job itself: intrinsic job quality; skills, lifelong learning and career development;
- under dimension II: gender equality; health and safety at work; flexibility and security; inclusion and access to the labour market; work organisation and work-life balance; social dialogue and worker involvement; diversity and non-discrimination, and overall work performance.

The Commission mentioned as possible indicators for intrinsic job quality: job satisfaction; the proportion of workers advancing to higher paid employment over time, and low wage earners, working poor and the distribution of incomes. Indeed, in the subsequent 2003 Communication, the Commission in treating intrinsic job quality focused on self-reported job satisfaction, transitions between non-employment and employment and within

[233] EC, 2005b.
[234] Karasek, 1979.
[235] EC, 2001a, 7, 11 ff.

employment by pay level, and on transitions by type of contract.[236] This measurement has been separated from measuring health and safety at work, although the Commission had, in the 2001 Communication, already noted that "new risks and pressures related to changing forms of employment and ever tighter rhythms of work have emerged", pointing to the outcomes of the first three European Surveys on Working Conditions.[237]

It is open to question whether the Commission's 10 indicators live up to the claim of consistency. The choice of indicators is very broad, easily leading to open-endedness in policy decision-making, and they hardly allow for links with the issue of the modernization of work organization. The latter weakness is all the more remarkable as it corresponded to the time when the strand of literature on this issue had been stimulated and swollen by research commissioned through the Commission.[238] Some studies explicitly addressed the relationship between new forms of work organization and the quality of work.[239] The relative isolation of the 'better jobs' theme, combined with the broad and rather elusive approach chosen, may have contributed to its demise in EU policy-making. It may have been a vague sign that in the 2005 Commission's Communication on the Social Agenda 'better jobs' as such was no longer mentioned. Only the four priorities of the Kok Task Force on Employment in 2003 were repeated, the priority that comes closest to the better jobs theme was: 'invest more, and more effectively, in human capital'.[240]

On the other hand, in the early years of this century the European Council of Health Ministers and the Commission undertook various activities to promote awareness of the causes and consequences of work-related stress. In 2001, for instance, the health ministers invited the member states "to give special attention to the increasing problem of work-related stress and depression".[241] The 1999 Commission's "Guidance on work-related stress" had defined the phenomenon as "a pattern of emotional, cognitive, behavioural and physiological reactions to adverse and noxious aspects of work

[236] EC, 2003b, 8-9.
[237] EC, 2001a, 9.
[238] Cf. Business Decisions Ltd, 1999; Ennals, 2002.
[239] Cf. Savage, 2001; Wiezer *et al*, 2001.
[240] EC, 2005a.
[241] Council, 2001.

content, work organisation and work environment. It is a state characterised by high levels of arousal and distress and often by feelings of not coping." This EC publication emphasized that work-related stress is often maladaptive and disease-provoking, and mentioned as appropriate actions the prevention or counteraction by job redesign (e.g. by empowering the employees, and avoiding both over- and under-loading), by improving social support, and by promoting reasonable reward for the effort invested.[242]

The European Agency for Safety and Health at Work has been notably active in targeting psychosocial issues and work-related stress. In 2002 the European Week for Safety and Health at Work was devoted to 'Working on stress'. In that year the Agency published various materials on stress prevention, like detailed descriptions of interventions at organisational level as examples of good practice.[243]

The European Parliament (EP) and the ETUC too have been active in counteracting the demise in EU policy-making of the quality of work theme. In 2000 the EP[244] called for work to be adapted to people's abilities and needs and not vice-versa, and urged the Commission to investigate "new problem areas which are not covered by current legislation, such as stress and burnout". The Parliament also noted that (along with muscular-skeletal diseases) psycho-social factors constituted the greatest modern threat to workers' health. It drew attention to the problems resulting from a lack of autonomy at the workplace, monotonous and repetitive work and work with a narrow variety of content (features which are typical of women's work in particular, according to the resolution). In 2002, the chair of EP's Employment and Social Affairs Committee recalled the importance of modernising work organisations as a key element in the approach of work-related stress.[245]

In 2003 its Tenth Congress committed the ETUC to seek a European Union built, among other things, on "full employment and quality jobs (…..) A high level of physical and mental health" and, under the heading 'The road from Lisbon: towards more and better jobs', "Promote high quality and stable jobs through EU legislative and collectively agreed provisions, in

[242] EC, 2000, 5, 17.
[243] European Agency, 2002a, 2002b.
[244] In Resolution A4-0050/99.
[245] Bouwman, 2002.

terms of issues such as working time, pay and conditions, health and safety, and access to training (…)".[246] A 2004 ETUC declaration emphasized that Europe needs to strengthen its social dimension by improving working conditions, and mentioned four negative trends related to quality of labour and productivity.[247] In June 2006, addressing the Finnish Presidency, the ETUC declared: "Improving the quality of working life in order to increase the employment rate, the productivity levels and innovation depends on the way work is organised but also on the skill levels of the workforce (...) Europe needs to invest more and better on skills and competences, on research, development and innovation".[248] In its document "The coordination of collective bargaining 2007", the ETUC confirmed its attachment to policies ensuring quality at work. In this respect the ETUC drew attention to the fact that, as the fourth EWCS showed, work intensity is rising throughout the EU.[249]

It has to be added that global union federations have displayed for a decade activities to raise the consciousness of workers about the causes and dangers of work-related stress. They have done so mainly by campaigning and information-spreading activities, but they have also increasingly emphasized the potential of collective bargaining in combating work-related stress.[250] Most global unions actively disseminate state-of-the-art information in this field, like interesting research results, specific national legislation, and collective bargaining results. In 2002 the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF) launched a project on (best) practices in stress prevention, in which its German, Swedish, Dutch and Danish affiliates participated. This project illustrated a disquieting paradox: in companies where occupational stress was a major problem, key worker representatives turned out to have little time and opportunities to tackle stress-related problems.[251]

[246] ETUC, 2003a, 12, 16.
[247] ETUC, 2004.
[248] ETUC, 2006a.
[249] ETUC, 2006b.
[250] Mureau, 2001; Koukoulaki, 2002, 8; various EIRO information.
[251] Jansen *et al*, 2005, 5.

8.3. Quality of work regulation in Europe

In many EU member states employers' associations in particular suggest that currently 90% of executive decrees on the quality of work are based on EU regulation and ILO treaties. Until recently, EU regulation has been limited to the 'classical' issues of health and safety at work while the organisational and mental dimensions of quality of work, like autonomy and work-related stress, remained peripheral. As such, stress was not mentioned in the EU legislative framework. The Framework health and safety Directive (89/391/EEC) lays down the employer's general obligations to ensure the health and safety of workers in every aspect related to the work, including requiring the employer to "adapt the work to the individual especially as regards (…) the choice of working and production methods, with a view, in particular, to alleviating monotonous work and work at a pre-determined work rate and to reducing the effect on health" (art. 6). This can be read as an indirect provision for stress-related aspects.[252]

The formal non-existence of work-related stress at EU level changed in October 2004 when the social partners at this level agreed upon a voluntary Framework Agreement on Work-Related Stress. Among other things, this agreement lays down that "If a problem of work-related stress is identified, action must be taken to prevent, eliminate or reduce it. The responsibility for determining the appropriate measures rests with the employer. These measures will be carried out with the participation and collaboration of workers and/or their representatives". From the trade union side, it has been argued that, although the Agreement contains no definition of stress, the main health and safety thrust is clearly on screening mechanisms and tackling the causal factors of work-related stress, including work organization, work environment, work content, and communication issues. In doing so, it adds a dynamic intervention aspect to assessment.[253]

In 2001, the EIRO observatory found in the then 15 EU member states and Norway, that "No country examined has specific regulations on psychosocial risk factors and/or work-related stress. In the general health and safety regulations (for all sectors) or the specific ones (for a particular sec-

[252] Koukoulaki, 2002, 6.
[253] Gauthy, 2004.

tor, occupational category or job) there are no clauses referring directly and specifically to work-related stress. Nor are there explicit references to work-related stress in regulations on work organisation (covering working time, performance control, assignment of tasks, power of the employer/control of workers, pay, or reconciling work with family and social life)". This study goes on to state that, despite this lack of specific regulations, the general legal frameworks of all countries refer to psycho-social risk factors causing work-related stress, most of these frameworks paraphrasing the 1989 Framework health and safety Directive. Following EIRO, only in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden do legal provisions go beyond the Directive by specifying the need for employers to act against other factors which are considered by experts to be psycho-social risks and to cause work-related stress, and by relating health and safety at work to detailed aspects of work organisation. Recently in Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal courts have ruled in favour of compensation for (former) workers experiencing post-traumatic stress. Moreover, in some countries tripartite arrangements at national or industry level focus on combating the risks of work-related stress. This is the case in the Netherlands, in a number of so-called Working Conditions Covenants, and in Sweden. The same holds for bipartite arrangements in collective agreements, actually to be found in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.[254]

8.4. Work-related stress: definitions

The causal model that we will summarize here, is as follows:

work load demands → stressors → work-related stress → burnout

Work-related stress can be described as a pattern of reactions occurring when workers are confronted with demands concerning their work that are not matched to their competencies and resources, and with which they have problems to cope. When a worker perceives an imbalance between job demands and his/her competencies and resources, this can cause emotional, cognitive, behavioural and physiological reactions. The long-term conse-

[254] EF, 2001; various EIRO information.

quences in case of prolonged exposure may be serious, and may well include musculoskeletal disorders, particularly backaches and muscular pains in neck and shoulders with RSI (repetitive strain injuries), and burnout as perhaps the most notorious stress reactions.[255] Thanks to extensive epidemiological research, the interrelations between stress reactions, symptoms and long-term consequences for workers have become relatively well-known.

The sources of work-related stress (stressors) and the determinants of the situation mostly regarded as leading to mental (job) strain, are much less clear and subject to heated academic debates. The 'classical' explanation, based on Karasek's job control-demand model, focuses on the conflict between high job demands and low job control (low decision latitude and low social support), leading to 'high strain jobs'. These jobs are characterized by complex tasks and high work intensity (in turn made up of high pace of work and working under high time pressure). The more recent literature, however, distinguishes no less than 20 clusters of causes of mental strain, on the one hand indicating the relevance of high strain jobs, but on the other hand emphasizing the relevance of low strain / low decision latitude or 'passive' jobs, characterized by monotonous, short-cyclical work, and lack of career opportunities.[256] Moreover, the combination of task 'passivity' and (sudden, unpredictable) high strain, which is spreading among the workforce of most EU countries, includes important risk categories like process operators, police officers, health care workers, and others.[257]

Recent research on stressors brings nearly the whole, broad field of job quality to the fore. Analyses of data from the third EWCS and from a large Dutch survey point to the following determinants of mental strain: physically heavy work; task complexity; unpredictability; repetitive work; lack of autonomy; work behind VDU screens, and emotionally demanding work (including violence and bullying in the workplace).[258] Moreover, these and other analyses show the importance of many other aspects of the organizational context: job content, working time (overtime!), (low) wages, (lack of)

[255] EF, 2002, 17-18; EF, 2006.
[256] Kompier, 1999.
[257] Smulders & Houtman, 2004; Houtman *et al*, 2006.
[258] Wiezer *et al*, 2005.

career prospects and training, (lack of) support from colleagues and managers, (lack of) job security, may all play substantial roles. Against this backdrop, it makes sense to rely on a broad definition of quality of work, including: skill use and task variety; autonomy at work; job strain, work-related stress; wages; training and career prospects, and worker representation. The practical advantages seem plain. With stressors being omnipotent, a broad range of policy options may seem effective, notably aiming at decreasing job demands (higher staffing levels, adjusting norms, supportive leadership) and increasing control options (redesign of IT systems, more training, participation, information). Yet, the abundance of options may be deceptive: coherent organizational development, including fundamental organizational redesign, will most likely be more rewarding and lasting than specific measures.[259]

In section 8.5 our first step will be to provide a review of the range of factors eventually determining job strain and work-related stress, based on the outcomes of the fourth EWCS (2005), for the nine EU member states for which we present *WageIndicator* data. This will include the incidence of complex work, autonomous work, monotonous work, and repetitive work. Finally, we present the incidence of work pressure (job strain). Work pressure has been measured by combining the scores on two questions: 'Does your job involve working at a very high speed?' and 'Does your job involve working to tight deadlines?'

A second step will consist of an exploration of the available *WageIndicator* outcomes. The *WageIndicator* questioning on the quality of work follows fairly closely that of the EWCS. We also used scores on the issues indicating the intensity of work, on working at very high speed and to tight deadlines, but added scores on three other indicators of work-related stress, namely whether the work is physically exhausting, mentally exhausting, and whether it cannot be finished in the allocated time. We first present how the variables correlate for five countries and for these five stress indicators, as well as the average of the five factors by countries and by industries. Then we treat the scores on the five single indicators, broken down by country and by gender, industry, low-wage threshold, length of working week, age

[259] Cf. Wiezer *et al,* 2001; Savage, 2001.

group, and educational level. We end up presenting and discussing such scores on three other stress indicators: whether the job involves monotonous tasks, whether the respondent finds the job stressful, and whether (s)he finds the job sufficiently varied. In this way we hope to do justice to the evidence from recent research, pointing to the importance of heavy work and monotonous tasks as stressors.

8.5. Work-related stress: outcomes

EWCS outcomes

The subsequent EWCS's allow for exploring long-term trends, although concerning the 2005 edition a number of reported outcomes are not comparable with those from the earlier EWCS's, either because of changes in the questioning or changes in the way of reporting.

We start with the most closely work-related stress issues. Based on the combined answers on the questions about working at very high speed and working to tight deadlines, it turns out that perceived work intensification is on the increase in the EU. In 2005 26% of all workers in the EU27 reported having to work at very high speed all or nearly all of the time. In 1991, the equivalent figure was 19% (for the EU12). From the six countries of which data are available for the 1991-2005 period, four countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain) showed a continuous growth of work intensity as could generally be seen for the EU12 although in the Netherlands and the UK work intensity diminished after 2000 and 1995 respectively.[260] At the same time, the share of those who recorded working to tight deadlines at least three-quarters of the time grew by the same amount. Moreover, there has been a substantial reduction in the share of those reporting never working at very high speed (from 36% in 1990 to 21% in 2005) and of those never working to tight deadlines (from 31% to 19%).[261]

[260] Parent-Thirion *et al*, 2007, 58. For the Netherlands, this trend seems to be the result of a slight fall of the share of those always/frequently working at high pace and a substantial fall of those working under high time pressure, both visible since 1999 (Smulders, 2006, 48).

[261] Parent-Thirion *et al*, 2007, 59; EF, 2007b, 4.

For the EU27, in 2005 working at very high speed was highest in construction and in hotels and restaurants, while working to tight deadlines was highest in (in this order:) construction, transport, other commercial services, and manufacturing. In the EU27, the pace of work was determined primarily (68% of respondents) by direct demands from people (customers, passengers, patients), thereafter by the work of colleagues (42%), by numerical and production targets (42%), direct control of the boss (36%) and automatic machine speed (19%). Obviously, the growing proportion of workers for which the pace of work is dependent on demands from people adds substantially to the overall figures on time pressure and pace of work. In the EWCS 2005 the share of 'pace of work dependent on direct demands from customers, patients etc.' was over 80% in three sectors: hotels and restaurants, retail, and health care, and in two out of nine occupational groups: senior managers and service and sales workers.[262] More advanced analyses showed that the hotel and restaurant sector had the highest levels of work intensity.[263]

Table 8.1 presents scores on various indicators for the quality of work (incidence among the workforce) from the fourth EWCS for the nine countries we are researching, compared with averages for the EU27. From the viewpoint of quality of work those scores that deviate negatively from the EU27 average are shaded. We first show the scores on two indicators of 'good work' (although under certain conditions), i.e. the shares of complex work and of autonomous work, followed by two indicators of 'bad work', the shares of monotonous and of repetitive tasks. Then, the table shows the scores on the perceived health or safety risks, and finally the two more specific indicators for work intensity.

It has to be noted that the shaded scores, seen in the context of work organisations, are not necessarily always 'bad'. In this respect it is worth trying to integrate the findings on work intensity in Karasek's model, and to link

[262] Parent-Thirion *et al*, 2007, 55; EF, 2007b.
[263] Parent-Thirion *et al*, 2007, 59.

Table 8.1. Indicators for quality of work, nine EU member states, 2005

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK	EU27
% complex work	52.3	74.6	74.5	71.6	75.6	65.0	58.2	39.9	56.1	59.4
% autonomous work	59.5	68.2	63.4	55.9	53.9	64.4	54.0	48.1	54.3	53.7
% monotonous tasks	31.4	43.8	48.0	28.5	36.6	22.7	52.0	63.5	55.0	42.9
% repetitive tasks	16.7	27.4	35.7	21.7	12.2	16.3	12.6	39.9	29.7	24.7
% consider H & S risk be cause of work	23.7	23.2	24.3	18.0	33.2	22.6	47.3	37.2	19.1	28.6
% working at very high speed	60.5	75.5	77.7	72.2	64.4	60.9	42.8	60.0	46.7	59.6
% working to tight deadlines	62.1	68.8	73.6	70.9	58.5	61.2	56.0	55.1	63.5	61.8

Source: EWCS-4: Parent-Thirion et al, 2007, Annex 3: Statistical tables:
% complex work: q23e
% autonomous work: average of (q24a+q24b+q24c+q24d+q24e)
% monotonous tasks: q23d
% repetitive tasks (short repetitive tasks less than 1 min.): q20a
% consider health and safety risks because of work: q32
% working at very high speed: q20_a
% working to tight deadlines: q20_b

them with the different forms of work organisation, as the authors of the fourth EWCS report did.[264] Yet, some outcomes seem puzzling, for example, the low shares of complex work in Belgium and the UK, the comparatively high shares of complex and autonomous work in Hungary, as well as the substantial percentage of monotonous and repetitive tasks in Denmark, Finland and the UK. Intriguing also is that high scores on the indicators for work intensity are widespread among the North-West European countries, but that moderate values show up for Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK.

[264] Parent-Thirion *et al*, 2007, 59-60. See also Smulders, 2004, 283-284.

WageIndicator outcomes

Regarding measurements of work-related stress based on *WageIndicator* data, we start by considering five indicators: 1) Work that is physically exhausting; 2) Work that is mentally exhausting; 3) Working at very high speed; 4) Work that cannot be finished in the allocated time; and 5) Work to tight deadlines. All variables are measured on a five-point scale, ranging from 1=never to 5=daily, with the exception of 'Work cannot be finished in allocated time', that is measured as a dichotomous variable yes/no, recoded to fit the scales 1=no, 5=yes.[265] For the UK the questions on physically and mentally exhausting work have not been included in the survey.

Table 8.2 presents the results for eight member states. The table shows that the incidence of the work-related stress variables does not vary much across the seven countries. In all countries work that is mentally exhausting, working at high speed, and working to tight deadlines are the most common reported indicators, except for work that is physically exhausting (third position) in Hungary. When comparing countries, Spain ranks highest on both mentally and physically exhausting work; the UK ranks highest on Working at very high speed and Working to tight deadlines, and Hungary has the highest scores on Work that can't be finished in allocated time.

