

An Overview of Women's Work and Employment in Indonesia

Decisions for Life MDG3 Project Country Report No. 14

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Management summary

This report provides information on Indonesia on behalf of the implementation of the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project in that country. The DECISIONS FOR LIFE project aims to raise awareness amongst young female workers about their employment opportunities and career possibilities, family building and the work-family balance. This report is part of the Inventories, to be made by the University of Amsterdam, for all 14 countries involved. It focuses on a gender analysis of work and employment.

History (2.1.1). After, in 1949, the Netherlands as colonial power had formally recognised Indonesian sovereignty, the Sukarno administration moved from democracy towards authoritarianism. In 1965-66 it was replaced by another authoritarian but more pro-western regime, the New Order of Suharto. The crisis of 1997-98 and the *reformasi* movement resulted in Suharto's fall and a stepwise opening to democracy. In the 2000s the Indonesian economy from year to year showed respectable though not quite high growth figures.

Governance (2.1.2). In spite of the current multiparty democracy, problems remain with compliance, especially in maintaining human, worker and women's rights. Corruption at regional and local levels remains virulent. The position of women in politics is weak, though the 2009 elections saw a rise of female representation in parliament to 11 to 18%. Women's position within the family context is difficult. Recently many women have been confronted with domestic violence and sexual harassment.

Prospects (2.1.3). The global economic crisis has had a limited impact on Indonesia economy, and the prospects for the country's rebound seem rather bright. Subcontracted, casual and temporary workers in export-oriented industries as well as migrant workers have borne the brunt of job cuts in 2008-09.

Communication (2.2). Though the number of fixed lines is still increasing, telephone use is rapidly switching to cellular phone networks. In 2008, already 599 of each 1,000 in the population used a cell phone. Internet coverage is still modest, with in 2008 about 12.5% of the population as users. With 95% of all households TV has high coverage, but radio is the most popular medium.

The sectoral labour market structure – Population and employment (2.3.1). With 53% in 2008, women's Labour Participation Rate (LPR) in 2008 was moderate, whereas the male rate of 85% was high. In the 2000s the female LPR fell and the male rate increased. In 2008 about 39% of all employed worked in agriculture, 13% in manufacturing, and 48% in services, with the female shares being 40%, 14% and 46%.

The sectoral labour market structure – Formal and informal employment (2.3.2) Slightly over 30% of all employed and less than 28% of females is currently working in the formal sector. About 42% of the total labour force and 32% of the females are self-employed. In the early 2000s the informal sector absorbed the largest amount of new entrants to the labour market, but this reversed in 2003-04.

The sectoral labour market structure – Unemployment (2.3.3). In the course of the 2000s unemployment for women remained at a higher level than for men. Unemployment is highest among youngsters, with for girls and young women in 2008 an official unemployment rates of over 18%.

Legislation (2.4.1). Indonesia has ratified the core ILO Labour Conventions. Yet, for unions there are a number of serious constraints. on collective bargaining and declaring strikes. The ITUC remains highly critical of the country's enforcement of labour legislation.

Labour relations and trade unionism (2.4.2). Under Suharto's New Order trade unions were disciplined, with (K)SPSI (con)federation as main vehicle of these policies. After the collapse of the Suharto regime

the right to organise was restored. Since then, the union movement developed in highly fragmented direction. Union density can be estimated at 8-10% for the labour force at large. Women have a weak position in the union movement, though incidental successes in collective bargaining on behalf of women can be traced.

The statutory minimum wage (2.5.1). The statutory minimum wage structure is complex and not transparent. Though the minimum wage rates are based on cost of living calculations, after the gap between minimum living needs and (average) minimum wage levels has widened. Moreover, the informal sector is not included. Compliance and enforcement are weak.

Poverty (2.5.2). For 2005, it has been estimated that 53.8% of its population lived below the poverty line of USD 2 a day. From 1999 on, income inequality is growing. Official inequality seems low, but correction for varying consumption patterns brings Indonesia in the middle-high inequality ranks. The incidence of working poor is highest among casual workers, followed by unpaid and own-account workers. There may be a shift to urban poverty: in the 2000s the number of slum dwellers in the cities has increased strongly.

Population and fertility (2.6.1). Current population growth is estimated at 1.3% per year, and is still slowing down. With 2.2 children per woman, the total fertility rate is rather low. With an estimated 51 to 54 births per 1,000 women 15-19 of age, the adolescent fertility rate is in the low-to-moderate range worldwide. Indonesia is urbanising at high speed, with in 2008 52% living in urban areas.

Health (2.6.2). In 2007, in Indonesia about 270,000 people lived with HIV/AIDS. Epidemics concentrate among injection drug users and sex workers. Health disparities are considerable, and government expenditure on health care is low.

Women's labour market share (2.6.3). The 2008 women's share in the labour force was nearly 38%. It was highest in households (76%), health and social work (57%), restaurants and hotels (56%), and education (55%). In 2008 still about 40% of women employed worked in agriculture, followed by wholesale and retail (22%). 48% of female employees and 45% of the total female labour force worked in services, broadly defined. With 22% respectively 24% in 2008, the Indonesian shares of female legislators, senior officials and managers among employees respectively the labour force at large were rather low.

Agriculture (2.6.4). Problems of land fragmentation, poor bureaucracy and infrastructure still dog agriculture. Under the prevailing conditions it is unlikely that many young women living in urban areas and trying to make a career can rely on a "fall-back scenario" in which they can go back to their families living from agriculture.

Mining and manufacturing (2.6.5). About two million women are dependent on employment in low wage-based, labour intensive industries, but Indonesia's share in these industries is falling. The prospects in manufacturing for girls and young women are not bright, maybe except for some professional and technical occupations.

Commerce (2.6.6). In the 2000s, commerce has expanded rapidly, though most recently the retail industry has suffered from falling purchasing power. Super- and hypermarkets continue to expand, with foreign investors playing major roles. In the course of the 2000s, wage rates and working conditions of retail workers seem to have deteriorated.

Services (2.6.7). Formal labour is quite limited in commercial services except commerce. Tourism is an important source of employment, also for women, but its growth may be hampered by low wages, unfavourable working conditions and lack of professionalism. The finance sector remains comparatively small, with employment prospects for girls and young women in the sector remaining limited as well.

Government (2.6.8). Since 2000, its size of public administration has been slimmed down, and in the process the already small female share has even declined to 20%. Average public sector wages are not extremely high, but still at the level of the finance sector.

Literacy (2.7.1). The adult literacy rates –those age 15 and over that can read and write – were in 2008 95.4% for men and 89.1% for women. The youth (15-24-year-olds) literacy rates were in 2006 97.0% for young males and 96.3% for young females.

Education of girls and young women (2.7.2). Combined gross enrollment in education was in 2006 overall 68.2%: females 66.8%, males 69.5%. Net enrollment in primary education was in 2007 98%, with boys' enrollment at 100% and girls' at 96%. However, recent reports stress the poor quality of much of primary education. The drop-out ratio during the secondary school ages is considerable. The urban – rural divide is large in educational facilities, and is reflected in lower enrollment and completion rates in rural areas. In 2007 tertiary gross enrollment was 18%, and equal for both genders.

Female skill levels (2.7.3). A larger share of female workers than males had no education at all completed but the share of working females educated at the three highest levels was also higher than that of men. The females aged 15-29 make the difference: by 2008 they had a higher average educational level than their male peers. As for Indonesia, about 2.5 million girls and young women can be estimated to belong to the DECISION FOR LIFE target group, as they work in commercial services in urban areas. About half of them did so in regular wage employment, with the other half working as self-employed, family workers or casual wage-earners.

Wages (2.8.1) Large income differences show up between workers of different type (employment status) and across industries. For both sexes the highest wages are paid in the finance sector, closely followed by public administration and utilities. With 23% the gender pay gap in Indonesia is still considerable.

Working conditions (2.8.2). According to official figures for 2009 over 9 million women are working more than 48 hours per week. Long working hours are in particular made by women in households (average 51.4 hours in 2008), wholesale and retail (49.2 hours) and hotels and restaurants (47.8 hours), and these averages were even prolonged between 2000 and 2008.

1. Introduction: The Decisions for Life project

The DECISIONS FOR LIFE project aims to raise awareness amongst young female workers about their employment opportunities and career possibilities, family building and the work-family balance. The lifetime decisions adolescent women face, determine not only their individual future, but also that of society: their choices are key to the demographic and workforce development of the nation.

DECISIONS FOR LIFE is awarded a MDG3 grant from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of its strategy to support the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals no 3 (MDG3): "Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women". DECISIONS FOR LIFE more specifically focuses on MDG3.5: "Promoting formal employment and equal opportunities at the labour market", which is one of the four MDG3 priority areas identified in Ministry's MDG3 Fund. DECISIONS FOR LIFE runs from October 2008 until June 2011 (See <http://www.wageindicator.org/main/projects/decisions-for-life>).

DECISIONS FOR LIFE focuses on 14 developing countries, notably Brazil, India, Indonesia, the CIS countries Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the southern African countries Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Project partners are International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Union Network International (UNI), WageIndicator Foundation, and University of Amsterdam/ AIAS.

This report is part of the Inventories, to be made by the University of Amsterdam, for all 14 countries involved. These Inventories and the underlying gender analyses are listed in the Table. All reports will be posted at the project website. In this country report on Indonesia the sequence of the sections differs from the table. The report covers mainly Activity nr 1.03, the Gender analysis regarding pay and working conditions (or, as Chapter 2 is called here, work and employment). Partly included (in section 2.4.1) is Activity 1.01, Inventories of national legislation; partly the analysis of national legislation has resulted in a separate product, the DecentWorkCheck for Indonesia. Activity 1.02, Inventories of companies' regulations, will take place through a company survey. Preparations for Activities 1.03a and 1.03b have resulted in a number of lists, to be used in the WageIndicator web-survey for country-specific questions and their analyses (Chapter 3). References can be found in Chapter 4; Chapter 5 gives more insight in the WageIndicator.