The last column in the table indicates the Cronbach alpha per country, which is a measure for the coherence across the five variables. It is highest in Spain, indicating that the five variables more often occur jointly in that country, whereas it is lowest in Finland, pointing to a greater impact of a single variable of work-related stress.

[265] Factor analyses indicated that all five load on one factor (Cronbach's alpha = 0.67). The answers 'Don't know' and 'Not applicable' were not taken into account, and only cases with valid values on all variables were included in the analyses.

Table 8.2. Scores on five indicators for work-related stress, eight EU member states, all ranging from 1=never to 5=daily

	Work physically exhausting	Work mentally exhaust ting	Work at very high speed	Work can't be finished in all. time	Work to tight deadlines	Cronbach's alpha
Belgium	2.7	3.2	3.5	2.6	3.4	0.69
Denmark	3.1	3.3	3.4	2.6	3.4	0.70
Finland	2.7	3.5	3.6	2.5	3.6	0.62
Germany	3.1	3.4	3.4	2.6	3.4	0.69
Hungary	3.2	3.5	3.3	3.1	3.1	0.69
Netherlands	2.6	3.0	3.5	2.2	3.1	0.64
Spain	3.3	3.9	3.3	2.5	3.4	0.73
UK	n.a.	n.a.	3.7	2.8	4.1	--

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: *n.a. = not available*

We were able to investigate in detail how the variables correlate for five countries and for five work-related stress indicators. Table 8.3 shows that in all countries the correlation between two indicators related closely to 'time pressure', 'working to tight deadlines' and 'working at high speed', is highest compared to other variables. In Denmark, Germany, Hungary and Spain workers particularly report that tight deadlines and high speed occur jointly. However, working at high speed turns out to be hardly physically exhausting, and this is even more the case for working to tight deadlines. These two conditions are more often mentally exhausting. These patterns can be noticed in all five countries. In all countries except Finland mentally exhausting work goes along with physically exhausting work.

Table 8.3. Correlation coefficients across five indicators of work-related stress in five EU member states, 2006, breakdown by country

	Work mentally exhausting	Work at very high speed	Work to tight deadlines	Work can't be finished in time
Belgium				
Work physically exhausting	0.44 (***)	0.25 (***)	0.20 (***)	0.18 (***)
Work mentally exhausting		0.31 (***)	0.30 (***)	0.27 (***)
Work at very high speed			0.67 (***)	0.38 (***)
Work to tight deadlines				0.36 (***)
Denmark				
Work physically exhausting	0.41 (***)	0.25 (***)	0.19 (***)	0.20 (***)
Work mentally exhausting		0.31 (***)	0.26 (***)	0.25 (***)
Work at very high speed			0.72 (***)	0.36 (***)
Work to tight deadlines				0.33 (***)
Finland				
Work physically exhausting	0.28 (***)	0.26 (***)	0.17 (***)	0.14 (***)
Work mentally exhausting		0.27 (***)	0.27 (***)	0.26 (***)
Work at very high speed			0.62 (***)	0.29 (***)
Work to tight deadlines				0.28 (***)
Germany				
Work physically exhausting	0.42 (***)	0.23 (***)	0.17 (**)	0.27 (***)
Work mentally exhausting		0.29 (***)	0.24 (***)	0.24 (***)
Work at very high speed			0.74 (***)	0.37 (***)
Work to tight deadlines				0.34 (***)
Hungary				
Work physically exhausting	0.03 (***)	0.14 (***)	0.10 (***)	0.22 (***)
Work mentally exhausting		0.24 (***)	0.26 (***)	0.28 (***)
Work at very high speed			0.70 (***)	0.36 (***)
Work to tight deadlines				0.33 (***)
Netherlands				
Work physically exhausting	0.43 (***)	0.25 (***)	0.14 (***)	0.14 (***)
Work mentally exhausting		0.27 (***)	0.26 (***)	0.23 (***)
Work at very high speed			0.59 (***)	0.30 (***)
Work to tight deadlines				0.28 (***)
Spain				
Work physically exhausting	0.47 (***)	0.33 (***)	0.27 (***)	0.20 (***)
Work mentally exhausting		0.36 (***)	0.34 (***)	0.24 (***)
Work at very high speed			0.71 (***)	0.43 (***)
Work to tight deadlines				0.42 (***)

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees*
Note: *** *Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed).*

Table 8.4 presents by industry the average of the five factors and its ranking within five countries. It shows at a glance that in all countries work-related stress is relatively high in the hotel and restaurant sector. The same results were found in the fourth EWCS. The public sector reveals in almost all countries the lowest work-related stress. It is striking that the rankings (from lowest to highest score) for all other industries are considerably less consistent across countries than they were concerning working time and low pay. Hereafter, we go into the single variables for which we have computed scores, before presenting the related Tables 8.5 – 8.12.

Table 8.4. Scores on five indicators for work-related stress and their ranking across industries, breakdown by country and industry

	BE		FI		NL		ES		UK**	
	mean	rank	mean	rank	mean	rank	mean	rank	mean	rank
Agriculture	3.0	4	4.4	13	2.9	6	3.2	3	3.8	11
Manufact.	3.1	7	3.1	3	2.9	9	3.3	7	3.3	2
Utilities	2.9	2	3.3	8	2.7	2	3.1	2	4.2	13
Construction	3.2	12	3.1	4	2.9	8	3.3	8	3.5	5
Whole-sale/retail	3.2	11	3.2	7	2.8	3	3.3	11	3.3	2
Hotels, rest., cater.	3.3	13	3.5	12	2.9	11	3.5	13	3.7	8
Transport, comm.	3.1	9	3.4	11	2.9	12	3.3	6	3.5	5
Finance	3.1	6	3.0	1	2.9	7	3.3	10	3.8	11
Other comm. serv	3.2	10	3.2	6	2.9	10	3.3	9	3.7	8
Public sector	2.8	1	3.0	2	2.7	1	2.9	1	3.7	8
Education	2.9	3	3.3	10	3.0	13	3.2	5	3.0	1
Health care	3.0	5	3.3	9	2.9	4	3.4	12	3.5	5
Other	3.1	8	3.2	5	2.9	5	3.2	4	3.3	2

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: *** for the UK average of three factors*
Note: *All indicators range from 1=never to 5=daily*

Physically exhausting work

As Table 8.5 shows, work is perceived as physically exhausting mostly in Hungary and Spain. Five industries show the highest scores: (in this order) hotels / restaurants / catering, agriculture, construction, health care, and wholesale / retail. Manufacturing, transport and communication, and education take middle positions, and the public sector and finance show the low-

est ratings. Exceptions here are the relatively high scores of Hungarian manufacturing and Spanish education. In all countries the differences between the perceptions of men and women are small.

Concerning age cohorts, the perception of physically exhausting work varies across countries. Except for Belgium, the youngest cohort shows the highest scores, followed by the 45-54 of age. The picture is dispersed for the other three generations.

As could be expected, physically exhausting work is consistently more widespread among the workers earning wages under the low wage threshold (see Chapter 4). The same holds true for those with low educational levels compared to those with middle-level education and even clearer with the high educated. Extreme long working weeks of over 48 hours are usually related to a high incidence of physically exhausting work. For lower hours' categories the results are inconclusive.

Mentally exhausting work

Table 8.6 reveals that in the seven countries under study work is perceived as mentally exhausting mostly in Spain, followed at some distance by Hungary and Finland. The same holds for four industries: (in this order) health care, finance, education, and other commercial services. For almost all industries, Belgium and the Netherlands show somewhat lower averages than do the other countries. Again, the differences between the perceptions of men and women are small, but in four countries the female scores are slightly higher.

Across countries, the picture is consistent that the youngest and the oldest generations perceive lower levels of mental exhaustion than the middle-aged groups. Regarding the low wage threshold, the results concerning mentally exhausting work are inconclusive: such work seems to be perceived pretty equally whether the respondents wage was under or over the low wage threshold. As with physically exhausting work long working weeks, of over 48 hours usually, are related to a high incidence of mentally exhausting work. Again, for lower hours' categories the results are inconclusive. Finally, the low educated seem to perceive lower mental stress levels than the middle and high educated, though for most countries the differences are minor.

Work at high speed

Table 8.7 shows that working at very high speed is reported most frequently in Finland and the UK, with only slightly lower levels reported in the other countries. Five industries rank high on this measure of work-related stress, (in this order) hotels / restaurants / catering, wholesale / retail, health care, construction, and finance. These outcomes are rather close to those of the fourth EWCS on this variable, with construction ranking first and hotels and restaurants second. Perceptions of working at very high speed are low in utilities, the public sector and education. Gender differences in the perception of working at very high speed are small, but in six out of eight countries the female scores are higher.

Workers aged 25-54 report to be working at very high speed, more often than both the youngest and oldest generations, with the exceptions of Denmark and Finland, where the youngsters show the highest scores in this respect.

Regarding the low wage threshold, work at high speed does seem to occur equally either under or over the low pay threshold, with the exception of Finland, where working at high speed clearly occurs more frequently for employees under the threshold. As with the two earlier stress indicators, working weeks of over 48 hours are usually associated with working at high speed too. Educational levels do not reveal much variation concerning working at high speed.

Work cannot be finished in allocated time

As Table 8.8 shows, employees in Hungary and to a lesser extent the UK report most frequently that work cannot be finished in the allocated time, while the scores for the Netherlands are low overall. Compared to the other stress indicators, the industry rankings of scores on 'work cannot be finished in the allocated time' show large variation across countries. In this context three industries show somewhat higher averages: hotels / restaurants / catering, education, and finance. Again, gender differences in the perception that work cannot be finished in time are small, but this time in five out of eight countries the male scores are somewhat higher.

Workers aged 25-54 report most often that their work cannot be finished in the allocated time compared to both the youngest and oldest generations;

within this broad category the 34-44 of age show the highest scores, except for Hungary and Spain. The youngsters clearly perceive the least problems with finishing work in time.

Regarding the low wage threshold, employees earning above the threshold much more often report that their work cannot be finished in the allocated time, except in Germany and Denmark. So do the high educated, again with Germany and Denmark as the exceptions where the middle educated report at least problems of the same magnitude. Similarly, those employees working very long hours cite that they cannot finish their work in the allocated time much more often than those working less hours.

Work to tight deadlines

Table 8.9 shows that employees in the UK and Finland report most frequently working to tight deadlines, whereas employees in Hungary and the Netherlands report this the least. On average, working to tight deadlines is most frequently reported in (in this order) finance, other commercial services, and manufacturing, and least frequently in the public sector and in education. The top three positions are different from those in the fourth EWCS: construction, transport, and other commercial services. Yet, our detailed results show a rather dispersed picture by country. As for the earlier indicators, gender differences are quite small, but in four out of eight countries the male scores are somewhat higher.

With the exception of Spain, workers in the middle generation (aged 35-44) report most often working to tight deadlines. In most countries the youngest generation are least likely to cite working to tight deadlines, except for Spain and the UK, where this is the case for the exit generation.

Except for Denmark and Spain employees earning above the low wage threshold more often report working to tight deadlines. In line with this finding, the high educated show the highest scores here, this time with the exception of the UK, where the highest scores are for the middle educated. The low educated consistently score lowest. Similarly, employees with very long hours report most frequently working to tight deadlines.

Monotonous tasks

As Table 8.10 shows, employees in Spain and Finland most frequently report performing monotonous tasks, whereas employees in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and notably Hungary report this the least. The country ranking for monotonous tasks shown in the fourth EWCS is nearly fully reproduced here. On average, monotonous tasks are most frequently reported from (in this order) agriculture, hotels / restaurants / catering, and transport and communication, with education, health care, and other community services showing the lowest ratings. Remarkable here though is the middle position of manufacturing, once regarded as the bastion of monotonous labour, only in Hungary does manufacturing display the highest score.

As for gender, in five out of seven countries women are more likely to be involved in monotonous jobs, while in Belgium and Finland the scores are equal for men and women. Except for Denmark, monotonous tasks are most frequently reported by the youngest generation. Mostly the shares for monotonous jobs diminish with age.

Regarding the low wage threshold, employees earning under the threshold consistently report monotonous tasks more often. The differences with those over the threshold are substantial. In four out of seven countries, the low educated report more often that they are involved in monotonous tasks, but in Denmark, Finland and Germany the figures for the middle educated are highest. Employees working part-time, defined here as less than 20 hours per week, more often report performing monotonous tasks. Hungary, where those working over 35 hours show the highest ratings, is the exception.

Stressful job

Table 8.11 shows that employees in Belgium and the Netherlands most frequently report performing stressful jobs, whereas employees in Denmark and Hungary report this the least. Overall, stressful jobs are most frequently reported by employees (in this order) in health care, hotels / restaurants / catering, and transport / communication. In some countries wholesale / retail and education also show above-average scores. In agriculture, employees in all six countries report least often that they perform stressful jobs.

Workers aged 25-54 report most often that they find their job stressful, with some concentration in the middle generation. Generally the differences across age groups are small although in Germany and Hungary the exit generation shows the highest scores.

Regarding the low wage threshold, in four countries employees with wages over the threshold more often report they are likely to be performing stressful jobs, whereas in Denmark, Germany and Spain the outcomes do not differ irrespective of wage level. Regarding education, no clear pattern can be revealed. Employees working extremely long hours report substantially more often that they also work in a stressful The incidence of stressful jobs grows with the more hours worked.

Sufficiently varied job

As Table 8.12 shows, employees in Germany most frequently report performing sufficiently varied jobs, followed by their colleagues from Belgium and the Netherlands, whereas employees in Spain and Hungary report the lowest scores here. Across countries the highest scores on this item are those in agriculture, followed by other community services and education, the lowest scores are in hotels, restaurants and catering, followed by finance and wholesale / retail. Looked at another way, these three industries indicate the highest perception of insufficiently varied jobs. Again and maybe surprisingly, manufacturing is to be found in the middle ranks.

As for gender differences, five countries report higher averages for males while in Finland and Hungary the scores for men and women are equal. As for age, the oldest generation shows the highest scores on finding jobs sufficiently varied. In nearly all countries the scores increase regularly with age.

As could be assumed, in all countries employees earning above the low wage threshold show (mostly considerably) higher scores on performing sufficiently varied jobs than those under the threshold. The same holds for those with high education, though the differences with the middle educated are not that large. Except for Denmark and Hungary, employees working extremely long hours more often report working in a sufficiently varied job; part-time workers mostly display the lowest scores.

Table 8.5. Average score on work physically exhausting (ranging from 1=never to 5=daily), breakdown by gender, industry, low-wage threshold, length of working week, age group, educational level, and country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	ES
Total (mean)	2.7	3.1	2.7	3.1	3.2	2.6	3.3
Gender							
Male	2.7	3.2	2.7	3.0	3.3	2.6	3.2
Female	2.7	3.0	2.7	3.1	3.2	2.6	3.4
Industry							
Agriculture	3.1	.	.	.	3.2	2.9	3.5
Manufacturing	2.6	3.2	2.8	2.9	3.4	2.6	3.3
Utilities	2.6	.	3.3	.	2.9	2.3	3.1
Construction	2.8	3.5	3.0	.	3.6	2.7	3.4
Wholesale/retail	2.8	3.1	2.9	3.2	3.6	2.7	3.5
Hotels, rest., catering	3.2	3.5	3.5	.	4.0	3.0	3.8
Transport, commun.	2.7	3.3	2.9	3.2	3.1	2.6	3.2
Finance	2.5	.	2.4	2.8	2.4	2.3	3.2
Other comm.services	2.5	2.6	2.4	3.0	2.6	2.4	3.2
Public sector	2.7	2.4	2.4	.	2.8	2.3	3.0
Education	2.8	.	2.6	2.9	3.1	2.6	3.4
Health care	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.4	3.4	2.7	3.5
Other commun. serv.	2.7	2.8	2.7	3.2	2.9	2.7	3.3
Age group							
< 25 yr	2.6	4.1	2.9	3.2	3.5	2.8	3.3
25-34 yr	2.6	3.1	2.6	3.0	3.2	2.6	3.3
35-44 yr	2.7	3.0	2.7	3.0	3.3	2.5	3.3
45-54 yr	2.8	3.1	2.7	3.2	3.3	2.5	3.3
>=55 yr	2.6	2.8	2.7	3.2	2.9	2.5	3.2
Low-wage threshold							
Under LW threshold	2.8	3.9	3.3	.	3.7	2.8	3.5
Over LW threshold	2.6	2.9	2.6	.	3.0	2.5	3.3
Usual working hours							
0-20 hrs pw	2.8	3.5	3.0	3.2	3.3	2.6	3.4
20 – 35 hrs pw	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.2	2.8	2.6	3.1
35 – 48 hrs pw	2.6	3.0	2.6	3.1	2.7	2.6	3.3
48 – 99 hrs pw	2.9	3.5	3.0	3.3	3.1	2.9	3.8
Education level							
Low	3.1	3.2	3.0	3.3	3.9	2.8	3.6
Middle	2.7	3.3	2.6	3.0	3.1	2.6	3.3
High	2.6	2.7	2.2	2.8	2.5	2.4	3.2
Sample size							
N	13606	285	3163	2523	7459	83938	14388

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: ** Other community, social and personal service activities*

Table 8.6. Average score on work mentally exhausting (ranging from 1=never to 5=daily), breakdown by gender, industry, low-wage threshold, length of working week, age group, educational level, and country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	ES
Total (mean)	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.0	3.9
Gender							
Male	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.0	3.8
Female	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.0	4.1
Industry							
Agriculture	3.1	3.6	-	-	2.7	2.8	3.7
Manufacturing	3.1	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.3	2.9	3.8
Utilities	3.0	-	3.3	-	3.5	3.0	3.8
Construction	3.1	2.6	3.2	-	3.1	2.9	3.9
Wholesale/retail	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.6	2.9	4.0
Hotels, rest., catering	3.2	3.0	3.4	-	3.4	2.8	4.0
Transport, commun.	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.7	3.0	3.8
Finance	3.3	-	3.4	3.5	4.0	3.0	3.9
Other comm.services	3.3	3.2	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.1	4.0
Public sector	3.2	3.1	3.4	-	3.8	3.0	3.6
Education	3.3	-	3.5	3.6	3.9	3.1	4.0
Health care	3.2	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.8	3.0	3.9
Other commun. serv.	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.6	3.0	4.0
Age group							
< 25 yr	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.1	2.9	3.8
25-34 yr	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.1	4.0
35-44 yr	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.0	3.9
45-54 yr	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.4	3.6	2.9	3.8
>=55 yr	3.0	3.0	3.3	3.2	3.6	2.7	3.7
Low-wage threshold							
Under LW threshold	3.1	4.1	3.5	-	3.2	3.0	4.0
Over LW threshold	3.2	3.4	3.5	-	3.8	3.0	3.9
Usual working hours							
0-20 hrs pw	3.2	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.3	2.7	3.8
20 – 35 hrs pw	3.2	3.1	3.4	3.4	3.7	3.0	3.8
35 – 48 hrs pw	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.0	3.9
48 – 99 hrs pw	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.0	4.2
Education level							
low	3.1	3.1	3.4	3.4	2.9	2.9	3.9
middle	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.0	3.9
high	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.5	4.0	3.1	3.9
Sample size							
N	18799	285	3177	2506	7485	84371	14454

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: ** Other community, social and personal service activities*