Table 1 **Activities for DECISIONS FOR LIFE by the University of Amsterdam**

Nr	Inventories
1.01	Inventories of national legislation
1.02	Inventories of companies' regulations
1.03	Gender analysis regarding pay and working conditions
1.03a	Gender analysis start-up design of off-line gender analyses inventory
1.03b	Gender analysis data-entry for off-line use inventories

2. Gender analysis regarding work and employment

2.1. Introduction: the general picture

2.1.1. History

The Indonesian archipelago has been an important trade region since at least the seventh century, when the maritime Srivijaya kingdom and later the Majapahit kingdom traded with China and India. Local rulers gradually adopted Indian cultural, religious and political models, and Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms flourished. Indonesian history has been influenced by foreign powers drawn to its natural resources. Muslim traders brought Islam, and European powers fought one another to monopolize trade during the 16th century. The first Europeans arrived in Indonesia in 1512, when Portuguese traders sought to monopolize the sources of nutmeg, cloves, and cubeb pepper in the Maluku islands. In 1602 the Dutch established the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and became the dominant European power. For three centuries, Dutch control remained mostly limited to coastal trade strongholds, but the Dutch also staged violent expeditions to enforce their spice monopoly and burn "illegal" cultivation, like to the Banda islands (1622) and Ambon (1655). From 1650-1680 the VOC was the most powerful European economic and political factor in Asia. The erosion of the VOC sway began with the late 17th century shift in demand for Asian products in Europe, stimulating imports of commodities such as cottons, raw silk, tea and coffee from regions where the Dutch possessed less or no garrisons. The Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-84) made clear that from then on the British ruled the waves and aggravated the financial problems of the VOC. Under the short-lived republican regime in the Netherlands, the VOC was liquidated and formally dissolved in 1800. Under Napoleon the Dutch empire was dismembered, with the British conquest of Java as the final act (wikipedia Indonesia; Israel 1995; De Vries and Van der Woude 1995; Gaastra 2002; Vickers 2005).

Three years after the restoration of the monarchy in the Netherlands in 1813, the Dutch state took over the VOC possessions. Dutch administrators returned to Java and Dutch troops tried to conquer Sumatra and some outer islands. In 1824, initiated by the Dutch merchant-king William I, the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM, Dutch Trade Company) was founded in an attempt to rebuild the Dutch economy and to activate trade with the East Indies. Acts of rebellion against the colonial power remained manifold; the most prolonged were the Padri War in Sumatra (1821-38) and the Java War (1825-30). These wars nearly bankrupted Dutch and East Indian public finance. In 1830, a concerted Dutch exploitation of Indonesian resources commenced with the government-controlled forced cultivation of crops for the Dutch market, on which the Javanese peasants had to spend one fifth of their arable land. Known as the Cultivation System (Dutch: *Cultuurstelsel*), much of Java became a Dutch plantation, making it highly profitable for the NHM. The system, however, brought much economic hardship to Javanese peasants, who suffered famine and epidemics in the 1840s. From then on, the heavily protective colonial complex of NHM and Cultivation System was liberalised, leading to proceeds totaling half of the public budget of the Netherlands from 1850-1870. Both economic interests, of entrepreneurs competing the NHM, and liberal political opposition led to the abolition of the Cultivation System. From 1870, the Indies were opened up to private enterprise, which developed large plantations. Sugar production doubled between 1870 and 1885; new crops such as tea and cinchona flourished, and at the turn of the century the demand for rubber boomed, leading to huge increases in profits of mostly Dutch companies. However, the resulting scarcity of land for rice production, combined with a dramatically increasing population, especially in Java, brought further hardship of the

peasantry. Dutch efforts to subjugate indigenous kingdoms and sultanates led to heavy fights on Sumatra, Bali and Lombok. The last independent area was Aceh, where the longest and bloodiest guerilla war was fought, from 1873 till 1908. By then, the Dutch government had extended more direct colonial rule. Finally West Papua was brought under Dutch administration in 1920. This final territorial range would form the territory of the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed in 1945, with the exception of West Papua, which became part of the Indonesian republic in the 1960s (wikipedia History of Indonesia; Lubis 1987; Van Zanden and Van Riel 2000).

Mining became important in the course of the 19th century. By 1850, private concessions were allowed, and three years later the first tin ore was extracted at Belitung island, the basis of the Billiton company; much later, in 1932, the same company started bauxite extraction at Bintan island. From 1890 on, at Langkat, Sumatra, crude oil was produced by the KNPM, one of the founding companies of Royal Shell. Extraction of coal, gold and silver were also started up. Exports blossomed. In the 1930s the Dutch colony produced about 90% of the world's supply of cinchona and pepper, half of its palm-oil, two fifths of its rubber, a quarter of its coconut products, and about a fifth of its tea, and tin and tin ore. Yet, all these mineral riches did not lead to substantial manufacturing activities: mines merely remained enclaves. By 1930 just over 10% of Indonesia's labour force was employed in manufacturing, and 70% in agriculture. In 1939, the country's economy could not supply its own needs in any of the 23 groups of manufacturing products distinguished. However, the expansion of secondary and -in the 1920s-- tertiary education (enabled as the indigeneous population financed the primary village schools themselves) helped create a small elite of educated Indonesians promoting an independent and unified nation. In 1908 the first nationalist movement was formed, *Budi Utomo*. Four years later, *Sarekat Islam*, the first mass movement, followed; in 1920 the communists organised in the *Partai Kommunis Indonesia* (PKI), and in 1927 the *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI) was formed, with Sukarno in the chair. Whereas the Dutch Queen's speech of 1918, under pressure of the revolutionary wave of those days, had promised "an important shift of responsibilities from Holland to the Indies", steps in this direction failed to come.¹ The nationalist movement faced strong Dutch oppression, especially when in 1932 radical and moderate movements unified behind the ideal of an independent Indonesia, *Indonesia Merdeka* (wikipedia's Indonesia, History of Indonesia, and Indonesian National Revolution; Tinbergen and Derksen 1941; Gobée 1941; Van Klaveren 1974; Vickers 2005).

In February and March 1942 Japanese troupes conquered the archipelago, bringing about the destruction of the colonial state in Indonesia. Although the top positions were held by the Japanese, the internment of all Dutch citizens meant that Indonesians filled leadership and administrative positions. Initially, the Japanese occupation was welcomed by the Indonesians as liberators. The Indonesian nationalist movement increased in popularity, and July 1942 leading nationalists like Sukarno accepted Japan's offer to rally in public in support of the Japanese war effort. Yet, many Indonesians living in areas considered important to the war effort experienced torture, sex slavery, arbitrary arrest and execution, and thousands taken were away from Indonesia as war labourers. A later UN report stated that four million people died as a result of famine and forced labour during the Japanese occupation. Two days after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesian independence. A four and a half-year war followed as the Dutch tried to re-establish their colony. Although Dutch forces at times re-occupied most of Indonesia's territory, a guerrilla struggle ensued in which the Republican

¹ Already in 1919, a majority of the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament concluded that, other than the English colonial rule in India which developed into a "training for independency", such an approach did not fit the Netherlands, "as long as we are in need, directly and indirectly, of the advantages we currently get from the Dutch Indies" (Gobée 1941, 449).

troops remained in control of Java's and Sumatra's countryside. On the outer islands, where Republican sentiment was not that strong, the Dutch set up autonomous states. However, the majority of Indonesians, and ultimately international opinion led by the UN and the US, favoured independence. In December 1949, the Netherlands formally recognised Indonesian sovereignty. Already in 1945, Sukarno had laid down the *Pancasila* or five principles of the country's Constitution: nationalism; internationalism; representative democracy; social justice, and theism. The 17 August 1950 Constitution changed the earlier federal republic, formed under Dutch pressure, into a unitary state (wikipedia's History of Indonesia; Japanese occupation of Indonesia, and Indonesian National Revolution; Lubis 1987; Vickers 2005).²

By the end of 1949, the country's economic, political and social perspectives were dark. Up to 200,000 people had been killed, and on Java and Sumatra seven million were displaced. Most of the population was unskilled, if not illiterate. The new Republic had to set up all necessities of life. The economy was in a disastrous state after eight years of war. Most of the *raja*, rulers on the outer islands who had been enriched by their support of the Dutch, were left powerless. The liberation struggle had relaxed the rigid racial and social categorisations of colonial Indonesia, and created tremendous energies and aspirations amongst Indonesians. However, for quite some time it would not improve the fortune of the poverty-stricken peasant majority. Despite democratic elections in 1955, the years following independence were characterized by regional dissidence, killings and coups d'état, military-civilian conflict, and economic stagnation. Sukarno, the country's first president, pursued a highly active foreign policy, amidst the Cold War playing off the superpower blocs against each other for foreign aid, and trying to unite developing countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (1961). He moved from democracy towards authoritarianism ("guided democracy"), and in 1963 proclaimed himself president-for-life, presiding over a political system in which the civilian nationalist leadership, much of the Islamic leadership, the PKI with its three million members, and the army were all at odds. His foreign adventures (like the *konfrontasi* with Malaysia, 1963-65) could not mask the worsening state of the economy, with 650% inflation in 1965, huge external debts, and a poor infrastructure. In October 1965, a coup including the assassination of six senior generals led to the army taking control. Backed by the CIA and local militias, the army carried out a violent anti-communist purge, during between 500,000 and one million people were killed, and many more arrested. The head of the military, General Suharto, out-maneuvered the politically weakened Sukarno, and was formally appointed president in March 1968 (wikipedia's Indonesia; "Guided Democracy" in Indonesia, and Sukarno; Vickers 2005; Klein 2007).