Table 8.7. Average score on working at very high speed (ranging from 1=never to 5=daily), breakdown by gender, industry, low-wage threshold, length of working week, age group, educational level, and country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	ES	UK
Total (mean)	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.3	3.6
Gender								
Male	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.3	3.6
Female	3.5	3.3	3.7	3.5	3.3	3.6	3.4	3.8
Industry								
Agriculture	3.0	-	-	3.2	2.8	3.5	3.0	-
Manufacturing	3.5	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.3	-
Utilities	3.2	-	3.5	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.1	-
Construction	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.5	3.3	-
Wholesale/retail	3.7	4.0	3.9	3.5	3.3	3.6	3.4	-
Hotels, rest, cater.	3.8	-	4.2	3.7	3.5	3.9	3.8	-
Transp, commun.	3.6	3.3	3.9	3.4	3.3	3.6	3.4	-
Finance	3.5	-	3.7	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.5	-
Other comm.serv.	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.0	3.5	3.3	-
Public sector	3.0	-	3.4	3.0	3.6	3.3	2.8	-
Education	3.0	-	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.4	3.1	-
Health care	3.5	-	3.7	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.6	-
Other comm.serv.	3.4	-	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.2	-
Age group								
< 25 yr	3.3	3.7	3.8	3.3	3.2	3.5	3.2	3.5
25-34 yr	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.3	3.6	3.4	3.9
35-44 yr	3.5	3.4	3.7	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.3	3.7
45-54 yr	3.5	3.2	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.4
>=55 yr	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.0	3.4
Low-wage threshold								
Under LW threshold	3.5	3.6	4.1	3.3	3.1	3.5	3.5	3.7
Over LW threshold	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.3	3.7
Usual working hours								
0-20 hrs pw	3.4	1.0	3.7	3.1	-	3.4	3.2	2.8
20 – 35 hrs pw	3.4	3.0	3.7	3.3	-	3.5	3.0	3.2
35 – 48 hrs pw	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.3	3.7
48 – 99 hrs pw	3.9	4.2	4.1	4.0	5.0	3.9	3.8	4.0
Education level								
low	3.5	3.1	3.6	3.4	3.1	3.5	3.4	3.4
middle	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.3	3.8
high	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.3	3.6
Sample size								
N	17068	120	3123	1832	6584	78834	12295	352

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: ** Other community, social and personal service activities*

Table 8.8. Average score on work cannot be finished in allocated time (ranging from 1=never to 5=daily), breakdown by gender, industry, low-wage threshold, length of working week, age group, educational level, and country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	ES	UK
Total (mean)	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.6	3.1	2.2	2.5	2.8
Gender								
Male	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.6	3.1	2.3	2.6	2.9
Female	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.6	3.1	2.2	2.4	2.6
Industry								
Agriculture	2.7	3.3	5.0	1.0	3.5	2.2	2.4	3.4
Manufacturing	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.4	3.0	2.3	2.5	2.7
Utilities	2.3	-	2.5	2.9	3.0	2.1	2.4	4.0
Construction	2.8	2.2	2.0	2.6	2.6	2.2	2.6	2.9
Wholesale/retail	2.7	2.8	2.4	2.8	3.3	2.2	2.4	2.2
Hotels, rest., catering	2.6	3.3	2.6	2.6	4.3	2.0	2.4	2.5
Transport, commun.	2.7	3.1	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.2	2.5	3.1
Finance	2.7	-	2.0	2.9	4.0	2.3	2.8	3.0
Other comm.services	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.4	3.0	2.3	2.6	2.8
Public sector	2.2	2.5	2.4	2.1	3.4	2.1	2.1	3.3
Education	2.8	-	3.3	3.3	3.2	2.6	2.5	2.5
Health care	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.9	2.4	2.6	3.0
Other commun. serv.	2.7	3.7	2.7	3.3	2.8	2.2	2.3	2.1
Age group								
< 25 yr	2.2	1.8	2.2	2.3	2.7	1.8	2.1	1.8
25-34 yr	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.6	3.1	2.3	2.6	2.8
35-44 yr	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.7	3.1	2.4	2.5	3.2
45-54 yr	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.6	3.4	2.4	2.4	3.1
>=55 yr	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.7	2.3	2.2	2.4
Low-wage threshold								
Under LW threshold	2.4	3.7	2.4	4.1	2.8	2.0	2.3	2.1
Over LW threshold	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.6	3.0	2.3	2.5	2.9
Usual working hours								
0-20 hrs pw	2.5	1.0	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.3
20 – 35 hrs pw	2.5	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.0	2.3	2.2	2.8
35 – 48 hrs pw	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.9	2.3	2.5	2.8
48 – 99 hrs pw	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.9	4.1	2.8	3.3	3.5
Education level								
low	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.0	2.3	2.5
middle	2.4	2.7	2.5	2.8	2.8	2.1	2.3	2.4
high	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.7	3.3	2.5	2.7	3.1
Sample size								
N	17398	263	2965	1311	455	90045	13305	609

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: ** Other community, social and personal service activities*

Table 8.9. Average score on working to tight deadlines (ranging from 1=never to 5=daily), breakdown by gender, industry, low-wage threshold, length of working week, age group, educational level, and country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	ES	UK
Total (mean)	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.4	3.1	3.1	3.4	4.1
Gender								
Male	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.3	3.4	4.1
Female	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.4	3.1	3.0	3.4	4.0
Industry								
Agriculture	3.0	4.0	4.0	3.5	2.7	2.8	3.1	4.3
Manufacturing	3.4	3.8	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.9
Utilities	3.2	-	3.8	3.3	3.1	3.2	3.3	4.8
Construction	3.5	3.0	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.2	3.5	3.9
Wholesale/retail	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.3	2.8	2.9	3.3	4.1
Hotels, rest., catering	3.5	-	3.7	3.2	2.7	2.9	3.5	4.3
Transport, commun.	3.6	3.5	3.8	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.9
Finance	3.4	-	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.2	3.4	4.7
Other comm.services	3.6	4.1	3.7	3.5	2.8	3.4	3.5	4.3
Public sector	3.0	-	3.5	3.0	3.4	3.0	2.9	4.1
Education	2.9	4.5	3.8	3.1	2.7	3.0	3.1	3.5
Health care	3.1	4.0	3.5	3.3	3.1	2.7	3.4	3.9
Other commun. serv.	3.4	4.0	3.7	3.3	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.9
Age group								
< 25 yr	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.1	2.8	2.8	3.1	3.9
25-34 yr	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.1	3.2	3.5	4.1
35-44 yr	3.4	3.6	3.7	3.5	3.2	3.2	3.4	4.2
45-54 yr	3.4	3.3	3.6	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.2	4.0
>=55 yr	3.3	3.3	3.6	3.3	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.8
Low-wage threshold								
Under LW threshold	3.2	3.9	3.5	3.2	2.9	2.9	3.5	3.8
Over LW threshold	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.3	3.2	3.4	4.1
Usual working hours								
0-20 hrs pw	3.3	1.0	3.4	2.7	-	2.5	3.2	3.6
20 – 35 hrs pw	3.2	2.5	3.6	3.3	-	2.9	3.1	3.6
35 – 48 hrs pw	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.4	4.1
48 – 99 hrs pw	4.0	5.0	3.8	4.0	4.3	3.6	3.9	4.3
Education level								
low	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.3	2.9	2.9	3.3	3.8
middle	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.0	3.3	4.2
high	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.3	3.4	3.5	4.0
Sample size								
N	16738	122	3109	1821	6020	75349	12180	353

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: ** Other community, social and personal service activities*

Table 8.10. Average score on job involving monotonous tasks (ranging from 1=never to 5=daily), breakdown by gender, industry, low-wage threshold, length of working week, age group, educational level, and country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	ES
Total (mean)	2.4	3.1	3.2	2.6	2.2	2.3	3.6
Gender							
Male	2.4	2.9	3.2	2.5	2.1	2.3	3.5
Female	2.4	3.3	3.2	2.8	2.2	2.4	3.7
Industry							
Agriculture	2.5	3.8	5.0	2.8	2.1	2.7	3.7
Manufacturing	2.4	2.8	3.3	2.5	2.4	2.4	3.5
Utilities	2.4	3.0	2.9	2.5	1.9	2.3	3.6
Construction	2.2	2.9	3.1	2.5	1.9	2.3	3.5
Wholesale/retail	2.4	3.6	3.5	2.7	2.1	2.5	3.8
Hotels, rest., catering	2.5	3.5	3.3	2.8	2.2	2.6	4.1
Transport, commun.	2.5	4.0	3.5	2.7	2.0	2.5	3.7
Finance	2.5	3.0	2.9	2.6	2.1	2.3	3.6
Other comm.services	2.5	3.0	3.3	2.6	2.1	2.3	3.5
Public sector	2.6	3.6	2.9	2.7	2.0	2.2	3.6
Education	2.2	2.5	2.7	2.5	1.7	2.0	3.3
Health care	2.2	2.4	3.0	2.6	2.0	2.1	3.6
Other commun. serv.	2.4	2.0	3.2	2.6	1.9	2.3	3.5
Age group							
< 25 yr	2.6	3.3	3.4	2.9	2.5	2.7	3.8
25-34 yr	2.5	3.4	3.3	2.7	2.3	2.4	3.6
35-44 yr	2.3	3.0	3.2	2.6	2.2	2.2	3.5
45-54 yr	2.3	2.7	3.0	2.4	2.1	2.1	3.6
>=55 yr	2.3	3.8	2.8	2.2	1.9	2.1	3.5
Low-wage threshold							
Under LW threshold	2.6	3.5	3.6	2.8	2.6	2.7	4.0
Over LW threshold	2.3	3.1	3.2	2.6	1.9	2.2	3.5
Usual working hours							
0-20 hrs pw	2.5	5.0	3.3	2.7	1.6	2.5	3.9
20 – 35 hrs pw	2.4	2.9	3.4	2.6	1.7	2.3	3.6
35 – 48 hrs pw	2.4	3.1	3.2	2.6	2.6	2.3	3.6
48 – 99 hrs pw	2.1	3.4	3.2	2.4	2.6	2.2	3.5
Education level							
low	2.5	3.1	3.2	2.6	2.6	2.5	4.0
middle	2.4	3.2	3.3	2.7	2.1	2.4	3.8
high	2.4	3.1	2.9	2.5	1.7	2.2	3.3
Sample size							
N	18179	215	3150	30799	7439	76507	13580

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: ** Other community, social and personal service activities*

Table 8.11. Average score on finding job stressful (ranging from 1=never to 5=daily), breakdown by gender, industry, low-wage threshold, length of working week, age group, educational level, and country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	ES
Total (mean)	3.8	3.3	3.5	3.6	3.2	3.7	3.6
Gender							
Male	3.8	3.3	3.5	3.6	3.2	3.8	3.6
Female	3.7	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.3	3.6	3.6
Industry							
Agriculture	3.5	3.3	2.0	-	2.4	3.4	3.3
Manufacturing	3.8	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.2	3.8	3.6
Utilities	3.6	2.5	3.6	-	3.0	3.7	3.4
Construction	3.8	3.3	3.2	-	2.8	3.7	3.5
Wholesale/retail	3.9	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.2	3.6	3.7
Hotels, rest., catering	4.0	3.7	3.6	-	3.2	3.8	3.9
Transport, commun.	4.0	3.5	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.9	3.7
Finance	3.8	2.5	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.8	3.7
Other comm.services	3.8	3.0	3.6	3.6	2.9	3.8	3.6
Public sector	3.4	2.8	3.5	-	3.5	3.7	3.3
Education	3.6	2.0	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.7
Health care	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.9
Other commun. serv.	3.6	3.3	3.5	3.8	3.2	3.6	3.6
Age group							
< 25 yr	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.6	2.9	3.5	3.4
25-34 yr	3.8	3.3	3.5	3.6	3.2	3.7	3.6
35-44 yr	3.8	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.3	3.8	3.6
45-54 yr	3.8	3.3	3.6	3.5	3.3	3.8	3.7
>=55 yr	3.7	2.7	3.4	3.6	3.3	3.7	3.6
Low-wage threshold							
Under LW threshold	3.6	3.3	3.5	3.6	3.1	3.5	3.6
Over LW threshold	3.8	3.3	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.8	3.6
Usual working hours							
0-20 hrs pw	3.7	2.5	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.3	3.4
20 – 35 hrs pw	3.7	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.2	3.6	3.5
35 – 48 hrs pw	3.8	3.3	3.5	3.7	3.0	3.8	3.6
48 – 99 hrs pw	4.2	3.9	4.0	3.9	3.3	4.1	4.1
Education level							
low	3.8	3.3	3.4	3.6	2.9	3.6	3.7
middle	3.8	3.3	3.6	3.6	3.3	3.7	3.6
high	3.8	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.8	3.6
Sample size							
N	18901	285	3168	2528	7073	82514	13753

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: ** Other community, social and personal service activities*

Table 8.12. Average score on finding job sufficiently varied (ranging from 1=never to 5=daily), breakdown by gender, industry, low-wage threshold, length of working week, age group, educational level, and country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	ES
Total (mean)	4.0	3.9	3.8	4.2	3.7	4.0	3.5
Gender							
Male	4.1	4.0	3.8	4.3	3.7	4.1	3.6
Female	4.0	3.8	3.8	4.1	3.7	4.0	3.4
Industry							
Agriculture	4.2	5.0	5.0	4.2	3.7	3.9	3.6
Manufacturing	4.0	4.0	3.6	4.3	3.4	4.0	3.6
Utilities	4.1	4.5	4.0	4.3	3.9	4.0	3.7
Construction	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.3	3.8	4.2	3.7
Wholesale/retail	4.0	4.0	3.6	4.1	3.7	3.9	3.5
Hotels, rest., catering	4.0	3.0	3.5	4.1	3.8	3.9	3.4
Transport, commun.	4.0	3.6	3.5	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.4
Finance	4.0	3.0	4.1	4.2	3.7	3.9	3.4
Other comm.services	4.0	4.0	3.8	4.2	3.6	4.0	3.4
Public sector	3.9	3.3	4.0	4.2	3.8	4.1	3.5
Education	4.2	3.7	4.2	4.4	4.2	4.2	3.7
Health care	4.2	3.9	4.1	4.3	3.9	4.2	3.6
Other commun. serv.	4.1	4.8	4.0	4.4	3.9	4.1	3.7
Age group							
< 25 yr	3.8	3.3	3.6	3.9	3.3	3.8	3.3
25-34 yr	4.0	3.8	3.7	4.2	3.5	4.0	3.5
35-44 yr	4.1	4.0	3.8	4.3	3.7	4.1	3.6
45-54 yr	4.1	4.1	4.0	4.3	3.8	4.2	3.6
>=55 yr	4.2	3.9	4.1	4.4	4.0	4.2	3.9
Low-wage threshold							
Under LW threshold	3.8	3.8	3.6	3.9	3.3	3.8	3.3
Over LW threshold	4.1	3.9	3.8	4.3	3.9	4.1	3.6
Usual working hours							
0-20 hrs pw	3.9	2.5	3.7	4.1	2.0	3.8	3.3
20 – 35 hrs pw	4.0	3.7	3.6	4.2	2.7	4.0	3.5
35 – 48 hrs pw	4.0	4.0	3.8	4.2	2.1	4.0	3.5
48 – 99 hrs pw	4.4	3.5	4.2	4.4	1.9	4.3	3.8
Education level							
low	4.0	3.7	3.7	4.1	3.3	4.0	3.4
middle	4.0	4.0	3.8	4.2	3.8	4.0	3.4
high	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.3	4.0	4.1	3.6
Sample size							
N	18564	217	3179	32040	7553	79387	13540

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*
Note: ** Other community, social and personal service activities*

8.6. Conclusions

The outcomes presented in this chapter emphasise how serious and persistent are quality of work problems throughout Europe. They point to the weakness of the repeated assurance that "quality is at the heart of the European social model" and underline the need for the development of intervention approaches, supported by the European Commission.

It is worth noting that the rankings concerning work-related stress across countries and across industries are considerably less consistent than those concerning working time and low pay that we showed earlier. Out of seven countries, Spain shows the highest average over-all score and the highest scores on four out of eight indicators of work-related stress namely: work that is physically exhausting (jointly with Hungary); work that is mentally exhausting, monotonous tasks, as well as jobs that are insufficiently varied. Finland, with the second highest average score on the eight variables, has the highest scores on two indicators: working at very high speed and working to tight deadlines. In addition to work that is physically exhausting, Hungary displays the highest score on work that cannot be finished in the allocated time; as does Belgium for stressful jobs. Nearly all values for Denmark and Germany can be found in the middle ranks, those for the Netherlands (except for working at very high speed and job stressful) at the lower end.

As for industries, hotels/restaurants/catering has the doubtful honour of showing up four times with the highest scores across countries: on work that is physically exhausting, working at very high speed, work that cannot be finished in the allocated time, and insufficiently varied jobs. This industry also holds the second position on the perceived monotonous tasks and on stressful jobs. The no. 1 ranking of health care and social work on both indicators work mentally exhausting and stressful job is striking, although the other scores of this sector do not rank high. Finance shows the highest scores on working to tight deadlines and, perhaps surprisingly, on insufficiently varied jobs. Agriculture displays the highest average score on monotonous tasks, and ranks second on work that is physically exhausting.

In analyzing the perceptions of work-related stress, the influence of competitive forces working at industry level appear to be comparatively weak. At least, they make themselves felt quite unevenly across countries. This is

also the case for the institutional factors that operate at the national and industry levels. The conclusion we draw from this is that the variation in work-related stress is most strongly affected by factors working at firm and workplace level. If these observations are correct, they raise a number of issues for the union movement. On the one hand, there is the need for continuous efforts aimed at defending and improving statutory and voluntary arrangements concerning the quality of work, wherever possible at international level. On the other hand, it may also mean emphasizing the firm and workplace level as the locus for most effectively combating work-related stress. Again, as we stressed at the end of Chapter 5, the union movement needs to form structural links between these various levels of activity.

9. Industries

Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens

9.1. Introduction

In chapters 3 to 8, we presented outcomes of the *WageIndicator* survey in six union policy fields. We compared these outcomes across industries and countries and related them to a number of employee characteristics. This chapter focusses the presentation and analyses of *WageIndicator* data on the 13 single industries. With this as a starting point we compare our industry data across the nine countries, presenting issues in the same order as in the preceding chapters: working time, low pay (low wage threshold), training, older workers (age), collective bargaining coverage, and work-related stress.

9.2. Agriculture

In four out of nine member states the usual working hours in agriculture are the highest across all of the 13 industries. In the remaining five countries, agriculture can be found between the 2nd and 5th position in the industry ranking. This picture is confirmed when investigating the share of employees usually working more than 48 hours per week. Using this yardstick, in four out of nine countries agriculture ranks first to third. Similarly, concerning annualised working hours in four of the nine countries agriculture ranks in one of the first three positions. Concerning flexible hours, agriculture also shows high scores, occupying first, second and third positions in three countries. On-call hours are cited as a problem to a lesser extent in agriculture; as is working in the evening and on Saturdays and Sundays. The Netherlands, where agriculture accounting for 56% of employees working on Saturdays takes second place of all industries in the country, is the exception.