From the very start in 1966, Suharto's authoritarian "New Order" administration was supported by the US. The economic policies of the New Order, largely shaped by young Indonesian economic technocrats educated at the University of California (the "Berkeley Mafia"), centering around the national planning agency (*Bappenas*), fiercely encouraged Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Suharto's main goals would remain until 1998 to restore and maintain tight political control over the archipelago, with the Golkar party as its vehicle; to accelerate the pace of economic development, and to improve living standards, defined in terms of material consumption. It cannot be denied that in each of these goals the New Order

² Soon, the federal construction turned out to have centrifugal effects. This is understandable, as across its many islands Indonesia consists of distinct ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. Indonesia has developed a shared identity defined by a national language, ethnic diversity, religious pluralism within a majority Muslim population, and a history of colonialism including rebellion against it. Indonesia's national motto, "*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*" ("Unity in Diversity", literally "many, yet one"), articulates the diversity that shapes the country (wikipedia's).

achieved success, though economically there were massive ups and downs. The boom in oil prices and the related increase in Indonesia's oil export revenues resulted in a growth of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita (person) of 545% between 1970 to 1980. However, with oil prices trending downwards, GDP per capita shrank 20% from 1980 to 1990, followed by a 13% decline from 1990 to 2000. Economic reforms, including reduction of import protection and deregulation of restrictions on foreign ownership, obviously were not sufficient for a return to rapid growth. And although inflation was held between 5%–10%, and the Rupiah stable and predictable, already in the early 1980s it became clear that more thorough restructuring of the economy would be needed to boost non-oil exports and to tackle the problem of the "high cost economy". The latter was an euphemism for the pervasive corruption of the Suharto era, with immense wealth accumulated by the Suharto family and their business cronies. In the 1990s the country was ranked consistently as among the most corrupt in the world. Under Suharto, Indonesia had moved toward private provision of public infrastructure, including electric power, toll roads, and telecommunications. A family favourite was the electric power sector, known for its "big deals" (wikipedia's Indonesia, and Indonesia- The "New Order"; Vickers 2005; Sato 2005; Klein 2007; Wells 2007; Booth 2005, 2008).

In July 1997, the baht, the currency of Thailand, collapsed. Despite a troubled political situation in early 1997, with increasingly open anti-government protests, virtually all observers thought the Indonesian economy remained strong. Yet, many Indonesian companies had withheld the situation that they had large foreign short-term debts to service, and one month later investors started to lose confidence in the Indonesian currency too. The Rupiah began a free fall from 3,000 Rupiah in August 1997 to around 15,000 Rupiah against the US dollar in June 1998. A first assistance package of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), pledging USD 37 billion, did not stop that fall, though Indonesian technocrats announced reforms. Most reforms, however, threatened the interests of Suharto's family or their cronies. Although critical of the IMF, after his re-election as president in April (by a compliant Peoples' Consultative Assembly, MPR), Suharto immediately implemented the harsh austerity measures of a third IMF package. Steep increases in prices of electricity, fuel and transport, and further budget cuts, triggered more protests. From January 1998 to March 1999, nominal food prices increased threefold (wikipedia's Economy of Indonesia and Indonesia- The "New Order"; Simatupang and Wahab 1999; Vickers 2005). Finally, protests took the form of a broad pro-democracy reform movement (*reformasi*), that brought Suharto down; on 21 May 1998 he resigned. The movement consisted of many civil society groups, including a number of women's organisations. They in particular responded to rising poverty and violence against women, but also raised national and international awareness of the problems that women workers faced (Ford 2008; Ford and Parker 2008; Schech and Mustafa 2010; see also our next section). The 1997-98 crisis was quite deep, and most likely doubled poverty (see section 2.5.2). The economy contracted severely; over 1998 the country's GDP fell by almost 14%, and total gross investment by 36% (Suryadarma *et al* 2005).

The economic recovery from the 1997-98 crisis took about five years. Only in 2003 the GDP per capita returned to its 1996 level (McLeod 2006). In between, the country was able to manage a relatively peaceful transition to a more genuine democracy, in three stages. The first stage began with the formal handover of power by Suharto to his deputy, B.J. Habibie, in May 1998. The second took place in 1999, following Indonesia's first democratic parliamentary election since 1955, when Habibie was replaced as president by Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) of the National Awakening Party. Wahid served erratically, alienating pro-democracy activists and allied political parties alike. The third stage saw the dismissal of Wahid in July 2001 and his replacement by Megawati Sukarnoputri of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). In contesting Indonesia's first direct presidential election in 2004,

Sukarnoputri lost to her former Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, usually known by his initials SBY. Elections notwithstanding, informal bases of support remain vital for the leaders of democratic Indonesia; the country has again seen the rise of wealthy business figures with ties to the government. There seems to be quite some continuity in the political-economic realm. Yet, the rules of the game have changed, especially since constitutional amendments in 2004 reinforced the move towards regional autonomy; not only are national elections democratic, so are provincial and local elections. Strong regional government can be effective for poverty alleviation and economic expansion, but there are also quite some examples of provincial and district governments seizing opportunities for personal enrichment (see the next section, on governance). Under these conditions, *reformasi* or democratic reform and effective government still seems un an unfinished project. Examples of post-reform institutions working well remain rather rare (Sato 2005; Pepinsky 2006; McLeod 2006).

SBY was re-elected in 2009, with his Democrat Party (PD) increasing its vote from 8% in 2004 to 21% in 2009. The other major suffered a drop in their votes (Kuncoro *et al* 2009). SBY's re-election, with the respected economist Boediono as his vice president, suggests continuity of economic policy, although the start of their term has been marred by corruption scandals. The government in 2010 faces the ongoing challenge of improving Indonesia's poor infrastructure to remove impediments to economic growth, combined with the urgency of addressing climate change, particularly as to conserve the country's forests and peatlands.

In the 2000s the Indonesian economy from year to year showed respectable though not quite high growth figures. GDP growth per person employed was 2.8% in 2000, 4.2% in 2001, 4.0% in 2002, 3.1% in 2003, 3.3% in 2004, 4.0% in 2005, 4.3% in 2006, and most recently 3.8% in 2007 and 4.2% in 2008 (World Bank World Development Indicators online; World Bank 2008b). Thus, the GDP growth rate per person employed for 2001-2006 averaged 4.0%, slightly falling down to an average 3.6% in 2003-2008. Terrorist attacks (the 2002 Bali terrorist attacks; the suicide bombings on two luxury hotels in Jakarta in July 2009) and nature disasters (the tsunami hitting Aceh in 2004; the Yogyakarta 2006 and Padang 2009 earthquakes), though impacting on the local economy, have had only slight effects on the country's economic development. By contrast, per capita growth rates of 5-6% as proclaimed government goals for 2004-2009 have not been attained. Against this backdrop, observers have received the goal of 7% yearly growth as announced by SBY for 2010-2014 with scepticism (Resosudarmo and Yusuf 2009).

In a global perspective, Indonesia is ranked in the medium ranks of medium human development. In 2006 its GDP per capita reached USD (PPP) 3,455, ranking no. 121 in the world. The estimated earned income for men was USD 4,729, and for women USD 2,179 (UNDP 2008), implying a women to men parity rate of 46%. As we will see, this low rate is indicative for the position of Indonesian women in the field of work and employment.

2.1.2. Governance

Indonesia is a multiparty democracy. Administratively the country is divided in 30 provinces, two special regions (Aceh and Yogyakarta), and one special capital city district (DKI Jakarta). Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became the first directly elected president in free and fair elections in 2004, and was re-elected in July 2009 with nearly 61% of the popular vote. The president is both the chief and head of government. Recently civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, although the fact that the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) continued to be partly self-financed weakened this control. Basic freedoms have expanded since 1999. In 2008 the government took

measures to advance human rights and consolidate democracy, and for example made some efforts to hold members of the security forces for acts of torture (US Dept of State 2009; CIA World Factbook).

The US Dept of State (2009) over 2008 reported that there were problems during that year in the following areas: killings by security forces; vigilantism; harsh prison conditions; impunity for prison authorities and some other officials; corruption in the judicial system; limitations of free speech; societal abuse and discrimination against religious groups and interference with freedom of religion, sometimes with the complicity of local officials; instances of violence and sexual abuse against women and children; trafficking in persons; child labour; and failure to enforce labour standards and worker rights. Conditions at the country's prisons and detention centres are harsh. By law, children convicted of serious crimes should serve their sentences in juvenile prisons. However, according to a November 2007 by the United Nations special rapporteur on torture, children were incarcerated with adults in both pretrial detention centres and in prisons. The police continued to focus on improving police professionalism and emphasizing law enforcement ethics. Nevertheless, impunity and corruption remained problems in some areas. Police commonly extracted bribes, ranging from minor payoffs in traffic cases to large bribes in criminal investigations. Moreover, military and civilian courts rarely accepted appeals based on claims of improper arrest and detention. In practice, the judiciary remained susceptible to influence from outside parties, including business interests, politicians, and the military; low salaries continued to encourage acceptance of bribes. In 2007 and 2008, key individuals in the justice system were accused of accepting bribes and turning a blind eye to other government offices suspected of corruption. Corrupt officials sometimes subjected migrants returning from abroad, particularly women, to arbitrary strip searches, theft, and extortion (US Dept of State 2009).

Observers disagree on whether the 2001 move to decentralisation has affected the spread of corruption. Some studies, grounded on data about firms paying bribes, found that local level corruption has decreased after 2001 (Henderson and Kuncoro 2004, 2006). By contrast, other observers argue that government agencies across the country are now even more willing to extort bribes and levies than before, as the institutional structure has no longer a central apparatus that can coordinate bribery and corruption. They refer to a number of notorious cases of corruption at provincial and district level happening between 2001 and 2005 (McLeod 2006; Pepinsky 2006). Also, it has been computed that between 1999-2000 and 2002-03 the size of Indonesia's shadow economy grew considerably (Schneider 2005). It certainly does not help that the 1999 legislation on decentralization has not given any clear role to the provincial governments (Booth 2005). It may be that since about 2003-05 the situation has improved. According to the World Bank's worldwide governance indicators (WGI), Indonesia's comparative position since the 2004 elections improved on all six governance indicators used though the country still is to be found in the world's lower half. On voice and accountability, the country in 2008 was in the sixth percentile, indicating that about 50% of countries worldwide had better ratings; on political stability and absence of violence, it was in the eighth percentile, thus with about 70% of countries rated better; on government effectiveness, it was in the sixth percentile, as it was on regulatory quality; on rule of law the country was in the seventh percentile, and on control of corruption it arrived in 2008 in the seventh percentile, after staying until in 2002 in the lowest 10% (World Bank 2009c).

Soon after taking office, SBY established the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), giving it a broad investigative mandate. However, KPK met strong obstruction, not least from the law enforcement apparatus. In 2006 the Constitutional Court ruled that the legal provision creating the Anticorruption Court was unconstitutional but permitted the court to continue functioning for three more years; it had to end its operations by December 19, 2009. Though often alleged to be mainly "frying small fish", in 2007 and 2008 the KPK arrested and investigated a number of high-level politicians and civil servants.

Yet, only a limited number of them were sentenced by the Anticorruption Court (US Dept of State 2009; various websites). Although most of the domestic business conglomerates formed under the New Order were forced to divest at least some of their assets to settle debts, the divestment process was often far from transparent. Powerful groups have been able to influence the decisions of regulators, including the courts, in favour of business groups from the Suharto era. As a leading analyst remarks, “The problems of “corruption, collusion and nepotism” that provoked student protests in 1998 have not gone away” (Booth 2008).

The law provides for freedom of assembly, and the government generally respected this right. The law generally does not require permits for social, cultural, or religious gatherings; however, any gathering of five or more persons related to political, labour, or public policy requires police notification, and demonstrations require a permit. In general these permits are granted routinely. The law provides for freedom of association, and the government respects it in practice. An exception is the banning of the PKI from 1966 on. Concerning freedom of religion, six faiths (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism) have received official recognition. In 2008, the civil registration system continued to discriminate against members of minority religions. Especially minorities’ registration of births and marriages can turn out to be problematic (US Dept of State 2009).

The law provides citizens with the right to change their government peacefully. Elections are based on universal suffrage. Married girls are legally adults and allowed to vote. The constitution provides for national elections every five years. There are no legal restrictions on the role of women in politics, but the position of women in politics remains weak. In the first general election of 1955, women made up 6.5% of those elected to the parliament. Since this election, women’s representation has ebbed and flowed, peaking at 13.0% in 1987. After the first general election of the reform era, in 1999, women made up 8.8% in the House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR), rising to 11.3% in 2004. The 2009 elections saw a sanguine rise, and brought 100 women representatives in parliament, 17.9% of 560 DPR members. From 2004 on women in the newly-created House of Regional Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*, DPD), based on provincial and district elections, occupied 27 of 128 seats, or 21.1%: in some areas women candidates clearly attracted support from women voters. Moreover, women held four of 36 cabinet seats (11.1%). The Electoral Law passed in February 2003 suggested a quota system with a call on parties to select women for at least 30% of the candidate slots (“bearing in their hearts the desirability of 30%”), but in December 2008 the Indonesian Constitutional Court effectively abolished the party ranking list. The Court’s verdict does not legally abolish the quota system, but renders it virtually useless (website IPU; US Dept of State 2009; Ardani and Kanadi 2009; Parawansa 2005). The former feminist Minister of the State Ministry for Women’s Empowerment (SMWE) has argued that the major associations of women’s organizations, like the Kongres Wanita Indonesia (KOWANI, National Council of Women’s Organizations of Indonesia), the BMOIWI (Federation of Indonesian Muslim Women Organizations) and the Center for the Political Empowerment of Women, should strengthen their mutual links, and use their potential to support increased representation of women in parliament (Parawansa 2005, 88).

As mentioned, women and women’s organisations played prominent roles in the 1998 *reformasi* movement. Soaring consumer prices brought both poor and middle-class women on the streets of Jakarta under the shared identity of *Suara Ibu Peduli* (SIP, Voice of Concerned Mothers). Women’s groups had high expectations of the SMWE. The Wahid government in 2000 formally made gender mainstreaming a national policy by issuing a Presidential Instruction that government institutions at all levels should conduct gender mainstreaming, but this instruction lacked the power of law. A decade later, weak enforcement clearly remains the central problem. The national process of drafting a National

Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP) as a testcase for incorporating gender mainstreaming was a laborious process, in which initially the SMWE was sidelined. In a later phase, a coalition of individual SMWE officials, gender non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and university-based gender experts was not unsuccessful: the final PRSP of 2005 included a frank assessment of the gender gaps in the achievement of human rights. However, such notions are not repeated in the Medium-Term Development Plan 2004-09 (Schech and Mustafa 2010).³

Indonesia is the world's most populous Muslim country. Much of Indonesian legislation emphasises the importance of equal opportunities for men and women, but secular laws co-exist with Islamic principles and traditional customs that affect the lives of Indonesian women (OECD-SIGI website). For example, in Aceh the Shari'a police, a provincial body, is responsible for enforcing Shari'a law; unless the Aceh governor's refusal to sign, the most strict part of this legislation –including the death penalty for adultery-- is effective as of January 2010. And though after international and domestic protests government oversight of the Shari'a police appears to have improved, Shari'a law and Shari'a police put their stamps upon public life in Aceh, especially by pushing women back in the private sphere (a.o. Maas 2010). Vigilantism is widespread and community surveillance, notably of "suspected couples", is officially promoted (Newman 2009). The courts at stake hear only cases involving Muslims and use decrees formulated by the local government rather than the penal code. Aceh is also the exception on the rule that there are no legal restrictions on the role of minorities: in this province, non-Muslims are effectively blocked from political office by the requirement that all candidates must demonstrate to read the Koran in Arabic. Local governments and groups outside Aceh have also undertaken campaigns to promote conformity by women with the precepts of Shari'a (CIA World Factbook; US Dept of State 2009).

The Indonesian constitution does not explicitly prohibit discrimination based on gender, race, disability, language, or social status. It provides for equal rights for all citizens, both native and naturalized. In recent years the government failed to defend these rights in practice (US Dept of State 2009). The situation of Indonesian women within the family context is difficult. Islamic law allows for polygamy, and a Muslim man in Indonesia may take as many as four wives. The Marriage Law considers men to be the head of the house but parental authority is shared equally by men and women. Inheritance practices vary between different regions and ethnic groups. Islamic law and many traditional customs tend to favour male heirs over female heirs, but in some regions land rights are passed down through matrilineal relations, from mothers to daughters. Women in Indonesia have legal rights to access to property other than land. They legally also have access to bank loans and credit, and have the right to independently conclude contracts (OECD-SIGI website).

³ The main international institutions involved were not in a position to focus on gender inequalities in poverty reduction planning. Though the World Bank in 1999-2002 had made alleviating poverty its overarching mandate and formulated own gender policies, in the aftermath of *reformasi* IMF and World Bank did not enjoy a high reputation as they had been closely linked to the New Order regime; consequently, the Bank experienced a serious backlash in Indonesia. Under these conditions, gender mainstreaming could easily be dismissed as a foreign concept pushed on Indonesia by international institutions. Moreover, the Bank's new approach in Indonesia was to largely bypass central government and (gender) NGOs, and target local communities directly. Finally, from 2003 Indonesia was no longer under IMF management and thus not obliged to go on with the PRSP process (Schech and Mustafa 2010).

Indonesia has established various laws to protect the physical integrity of women, but legal definitions include loopholes and enforcement is weak. The legal definition of rape is narrow and does not recognize spousal rape. Domestic violence is considered a private matter and incidents are under-reported, as most Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working on women and children's issues believe. Though data is scarce, some evidence suggests that violence against women and sexual harassment are common in the country. In 2007 and 2008 the local press reported that such violence against women continued to increase. Nationwide the police operates "special crisis rooms" or "women's desks" where female officers received criminal reports from female and child victims of sexual assault and trafficking and where victims found temporary shelter. Trafficking and prostitution pose serious threats for Indonesian girls and women. During 2008 security forces reportedly participated in operating brothels or protection rackets by shielding brothels from protection (OECD-SIGI website; US Dept of State 2009). Sexual harassment of women in the workplace is reported to be widespread; it is added that women workers remain highly reluctant to voice abuses of management and fellow workers (Rachmawati and De Ruyter 2007).