The incidence of low pay is comparatively high in agriculture in all countries, except in Denmark and Finland. In Hungary as much as 55% and in the UK 50% of all workers in agriculture earn less than the low pay threshold, followed by Poland (47%) and Belgium (38%). The picture concerning collective bargaining coverage emerging for agriculture is varied: a relatively good

position in the Netherlands with 88% coverage ranking 7th, and in Denmark with 86% coverage ranking 5th compares with Spain, Belgium, Germany and Hungary, where coverage is slightly lower and agriculture occupies the middle positions across industries. In five countries the share of those agreeing that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement is higher than the share actually covered by an agreement. This is not the case in the Netherlands and Belgium. In the UK, only 25% are covered by an agreement while nearly twice as many respondents (47%) agreed that it was important to be covered.

Across industries in most countries agriculture takes the middle position concerning age distribution. In Poland, employees in agriculture are relatively young, on average 31 years of age. In contrast, with an average age of 44 years, the industry has an older work force in Hungary. The share of workers over 45 years of age is highest in the agriculture workforce in Hungary and Finland. It is lowest in Poland, where particularly the share of workers 25-34 of age is high. With 24%, the Netherlands shows by far the highest share of respondents in the youngest age group. In this country agriculture is also one of the 'youngest' of industries.

Concerning indicators of work-related stress, agriculture displays the highest score across industries concerning physically exhausting work. In contrast, work in agriculture is not perceived as mentally exhausting in almost all countries. Neither working at very high speed nor working to tight deadlines is common in the sector, the latter with one exception: German employees in agriculture relatively often find that they are working to tight deadlines.

In nearly all EU member states under study agriculture displays an accumulation of problems concerning long working hours, a high incidence of low pay, and a lack of training. In some countries these are combined with substantial problems of bargaining coverage. Nevertheless, in most countries work-related stress does not show up as a particular problem among agricultural workers.

Table 9.1. Average scores in agriculture by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
Usual working hours									
Average usual hours	39.4	37.1	38.6	40.2	-	37.8	41.2	40.6	41.4
% >= 48 usual hours	-	-	-	8	-	8	-	11	14
% annualised hours	-	-	-	4	-	2	-	-	-
% flexible hours	9	15	17	9	-	5	0	8	10
% on call hours	0	1	1	1	-	1	0	3	0
% working evening	30	-	-	-	27	36	-	72	32
% working Saturdays	30	-	-	-	56	45	-	26	31
% working Sundays	9	-	-	-	43	15	-	11	20
Low-wage threshold									
% under LWT	38	18	5	24	55	30	47	26	50
Training									
% with empl-prov train	52	-	-	26	-	42	60	34	-
Empl-prov train. days	6.3		6.8	5.1		8.7	9.0	7.9	
% with self-paid train.	19	-	-	21	-	14	60	44	-
Self-paid training days	3.0	-	-	1.3	-	2.5	11.7	15.6	-
Age									
Average age	35.8	43.1	40.6	37.2	43.8	33.6	31.5	34.0	37.8
% above 45 years	30	48	38	21	53	16	13	14	26
Collective bargaining coverage									
% covered	72	86	-	55	69	88	-	68	25
% agrees CBC import	68	100	-	72	-	77	-	87	48
Work-related stress									
score physically exhausting	3.1	-	-	-	3.2	2.9	-	3.5	-
score mentally exhausting	3.1	3.6	-	-	2.7	2.8	-	3.7	-
score at very high speed	3.0	-	-	3.2	2.8	3.5	-	3.0	-
score can't be finished	2.7	3.3	-	-	3.5	2.2	-	2.4	3.4
score to tight deadlines	3.0	-	-	3.5	2.7	2.8	-	3.1	4.3

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007.*
Selection: employees in agriculture.

9.3. Manufacturing

Regarding the length of the usual working week, manufacturing in most countries can be found among the lower ranks. In almost all countries, the average working week is relatively short, with the exception of Denmark. (Although even here at 37 hours the average working week is still lower than in most other countries). Concerning the incidence of working over 48 hours a week, manufacturing displays a middle position in almost all countries, except for Germany and Belgium, where the share of those working over 48 hours is relatively high. Annualised hours can be found in manufacturing to a modest extent (2-3%) in Belgium, Denmark and Germany; in the remaining countries it is below 1%. Flexible hours range from 4% in Poland to 16% in Hungary, and in all countries flexible hours are in the upper half of the industry ranking. Working on call is below 1% in most countries. In manufacturing the incidence of working in the evenings and working on Saturdays and Sundays is consistently somewhat higher than the respective country averages.

Compared across industries, manufacturing does not show a high incidence of low pay. Only in Hungary is the share for employees being paid under the low wage threshold in this industry above the national average. This relatively high share (33%) is followed by those of Poland (21%) and the Netherlands (19%). The picture concerning collective bargaining coverage for the manufacturing industry is relatively good, for example, seven out of nine countries reveal 50% coverage or higher. With rates of 18% and 24% respectively, coverage is considerably lower in Poland and the UK. Compared to other industries, manufacturing is covered well in Finland and the Netherlands, with a first and second position. In the remaining countries manufacturing takes middle positions. The share of those agreeing that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement is higher than the share covered by an agreement in the six countries for which we gathered data.

In all countries manufacturing holds middle positions concerning the shares of employees having received at least one day of employer-provided training last year. Finland and Belgium reveal the highest incidence with 68% and 64% respectively of the employees having received such training, whereas with 38% Spain reveals the lowest incidence. The relative picture

Table 9.2. Average scores in manufacturing by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
Usual working hours									
Average usual hours	37.9	36.9	39.0	39.3	-	38.1	40.4	40.6	39.4
% >= 48 usual hours	4	1	2	6	23	4	7	9	6
% annualised hours	0	3	3	2	-	0	-	5	2
% flexible hours	7	10	11	9	25	2	4	10	6
% on call hours	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
% working evening	38	21	25	26	45	41	-	66	32
% working Saturdays	20	16	10	-	40	23	-	14	19
% working Sundays	12	11	8	-	29	12	-	8	13
Low-wage threshold									
% under LWT	12	12	4	9	33	19	21	9	13
Training									
% with empl-prov train	59	-	60	50	-	55	59	42	-
Empl-prov train. days	6.6	-	7.6	4.6	-	10.4	2.7	3.4	-
% with self-paid train.	17	-	-	25	14	14	32	30	-
Self-paid training days	3.3	-	-	4.1	-	2.7	7.6	10.6	-
Age									
Average age	38.3	45.6	37.5	37.6	40.7	36.8	32.5	35.6	37.9
% above 45 years	27	55	25	23	40	22	13	17	27
Collective bargaining coverage									
% covered	82	90	91	63	77	80	18	73	22
% agrees CBC import	77	79	87	64	-	68	-	87	36
Work-related stress									
score physically exhausting	2.6	3.2	2.8	2.9	3.4	2.6	2.8	3.3	-
score mentally exhausting	3.1	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.3	2.9	3.4	3.8	-
score at very high speed	3.5	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.5	-	3.3	-
score can't be finished	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.4	3.0	2.3	-	2.5	2.7
score to tight deadlines	3.4	3.8	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.3	-	3.5	3.9

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007.*
Selection: employees in manufacturing.

concerning average number of training days is better. On average 3 to 10 days of training were received.

The scores in manufacturing on indicators of work-related stress vary around the national averages. No extreme values show up, except the comparatively high scores for Belgium, Germany and Finland on Work that cannot be finished in the allocated time.

Of course, manufacturing is a large and heterogeneous industry. One should be aware that the aggregate figures presented here may hide quite diverse outcomes in for example steel and metal industries, chemicals, food manufacturing, textile and garment manufacturing, and the printing industry.

9.4. Utilities

Analysing the length of the working week in utilities revealsthat the longest average working weeks across countries can be found in Poland, while the highest shares of employees working over 48 hours are to be found in Spain and the UK (7%). The latter shares are consistent with the national averages. Compared across countries and industries, annualised hours are rather widespread in Hungarian, Danish and Finnish utilities. In the utilities industry the incidence of working in the evenings and on Sundays fluctuates around the national averages, while everywhere working on Saturdays is lower than the national average.

In utilities the incidence of low pay is comparatively low in all countries. In Hungary, 23% earn below the low pay threshold, with the UK (5%) and Germany (6%) at the bottomof the range. In all countries the industry reveals comparatively good collective bargaining coverage rates. In Finland, Denmark, Hungary, Belgium and the Netherlands these rates are at least 89%, while in the remaining countries they range from 57% to 79%. The shares of those agreeing that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement approximately equal the shares of those covered, with the exceptions of the Netherlands, where the percentage agreeing is much lower, and Spain, where the opposite holds true.

In all countries the shares of employees having received at least one day of employer-provided training last year are far above the national averages: these shares range from 50% in Hungary to 88% in Finland. Training days vary from 2.7 in Poland to 4.6 in Spain. In almost all countries, training days are also at the top of the league compared to other industries.

The average age of employees in utilities ranges from 35 years in Belgium to 48 in Denmark. In comparison to other industries, utilities have rather old workforces in almost all countries, except for Belgium. This pattern is confirmed in the proportions of employees aged 45 or older.

Table 9.3. Average scores in utilities by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
Usual working hours									
Average usual hours	37.0	37.6	38.8	39.6	-	38.8	40.9	39.7	38.7
% >= 48 usual hours	-	-	-	6	-	6	-	7	7
% annualised hours	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	6	4
% flexible hours	7	9	9	11	12	2	1	7	8
% on call hours	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	6	1
% working evening	34	-	-	26	36	36	-	67	37
% working Saturdays	20	-	-	-	39	16	-	15	25
% working Sundays	16	-	-	-	34	14	-	10	19
Low-wage threshold									
% under LWT	14	-	14	6	23	11	16	10	5
Training									
% with empl-prov train	79	-	88	59	-	80	79	56	-
Empl-prov train. days	2.8	-	-	4.0	-	3.5	2.7	4.6	-
% with self-paid train.	19	-	-	19	-	15	35	26	-
Self-paid training days	3.4	-	-	3.7	-	3.7	11.3	10.1	-
Age									
Average age	35.5	48.4	41.9	38.4	44.2	36.5	38.3	36.4	38.6
% above 45 years	27	70	46	27	53	23	28	22	30
Collective bargaining coverage									
% covered	90	97	-	72	90	89	59	79	57
% agrees CBC import	85	-	-	72	-	63	-	89	60
Work-related stress									
score physically exhausting	2.6	-	3.3	-	2.9	2.3	2.5	3.1	-
score mentally exhaust-ing	3.0	-	3.3	-	3.5	3.0	3.2	3.8	-
score at very high speed	3.2	-	3.5	3.3	3.1	3.3	-	3.1	-
score can't be finished	2.3	-	2.5	2.9	3.0	2.1	-	2.4	4.0
score to tight deadlines	3.2	-	3.8	3.3	3.1	3.2	-	3.3	4.8

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007.*
Selection: employees in utilities.

Working in utilities is on average not perceived as physically exhausting, compared to other industries. Only in Finland do utilities rank high on this work-related stress indicator. The scores on work being mentally exhausting and working at very high speed are comparatively low in all countries too. Concerning the indicators working to tight deadlines and work that cannot be finished in allocated time, utilities can be found in middle positions compared to other industries, with the UK as the exception. Here, three out of four employees report not being able to finish work in the allocated time.

From an employee perspective, the utilities sector reveals a pretty good picture. Working time patterns are around the national averages. Pay levels are comparatively high, as well as collective bargaining coverage. Opinions about the importance of being covered are in line with coverage rates. Training facilities are far above national averages. Workforces are relatively old in almost all countries. In most countries work-related stress levels are not high, the exception being the UK.

9.5. Construction

Working hours in the construction industry are long. In all countries, they can be found at the 1st to 4th position in the national industry ranking. Spain is on top with an average of 41 hours, followed by Poland and Germany. Similarly, the proportion of employees working over 48 hours a week is high, again with Spain on top at 14%. Annualised working hours and on-call work are negligible in most countries, and flexible hours remain between 2 and 8%. In all countries, the incidence of these three forms of working hours is far below the national averages. Working on Sundays remains below 8% and working on Saturdays below 17%, with the exception of Hungary, where both Sunday and Saturday work is more widespread. Regularly working in the evening remains in most countries below 26%, but it is higher in Hungary and notably in Spain, most likely as a consequence of the siesta tradition in that country.

The incidence of low pay in construction mostly takes middle positions in the industry rankings, except in the UK and Denmark where high positions prevail. The shares of construction workers under the low pay threshold are considerable in Hungary, Poland, and Belgium. Collective bargaining coverage rates vary widely, from 92% in the Netherlands to 11% in the UK. Coverage in Construction is in a comparatively high position in Denmark and the Netherlands, but is amongst the lowest ranks in the other countries. The ranking of construction according to the share of those agreeing that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement is about equal in all the countries.

Concerning the shares of employees having received at least one day of employer-provided training last year, Finland, the Netherlands and Poland

Table 9.4. Average scores in construction by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
Usual working hours									
Average usual hours	39.4	37.6	39.4	40.9	-	39.2	41.0	41.1	40.1
% >= 48 usual hours	8	-	3	9	-	6	11	14	9
% annualised hours	-	-	-	2	-	0	-	2	-
% flexible hours	5	4	8	7	6	2	3	8	5
% on call hours	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
% working evening	28	13	6	19-	32	28	-	76	21
% working Saturdays	15	12	4	-	42	18	-	10	15
% working Sundays	4	8	3	-	21	6	-	2	6
Low-wage threshold									
% under LWT	19	9	8	15	36	18	24	9	10
Training									
% with empl-prov train	47	-	53	36	-	55	55	31	-
Empl-prov train. days	4.2	-	5.4	3.8	-	5.6	6.7	5.3	-
% with self-paid train.	15	-	-	30	-	12	32	30	-
Self-paid training days	3.4	-	-	4.5	-	2.2	6.9	11.5	-
Age									
Average age	36.8	44.2	38.0	37.1	39.1	35.6	31.7	33.5	36.9
% above 45 years	25	56	28	20	33	21	9	10	24
Collective bargaining coverage									
% covered	70	91	90	46	47	92	-	56	11
% agrees CBC import	74	96	85	67	-	78	-	87	28
Work-related stress									
score physically exhausting	2.8	3.5	3.0	-	3.6	2.7	2.6	3.4	-
score mentally exhausting	3.1	2.6	3.2	-	3.1	2.9	3.3	3.9	-
score at very high speed	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.5	-	3.3	-
score can't be finished	2.8	2.2	2.0	2.6	2.6	2.2	-	2.6	2.9
score to tight deadlines	3.5	3.0	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.2	-	3.5	3.9

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees in construction.*

reveal the highest scores, and Spain the lowest. Compared to the other industries, these shares are low in all countries. The average number of training days in the industry can be found in the middle ranks.

In construction, the average age of workers occupy middle positions in all countries. The share of workers over 45 years of age is relatively low in all countries, pointing to the widespread practice of early exit in construction.

The Finnish, Hungarian and German construction workers report high levels of physically exhausting work compared to other industries in the country. By contrast, as the relatively low levels indicate, construction work is not mentally exhausting. Working at high speed is common, and reported in all countries, as well as working to tight deadlines.

Throughout the nine countries construction is characterised by substantial working time and training problems and in most countries collective bargaining coverage is low. The outcomes for the German construction industry in particular point to large problems in every respect. It seems likely that the dominance in Germany of large building companies who have developed international subcontracting networks, leading to a large influx of foreign (posted) workers, has contributed to these problems. Moreover, since 2001 the German construction industry has showed a high unemployment rate and no labour shortages. As such it has proved to be the exception from a European perspective.[266]

9.6. Wholesale and retail

The average working week in the wholesale and retail industry ranges from 36 hours in the Netherlands to 44 hours in Hungary. The proportion of workers with a usual working week of more than 48 hours is notably high in Poland and Spain (both 10%). In all countries, the incidence of annualised hours is 3% or less. On-call contracts are hardly found in this industry. Flexible work ranges from 4% in the UK to 15% in Hungary. Concerning these forms of working hours, the industry occupies middle positions in all the countries studied. The incidence of working regularly in the evening ranges from 26% in Germany to 74% in Spain. Working on Saturdays reveals comparatively high percentages although working on Sundays shows lower percentages as well as lower positions in the national rankings.

In all the countries, the incidence of low pay in wholesale and retail is comparatively high. It is highest in Hungary, the Netherlands and Poland, at 47%, 39% and 35% respectively of the employees report wages under the threshold. Collective bargaining coverage varies tremendously across countries,

[266] Fellini *et al*, 2007. See also EMCC, 2005a.

from 84% in Finland to 4% in Poland. Compared to other industries, coverage rates in wholesale and retail are at the bottom of the league in all countries. Everywhere the share of those agreeing that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement is higher than the share actually covered, except for the Netherlands.

Table 9.5. Average scores in wholesale and retail by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
Usual working hours									
Average usual hours	37.4	36.8	36.0	39.6	-	35.9	40.7	39.8	37.7
% >= 48 usual hours	4	-	2	8	-	4	10	10	7
% annualised hours	-	-	0	2	-	1	-	3	1
% flexible hours	9	6	8	6	15	4	4	5	4
% on call hours	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
% working evening	30	34	42	26	36	42	-	74	36
% working Saturdays	44	45	43	-	55	48	-	43	49
% working Sundays	10	30	12	-	27	14	-	8	29
Low-wage threshold									
% under LWT	30	28	12	22	47	39	35	20	27
Training									
% with empl-prov train	51	-	59	44	-	51	68	34	-
Empl-prov train. days	5.0	-	5.0	3.4	-	6.0	6.2	5.9	-
% with self-paid train.	15	-	-	21	-	15	39	23	-
Self-paid training days	3.5	-	-	3.6	-	3.3	7.9	7.5	-
Age									
Average age	37.0	38.3	34.7	36.2	37.4	33.7	29.4	33.2	34.6
% above 45 years	24	31	17	19	29	16	4	10	20
Collective bargaining coverage									
% covered	65	70	84	48	41	79	4	62	14
% agrees CBC import	76	71	85	67	-	75	-	87	39
Work-related stress									
score physically exhausting	2.8	3.1	2.9	3.2	3.6	2.7	2.9	3.5	-
score mentally exhausting	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.6	2.9	3.4	4.0	-
score at very high speed	3.7	4.0	3.9	3.5	3.3	3.6	-	3.4	-
score can't be finished	2.7	2.8	2.4	2.8	3.3	2.2	-	2.4	2.2
score to tight deadlines	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.3	2.8	2.9	-	3.3	4.1

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007.*
Selection: employees in wholesale and retail.

The shares of employees in wholesale and retail received at least one day of employer-provided training last year range from 34% in Spain to 68% in Poland. Training days range from 3 in Germany to 6 in Poland. In the industry rankings, training in this industry takes middle positions.

In all countries, wholesale and retail is an industry with a relatively young workforce. The average ages vary between 29 in Poland and 38 in Denmark, and the share of workers over 45 years of age between 4% in Poland and 31% in Denmark.

Compared across industries, the average scores on physically exhausting work are high, except for Denmark. The scores on mentally exhausting work show a wider variation, with relatively low rankings for the Netherlands and Germany. Except for Denmark and Hungary, working at high speed is reported quite often. In the national industry rankings the scores on work that cannot be done in the allocated time and working to tight deadlines can be found in the middle positions.

The wholesale and retail trade is characterized by a combination of serious workers' problems: first and foremost the high incidence of low pay and low collective bargaining coverage rates although the workers here underline the importance of being covered. In most countries, retail employers focus on the youngest generation. Despite the high incidence of low pay, especially for youngsters and adult women, retail often remains attractive for these categories because of the convenient working hours and the vicinity of stores and short commuting times.[267]

9.7. Hotels, restaurants and catering

The working weeks in the hotel/restaurant/catering industry are quite long in Germany, the UK, Poland, and Spain where 13-15% of workers report working usually more than 48 hours a week. Annualised hours are particularly prevalent in Spain. The shares of flexible hours are comparatively high in this industry, except for Spain and Hungary. By contrast, the shares of on call hours are low everywhere. In all countries the shares of evening work are

[267] Van Klaveren & Tijdens, 2005.

high compared to other industries. The same holds for working on Saturdays, with quite similar shares, as well as working on Sundays, albeit with somewhat lower shares.

The incidence of low pay in hotels, restaurants and catering is extremely high in all countries. In five countries, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands and Poland, the incidence is the highest across industries. The level is

Table 9.6. Average scores in hotels, restaurants and catering by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
Usual working hours									
Average usual hours	38.1	35.8	36.8	41.2	-	34.8	41.0	39.7	40.5
% >= 48 usual hours	8	-	4	15	-	5	14	13	15
% annualised hours	-	-	-	3	-	2	-	5	-
% flexible hours	13	25	15	10	11	10	3	6	7
% on call hours	0	4	3	1	0	2	1	1	0
% working evening	55	-	54	53	66	71	-	65	63
% working Saturdays	63	50	57	-	71	71	-	65	64
% working Sundays	52	-	41	-	60	60	-	53	54
Low-wage threshold									
% under LWT	45	-	13	48	55	47	58	20	40
Training									
% with empl-prov train	41	-	54	28	-	42	20	29	-
Empl-prov train. days	3.9	-	5.3	3.3	-	4.8	4.4	5.5	-
% with self-paid train.	20	-	-	21	-	18	33	28	-
Self-paid training days	3.4	-	-	3.6	-	4.0	12.2	9.3	-
Age									
Average age	35.4	38.3	33.7	34.2	34.9	31.0	28.9	32.7	32.5
% above 45 years	21	33	15	16	23	12	4	10	16
Collective bargaining coverage									
% covered	69	64	87	54	32	93	-	62	6
% agrees CBC import	77	89	90	72	-	81	-	88	37
Work-related stress									
score physically exhausting	3.2	3.5	3.5	-	4.0	3.0	3.2	3.8	-
score mentally exhausting	3.2	3.0	3.4	-	3.4	2.8	4.0	4.0	-
score at very high speed	3.8	-	4.2	3.7	3.5	3.9	-	3.8	-
score can't be finished	2.6	3.3	2.6	2.6	4.3	2.0	-	2.4	2.5
score to tight deadlines	3.5	-	3.7	3.2	2.7	2.9	-	3.5	4.3

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007.*
Selection: employees in hotels, restaurants and catering.

highest in Poland, where 58% of employees in this industry report wages under the low pay threshold. Collective bargaining coverage is comparatively low in this industry, except for the Netherlands. Low rates notably show up for the UK (6%) and Hungary (32%). In all countries except the Netherlands, the share of those agreeing that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement is higher than that of those actually covered.

Compared across industries, the shares of employees in the hotel and restaurant sector having received at least one day of employer-provided training last year are low in all six countries where we have data. Finland reveals the highest shares, and Germany and Poland the lowest. Compared across industries the average number of training days is at the low end too. Here, Spain shows the highest score.

In all countries, the hotels, restaurants and catering form an industry with a very young workforce. Except for Belgium and Spain, the average ages are the lowest in the industry rankings. Consequently, the shares of those above 45 years of age are also low but less pronounced.

Concerning work-related stress, hotels/restaurants/catering show up three out of five times with the highest scores: on work that is physically exhausting, working at very high speed, and work that cannot be finished in the allocated time. The scores on work that is mentally exhausting vary widely, and so do those on working to tight deadlines.

In the hotel and restaurant industry workers' problems concerning working time, low pay, training, and work-related stress accumulate and in some countries are negatively reinforced by low collective bargaining coverage. Here, union progress is definitely not that easy. Large international chains are developing, but the industry is still dominated by (very) small enterprises, slow in raising the standards of working conditions and staff skills. As a recent study states, "legislation may be needed to take staff development more seriously and improve their career prospects", adding that small businesses are likely to find it hardest to conform to such legislation.[268]

[268] EMCC, 2005b.

9.8. Transport and communication

The working weeks in transport and communication are quite long, notably in the UK, the Netherlands and Germany where 12-13% of workers report working usually more than 48 hours a week. Annualised hours can be found particularly in Germany (13%), followed by Spain (6%). The shares of flexible hours are comparatively high in this industry, except for Poland and the Netherlands. In contrast, the shares of on call hours are low everywhere, except for Spain. In all countries the shares of evening work are high compared to other industries. The proportions working on Saturdays can be found in the middle ranks, except for Hungary, the Netherlands and the UK where quite high scores are recorded. The shares working on Sundays are lower, though comparatively high again in Hungary, the Netherlands and the UK.

In nearly all countries, the incidence of low pay in transport and communication holds middle positions in the industry rankings, except for Denmark and the UK, where the position of the industry is better. Collective bargaining coverage is average, with the exception of Poland and Hungary, where the bargaining rates rank 1st and 2nd respectively. The differences between coverage rates and the importance attached to being covered by a collective agreement are minor.

Compared across industries, the proportions of transport and communication workers receiving at least one day of employer-provided training last year are modest in the six countries with sufficient data. Training rates rank average to low; average training days vary from 3 in Denmark to 9 in Belgium and the Netherlands.

Both the average age and the share of workers over 45 years of age in transport and communication are mostly in the middle ranks, except for Denmark, Germany and the UK, who are all countries with a relatively old workforce in this industry.

The scores of transport and communication on the five work-related stress indicators are mostly in the middle ranks, with some exceptions. Belgium shows high scores on work that is mentally exhausting, working at very high speed and working to tight deadlines. Finland and the Netherlands show high scores on working at very high speed and working to tight deadlines.

Table 9.7. Average scores in transport and communication by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
Usual working hours									
Average usual hours	38.1	38.7	39.5	41.0	-	40.0	40.7	40.3	40.8
% >= 48 usual hours	8	6	9	12	-	12	6	8	13
% annualised hours	-	3	1	13	-	1	-	6	3
% flexible hours	10	13	11	9	21	5	3	7	6
% on call hours	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	4	1
% working evening	46	34	29	32	57	54	-	63	43
% working Saturdays	30	27	26	-	56	40	-	24	37
% working Sundays	20	17	21	-	48	26	-	18	27
Low-wage threshold									
% under LWT	19	12	7	15	19	28	24	9	14
Training									
% with empl-prov train	56	-	57	47	-	56	50	51	-
Empl-prov train. days	8.7	-	3.9	3.2	-	8.7	5.6	8.4	-
% with self-paid train.	17	-	-	26	-	17	21	30	-
Self-paid training days	4.1	-	-	4.0	-	3.3	4.9	9.0	-
Age									
Average age	37.2	46.8	36.9	38.4	41.7	36.3	31.6	35.8	38.5
% above 45 years	25	61	23	25	42	22	9	18	29
Collective bargaining coverage									
% covered	81	92	88	70	91	79	27	76	39
% agrees CBC import	78	90	84	69	-	71	-	91	55
Work-related stress									
score physically exhausting	2.7	3.3	2.9	3.2	3.1	2.6	2.6	3.2	-
score mentally exhausting	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.7	3.0	3.4	3.8	-
score at very high speed	3.6	3.3	3.9	3.4	3.3	3.6	-	3.4	-
score can't be finished	2.7	3.1	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.2	-	2.5	3.1
score to tight deadlines	3.6	3.5	3.8	3.3	3.2	3.3	-	3.5	3.9

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007.*
Selection: employees in transport and communication.

In general terms, transport and communication shows a rather mixed picture. In the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands the industry notably shows quite long working weeks, and in the Netherlands particularly the incidence of low pay is high. With the partial exception of Belgium and Spain, the shares of those receiving and taking training days as well as the average number of training days are comparatively modest. On the other hand, collective bargaining coverage is, except for the UK and Poland, rather high, as well as the

share of those valuing the coverage of a collective agreement. In the rankings concerning work-related stress levels, transport and communication takes a middle position, except for Belgium where the high scores on 'working at very high speed' and working to tight deadlines' affect the overall score negatively.

9.9. Finance

In finance both the longest average working week (40 hours) as well as the highest shares of employees (6%) working over 48 hours a week can be found in Germany. The shares of those working over 48 hours are comparatively low in all countries. Annualised hours are rare, except for Spain (3%). There is no incidence of on-call hours, but in nearly all countries the share of those working flexible hours is substantial, with 32% in Hungary, 12% in Denmark and 11% in Belgium at the top. The incidence of evening work fluctuates around the national averages, while working on Saturdays and Sundays is lower than these averages.

In finance the incidence of low pay is comparatively low in all countries. The absolute figure is highest in the Netherlands where 18% of workers were found to be under the threshold, with Germany (5%) and Finland (2%) at the other end of the range. In all countries the industry reveals varying collective bargaining coverage rates. In Finland, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain these rates are at least 87%, while in the remaining countries they range from 6% (Poland) to 77% (Germany). In four countries the shares of those agreeing that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement are lower than the shares of those covered, while in Spain and the UK they are higher.

In all countries the shares of employees who received at least one day of employer-provided training last year are quite high and above the national averages. These shares range from 59% in Spain to 90% in Finland. Training days are less abundant and vary from 3.2 in Germany to 6.4 in Poland. The average ages range from 30 years in Poland to nearly 40 in Hungary. Except for Belgium and Germany, finance has a relatively young workforce.

Apart from generally low scores on the first work-related stress indicator: work is physically exhausting, the scores for finance on the other four indica-

tors vary widely across countries. For work that is mentally exhausting, scores are comparatively high in Belgium, Hungary and the Netherlands, and low in notably Germany. Working at very high speed scores high in Hungary and Spain, as does work that cannot be finished in the allocated time. Finally, the scores on working to tight deadlines are comparatively high in Hungary and the Netherlands.

Across industries, finance shows a rather favourable position on some issues, namely, low shares of extremely long hours, low on working Saturdays and on Sundays, a low incidence of low pay, and in most countries, modest scores on work-related stress indicators. Yet, except for physically exhausting work, the latter scores are in total quite high for Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium. From an employee perspective, these signs may be disquieting as the finance industry feels the cold winds of growing competitive pressure. With the liberalization of financial markets in the EU, including the introduction of the EMU, the Euro and the Financial Services Action Plan, and with the rapid advance of ICT, large-scale mergers, acquisitions and split-ups as well as the massive (international) relocation of employment can be envisaged.[269]

[269] EMCC, 2004.

Table 9.8. Average scores in finance by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
Usual working hours									
Average usual hours	35.9	33.8	38.1	39.7	-	36.3	39.3	39.2	37.2
% >= 48 usual hours	3	-	2	6	-	3	2	5	5
% annualised hours	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	3	1
% flexible hours	11	12	8	10	32	3	4	6	7
% on call hours	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
% working evening	26	-	11	26	32	35	-	58	25
% working Saturdays	17	-	3	-	21	12	-	15	18
% working Sundays	3	-	1	-	16	4	-	3	5
Low-wage threshold									
% under LWT	8	-	2	5	6	18	16	6	13
Training									
% with empl-prov train	76	-	90	69	-	75	76	59	-
Empl-prov train. days	4.3	-	4.4	3.2	-	5.3	6.4	6.3	-
% with self-paid train.	14	-	-	31	-	22	29	33	-
Self-paid training days	3.3	-	-	5.5	-	4.9	4.3	10.4	-
Age									
Average age	37.5	39.4	37.6	36.1	39.7	34.4	30.1	37.0	32.9
% above 45 years	27	47	27	17	38	15	4	24	14
Collective bargaining coverage									
% covered	88	87	96	77	65	71	6	89	27
% agrees CBC import	77	-	89	57	-	65	-	94	39
Work-related stress									
score physically exhausting	2.5	-	2.4	2.8	2.4	2.3	2.6	3.2	-
score mentally ex-hausting	3.3	-	3.4	3.5	4.0	3.0	3.4	3.9	-
score at very high speed	3.5	-	3.7	3.4	3.6	3.5	-	3.5	-
score can't be finished	2.7	-	2.6	2.4	4.0	2.3	-	2.8	3.0
score to tight deadlines	3.4	-	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.2	-	3.4	4.7

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees in finance.*

9.10. Other commercial services

Other commercial services consist of an amalgam of sub-sectors, often indicated as (other) business activities. It includes sub-sectors positioned at the so-called 'high end' of the labour market, like the ICT sector (hardware and software development, production and maintenance, data processing, database activities etc.[270]), and at the 'low end', like cleaning[271], and many activities positioned somewhere in between, like those of call centres.[272] Below, we show our findings for these three sub-sectors.

In other commercial services both the longest average working week (nearly 40.5 hours) as well as the highest shares for working over 48 hours a week (9%)can be found in Germany. It should be noted that within Germany, compared to other industries these are rather high scores too. For the other countries, the shares of those working over 48 hours are in the middle ranges of the industry-rankings. ICT, cleaning and call centres, the three sub-sector investigated in greater detail, remain below the industry averages. Annualised hours are low, except for Denmark (6%). Low shares of on-call hours are found in Denmark, Hungary and Spain while in the other countries they are zero. In contrast, in a number of countries the share of those working flexible hours is high, notably in Denmark, Finland, Hungary and Poland. The ranking of other commercial services for evening work is modest, except for Spain (at 77%, this country's highest percentage overall) and in Hungary. The incidence of working on Saturdays and Sundays in this industry is comparatively low in all countries. Patterns of working evenings and on Saturdays and Sundays obviously vary considerably, even within sub-sectors. This is confirmed by research on *WageIndicator* data considering the working hours of Dutch, Belgian and UK call centre operators and team leaders.[273]

[270] NACE 3-digit codes 720-727, Computer and related activities.
[271] NACE 3-digit code 747, Industrial cleaning. This sub-sector could not be separated as for Germany and for Poland the numbers of respondents were too small to take into account.
[272] NACE 4-digit code 7486, Call centres, including call centre occupations in other industries as indicated by the respondents.
[273] Tijdens & Van Klaveren, 2007.

Table 9.9. Average scores in other commercial services by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
Usual working hours									
Average usual hours	37.8	36.6	38.0	40.5	-	37.3	39.5	39.7	38.6
% >= 48 usual hours	3	-	2	9	-	3	5	6	6
% annualised hours	0	6	1	2	-	0	-	2	1
% flexible hours	9	14	13	8	20	3	4	9	8
% on call hours	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	1	0
% working evening	38	37	20	35	46	37	-	77	29
% working Saturdays	18	15	9	-	38	15	-	11	16
% working Sundays	10	19	6	-	33	9	-	6	10
Low-wage threshold									
% under LWT	17	27	4	12	24	21	20	12	12
Training									
% with empl-prov train	66	-	67	52	-	65	68	43	-
Empl-prov train. days	4.2	-	4.8	3.0	-	5.3	5.6	6.7	-
% with self-paid train.	22	-	-	28	-	20	30	34	-
Self-paid training days	4.1	-	-	5.7	-	4.3	6.1	12.7	-
Age									
Average age	34.6	41.9	35.6	35.5	41.0	34.1	29.6	32.2	33.9
% above 45 years	16	45	18	15	41	14	5	6	16
Collective bargaining coverage									
% covered	65	60	82	29	53	46	8	63	14
% agrees CBC import	65	76	83	43	-	48	-	88	30
Work-related stress									
score physically exhausting	2.5	2.6	2.4	3.0	2.6	2.4	2.6	3.2	-
score mentally exhausting	3.3	3.2	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.1	3.3	4.0	-
score at very high speed	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.0	3.5	-	3.3	-
score can't be finished	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.4	3.0	2.3	-	2.6	2.8
score to tight deadlines	3.6	4.1	3.7	3.5	2.8	3.4	-	3.5	4.3

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007.*
Selection: employees in other commercial services.

Concerning the incidence of low pay, the position of other commercial services varies by country with a high incidence of low pay in Denmark and comparatively low shares in Poland, the UK and Belgium. As could be expected, the low pay incidence is low in the ICT sub-sector, while it is quite high in cleaning. The share of call centre workers under the low pay threshold is high in five out of seven countries. The outcomes concerning collective bargaining coverage for the other commercial services may worry trade unio-

nists: coverage is the lowest of all industries in Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, but is also low in the remaining five countries. On the other hand, in all the countries studied the share of those agreeing that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement is higher than the share actually covered by an agreement.

In all countries the shares of employees who received at least one day of employer-provided training last year are in the middle range of the industry-rankings. The same holds for the number of employer-provided training days.

The average ages in other commercial services are relatively low, indeed, in Belgium and Spain they were the lowest of all industries in those countries. Average ages range from 30 in Poland to 42 in Denmark. Consequently, in most countries the shares of those over 45 are low, especially in Poland (5%) and Spain (6%).

Leaving to one side the generally quite low scores on the first work-related stress indicator: work that is physically exhausting, the scores of other commercial services on the other four indicators vary widely across countries. For work that is mentally exhausting, scores are comparatively high in Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, and Spain. For working at very high speed, the Dutch score is high, while for work that cannot be finished in the allocated time the Belgian score is high. Finally, the scores on working to tight deadlines are comparatively high in Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, and Spain. The joint scores over the last four indicators are, on average, rather high in these four countries, while in the other countries they remain under the national averages. In the ICT industry, scores on one indicator, namely, work that is mentally exhausting, are markedly high in nearly all countries.

9.11. Public administration

Average weekly working hours in public administration range from 35.9 in the Netherlands to 39.2 in Germany. In all countries, working hours in public administration rank in the lower positions compared to other industries. The proportions of employees with excessive working hours are 3% or lower, which in four countries is the lowest proportion of all industries in the country. The shares of employees working annualised hours are at this low level too.