2.1.3. Prospects

We found unanimity among observers that, in the short run, the global credit crunch has had relatively mild effects on Indonesia's economy (Resosudarmo and Yusuf 2009; Gunawan and Siregar 2009; Kuncoro *et al* 2009; ILO 2009a). Just before the crisis, the period of "jobless growth" seemed to have passed and both the GDP per person employed and employment expanded strongly. In 2007, employment increased by 4.5 million workers, with its growth spread evenly across the formal and informal sector (World Bank 2008b). Throughout 2008, the Indonesian government did not seem particularly worried by the unfolding crisis and its implications for the national economy. There were indeed hopeful signs, like the country's continuous attractiveness for foreign investors. FDI inflows in Indonesia remained considerable and even growing. Whereas in the second and third quarters of 2008 the FDI inflows were around USD 2 billion each, this increased to nearly USD 2.5 billion in the fourth quarter, reaching around USD 8 billion over 2008, and continued to grow to over USD 3.5 billion in the first quarter of 2009 (UNCTAD 2009, 56). Yet, even with these substantial inflows the total FDI stock contributes less than 7% to Indonesia's (gross fixed) capital formation, pointing at a relatively "closed" nature of the country's economy and a limited integration of that economy in the global economy. Jointly with a rather weak and locally operating finance sector, this may well limit the impact of the global crisis (World Bank 2009d). On economic globalization rankings Indonesia scores in the middle ranks. For example, on the KOF Globalization Index 2010 the country on economic globalisation ranked no. 68 of 141 countries (KOF Swiss Economic Institute 2010). In UNCTAD's Transnationality Index 2005 Indonesia ranked no. 26 of 32 developing countries (UNCTAD 2008, 12). Exports represent about 30% of Indonesia's GDP – a low figure compared to many East and Southeast Asian economies (ILO 2009a).

The prospects for Indonesia's rebound from the crisis are broadly perceived as rather bright. In the 2009-2010 Global Competitiveness Report, Indonesia is ranked by a panel of leading economists as tenth among countries according to their competitiveness prospect. Indonesia improved one place since 2008, ending up at rank no. 54 (of 133 countries), and six places since 2004 (when it was listed 60th out of 101 countries). The country had the no. 58 ranking in the latest Global Competitiveness index on institutions, was lower ranked on the pillars infrastructure (no. 84), health and primary education (no. 82), higher education and training (no. 69), financial market sophistication (no. 61), and technological readiness (no. 88), and higher on the pillars goods market efficiency (no. 41), business sophistication (no. 40), innovation (no. 39), and of course on market size (no. 16)(Sala-I-Martin *et al* 2009). Expanding at 4%

GDP growth in the first half of 2009, Indonesia outperformed its regional neighbours and joined China and India as the only G20 members posting growth during the crisis (CIA World Factbook). Forecasts of leading institutes and economists held till June 2009 that Indonesia's GDP real growth over 2009 in total would be 3.2-5.0% (ILO 2009a, 5). The most recent World Bank forecast lifted this figure to 4.5% real growth in 2009, further increasing to 5.6% in 2010 and 5.8% in 2011, and indicating "a solid acceleration in activity in Indonesia" (World Bank 2010, 122).

The main short-term problem areas seem monetary and fiscal policies, and the inflationary risks connected with easing monetary policies (Islam and Chowdhury 2009). A World Bank research note as of July 2009 ranked Indonesia among the 43 countries that will be highly exposed to the crisis, showing decelerating growth. It is rated in the category of countries with medium fiscal capacity, meaning the government has some fiscal space to counteract the poverty effects of the crisis (Cord *et al* 2009). In this respect, the composition of the Indonesian May 2009 stimulation package was important. Various experts have criticized that over three quarters of the USD 8 billion package was in the form of tax cuts. They argue that these such cuts are not as effective as job-creating public expenditure and are likely to be captured by the relatively well-off. By contrast, only USD 1.3 billion was directed towards infrastructure expenditure (Islam and Chowdhury 2009; ILO 2009a, 19-20, 22). This point is remarkable. The under-spending in Indonesia's infrastructure development, like for road and energy transport as well as access to drinking water and good sanitation (MDG goals!), was and is widely known, and it was a major concern to the first SBY administration (Kong and Ramayandi 2008, 18-19). We have to add that campaign spending related to the April and July 2009 elections by individual candidates most likely softened the impact of the crisis on households. Moreover, in the second half of 2009 the government lifted its social expenditure considerably (Resosudarmo and Yusuf 2009).

In spite of the rather rosy picture in macro-economic terms, serious problems for Indonesian (women) workers have resulted from the decline in industrial production and exports, especially in manufacturing exports, in 2008-09. Exports declined by 29% in the first half of 2009 compared to the first half of 2008, and the likely outcome over the year 2009 will be 17% decrease (CIA World Factbook). Especially women working in manufacturing for global supply chains (see 2.6.5) seem to have paid the price. Wage employment grew only 1.4% between February 2008 and February 2009, compared to 6.1% in the previous period (February 2007 to 2008). The Indonesian Employers Association (APINDO) reported over 237,000 layoffs between October 2008 and March 2009, with the textile and garments sector alone accounting for 100,000 jobs shed. Subcontracted, casual and temporary workers in export-oriented industries have borne the brunt of these initial job cuts as shedding these workers is often easier and less costly than laying off permanent staff. According to the employers' association, 90 to 95% of those who lost jobs were casual or subcontract workers; union information (ITUC and IUF websites) confirm that they were in majority women. In spite of these job losses, many of the displaced workers appear to have been absorbed into other jobs as the unemployment rate continued its downward trend (ILO 2009a). As we will see in section 2.3.2, the proportion of men in informal labour rose between August 2008 and February 2009, but according to our computations this was --surprisingly-- not the case for women. It may well be that they partly were discouraged to search for paid work.

The problems have been aggravated by the return of overseas migrant workers. Among Indonesians, women make up 80% of this group, and up 80% of these women are primary breadwinners for their families. Already in December 2008, the Indonesian Minister of Manpower and Transmigration indicated that 250,000 overseas migrant workers had been laid off and had returned home before their contracts had expired. Many of them were female workers in Malaysia's electronics sector (ILO 2009a;

Jones and Holmes 2009).⁴ The continuation of lay-offs in 2009 underpins that the crisis is especially felt in the exporting manufacturing industry, like in textiles, paper and paper products, chemical products, machinery and equipment, and furniture production (UNCTAD 2009; Tjandra 2009; World Bank 2009d). The International Labour Organisation (ILO) notes that “The global crisis is likely to have exacerbated the already severe youth employment problems in Indonesia, as inexperienced young workers are likely to be among the first to be let go by firms and among the last to be recruited” (ILO 2009a, 15)(see also section 2.3.3). This notion may be connected with another observation of the ILO, that there is a critical need for unemployment insurance in Indonesia. Protection is especially missing for the semi-skilled, in particular for women and the near-poor. As public infrastructural works typically attract mainly male workers, they cannot absorb the large number of women who have been laid off in export-oriented industries. According to the ILO, the introduction of a basic unemployment insurance scheme in Indonesia would be an important step both toward protecting workers and supporting domestic demand during crisis (ILO 2009a, 22-23).

2.2. Communication

Adequate communication facilities are absolutely essential for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project. Unlike in other developing countries, in Indonesia the number of fixed telephone lines is still increasing, even rapidly. Whereas in 2005 there were 4.55 fixed telephone lines per 100 people in use, or 13.5 million, by 2007 this rate had grown to 7.90 per 100 or 17.8 million lines (World Bank 2009a). A 2008 estimate even comes at 15.88 per 100 or over 38 million fixed lines (ADB 2009). The general assessment is that the domestic service is fair and the international service good (CIA World Factbook). Yet, in Indonesia too clearly the future is on cellular telephone services, including possible access to mobile Internet. Cellular service in the 2000s has grown very rapidly. In 2005, there were in total 210.6 telephone subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants, or 47 million users, increasing to 363 per 1,000 inhabitants or 82 million users in 2007. In that year the average mobile phone use was 66 minutes per user per month. With USD 7.20 per month, the price basket for mobile service was not very low and higher than the price basket for residential fixed line service: USD 5.10 (UN MDG Indicators; World Bank 2009a). In 2008, the amount of cell phone users exploded, to 599 per 1,000 or 143 million users (ADB 2009). Because of the country’s geography, national coverage is not easy to attain. Nevertheless, in 2007 90% of the population was covered by mobile cellular networks (World Bank 2009a). The mobile cellular service is based on an inter-island microwave system and a HF radio police net, as well as a domestic communications system. Recently coverage has been expanded by the use of over 200,000 telephone kiosks, of which mainly located in remote areas. Indonesia is a landing point for both the SEA-ME-WE-3 and SEA-ME-WE-4 submarine cable networks that provide links throughout Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Moreover, the country is served by two Intelsat satellite earth stations (CIA World Factbook).

Internet coverage is growing but still quite modest. Currently one in eight Indonesians is regularly surfing on the Internet. For 2008, the CIA World Factbook set Internet coverage at 30 million users or 12.5% of the population, in global perspective still modest but more than doubling the coverage rate of 2007 that was estimated at 13 million users or 5.8%. Again, with USD 21.90 per month the price basket for Internet service was rather high (World Bank 2009a). By 2009, the country had 865,000 Internet hosts,

⁴ According to the National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers (BNP2TKI) the number of Indonesian overseas migrant workers, including undocumented migrant workers, stood at 5.8 million in December 2008. Remittances by Indonesian workers abroad are estimated to have reached USD 12 billion in 2008 (ILO 2009, 12).

and by December 2008 a rather low 1.0 secure Internet servers per 1 million people. A low share (8.2%) of all Internet subscribers were fixed broadband subscribers (CIA World Factbook; World Bank 2009a). In March 2008, the DPR passed the Information and Electronic Transaction Law. The law, intended to combat online crime, pornography, gambling, blackmail, lies, threats, and racism, prohibits citizens from distributing in electronic format any information that is defamatory and punishes transgressors with a maximum of six years in prison or a fine of one billion Rupiah (about USD 100,000) or both. The Information and Communication Ministry offered the public software to block websites with adult content, available for download at its official website. Internet cafés are required to provide the identities of Internet users to a government agency on a monthly basis (US Dept of State 2009).

The incidence of personal computers (PCs) is, also for Asian standards, rather low. In 2005 that incidence was 1.37%, implying just over 3 million PCs, whereas in 2007 it had increased to 2% or 4.5 million PCs (UN MDG Indicators; World Bank 2009a). Personal computer coverage in 2009 may have passed the 3% mark.