Although positive, when compared to other industries, these shares rank in the middle. Flexible hours are relatively common in public administration: in the UK, as many as 29% of employees in the public sector report flexible hours, and in Spain this is 11%. In these two countries, flexible hours are more common in the public sector than they are in any other industry. In Hungary evening work, Saturday work and Sunday work particularly cover

Table 9.10. Average scores in public administration by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
Usual working hours									
Average usual hours	36.8	36.1	37.2	39.2	-	35.9	39.0	37.2	37.2
% >= 48 usual hours	3	-	1	3	-	2	2	3	3
% annualised hours	-	-	1	2	-	1	-	3	1
% flexible hours	11	13	9	7	11	3	1	11	29
% on call hours	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
% working evening	26	-	12	17	37	35	-	36	23
% working Saturdays	17	-	6	-	31	20	-	16	13
% working Sundays	12	-	5	-	29	18	-	12	11
Low-wage threshold									
% under LWT	19	-	1	8	18	10	39	6	11
Training									
% with empl-prov train	76	-	86	68	-	79	60	55	-
Empl-prov train. days	3.6	-	5.0	2.9	-	6.3	2.4	7.2	-
% with self-paid train.	18	-	-	24	-	19	29	39	-
Self-paid training days	4.3	-	-	4.9	-	4.6	5.9	12.2	-
Age									
Average age	39.3	47.4	43.2	39.4	41.9	37.7	31.4	40.0	37.9
% above 45 years	32	61	46	32	44	28	10	32	28
Collective bargaining coverage									
% covered	69	97	96	85	58	97	9	85	83
% agrees CBC import	81	90	94	84	-	82	-	94	80
Work-related stress									
score physically exhausting	2.7	2.4	2.4	-	2.8	2.3	2.4	3.0	-
score mentally exhausting	3.2	3.1	3.4	-	3.8	3.0	3.2	3.6	-
score at very high speed	3.0	-	3.4	3.0	3.6	3.3	-	2.8	-
score can't be finished	2.2	2.5	2.4	2.1	3.4	2.1	-	2.1	3.3
score to tight deadlines	3.0	-	3.5	3.0	3.4	3.0	-	2.9	4.1

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007.*
Selection: employees in public administration.

high proportions of employees, though in most other countries the incidence of these forms is relatively low.

The incidence of low pay is particularly high in Poland with 39% of the employees in the public sector earning under the threshold. In the remaining countries, these shares vary from 19% in Belgium to 1% in Finland. In all countries, the public sector is located in the upper half of the industry rankings. The picture concerning collective bargaining coverage varies widely too, from 9% in Poland to 97% in Denmark and the Netherlands. Across industries, bargaining coverage ranks high on the national rankings; in four countries the sector at the top of their league. The percentages of those agreeing that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement are rather high in the seven countries where this data is available.

Concerning the shares of employees who received at least one day of employer-provided training last year, Finland, the Netherlands and Belgium reveal the highest scores with 86%, 79% and 76% respectively. Compared to other industries in these countries, the public sector scores are quite high.

Average ages of the national workforces in public administration are high, varying from 31 in Poland to 47 in Denmark. Similarly, the share of workers over 45 of age is high. In six countries, the public sector workforce is the (almost) oldest of all industries.

Public administration shows low scores on the five indicators of work-related stress, except in Hungary. Here four indicators, work that is mentally exhausting, working at very high speed, work that cannot be finished in allocated time and working to tight deadlines, show relatively high scores on the national industry ranking.

Comparing across industries, public administration shows rather favourable outcomes on a number of issues. Long working hours are rare, the incidence of low pay is rather low, and collective bargaining coverage is high. The levels of employer-provided training are high. Moreover, except for Hungary, scores on work-related stress indicators are rather low. Thus, unless public authorities increase budget constraints and make greater efforts to rely on market mechanisms to increase efficiency with adverse affects on pay and working conditions, public administration seems to offer good practices and a benchmark for other industries.

9.12. Education

In education, average weekly working hours range from 32 in Poland to 39 in Germany. Compared to other industries, in almost all countries education has the shortest weekly working hours. Overall, the incidence of long working hours in education is modest too. Annualised hours are widespread, and can be found to a considerable extent in Denmark (25%) and Finland (13%). In four countries, education is the sector with the highest percentages of employees with annualised hours. In contrast, the percentages of on-call work in education are negligible. In education the shares of employees working evenings, Saturdays or Sundays rank in the middle positions in the national industry rankings.

The incidence of low pay is fairly low in education, except for the UK where the sector ranks 6th in this respect. The absolute level of low pay remains considerable in Poland (21%), but compared to other industries in this country, education is better off. In education the picture concerning collective bargaining coverage is clear: coverage rates are relatively high and in all countries the sector is positioned in the upper to middle segment. In four out of six countries for which we have data, the share agreeing that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement is higher than the share actually covered (Belgium, Germany, Spain, and the UK), in the other two it is lower (Finland and the Netherlands).

Concerning the shares of employees who received at least one day of employer-provided training last year, Finland, the Netherlands and Belgium reveal the highest scores, and Spain the lowest score. Compared to the other industries, these shares are consistently in the middle of the national rankings. In Belgium, Germany and Spain the average number of employer-provided training days is relatively low.

The average age in education ranges from 35 in Poland to 45 in Denmark. In all countries, education has a relatively old workforce compared to other industries, except for Denmark, where it ranks in the middle.

In education, one out of the five indicators of work-related stress reveals high scores in all countries: employees in education find their job mentally exhausting. In almost all countries scores on this indicator are comparatively high, while working at high speed and work that cannot be finished in the allocated time rank relatively low. In contrast, work that is physically

Table 9.11. Average scores in education by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
Usual working hours									
Average usual hours	34.0	34.1	35.1	39.1	-	34.4	32.3	34.4	35.6
% >= 48 usual hours	3	-	2	6	-	2	4	3	5
% annualised hours	-	25	13	3	-	5	-	2	5
% flexible hours	6	16	8	7	0	2	2	10	7
% on call hours	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
% working evening	49	-	27	51	39	47	-	59	34
% working Saturdays	23	-	6	-	29	17	-	7	12
% working Sundays	13	-	5	-	26	13	-	3	10
Low-wage threshold									
% under LWT	14	-	4	8	19	16	21	6	15
Training									
% with empl-prov train	70	-	74	58	-	71	61	48	-
Empl-prov train. days	3.3	-	4.6	2.9	-	4.0	5.3	4.2	-
% with self-paid train.	27	-	-	40	-	22	61	52	-
Self-paid training days	4.2	-	-	5.3	-	4.9	14.8	19.3	-
Age									
Average age	37.9	45.3	40.7	39.5	44.0	38.4	35.2	37.1	38.5
% above 45 years	32	55	36	31	53	33	20	22	32
Collective bargaining coverage									
% covered	83	93	95	69	77	89	23	76	59
% agrees CBC import	84	-	85	75	-	83	-	92	68
Work-related stress									
score physically exhausting	2.8	-	2.6	2.9	3.1	2.6	2.7	3.4	-
score mentally exhausting	3.3	-	3.5	3.6	3.9	3.1	3.3	4.0	-
score at very high speed	3.0	-	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.4	-	3.1	-
score can't be finished	2.8	-	3.3	3.3	2.2	2.6	-	2.5	2.5
score to tight deadlines	2.9	-	3.8	3.1	2.7	3.0	-	3.1	3.5

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007.*
Selection: employees in education.

exhausting is often reported in the education sector, and takes middle positions in the national rankings by industry.

Summarizing, working hours in education are low, but annualised working hours are common in the sector. The incidence of low pay is low too. Collective bargaining coverage is high, and so is support for collective bargaining. The workforces are relatively old. Surprisingly, the position of the sector concerning employer-provided training is not outstanding. Yet, it is clear that

education workers compensate for this by comparatively large self-paid training efforts. Finally, although the ranking of the mean outcomes on work-related stress varies, education shows high scores on work that is mentally exhausting, and in some countries on a second stress indicator, namely, work that cannot be finished in allocated time.

9.13. Health care and social work

In health care and social work, average working hours per week range from 31 in the Netherlands to 39 in Germany. In almost all countries health care and social work reveals relatively short weekly working hours compared to other industries. Overall, the incidence of long working hours is very modest too. Annualised hours are quite unusual, with the exception of Spain, where the sector ranks highest in this respect. On call hours are not common either. Flexible hours, though fluctuating around 10% in most countries, are low on the national industry rankings. In contrast, the shares of those regularly working in the evening, on Saturdays and on Sundays are relatively high in all countries. In Spain, as many as 51% of the employees in health care and social work reported working evenings, but the health care sector still ranks at the bottom of the Spanish industry ranking in this respect.

In most countries the incidence of low pay is substantial in health care and social work. In Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Poland and the UK, the industry ranks high concerning low pay. In Poland, as many as 44% of all workers in health care earn under the low pay threshold with only hotels etc. and agriculture showing higher levels of low pay. The picture concerning collective bargaining coverage for health care is fairly consistent: a relatively good position in most countries, except in Germany (7^{th} position). In all countries the share of those agreeing that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement is about equal to the share actually covered.

Concerning the shares of employees who received at least one day of employer-provided training last year, Finland, Belgium and the Netherlands reveal the highest scores and Spain the lowest. On average 2 to 6 days of training was received. The average age in the sector varies from 35 in Poland to 45 in Denmark. Health care and social workers are older compared to their colleagues in other industries.

Table 9.12. Average scores in health care and social work by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
Usual working hours									
Average usual hours	36.5	35.7	37.7	39.1	-	30.8	39.2	37.6	35.8
% >= 48 usual hours	2	-	1	7	-	1	5	5	3
% annualised hours	1	-	3	2	-	3	-	9	1
% flexible hours	10	9	5	6	13	6	2	5	8
% on call hours	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	5	1
% working evenings	48	31	31	41	47	48	-	51	41
% working Saturdays	42	65	25	-	47	40	-	30	33
% working Sundays	33	53	22	-	43	39	-	21	29
Low-wage threshold									
% under LWT	20	20	7	15	25	19	44	11	18
Training									
% with empl-prov train	74	-	77	59	-	71	47	45	-
Empl-prov train. days	3.1	-	3.1	1.9	-	4.2	6.4	5.1	-
% with self-paid train.	23	-	-	36	-	20	43	43	-
Self-paid training days	3.6	-	-	5.0	-	3.9	8.4	13.5	-
Age									
Average age	37.5	44.5	39.5	38.1	41.6	36.7	34.7	36.6	38.1
% above 45 years	28	49	35	26	40	27	17	24	30
Collective bargaining coverage									
% covered	90	93	97	63	72	95	21	79	43
% agrees CBC import	92	94	93	78	-	90	-	95	67
Work-related stress									
score physically exhausting	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.4	3.4	2.7	3.0	3.5	-
score mentally ex-hausting	3.2	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.8	3.0	3.4	3.9	-
score at very high speed	3.5	-	3.7	3.5	3.6	3.5	-	3.6	-
score can't be finished	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.9	2.4	-	2.6	3.0
score to tight deadlines	3.1	-	3.5	3.3	3.1	2.7	-	3.4	3.9

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007.*
Selection: employees in health care and social work.

In health care and social work, one out of the five indicators for work-related stress revealed high scores in all countries: employees in the sector perceived their jobs to be mentally exhausting. In almost all countries this indicator ranks high in the national industry rankings. To a slightly lesser extent, the rankings of physically exhausting work and working at high speed are also high. In contrast, in the sector work can mostly be finished in the allocated time, and working to tight deadlines was also not very common.

Conditions in health care and social work are characterized by more variation across countries than for most other industries. Its working hours' patterns follow those of public administration and education, and so do collective bargaining coverage and opinions about collective bargaining. On the other hand, wage figures suggest considerable low pay rates, and the outcomes on work-related stress indicate working conditions problems related to physical and mental exhaustion. These problems may well point to the disadvantages of the current tendencies of relying on market mechanisms and of budget constraints in this sector.[274]

9.14. Other community and personal services

Concerning the length of the working week in other community and personal services, the shortest hours are found in the Netherlands (34) and the longest in Germany (39). In almost all countries working hours in other community and personal services are relatively short. The shares of employees working more than 48 hours per week range from 3% in Finland and the Netherlands to 9% in Germany, implying in most countries lower middle positions in the industry rankings. Annualised hours and on-call hours are hardly found in this sector. Flexible hours are reported by 4% of the employees in Poland to 16% in Hungary, meaning in all countries a ranking in the upper half. Regarding the shares of those regularly working in the evening, it can be seen that Spain as in other industries reveals a high share (72%), most likely as a consequence of the siesta tradition. Under different climate conditions, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and the UK also show up with rather high scores for evening work. Saturday and Sunday work occurs regularly too. The sector displays relatively high shares of all three forms of working time, compared to other industries in the respective countries.

As for the incidence of low pay in other community and personal services, four countries can be located in a middle group of industries. Yet, in the Netherlands, Poland and Spain the industry shows a rather poor ranking in this respect. The picture concerning collective bargaining coverage is varied

[274] EMCC, 2005c.

Table 9.13. Average scores in other community and personal services by country

	BE	DK	FI	DE	HU	NL	PL	ES	UK
Usual working hours									
Average usual hours	37.0	37.0	36.9	39.5	-	34.3	37.9	37.5	37.2
% >= 48 usual hours	4	-	3	9	-	3	5	7	4
% annualised hours	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	3	1
% flexible hours	11	13	10	8	16	5	4	10	8
% on call hours	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
% working evening	46	20	32	43	46	53	-	72	42
% working Saturdays	33	20	22	-	41	44	-	26	34
% working Sundays	20	-	13	-	32	24	-	14	25
Low-wage threshold									
% under LWT	19	-	6	14	27	34	40	11	18
Training									
% with empl-prov train	64	-	68	50	-	55	61	38	-
Empl-prov train. days	2.7	-	3.7	1.9	-	3.1	0.2	3.7	-
% with self-paid train.	21	-	-	23	-	20	50	43	-
Self-paid training days	4.7	-	-	4.9	-	4.5	6.5	14.7	-
Age									
Average age	37.0	47.3	38.2	37.7	42.5	33.9	33.7	34.5	33.9
% above 45 years	27	69	29	24	46	18	17	13	18
Collective bargaining coverage									
% covered	78	82	77	49	54	69	19	63	24
% agrees CBC import	84	83	80	65	-	72	-	93	48
Work-related stress									
score physically exhausting	2.7	2.8	2.7	3.2	2.9	2.7	2.6	3.3	-
score mentally exhaust-ing	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.6	3.0	3.3	4.0	-
score at very high speed	3.4	-	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.5	-	3.2	-
score can't be finished	2.7	3.7	2.7	3.3	2.8	2.2	-	2.3	2.1
score to tight deadlines	3.4	-	3.7	3.3	3.0	3.1	-	3.3	3.9

Source: WageIndicator data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007.
Selection: employees in other community and personal services.

but coverage is comparatively low in Poland and the UK. In all countries the share of those agreeing that it is important to be covered by a collective agreement is higher than the share covered by an agreement.

Concerning the shares of employees who received at least one day of employer-provided training last year, Finland and Belgium reveal the highest scores (68% respectively 64%), and Spain the lowest (38%). The average number of training days fluctuates between 2 and 4. In other community and

personal services the average workforce age varies between 33 in Poland to 47 in Denmark, which compared to other industries in most countries implies middle positions. The share of workers over 45 years of age is highest in the Danish workforce and lowest in Spain. In Denmark in particular, this sector has one of the oldest workforces compared to other industries in the country.

Regarding work-related stress, no clear picture emerges. All scores in all countries for the five indictors take middle positions in the national industry rankings. The least problems are encountered with working to tight deadlines, although particularly in the Netherlands scores on the indicator: work is physically exhausting are relatively high.

The overall picture is that community and personal services reveal working time problems with regard to working in the evening, on Saturdays and on Sundays. A few countries show problems with low pay, and a few other countries have problems with collective bargaining coverage. In some countries, the workforce is relatively old. In this sector no particular problems were identified concerning work-related stress.

9.15. Conclusions

In order to make the outcomes presented above comparable across industries, we composed a problem-ranking on five items shown in Table 9.14. To do this we selected one yardstick from each of the five issues: percent age working over 48 hours per week (working time, WT); percentage under the low pay threshold (low pay, LP); percentage receiving employer-provided training last year (training, TR); percentage covered by collective agreement (collective bargaining coverage, CBC), and joint scores on the first five work-related stress indicators (work-related stress, WRS). As we have aimed at a *problem*-ranking, the scores for the training and collective bargaining items have been subtracted from 100%. We calculated unweighted averages over the five items, and reversed the order of the rankings (compared to all tables presented earlier), to show the worst result from an employees' perspective in the no. 1 position.

Although grouping outcomes like these is always somewhat arbitrary, a division of the industries ranked by problems into five categories seems to make sense:

I *Hotels, restaurants and catering:* average score 43.4, sum of rankings 9, including three no. 1 positions (working time, low pay, training) and one no. 2 position (work-related stress).
Agriculture: average score 39.1, sum of rankings 13, with one no. 1 position (work-related stress) and three no. 2 positions (working time, low pay, training).
Wholesale and retail: average score 37.2, sum of rankings 25, with one no. 2 position (collective bargaining coverage) and one no. 3 position (low pay).

II *Construction:* average score 34.2, sum of rankings 26, including one no. 3 position (training).
Other commercial services: average score 34.2, sum of rankings 27, including one no. 1 position (collective bargaining coverage) and one no. 3 position (work-related stress).

III *Other community services:* average score 33.3, sum of rankings 32, including one no. 3 position (collective bargaining coverage).
Transport and communication: average score 31.3, sum of rankings 29, including one no. 3 position (working time).

IV *Manufacturing:* average score 30.9, sum of rankings 37.
Health care and social work: average score 28.7, sum of rankings 42.

V *Education:* average score 26.2, sum of rankings 55.
Finance: average score 25.4, sum of rankings 50.
Utilities: average score 24.5, sum of rankings 47.
Public administration: average score 24.1, sum of rankings 59.

Contrasting these results with the positions of the respective industries vis-à-vis international market forces delivers fairly indefinite outcomes. Industries who have been exposed for some time to these forces can be found in the middle ranks (other commercial services; transport and communication; manufacturing) and in the low problem ranks (finance); industries growingly exposed and less and less sheltered show up at the top of the problem-ranking league (hotels, restaurants and catering; agriculture; wholesale and retail) as well as in the higher middle group (construction) and also in the lowest ranks (utilities). Sheltered industries, mostly dependent on political decision-making, can be found in the middle of the spectrum (other community services), in the lower middle group (health care and social work), and at the low end of the ranking (education, public administration). Of course, this is

only a snapshot and not a dynamic picture. Longitudinal results may indicate shifts in the relative position of industries under pressure of (increasing) exposure to market forces. For the time being it would seem that other factors such as skill structures, regulation and political decision-making, and the strength of workers' representation including collective bargaining coverage, are at least to a certain extent proving to be counteracting the effects of 'exposure'.

Table 9.14. Problem-ranking on five items, by industry

	WT		LP		TR	
	score	ranking	score	ranking	score	ranking
Agriculture	10.3	2	32.6	2	57.2	2
Manufacturing	6.9	5	14.7	9	45.8	6
Utilities	6.5	6	12.4	12	26.5	12
Construction	8.6	4	16.4	7	53.8	3
Wholesale/retail	6.4	7	28.9	3	48.8	4
Hotels, rest., cater.	10.6	1	40.8	1	64.3	1
Transport, comm.	9.3	3	15.6	8	47.2	5
Finance	3.7	10	9.3	13	25.8	13
Other comm.serv.	4.9	9	16.6	6	39.8	8
Public administrat.	2.4	13	14.0	10	29.3	11
Education	3.4	11	12.9	11	36.3	10
Health care	3.4	11	19.9	5	37.8	9
Other community s.	5.0	8	21.1	4	44.0	7

	CBC		WRS		TOT	
	score	ranking	score	ranking	score	ranking
Agriculture	33.9	6	61.5	1	39.1	2
Manufacturing	33.8	7	53.5	10	30.9	8
Utilities	20.9	13	56.0	4	24.5	12
Construction	37.1	5	55.0	7	34.2	4
Wholesale/retail	48.1	2	54.0	9	37.2	3
Hotels, rest., cater.	41.6	4	59.5	2	43.4	1
Transport, comm.	28.6	9	56.0	4	31.3	7
Finance	32.7	8	55.5	6	25.4	11
Other comm.serv.	53.3	1	56.5	3	34.2	4
Public administrat.	24.5	12	50.5	13	24.1	13
Education	26.3	11	52.0	12	26.2	10
Health care	27.4	10	55.0	7	28.7	9
Other community s.	42.8	3	53.5	10	33.3	6

WT: %>=48 usual hours/week LP: % under LWT
TR: 100 – (% empl-prov. training) CBC: 100 – (% covered)
WRS: joint score on five indicators, recalculated to 0-100
TOT: unweighted averages WT/LP/TR/CBC/WRS

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Abbreviations

AIAS	Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies
BDA	Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbaende (Confederation of German Employers' Associations)
CBI	Confederation of British Industry
CEDEFOP	European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training
DGB	Deutscher Gewerkschafts Bund (German Trade Union Confederation)
EC	European Commission
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EES	European Employment Strategy
EF	European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
EIRO	European Industrial Relations Observatory (related to EF)
Eironline	European Industrial Relations Observatory on-line
EMCC	European Monitoring Centre on Change (related to EF)
EMF	European Metalworkers' Federation
EMU	European Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
EPSU	European Federation of Public Service Unions
ESD	European Social Dialogue
ESM	European Social Model
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
ETUI-REHS	European Trade Union Institute for Research, Education and Health and Safety
EWC	European Works Council

EWCS	European Working Conditions Survey
FNV	Netherlands Trade Union Confederation
GBP	British Pound
HPWO	high performance work organisation(s)
HPWS	high performance work system(s)
HR	Human Relations
HRM	Human Relations Management
HUF	Hungarian Forint
ICT	information and communication technology(-ies)
ILO	International Labour Organisation
LFS	Labour Force Survey
NGG	Nahrung-Genuss Gewerkschaft (Food, Beverages and Catering Union)
NMW	National Minimum Wage
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-ordination and Development
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PPS	Purchasing Power Standard
RSF	Russell Sage Foundation
SME(s)	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise(s)
SMW	Statutory Minimum Wage
TUC	Trades Union Congress
UK	United Kingdom
UvA	University of Amsterdam
WERS	Workplace Employment Relations Survey
WTD	Working Time Directive

Country codes

EU	European Union
EU15	15 EU Member States prior to enlargement in 2004
EU25	25 EU Member States after enlargement in 2004
EU27	27 EU Member States after enlargement in 2007

BE	Belgium
DE	Germany
DK	Denmark
ES	Spain
FI	Finland
HU	Hungary
NL	Netherlands
PL	Poland
UK	United Kingdom

Glossary *WageIndicator*

WageIndicator Foundation is a non-profit organization dedicated to contributing to a transparent labour market by providing accurate wage and wage-related information. In 2003 it was founded under the laws of the Netherlands. The Foundation is a joint initiative of the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS) of the University of Amsterdam, the Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions (FNV), and the career network Monster.

WageIndicator websites are country-specific websites in national languages

WageIndicator web-survey is the multi-country, multilingual, continuous questionnaire on work and wages

WageIndicator web operation is the operation to run the websites and the survey, including overall web management, technical support, hosting, web design and the like

WageIndicator QMS is the Questionnaire Management System, a web-based database underlying the web-survey

WageIndicator data-sets consist of the survey data and accompanying documentation, weights, and codebooks

WageIndicator national teams run the national websites; a team mostly consists of a researcher or a research team, either university based or from a research institute, and a web manager, either free-lance or employed by the research institute or by a career site, a trade union site, a governmental agency, and the like

WageIndicator research network presently encompasses more than 50 researchers from national teams, using the data for their empirical analyses;

WageIndicator technical support team is operating the *WageIndicator* Research Infrastructure

Contributors

Maarten van Klaveren is a researcher at AIAS, University of Amsterdam, and a senior consultant and researcher at STZ consultancy & research, Eindhoven. He studied economics at the University of Amsterdam; worked 17 years in the FNV union confederation and its predecessors, in the research foundation of the then three union confederations, SWOV (1970-75), and as research coordinator in the FNV (1976-86), publishing on women and work, workers' participation, multinational enterprises and developing countries, and negotiating technological change. In 1986 he co-founded STZ, an independent research and employee consultancy bureau, yet closely co-operating with the union movement. Van Klaveren acted as consultant in major development projects in ports, finance, and waste treatment. He also participated in various international research projects, like on opportunities for women in call centres, and in the Saltsa project 'The New Trade Union', on strategic options for trade unions (1999-2004); co-organised research and debate in the Netherlands on the EC Green Paper '*Partnership for a new organisation of work*' (1997); acted for AIAS as organizer of the International Labour Process Conference (ILPC; 2004 and 2007). Current work includes research in the Opportunity in the Workplace: US – Europe Comparison project, sponsored by the RSF. Published frequently on the quality of work and on work organisation in the 1990s; wrote more recently, together with Tijdens, on many issues based on *WageIndicator* survey data; together with Sprenger on union innovation and on organisation development, and jointly with Tijdens and Sprenger on telework and on the gender pay gap.

Kea Tijdens is Research Coordinator at AIAS and Associate Professor at the Department of Economics at the University of Amsterdam. She is also Professor of Women's Employment at the Department of Sociology, Erasmus University Rotterdam. She studied psychology and sociology at Groningen University, and defended her Ph.D. thesis on automation and women's work in banking in 1989. In 2000, together with Paulien Osse, she founded the continuous *WageIndicator* web survey about work and wages in the Nether-

lands. From 2004-2007, she co-ordinated WOLIWEB, an EU-FP6 funded project examining the socio-economic determinants of citizens' work life attitudes, preferences and perceptions, using *WageIndicator* data. Since 2006, she coordinates EUROCCUPATIONS, an EU-FP6 funded project aiming to build an 8-country occupations database. Recent research includes the gendered structures of organisations, gender-based wage differentials, household's outsourcing behaviour, telework, working time-related issues, industrial relations, collective bargaining, and the upgrading and downgrading of occupations. Tijdens published several books, contributed articles to books and had articles in *Feminist Economics*, *Journal of Family Issues*, *Information & Management*, *Acta Sociologica*, *New Technology, Work and Employment*, and, jointly with Van Klaveren, in *Economic and Industrial Democracy* (2x). She recently published on working hours, overtime hours, women in ICT and cleaning, and on the gender pay gap, for most studies using *WageIndicator* data.

Wim Sprenger is a senior consultant and researcher at STZ consultancy & research. He studied social sciences and adult education strategies at the University of Amsterdam; worked with the FNV and its predecessors from 1968 on, first as a developer of programs to involve union membership in policy making and as a trainer of union groups and works councils. Lectured in labour organization and industrial relations at a post-graduate course at an institute for higher education from 1982-88. Developed into a senior policy advisor and research manager after returning to FNV. Participated in various EU-funded projects, like WORKFRET, on changing working cultures in freight transport, and SUNREG, on creating new employment in regions (both 1996-98), as well as in the Saltsa project 'The New Trade Union' (1999-2004); co-organised research and debate in the Netherlands on the EC Green Paper '*Partnership for a new organisation of work'* (1997) and a conference on the informalisation of economies in Europe and worldwide (2002); participated in the ETUC expert group Euro-Telework (2000-01). In 2001, Sprenger left FNV and concentrated on research, to join STZ later. Recent research activities include participation in the Low Wage Work in Europe project and research on the gender pay gap. Published recently on union policies concerning career development, jointly with Van Klaveren on organisation development and union innovation, and jointly with Van Klaveren and Tijdens on telework and the gender pay gap.

Nuria Ramos Martin is a researcher at the Amsterdam Centre for International Law/Hugo Sinzheimer Institute (HSI) and at AIAS, both University of Amsterdam. She took her Degree of Law at the University of Salamanca (1992-1997). Afterwards she followed postgraduate Legal Studies in the Doctorate Programme 'The Regulation of the Labour Market' at the Universities of Bristol (U.K.) and Salamanca (Spain) 1997-1999. From 1999 to 2003 she worked as a researcher and lecturer at the Labour Law and Social Work Department, Law Faculty, University of Salamanca. In 2001 she visited as a researcher the Research Centre in Labour Law and Professional Relations of the University of Paris X-Nanterre. In 2004 she visited the HSI as a Marie Curie Fellow Researcher, and since 2005 she is associated to HSI and AIAS. In 2005 she defended her Ph.D. thesis on "Equality in EU Social Law" in the University of Salamanca (Cum Laude & European Doctorate); obtained the doctorate extraordinary prize of the University of Salamanca for her thesis in 2006.

Appendix

Table 1 Percentages of employees in five age groups, breakdown by industry and country

		BE	DK	FI	DE	HU
Agriculture	<25 yr	16%	9%	5%	8%	3%
	25-34 yr	36%	11%	24%	34%	20%
	35-44 yr	17%	31%	33%	37%	24%
	45-54 yr	26%	32%	31%	15%	34%
	>=55 yr	3%	16%	7%	6%	19%
Manufacturing	<25 yr	6%	1%	6%	5%	6%
	25-34 yr	32%	12%	38%	35%	27%
	35-44 yr	34%	31%	30%	37%	27%
	45-54 yr	22%	34%	18%	18%	28%
	>=55 yr	6%	21%	7%	5%	12%
Utilities	<25 yr	17%	3%	4%	5%	1%
	25-34 yr	35%	0%	27%	33%	14%
	35-44 yr	20%	27%	23%	35%	32%
	45-54 yr	19%	36%	33%	22%	41%
	>=55 yr	8%	33%	13%	6%	13%
Construction	<25 yr	9%	9%	9%	6%	7%
	25-34 yr	36%	11%	34%	38%	34%
	35-44 yr	29%	24%	29%	37%	27%
	45-54 yr	20%	36%	19%	16%	20%
	>=55 yr	5%	21%	9%	4%	12%
Wholesale/retail	<25 yr	10%	13%	14%	9%	12%
	25-34 yr	34%	27%	41%	38%	33%
	35-44 yr	31%	29%	27%	34%	25%
	45-54 yr	19%	23%	13%	15%	23%
	>=55 yr	5%	8%	4%	4%	6%
Hotels, rest., cater	<25 yr	18%	18%	20%	15%	23%
	25-34 yr	32%	27%	37%	42%	32%
	35-44 yr	28%	22%	28%	28%	21%
	45-54 yr	16%	20%	12%	13%	17%
	>=55 yr	4%	13%	3%	3%	7%
Transp, commun.	<25 yr	7%	2%	9%	4%	3%
	25-34 yr	36%	12%	36%	32%	22%
	35-44 yr	31%	25%	32%	39%	33%
	45-54 yr	20%	31%	17%	20%	30%
	>=55 yr	5%	30%	6%	5%	11%
Finance	<25 yr	6%	24%	6%	6%	6%
	25-34 yr	38%	15%	41%	42%	35%
	35-44 yr	28%	15%	27%	35%	21%
	45-54 yr	23%	24%	19%	14%	23%
	>=55 yr	4%	24%	7%	3%	15%

Table 1 (Cntd) Percentages of employees in five age groups, breakdown by industry and country

		BE	DK	FI	DE	HU
Other comm.serv	<25 yr	11%	7%	6%	6%	6%
	25-34 yr	45%	26%	48%	45%	33%
	35-44 yr	27%	22%	28%	34%	20%
	45-54 yr	13%	27%	14%	12%	21%
	>=55 yr	3%	18%	4%	3%	20%
Public sector	<25 yr	5%	1%	2%	7%	1%
	25-34 yr	32%	12%	22%	28%	29%
	35-44 yr	31%	26%	30%	34%	25%
	45-54 yr	25%	35%	29%	23%	30%
	>=55 yr	7%	27%	17%	9%	14%
Education	<25 yr	10%	3%	2%	2%	3%
	25-34 yr	34%	16%	29%	34%	21%
	35-44 yr	24%	25%	32%	33%	24%
	45-54 yr	24%	31%	26%	22%	34%
	>=55 yr	8%	24%	10%	9%	19%
Health care	<25 yr	8%	1%	5%	6%	2%
	25-34 yr	35%	20%	31%	33%	26%
	35-44 yr	29%	30%	30%	35%	32%
	45-54 yr	24%	34%	26%	21%	27%
	>=55 yr	3%	15%	9%	5%	13%
Other comm. serv.	<25 yr	8%	2%	7%	5%	6%
	25-34 yr	38%	13%	36%	38%	28%
	35-44 yr	27%	17%	29%	33%	19%
	45-54 yr	22%	47%	20%	19%	21%
	>=55 yr	5%	21%	8%	6%	25%

		NL	PL	ES	UK
Agriculture	<25 yr	23%	6%	7%	9%
	25-34 yr	34%	72%	55%	34%
	35-44 yr	27%	9%	24%	30%
	45-54 yr	13%	13%	13%	19%
	>=55 yr	3%	0%	1%	7%
Manufacturing	<25 yr	9%	9%	5%	8%
	25-34 yr	35%	62%	49%	35%
	35-44 yr	34%	16%	29%	30%
	45-54 yr	17%	12%	14%	19%
	>=55 yr	5%	1%	3%	8%
Utilities	<25 yr	9%	2%	6%	9%
	25-34 yr	39%	41%	43%	29%
	35-44 yr	29%	29%	28%	31%
	45-54 yr	18%	23%	19%	20%
	>=55 yr	5%	5%	4%	9%

Table 1 (Cntd) Percentages of employees in five age groups, breakdown by industry and country

		NL	PL	ES	UK
Construction	<25 yr	14%	7%	8%	12%
	25-34 yr	37%	69%	57%	35%
	35-44 yr	28%	15%	25%	28%
	45-54 yr	16%	8%	8%	16%
	>=55 yr	5%	1%	2%	8%
Wholesale/retail	<25 yr	21%	16%	12%	18%
	25-34 yr	36%	69%	52%	37%
	35-44 yr	27%	11%	25%	24%
	45-54 yr	13%	4%	9%	15%
	>=55 yr	3%	0%	2%	5%
Hotels, rest., cater	<25 yr	32%	19%	16%	24%
	25-34 yr	35%	70%	48%	39%
	35-44 yr	20%	7%	25%	21%
	45-54 yr	10%	4%	9%	12%
	>=55 yr	2%	0%	2%	3%
Transp, commun.	<25 yr	13%	12%	6%	7%
	25-34 yr	34%	63%	44%	32%
	35-44 yr	31%	16%	32%	32%
	45-54 yr	17%	8%	16%	20%
	>=55 yr	5%	1%	2%	8%
Finance	<25 yr	12%	10%	4%	18%
	25-34 yr	44%	73%	44%	44%
	35-44 yr	29%	13%	27%	23%
	45-54 yr	12%	3%	20%	11%
	>=55 yr	2%	0%	4%	3%
Other comm.serv	<25 yr	12%	13%	8%	16%
	25-34 yr	46%	73%	63%	44%
	35-44 yr	27%	9%	23%	24%
	45-54 yr	12%	5%	5%	12%
	>=55 yr	2%	1%	1%	4%
Public sector	<25 yr	8%	10%	2%	10%
	25-34 yr	36%	67%	27%	31%
	35-44 yr	28%	14%	39%	31%
	45-54 yr	22%	8%	26%	21%
	>=55 yr	6%	2%	5%	7%
Education	<25 yr	8%	5%	5%	8%
	25-34 yr	34%	54%	41%	33%
	35-44 yr	26%	21%	32%	26%
	45-54 yr	25%	15%	18%	23%
	>=55 yr	7%	5%	5%	9%
Health care	<25 yr	13%	7%	7%	10%
	25-34 yr	33%	49%	42%	31%
	35-44 yr	26%	27%	27%	29%
	45-54 yr	22%	15%	20%	21%
	>=55 yr	5%	2%	4%	8%

Table 1 (Continued) Percentages of employees in five age groups, breakdown by industry and country

		NL	PL	ES	UK
Other comm. serv.	<25 yr	21%	8%	7%	19%
	25-34 yr	36%	58%	49%	40%
	35-44 yr	24%	17%	31%	22%
	45-54 yr	15%	13%	11%	14%
	>=55 yr	4%	4%	2%	5%

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 2 Work-related stress indicators by age group over age groups by industry, breakdown by country

		BE	DK	FI	DE	HU
< 25yr	Work physically exhausting	2.6	4.1	2.9	3.2	3.5
	Work mentally exhausting	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.1
	How often work at very high speed	3.3	3.7	3.8	3.3	3.2
	How often work to tight deadlines	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.1	2.8
	Work cannot be finished in time	2.2	1.8	2.2	2.3	2.7
25-34	Work physically exhausting	2.6	3.1	2.6	3.0	3.2
	Work mentally exhausting	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.5
	How often work at very high speed	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.3
	How often work to tight deadlines	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.1
	Work cannot be finished in time	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.6	3.1
35-44	Work physically exhausting	2.7	3.0	2.7	3.0	3.3
	Work mentally exhausting	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.5
	How often work at very high speed	3.5	3.4	3.7	3.4	3.3
	How often work to tight deadlines	3.4	3.6	3.7	3.5	3.2
	Work cannot be finished in time	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.7	3.1
45-54	Work physically exhausting	2.8	3.1	2.7	3.2	3.3
	Work mentally exhausting	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.4	3.6
	How often work at very high speed	3.5	3.2	3.5	3.4	3.3
	How often work to tight deadlines	3.4	3.3	3.6	3.3	3.2
	Work cannot be finished in time	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.6	3.4
>=55	Work physically exhausting	2.6	2.8	2.7	3.2	2.9
	Work mentally exhausting	3.0	3.0	3.3	3.2	3.6
	How often work at very high speed	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.2	3.2
	How often work to tight deadlines	3.3	3.3	3.6	3.3	3.0
	Work cannot be finished in time	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.7

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 2 (Continued) Work-related stress indicators by age group over age groups by industry, breakdown by country

		NL	PL	ES	UK
< 25 yr	Work physically exhausting	2.8	2.8	3.3	-
	Work mentally exhausting	2.9	3.3	3.8	-
	How often work at very high speed	3.5	-	3.2	-
	How often work to tight deadlines	2.8	-	3.1	-
	Work cannot be finished in time	1.8	-	2.1	1.8
25-34	Work physically exhausting	2.6	2.7	3.3	-
	Work mentally exhausting	3.1	3.3	4.0	-
	How often work at very high speed	3.6	-	3.4	-
	How often work to tight deadlines	3.2	-	3.5	-
	Work cannot be finished in time	2.3	-	2.6	2.8
35-44	Work physically exhausting	2.5	2.6	3.3	-
	Work mentally exhausting	3.0	3.3	3.9	-
	How often work at very high speed	3.5	-	3.3	-
	How often work to tight deadlines	3.2	-	3.4	-
	Work cannot be finished in time	2.4	-	2.5	3.2
45-54	Work physically exhausting	2.5	2.7	3.3	-
	Work mentally exhausting	2.9	3.5	3.8	-
	How often work at very high speed	3.4	-	3.2	-
	How often work to tight deadlines	3.1	-	3.2	-
	Work cannot be finished in time	2.4	-	2.4	3.1
>=55	Work physically exhausting	2.5	2.7	3.2	-
	Work mentally exhausting	2.7	3.2	3.7	-
	How often work at very high speed	3.3	-	3.0	-
	How often work to tight deadlines	3.0	-	3.0	-
	Work cannot be finished in time	2.3	-	2.2	2.4