There were, by 2008, 65 TV stations, of which the public *Televisi Republik Indonesia* (TVRI), ten other national (commercial) TV networks, and 54 provincial networks (wikipedia). Already in 1974, Indonesia launched its own communications satellite. Whereas the Suharto administration after some years banned advertising from TVRI, since 1988 a number of commercial TV networks started up and the Broadcast Law of 1996 legitimated their news programs. By 2007, it was estimated that the very high share of 95% of all households had a television set (World Bank 2009a). Yet, radio is the most important medium in Indonesia. The national radio station, *Radio Republik Indonesia* (RRI), was founded in 1945 and has been prominent in the struggle against the Dutch troops and in nation-building. After the resignation of Suharto the number of independent radio stations grew by over 30%. Currently there are over 800 radio stations (website Press reference).

Also shortly after the end of the Suharto regime many newspapers began publishing, leading to “a flourishing and varied publishing industry” (website Press reference). With 59 per 1,000 inhabitants in the early 2000s newspaper circulation remained rather low, though growing with increasing literacy and the rising of an urban middle class. High distribution costs continue to be a major constraint. By 2000, there were 172 daily newspapers and 425 non-daily newspapers. Major newspapers include Pos Kota; Kompas; Jawa Pos; Suana Merdeka, and Republika, all written in Bahasa Indonesia (website Press reference). The Indonesian constitution and law provide for freedom of speech and freedom of the press. After the fall of Suharto, press freedom was part of the agendas of presidents Habibie and Wahid. In September 1999 Habibie signed a liberal press law, providing protection for notably the printed media. In the 2000s, government restrictions were no longer the main threat to a free press; intimidation by politicians and powerful business now was. They filed criminal or civil complaints against journalists whose articles they found insulting or offensive; some journalists faced threats of violence (US Dept of State 2008, 2009; website Press reference). The US Dept of State (2009) maintains that (in 2008) “a vigorous, independent media operated in the country and expressed a wide variety of views generally without restriction”.

2.3. The sectoral labour market structure

2.3.1. Population and employment

In this section we present a statistical picture of the development of employment in Indonesia, and of the working age and economically active population (labour force). Following the CIA World Factbook, by 2009 Indonesia had a working age population (15-64 of age) of 79.5 million males and 78.9 million females, totaling 158.4 million. The country's statistical bureau, *Badan Pusat Statistik* (BPS), based on its August 2008 Labour Force Survey estimated an economically active population (labour force) of 107.2 million, in a working age population of 154.8 million. This would imply a Labour Participation Rate (LPR) or Employment-to-Population ratio (EPOP) (MDG indicator 1.5) of 69.3%, across countries a participation rate in the middle ranks. With 66.1 million men and 41.1 million women being economically active, this would imply LPRs of respectively 85.5% for men and 53.0% for women. The 2008 female rate is 62% the male rate, and in this respect in the middle range across the 14 DECISIONS FOR LIFE countries. According to the 2000 Census, there were by then 91.2 million economically active in a working age population of 130.9 million, bringing the LPR/EPOP at 70.2%. Thus, the total LPR has decreased slightly.

Table 2 (next page) presents the LPRs by gender and 5-years' age groups, following the 2000 Census and the 2008 Labour Force Survey as reported in the ILO Labour Statistics (Laborsta). It shows that the slightly decreasing total LPR between 2000-2008 is composed by a 2.3%point increase for men and a 4.3%point decrease for women.⁵ For females all LPRs decreased 2 to 6.5%points.⁶ While the number of Indonesian women aged 15-64 grew by more than 12 million, in these eight years the female labour force increased by just 3.7 million. For our target group, the 15-29 of age, the decrease was 3.8%points for the youngest cohort, falling to 30.2% in 2008; 3.9%points for the 20-24 of age, falling to 53.9%, and even 5.0%points for the 25-29 of age, bringing their LPR at 54.4%. By contrast, the LPRs of their male peers showed a similar growth. Another remarkable fact is that in Indonesia the highest female LPR remained at the age of 45-49, whereas in most countries under scrutiny the highest LPRs are reached in the cohorts between ages 30 and 39. If we start from these figures, then by 2008 the economically active aged 15-29 would amount to 14,38 million girls and young women, on a total female population in this age group of 3,4 million – resulting in a LPR of nearly 46%. We will use these figures as the basis for our indications of the target group size.

⁵ Comparison of year-to-year figures learns that LPR development in the 2000s was rather volatile. The increase of the male LPR mainly took place from 2006 on, whereas the decrease of the female LPR happened between 2000-2002 and 2005-2006, with a recovery between 2006-2008 (comparison of LPR/EPOP data from UN MDG Indicators, though calculated over all aged 15 and older instead of 15-64 of age, and ILO Laborsta data).

⁶ Between 2000-2008 the LPR for women aged 65 and older (not in Table 2) decreased by 19.8%points to 26.7%, though for this age group the male LPR showed a similar trend, with a decrease of 21.0%points to 54.8% (authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta).

Table 2 Labour participation rates by gender and by age group, Indonesia, 2000 and 2008

	2000			2008		
	all	women	men	all	women	men
15-19	35.5	34.0	37.0	35.6	30.2	40.6
20-24	66.9	57.8	76.8	68.7	53.9	83.9
25-29	75.5	59.4	92.2	74.6	54.4	95.4
30-34	78.4	60.4	96.3	75.3	54.2	97.4
35-39	80.0	62.6	97.5	78.1	58.9	98.1
40-44	81.2	63.7	97.6	79.8	61.8	97.9
45-49	83.5	68.0	97.5	80.5	63.6	97.4
50-54	82.0	67.1	96.1	78.4	60.6	95.1
55-59	79.3	65.2	92.9	72.6	55.7	88.3
60-64	74.2	60.2	88.8	61.4	45.5	78.2
Total 15-64	70.2	57.3	83.2	69.3	53.0	85.5
<i>total 15-64 econom. active (x million)</i>	91,9	37,4	54,5	107,2	41,1	66,1
<i>total 15-64 working age (x million)</i>	130,9	65,4	65,5	154,8	77,5	77,3

Source: ILO Laborsta

Table 3 shows the division of the total Indonesian labour force in 2008 by industry and gender, in million headcounts and in shares of the total, female and male labour forces.

Table 3 Employment by industry and gender, total labour force, Indonesia, 2008 (August)

		all		women		men	
		mln.	%	mln.	%	mln.	%
agriculture, hunting, forestry		39,6	39	15,3	40	24,3	38
fishing		1,8	2	0,2	0	1,6	3
mining		1,1	1	0,1	0	1,0	2
manufacturing		12,5	12	5,4	14	7,1	11
utilities		0,2	0	0,0	0	0,2	0
construction		5,4	5	0,1	0	5,3	8
transport, storage, commun.		6,2	6	0,7	2	3,8	6
wholesale and retail		17,2	17	8,5	22	8,7	14
restaurants, hotels		4,1	4	2,3	6	1,7	3
finance		0,7	1	0,2	0	0,5	1
real estate, renting, business		0,8	1	0,2	0	0,6	1
community, social and personal services		13,0	12	5,7	14	7,3	12
<i>of which</i>	<i>public administr., defense</i>	2,5	2	0,5	1	2,0	3
	<i>education</i>	3,3	3	1,8	5	1,5	2
	<i>health, social work</i>	0,7	1	0,4	1	0,3	1
	<i>other community services</i>	4,2	4	1,2	3	3,0	5
	<i>private households</i>	2,2	2	1,7	4	0,5	1
Total		102,6	100	38,7	100	63,9	100

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta

The table reveals that by 2008 39% of all employed (40% of all women and 38% of men) was working in agriculture, as a single sector still by far the largest employer. With 13% the share working in manufacturing and mining is low in international perspective; 14% of all females employed and 13% of

males could be found here. In 2008 18 million women or 48% of the Indonesian female labour force worked in the service sector, broadly defined, from transport and communications to the civil service and services in private households; this was the case for 46% of all females in the labour force and a larger share, 49%, of all male employed. As for single industries, the shares of those in wholesale and trade (17% of all employed, 22% of all females employed and 14% of all males) were large in international perspective. By contrast, the shares of both women and men employed in finance, public administration, education, and health and social work were relatively small. Compared to other developing countries, the share of women in private households (4%), performing domestic chores for rich and middle-class households, is rather limited. More detailed breakdowns of female labour market shares will follow in section 2.6.3.

The development of the share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector has been rather volatile, most likely as female wage employment in Indonesia was and is quite vulnerable for the business cycle. This share grew from 29.2% in 1990 to 31.7% in 2000, then fell to 29.1% in 2004 and recovered to 30.6% in 2007 (UN MDG Indicators). Based on various sources we calculated this share for 2008 at 31.1%.

2.3.2. Formal and informal employment

It is important to divide between the formal and the informal sector and to follow their respective development. Table 4 presents an overview of the development of employment in Indonesia between 2000 and 2008 by type (or employment status). According to the 2000-01 BPS National Labour Force Survey (*Sakernas*) slightly less than 29% worked in the formal sector: nearly 3% as an employer and nearly 26% regularly as an employee (in wage employment). According to its 2008 equivalent those in formal employment had increased to 30.4%: 2.9% was employer (“assisted by permanent worker(s)”), whereas 27.5% (in the table 27%) was a regular employee.⁷ The urban labour force experienced a major growth. By 2007, 41% of all employees worked in urban areas and 59% in rural areas; in 1970 these shares were 26% and 74% respectively (Chowdhury *et al* 2009). By 2007, in rural areas around 80% of employment was informal (Cuevas *et al* 2009).