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 3 Percentages of employees in eight working hours' arrangements, breakdown by industry and country

		BE	DK	FI	DE	HU
Agriculture	No hours agreed	11%	18%	10%	8%	22%
	Full-time hours	66%	58%	58%	69%	56%
	Part-time hours	11%	3%	6%	9%	0%
	Annualised hours	3%	3%	5%	3%	0%
	Flexible hours	9%	15%	17%	9%	22%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	On call	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%
	Other	0%	2%	3%	2%	0%
Manufacturing	No hours agreed	17%	7%	4%	4%	4%
	Full-time hours	68%	76%	80%	80%	67%
	Part-time hours	8%	2%	1%	4%	2%
	Annualised hours	0%	2%	2%	2%	2%
	Flexible hours	7%	10%	11%	9%	25%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	On call	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%
	Other	1%	2%	1%	2%	0%
Utilities	No hours agreed	19%	6%	0%	3%	6%
	Full-time hours	67%	76%	81%	78%	59%
	Part-time hours	5%	0%	0%	3%	6%
	Annualised hours	1%	9%	9%	3%	18%
	Flexible hours	7%	9%	9%	11%	12%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	On call	1%	0%	2%	0%	0%
	Other	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%
Construction	No hours agreed	19%	9%	7%	7%	9%
	Full-time hours	66%	83%	81%	78%	82%
	Part-time hours	9%	2%	1%	4%	3%
	Annualised hours	0%	0%	1%	2%	0%
	Flexible hours	5%	4%	8%	7%	6%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	On call	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	Other	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%
Wholesale/retail	No hours agreed	18%	8%	6%	6%	8%
	Full-time hours	58%	72%	69%	74%	67%
	Part-time hours	14%	10%	14%	9%	6%
	Annualised hours	0%	0%	0%	2%	4%
	Flexible hours	9%	6%	8%	6%	15%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	On call	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%
	Other	1%	4%	1%	2%	0%
Hotels, rest., cater	No hours agreed	17%	20%	8%	8%	0%
	Full-time hours	52%	40%	64%	68%	78%
	Part-time hours	15%	7%	7%	8%	0%
	Annualised hours	1%	4%	0%	3%	11%
	Flexible hours	13%	25%	15%	10%	11%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	On call	0%	4%	3%	1%	0%
	Other	1%	0%	3%	3%	0%

Table 3 (Continued) Percentages of employees in eight working hours' arrangements, breakdown by industry and country

		BE	DK	FI	DE	HU
Transp, commun.	No hours agreed	22%	10%	7%	6%	8%
	Full-time hours	58%	69%	74%	67%	64%
	Part-time hours	8%	2%	2%	3%	3%
	Annualised hours	1%	3%	1%	12%	3%
	Flexible hours	10%	13%	11%	9%	21%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	On call	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%
	Other	1%	2%	3%	2%	3%
Finance	No hours agreed	20%	9%	3%	5%	0%
	Full-time hours	57%	64%	84%	76%	61%
	Part-time hours	11%	12%	2%	5%	0%
	Annualised hours	0%	3%	1%	2%	3%
	Flexible hours	11%	12%	8%	10%	32%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	On call	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	Other	0%	0%	2%	2%	3%
Other comm. serv	No hours agreed	16%	7%	5%	5%	5%
	Full-time hours	63%	56%	77%	77%	65%
	Part-time hours	11%	13%	2%	7%	2%
	Annualised hours	0%	6%	1%	2%	3%
	Flexible hours	9%	14%	13%	8%	20%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	On call	0%	2%	0%	0%	2%
	Other	0%	2%	2%	1%	3%
Public sector	No hours agreed	29%	12%	4%	3%	8%
	Full-time hours	48%	62%	80%	78%	76%
	Part-time hours	11%	6%	2%	9%	3%
	Annualised hours	1%	5%	1%	2%	0%
	Flexible hours	11%	13%	9%	7%	11%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	On call	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	Other	1%	2%	3%	1%	3%
Education	No hours agreed	19%	13%	4%	4%	20%
	Full-time hours	56%	42%	67%	64%	80%
	Part-time hours	17%	5%	5%	19%	0%
	Annualised hours	2%	22%	13%	3%	0%
	Flexible hours	6%	16%	8%	7%	0%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	On call	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	Other	1%	3%	2%	2%	0%
Health care	No hours agreed	9%	10%	2%	3%	0%
	Full-time hours	51%	43%	82%	69%	79%
	Part-time hours	27%	25%	4%	19%	3%
	Annualised hours	1%	6%	3%	2%	3%
	Flexible hours	10%	9%	5%	6%	13%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	On call	0%	2%	1%	0%	0%
	Other	1%	5%	3%	1%	3%

Table 3 (Continued) Percentages of employees in eight working hours' arrangements, breakdown by industry and country

		BE	DK	FI	DE	HU
Other comm. serv	No hours agreed	18%	8%	4%	7%	4%
	Full-time hours	56%	70%	76%	68%	73%
	Part-time hours	15%	4%	6%	13%	4%
	Annualised hours	0%	3%	1%	2%	0%
	Flexible hours	11%	13%	10%	8%	16%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	On call	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%
	Other	1%	3%	2%	2%	2%
		NL	PL	ES	UK	
Agriculture	No hours agreed	7%	3%	14%	10%	
	Full-time hours	70%	90%	64%	68%	
	Part-time hours	14%	3%	4%	4%	
	Annualised hours	2%	0%	3%	2%	
	Flexible hours	5%	0%	8%	10%	
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	6%	
	On call	1%	0%	3%	0%	
	Other	2%	3%	4%	0%	
Manufacturing	No hours agreed	4%	7%	13%	4%	
	Full-time hours	81%	88%	69%	79%	
	Part-time hours	10%	1%	3%	2%	
	Annualised hours	0%	0%	4%	2%	
	Flexible hours	2%	4%	10%	6%	
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	6%	
	On call	0%	0%	1%	0%	
	Other	1%	0%	1%	1%	
Utilities	No hours agreed	3%	4%	8%	6%	
	Full-time hours	82%	94%	68%	70%	
	Part-time hours	12%	1%	3%	4%	
	Annualised hours	0%	0%	5%	4%	
	Flexible hours	2%	1%	7%	8%	
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	5%	
	On call	0%	0%	6%	1%	
	Other	1%	0%	2%	1%	
Construction	No hours agreed	5%	10%	16%	4%	
	Full-time hours	85%	84%	68%	79%	
	Part-time hours	7%	3%	5%	3%	
	Annualised hours	0%	0%	2%	0%	
	Flexible hours	2%	3%	8%	5%	
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	7%	
	On call	0%	0%	1%	0%	
	Other	0%	1%	2%	1%	
Wholesale/retail	No hours agreed	4%	9%	14%	6%	
	Full-time hours	70%	81%	65%	73%	
	Part-time hours	19%	4%	11%	13%	
	Annualised hours	1%	0%	3%	0%	
	Flexible hours	4%	4%	5%	4%	
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	3%	
	On call	0%	0%	0%	0%	
	Other	1%	0%	2%	1%	

Table 3 (Continued) Percentages of employees in eight working hours' arrangements, breakdown by industry and country

		NL	PL	ES	UK
Hotels, rest., catering	No hours agreed	6%	9%	17%	11%
	Full-time hours	58%	79%	61%	64%
	Part-time hours	20%	7%	9%	8%
	Annualised hours	2%	0%	4%	1%
	Flexible hours	10%	3%	6%	7%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	7%
	On call	2%	1%	1%	0%
	Other	2%	0%	3%	1%
Transport, commun.	No hours agreed	8%	7%	12%	5%
	Full-time hours	74%	87%	65%	72%
	Part-time hours	11%	2%	4%	3%
	Annualised hours	1%	0%	6%	3%
	Flexible hours	5%	3%	7%	6%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	8%
	On call	1%	0%	4%	1%
	Other	1%	1%	3%	1%
Finance	No hours agreed	2%	9%	8%	5%
	Full-time hours	74%	83%	79%	76%
	Part-time hours	19%	4%	3%	6%
	Annualised hours	1%	0%	2%	1%
	Flexible hours	3%	4%	6%	7%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	5%
	On call	0%	0%	0%	0%
	Other	0%	0%	1%	0%
Other comm. services	No hours agreed	2%	7%	12%	4%
	Full-time hours	74%	84%	68%	78%
	Part-time hours	20%	5%	5%	4%
	Annualised hours	0%	0%	2%	0%
	Flexible hours	3%	4%	9%	8%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	5%
	On call	0%	0%	1%	0%
	Other	1%	0%	2%	0%
Public sector	No hours agreed	2%	8%	5%	3%
	Full-time hours	74%	87%	71%	58%
	Part-time hours	19%	3%	2%	7%
	Annualised hours	1%	0%	3%	1%
	Flexible hours	3%	1%	11%	29%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	1%
	On call	0%	0%	5%	0%
	Other	0%	0%	2%	1%
Education	No hours agreed	3%	8%	6%	6%
	Full-time hours	57%	79%	69%	66%
	Part-time hours	32%	8%	11%	14%
	Annualised hours	5%	2%	2%	4%
	Flexible hours	2%	2%	10%	7%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	1%
	On call	0%	0%	0%	0%
	Other	1%	0%	2%	1%

Table 3 (Continued) Percentages of employees in eight working hours' arrangements, breakdown by industry and country

		NL	PL	ES	UK
Health care	No hours agreed	2%	6%	7%	3%
	Full-time hours	41%	86%	63%	69%
	Part-time hours	47%	5%	9%	16%
	Annualised hours	2%	0%	8%	1%
	Flexible hours	6%	2%	5%	8%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	2%
	On call	1%	1%	5%	1%
	Other	1%	0%	3%	1%
Other comm. serv	No hours agreed	3%	6%	11%	3%
	Full-time hours	57%	79%	65%	74%
	Part-time hours	31%	9%	9%	8%
	Annualised hours	1%	1%	3%	1%
	Flexible hours	5%	4%	10%	8%
	Opt-out	0%	0%	0%	4%
	On call	1%	0%	1%	0%
	Other	2%	0%	2%	1%

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*

Table 4 Average contractual working hours, breakdown by overtime payment arrangement, industry and country

		BE	DK	FI	DE	HU
Agriculture	Paid + overtime premium	-	-	38.5	40.4	40
	Paid as normal hours	36.5	-	36.2	37.7	40
	Time-off in lieu	38.2	-	38.4	38.4	40
	Partly paid, partly time-off	33.5	37	37.1	38.5	-
	Not compensated	38.1	-	37.9	39.6	40
Manufacturing	Paid + overtime premium	37.3	36.1	39.2	38.3	40
	Paid as normal hours	36.8	30.8	38.5	38.8	40
	Time-off in lieu	36.8	37	38.5	37.8	40
	Partly paid, partly time-off	37.3	35.3	38.8	37.8	40.5
	Not compensated	37.7	37	38.9	40	40
Utilities	Paid + overtime premium	38.9	37	38.9	39.1	40
	Paid as normal hours	38.8	-	-	40	40
	Time-off in lieu	38.4	-	37.7	38.3	40
	Partly paid, partly time-off	38.9	-	40	38.6	40
	Not compensated	38.7	-	40	40.5	40
Construction	Paid + overtime premium	38	37.5	39.6	40.5	40
	Paid as normal hours	39.3	40	39	40.7	40.3
	Time-off in lieu	36.7	38.7	38.1	38.8	40
	Partly paid, partly time-off	38.3	38	38.9	39.3	42.5
	Not compensated	38.6	37	38.9	40.4	40
Wholesale/retail	Paid + overtime premium	36.6	38	36.1	38.4	39.8
	Paid as normal hours	33.4	37.5	29.9	36.3	40
	Time-off in lieu	35.2	37	37.2	37.4	40
	Partly paid, partly time-off	34.7	33.8	37.3	36.6	41
	Not compensated	37.5	37.8	36.8	40.2	40
Hotels, rest., catering	Paid + overtime premium	39	37	36.9	38.6	40
	Paid as normal hours	30.9	-	33.3	38.9	40
	Time-off in lieu	37.1	25.5	37.4	39.1	40
	Partly paid, partly time-off	32	36	36.3	39.4	40
	Not compensated	36.2	37	35.6	41.6	40.2
Transport, commun.	Paid + overtime premium	38.2	38.5	38.8	39.6	40.1
	Paid as normal hours	39.3	-	38.8	42.2	40.2
	Time-off in lieu	36.2	45.2	38.1	38	40
	Partly paid, partly time-off	36.9	38.6	38.1	39	40
	Not compensated	37.3	39.5	39.8	41.6	40.1
Finance	Paid + overtime premium	35.7	-	37.8	38.6	40
	Paid as normal hours	34.6	-	36.5	38.5	41
	Time-off in lieu	34.3	-	37.8	38.3	40
	Partly paid, partly time-off	34.5	-	37.6	38.2	-
	Not compensated	36.1	-	37.6	39.9	40.3
Other comm.services	Paid + overtime premium	38	37	38.2	39.6	40
	Paid as normal hours	34.2	37	36.1	38.7	40
	Time-off in lieu	36.3	32.1	37.8	38.1	40
	Partly paid, partly time-off	36.2	36.5	37.9	38.3	40.1
	Not compensated	37.4	45.9	37.8	40	40

Table 4 (Continued) Average contractual working hours, breakdown by overtime payment arrangement, industry and country

		BE	DK	FI	DE	HU
Public sector	Paid + overtime premium	36.8	-	37.6	38.3	40
	Paid as normal hours	33.9	10	34.8	40.7	40
	Time-off in lieu	35.6	38.5	36.8	38.1	39.9
	Partly paid, partly time-off	36.5	37	37	38.8	-
	Not compensated	36.8	-	36.3	38.2	40
Education	Paid + overtime premium	35.3	35.2	33.3	33.9	40
	Paid as normal hours	30	-	28.9	35.6	40
	Time-off in lieu	33.8	-	36.1	36.3	40
	Partly paid, partly time-off	29.5	-	36.2	34.4	-
	Not compensated	28.9	-	33.9	37.1	40
Health care	Paid + overtime premium	35.1	35.4	38.1	38.8	40
	Paid as normal hours	30.9	-	36.7	34.1	40
	Time-off in lieu	33.5	35.2	37.5	36.2	39.8
	Partly paid, partly time-off	33	38	37.8	37.6	43.7
	Not compensated	35.2	-	38	38.7	40
Other commun. serv.	Paid + overtime premium	38.5	45	37.1	39.7	40
	Paid as normal hours	31.5	37.8	32.1	36	40.3
	Time-off in lieu	34.1	-	36.8	36.6	39.7
	Partly paid, partly time-off	36.3	40	37.4	36.2	40
	Not compensated	36.1	41	36.5	39.3	40
		NL	PL	ES	UK	
Agriculture	Paid + overtime premium	38.1	40	41.3	40.2	
	Paid as normal hours	37.1	-	38.7	39.4	
	Time-off in lieu	36.4	41	39.3	39.2	
	Partly paid, partly time-off	36.9	-	40	-	
	Not compensated	39.7	40.9	38.9	40.1	
Manufacturing	Paid + overtime premium	38.4	40.7	40	39.1	
	Paid as normal hours	36.9	40.8	41.3	37.7	
	Time-off in lieu	36.7	39.3	38.9	37.9	
	Partly paid, partly time-off	37.2	39.8	39.1	37.8	
	Not compensated	38.7	40.2	39.9	38.8	
Utilities	Paid + overtime premium	38.2	40.2	39.9	38	
	Paid as normal hours	36.8	40	39.1	35.1	
	Time-off in lieu	37.4	40.6	38.5	35.9	
	Partly paid, partly time-off	37.4	41	39.2	37.5	
	Not compensated	38.7	41	39.4	38.6	
Construction	Paid + overtime premium	39.6	39.8	40.9	40.3	
	Paid as normal hours	39.1	42.9	39.1	38.5	
	Time-off in lieu	37.3	40.3	40.1	38.2	
	Partly paid, partly time-off	38	41.4	39.9	39.7	
	Not compensated	39.7	41.5	40.4	39.8	
Wholesale/retail	Paid + overtime premium	36.2	39.6	37.9	37.8	
	Paid as normal hours	32.2	35.4	37	29.7	
	Time-off in lieu	35.3	39.9	38.4	38.7	
	Partly paid, partly time-off	35.1	39.5	34.8	38.1	
	Not compensated	38.9	40.7	39.8	39.5	

Table 4 (Continued) Average contractual working hours, breakdown by overtime payment arrangement, industry and country

		NL	PL	ES	UK
Hotels, rest., catering	Paid + overtime premium	36.4	42.3	38	38.8
	Paid as normal hours	31.3	42.8	34.4	34.9
	Time-off in lieu	36.6	41.7	39.4	40.9
	Partly paid, partly time-off	34.2	45.3	39.9	44
	Not compensated	38.3	41.3	37.5	40.8
Transport, commun.	Paid + overtime premium	40.2	40.7	37.7	40.7
	Paid as normal hours	37.7	45	37.4	39.2
	Time-off in lieu	37.5	40.9	38.5	38.6
	Partly paid, partly time-off	37.7	39.9	37.7	39.8
	Not compensated	40.1	41	40.4	40.1
Finance	Paid + overtime premium	36.8	39.8	38.5	36
	Paid as normal hours	34.9	37.1	38.8	32.8
	Time-off in lieu	35.2	39.1	39.6	35.5
	Partly paid, partly time-off	34.8	39.7	38.9	35.3
	Not compensated	38.3	39.7	38.8	37.4
Other comm.services	Paid + overtime premium	38.6	39.3	39	37.8
	Paid as normal hours	34.6	37.8	36.1	37.1
	Time-off in lieu	36.5	39.6	39	37.4
	Partly paid, partly time-off	36.6	39.2	39.1	36.8
	Not compensated	38.6	39.3	39.6	38.5
Public sector	Paid + overtime premium	37.6	36.2	36.6	37.5
	Paid as normal hours	35.7	40	37.1	31.9
	Time-off in lieu	35.1	38.9	36.7	36.3
	Partly paid, partly time-off	36.1	39.4	38.2	36.6
	Not compensated	36.6	39.3	38.3	37.6
Education	Paid + overtime premium	37.9	26.7	31.5	35.5
	Paid as normal hours	31	26.7	24.5	29.5
	Time-off in lieu	34	38	35.8	34.9
	Partly paid, partly time-off	34.5	34	38.3	33.7
	Not compensated	35.1	36.8	34.9	36
Health care	Paid + overtime premium	32.7	43.9	35	36.6
	Paid as normal hours	28.3	40.8	34	32.7
	Time-off in lieu	31.7	38.5	36.8	35.6
	Partly paid, partly time-off	30.1	39.9	38	35.1
	Not compensated	35	38.4	38.1	37.1
Other commun. serv.	Paid + overtime premium	38.3	32.1	37.1	37.7
	Paid as normal hours	29.4	31.3	37.4	33.3
	Time-off in lieu	34.5	36.7	36.3	36.9
	Partly paid, partly time-off	33.3	40.7	36.1	35.2
	Not compensated	37.2	39.3	37.8	38

Source: WageIndicator *data, Sep.2004-Mar.2007. Selection: employees.*