Table 4 Labour force participation and type of employment, Indonesia, 2000 and 2008

		2000	2008
Labour force participation		70%	69%
Unemployed in % of labour force		6%	8%
Employed in % of labour force		94%	92%
formal labour in % of employed		29%	30%
of which	employers	3%	3%
	employees	26%	27%
informal labour in % of employed		71%	70%
of which	self-employed	43%	42%
	contributing family workers	21%	17%
	casual wage workers	7%	11%

Sources: ILO, Laborsta; BPS 2002, 2009a, 2009b

⁷ As to allow for international comparisons, we have adopted the ILO terminology and division. Most Indonesian authors follow the definition of BPS, in which after 2000 casual agricultural workers are grouped under wage earners, and casual non-agricultural workers under self-employed, thus increasing the share of the formal sector by 6% in 2000 and 7% in 2008. The trends described remain the same.

In 2000-01 the informal sector covered 71% of all employed, decreasing by 1.4%points to 69.6% in 2008. In 2000-01, 43% of all employed were counted as self-employed, a share slightly declining to 41.6% (in the table 42%) in 2008. In the last year, own-account workers made up nearly half of this category (20.1% of the labour force), and “employers assisted by temporary / unpaid workers” just over half (21.5% of the labour force). The share of contributing family workers fell by 4%points, whereas the share of casual wage workers increased by the same amount.

Detailed analysis of various statistics for 2002 provides further insight in the Indonesian labour market structure by main sector, type of employment and gender. In agriculture, 95% of employment was informal according to the BPS definition. More than half (52%) of all agricultural workers was self-employed, against nearly one in three (29%) being family workers. Yet, a majority of females working in agriculture (58%) were contributing family workers, and only one in four women (26%) was self-employed; among males, these shares were 12% respectively 67%. With both 11%, the share of casual wage workers in agriculture was equal by gender. In non-agricultural employment, with 52% the incidence of informal work was much less: 48% of male and 59% of female employment. In non-agriculture, the shares of the self-employed hardly differed by gender: 38% of all females and 36% of males worked as such. Again the share of family workers was much lower for men (3%) than for women (18%), but here the incidence of casual wage-earners among men (9%) was higher than among women (3%). In non-agricultural employment the formal - informal labour divide between rural areas (66% formal) and urban areas (44% formal) was substantial. For our project it is important to note that in non-agricultural activities in urban areas 53% worked in regular wage employment. According to the other figures presented, this share may have been about 50% for females (Alisjahbana and Manning 2006). We may assume that in the course of the 2000s the labour market structure has only slightly changed.

The period 2004-2008 seems fully accountable for the relative growth of formal wage employment shown in Table 4, after low to negative growth rates of wage employment between 1996-2000 and 2000-2004. In the early 2000s the informal sector absorbed by far the largest amount of new entrants to the labour market (Alisjahbana and Manning 2007). Since 2003-04 the trend has been reversed. Using slightly different terminology, the UN MDG Indicators traced for 2000 64.0% own-account and contributing family workers in total employment (in our table self-employed and family workers). While this share rose to 64.7% in 2002 and 66.1% in 2003, it gradually fell to 63.1% in 2007. According to this source, in the female labour force the share of own-account and contributing family members decreased even stronger, from 67.9% in 2003 to 61.4% in 2007 (*MDG Indicator 1.7*).

Table 5 (next page) shows the most recent figures on type (status) of employment by gender. As could be expected, women can be found to a larger extent in informal labour: in February 2009 over 72%, against 68% for men. Nevertheless, the period August 2008 – February 2009 showed a remarkable 1%point increase of the share of women in formal labour, while the male share fell by 0.7%points. The share of employers in female employment remains small, one-third of that among males. Slightly less than one-third of all women employed (32.4%) are self-employed, about two thirds of the male share (46.8%). The same share of females (32.4%) is made up by contributing family members, four times the male share. Nearly 8% of females is in casual wage employment. The largest differences by gender were the respective shares of contributing family workers.

Table 5 Type of employment by gender, Indonesia, 2008 (August) and 2009 (February)

		2008		2009	
		women	men	women	men
formal labour in % of employed		26.5	32.8	27.4	32.1
of which	employers	1.4	3.9	1.3	3.9
	employees	25.1	28.9	26.1	28.2
informal labour in % of employed		73.5	67.2	72.6	67.9
of which	self-employed	33.4	46.6	32.4	46.8
	of which	own-account workers	19.1	21.2	18.6
		employers assisted by temp/unpaid workers	14.3	25.4	13.8
	contributing family workers		32.1	7.8	32.4
	casual wage workers		8.0	12.8	7.8
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: BPS 2009a, 2009b

In 2007, Indonesia still had nearly two-thirds, or 63%, of all workers trapped in what the International Labour Organization (ILO) defines as vulnerable work, the same percentage as in 1995 (De Ruyter *et al* 2009). There are strong indications that since 1990 in manufacturing informalization and casualisation have constantly grown, with the extension of subcontracting chains beyond factory labour. Many textile and garment factories have relocated away from urban areas, causing many factory workers to shift from permanent employment to informal work – a process that accelerated in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis and the subsequent downturn in the manufacturing export sector (De Ruyter and Warnecke 2008). For example, a survey conducted by the NGO Humanika in 2003 indicated that in Surabaya, the East Javan capital, “73% of home-based workers used to work in factories” (Wulandari 2008, cited in De Ruyter *et al* 2009). Home-based work generally results in a much lower level of earnings compared to factory work; therefore, Indonesians transitioning from a permanent factory job to home-based work must often work two or three jobs to earn equivalent income. Women make up majorities of those in such vulnerable, casualized and home-based work (De Ruyter *et al* 2009).

2.3.3. Unemployment

We now turn to unemployment. After the 1997-98 crisis, Indonesia continued to show the highest open unemployment rate in Southeast Asia (Chowdhury *et al* 2009). Since 2001, when unemployment⁸ passed the 8% mark, it grew to a peak of 11,90 million unemployed or 10.7% in 2005. In 2005-2008, under favourable economic conditions, employment growth was considerable and unemployment fell to 9,39 million average for 2008 (8.4%). As noted, the worldwide crisis did not clearly lift the country's unemployment, with the official rate falling to 7.9% over 2009. Female unemployment showed the same trend, but initially its rate grew quicker than the male rate and it also remained at a higher level: an increase to 14.5% in 2005, decreasing to 9.7% in 2008 and 8.5% in 2009 (authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta; BPS 2010). Youth unemployment, that is unemployment among the 15-24 aged, developed along the same route. It peaked in 2005 with rates of respectively 28.9% (males) and even 37.7% (females), before falling to 21.8% (males) and 25.5% (females) in 2008, and in 2009 to 21.6% for males and a stronger decline to 23.0% for 15-24 aged females (UN MDG Indicators; BPS 2010). This decrease

⁸ Using a new definition introduced in 2001, which includes those who are not working, but (a) actively looking for jobs, (b) *not* actively looking for jobs, (c) have jobs to start later, or (d) preparing a business. Compared to the old definition, this would have lifted the unemployment rate for 2001 with 3% points and for 2007 by 2.8% points (Chowdhury *et al* 2009, 41-2).

was partly due to an increase in the enrollment rate in secondary and tertiary education (ILO 2009a, 32). Yet, in 2009 over 12,6 million young Indonesians aged 15-24 were neither in education nor in employment, in majority young women: this group was made up by 4,65 million males and nearly eight (7,98) million females (BPS 2010).

Table 6 shows the detailed composition of the officially unemployed in 2008 by gender and age. The table clarifies that, except for the 50-59 of age, female unemployment rates surpass the male rates, mostly by 20-30%. Relatively high-educated are overrepresented among the unemployed. In 2008, over half of all unemployed (51%) had at least completed senior high school, against about 33% of all economically active (see our Table 10: senior high school is equivalent to secondary level second stage). These shares among the unemployed were nearly equal for men and women. As the share of such high-educated among the female labour force was lower (27.5%) the overrepresentation of highly educated women among the female unemployed was even larger. Most recently, while unemployment of lower educated women declined, that of higher educated grew considerably. In 2009, females with a diploma or university degree made up 18% of the female unemployed, compared with a share of less than 7% in the female labour force (BPS 2010).

Table 6 Unemployment rates by gender and by age group, Indonesia, 2008 (August)

shares	total	male	female
15-19	28.3	26.4	31.0
20-24	20.3	19.1	22.1
25-29	11.4	10.2	13.6
30-34	7.0	6.1	8.5
35-39	5.0	4.2	6.2
40-44	2.9	2.7	3.2
45-49	1.8	1.7	1.9
50-54	1.7	1.7	1.6
55-59	1.7	1.8	1.6
60-64	1.7	1.6	1.8
65-69	0.5	0.2	1.4
70-74	0.5	0.2	1.3
75+	0.3	0.1	1.1
Total 15+	8.4	7.6	9.7

Sources: BPS 2010; authors' calculations based on ILO, Laborsta

Important for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project is, as Table 6 clearly shows, that the categories most affected by unemployment were the girls and young women aged 15-19 and 20-24. In August 2008 their official unemployment rates were respectively 31 and 22%; by then the joint rate of the 15-24 of age (officially regarded as the female youth unemployment rate) was 25%, against a male youth unemployment rate of 21%. With over 13%, unemployment among females aged 25-29 was also considerable, and again higher than the rate of their male peers. Jointly, in 2008 the unemployment rate for our target group, the female 15-29-year-olds, was 18.5%. By that time these young unemployed, nearly 3.0 million in numbers, accounted for 72% of all unemployed women and 31% of all unemployed (authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta and BPS 2009b).

Especially against the backdrop of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), emphasizing the importance of decent and productive work for youth, the high youth unemployment rate is a major concern and a major reason behind the current preoccupation of Indonesia's authorities with job creation (Chowdhury *et al* 2009). It has to be noted that Indonesia was one of the first nations to

volunteer to be a “lead” country in the UN Secretary-General’s Youth Employment Network (YEN), created within the framework of the Millennium Declaration. Under YEN, heads of state and governments resolved to develop and implement strategies that give young people everywhere a real chance to find decent and productive work. Among other initiatives, this led to the Indonesia Youth Employment Action Plan 2004 - 2007 (IYEAP), which from 2007-2010 has got a number of regional follow-ups (various websites).

An analysis for 2002 revealed that participation rates and unemployment rates hardly varied between the poor, near-poor and non-poor parts of the population, though for the young aged 15-24 the differences were somewhat larger. The participation rates for prime-aged males (25-59-year-olds) varied between 97.8-98.3%, those for prime-aged women from 47.8% (non-poor) to 51.8% (poor), but for the youth they varied from 52.1% (non-poor) to 61.0% (poor). By the time unemployment rates for the three prime-age male groups were all 3.1%; the rates for prime-age females varied from 14.6% (near-poor) to 15.7% (poor), whereas those for the 15-24 aged also varied hardly. Yet, major differences showed up for the underemployment rate, defined as the share of the population working less than 35 hours per week and prepared to take on more work or to be fully employed. The reported underemployment rate in this sample for 2002 was 12.3%, and for youngsters 18.3%. This rate was 13.3% for the non-poor 15-24 aged, but doubled nearly for the near-poor (24.8%) and for the poor youngsters (26.1%) (Alisjahbana and Manning 2006, Table 3). BPS, using a wider definition, measured in February 2009 31.4 million underemployed Indonesians in the week previous to the survey in question: about one in five of all in the working age population. Nearly half of them, 15.0 million, were counted as involuntary underemployed. Of the total amount of underemployed by February 2009, 15.4 million or 49% were females. According to this source, by that time 3.6 million girls and young women aged 15-29 were underemployed, 26% of all economically active in that gender/age category. Yet, with 24.5% their share among the female underemployed was not that large; they made up 11.5% of all underemployed (authors’ calculations based on ILO Laborsta and BPS 2009b).

2.4. National legislation and labour relations

2.4.1. Legislation

Indonesia has ratified the eight core ILO Labour Conventions 29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138 and 182. The Manpower Law (No. 13 of 2003) is the country’s central legal instrument for regulating labour relations and collective bargaining (Manning and Roesad 2007). Concerning collective bargaining, article 116 of the Manpower Law prescribes that a collective labour agreement shall be made between a trade union or several trade unions already recorded at a government agency responsible for labour/manpower affairs and an entrepreneur or several entrepreneurs respectively. However, for unions to effect collective bargaining there are a number of serious constraints. Under article 119 of the same Law a union, in order to negotiate a collective agreement, must have membership equal to more than 50% of the total workforce in the establishment or receive more than 50% support in a vote of all the enterprise’s workers on its demands. Moreover, collective agreements must be concluded within 30 days after the beginning of negotiations or must be submitted to the Manpower Ministry for mediation, conciliation or arbitration. A collective agreement is valid for two years and may be extended for a maximum of one more year (ITUC 2009a). These rules are frustrating collective bargaining anyhow, but may in particular frustrate the right of a small trade union to conclude an agreement (Mizuno 2005; Suryomenggolo 2008). In another essential piece of legislation, the Trade Union Law (No. 21 of 2000),

civil servants are still excluded and concerning the establishment of unions their position is formally unclear. The police and the military are explicitly forbidden to establish unions (Tjandra 2008).

As for the freedom to join a union, in accordance with Article 104 of the Manpower Law ten or more workers have the right to form a union, with membership open to all workers. A trade union shall have the right to collect and manage funds and be accountable for the union's finances, including for the provision of a strike fund. Article 28 of the Trade Union Law (No. 21 of 2000) sets up that it is prohibited to prevent or force a worker from forming or not forming a trade union, becoming or not becoming a union official, becoming or not becoming a union member and or carrying or not carrying out trade union activities. The article sums up possible ways to do so: a. terminating his employment, temporarily suspending his employment, demoting him, or transferring him to another post, another division or another place in order to discourage or prevent him from carrying out union activities or make such activities virtually impossible; b. not paying or reducing the amount of the worker's wage; c. intimidating him or subjecting him to any other forms of intimidation; d. campaigning against the establishment of trade unions. Art. 153 of the Manpower Law lays down that an entrepreneur is prohibited from terminating the employment of a worker because a. he establishes, becomes a member of and / or an administrator/ official of a trade union; b. carries out trade union activities outside working hours, or during working hours with permission of the entrepreneur, or according to that which has been stipulated in the individual work agreement, or the enterprise's rules and regulations, or the collective work agreement. Any termination of employment that takes place for the reasons referred above shall be declared null and void by law. The entrepreneur shall then be obliged to reemploy the affected worker/ labourer. Finally, art. 106 of the Manpower Law compels all companies with more than 50 employees to establish a "bipartite cooperation institution", with representation proportionate to the number of union and non-union workers in the factory. The role of these institutions overlaps with the representative role of unions (ITUC 2009a). Additionally, under the Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement Law (No. 2 of 2004) the mechanism for settling labour disputes is transferred from committees under the Department of Manpower to an Industrial Court. The creation of an alternative channel for individuals to redress their grievances tends to reduce the need for union representation too (Tjandra 2008).

In spite of the ratification by Indonesia of ILO's core Conventions, the ITUC as well as Indonesian labour lawyers remain highly critical of elements of country's labour legislation, in particular when it comes to enforcement. They have noted that, though private sector workers are by law free to form unions and draw up their own rules, a court can dissolve a trade union among other things if its basic principles conflict with the *Pancasila*. In its most recent overview of violations of trade union rights, the ITUC concluded that the government of Indonesia continued to undermine worker rights by failing to enforce labour laws effectively. Unions that attempted to enforce their basic contractual or statutory rights by resorting to strikes found that the government ignored the flagrant violations of law by employers and declared the strikes illegal. The ILO noted that Indonesia still needs to amend its current labour laws to provide full protection to workers under Conventions 87 and 98 (ITUC 2009a; Suryomenggolo 2008). A remarkable feature of the Manpower Law is, according to trade unionists and some lawyers, that it marked the intrusion of the concept of labour market flexibility into labour law. By legalising contract and outsourcing labour, in their view the law diminished the notion of protection within Indonesian labour legislation and paved the way for more widespread outsourcing practices (Tjandra 2008; for an opposite view: Manning and Roesad 2007).

Concerning strikes, the Manpower Law specifies that prior to engaging in a strike action, the union, or a worker representative in the absence of a registered union, must give seven days advance notice to the

authorities and to the employer. The notice must include the starting and ending time of the strike; the location of pickets; the reason(s) for the strike; and be signed by the chairperson and secretary of the union. Since union leaders consider these mediation procedures both excessively cumbersome and time consuming, they are often ignored – meaning the government declares most strikes illegal. In turn, this results in mass dismissals of union officials and workers as well as the arrest and imprisonment of union leaders under section 335 of the Criminal Code. In addition, ministerial regulation KEP.232/MEN/2003 defines strikes as illegal if they are “not as a result of failed negotiations”. This provision gives employers unilateral power to obstruct a union's ability to strike because “failure” is classified as negotiations that lead to a deadlock “that is declared by both sides”. The same regulation prohibits strikes at “enterprises that cater to the interests of the general public and/or at enterprises whose activities would endanger the safety of human life if discontinued”. Types of enterprises covered by this definition are not specified, leaving it to the government's discretion. In practice strikes are prohibited in large parts of the public sector, at least in essential services, and at enterprises that serve the public interest (ITUC 2009a; US Dept of State 2009; Budiarti 2009).

According to the ITUC, there are four primary issues at stake in Indonesia that undermine and frustrate effective union representation of workers and the proper exercise of the rights guaranteed under ILO Convention No 87 on freedom of association: (1) illegal and improper use of contract labour; (2) statutorily imposed negotiation and dispute resolution processes that are flawed and undermine the ability of unions to engage in lawful strikes; (3) government officials who turn a blind eye to companies that flagrantly violate labour laws; and (4) government officials who are more prone to side with employers than workers in interpreting, or ignoring, labour law violations. On all four issues, the ITUC report (2009a) gives a number of examples.

Child labour remains a substantial issue and a major problem. According to Articles 68 and 69 of the Manpower Act, labour of under 16-year-olds is forbidden, with the exception of deploying children aged 13-15 for light work, no more than three hours per day and only under a number of other conditions, such as parental consent, no work during school hours, and payment of legal wages. In 2008, the government officially estimated that there were more than two million child labourers in the country; many institutions believed the number to be much higher. Recently published rates of child labourers in employment of BPS – Statistics Indonesia (2010) imply that in 2009 2.4 million boys and 1.6 million girls aged 10-17 were in child labour; BPS added that 28% of the boys and over 34% of the girls at stake were in hazardous labour, with total working hours more than 40 per week. The US Dept of State for 2008 estimated that six to eight million children exceeded the legal three hour daily work limit, working in agriculture, street vending, mining, construction, prostitution, and other areas. Some children worked in large factories, but their numbers were unknown, largely because documents verifying age could be falsified easily (US Dept of State 2009). The ITUC (2009a) concludes, based on ILO studies, that more than 700,000 children, mainly girls, work as domestic workers. Typically recruited between the ages of 12 and 15, often on false promises of decent wages and working conditions, they may work 14 to 18 hours a day, seven days a week, earning far less than the prevailing minimum wage. In the worst cases, child domestic workers are paid no salary at all and are physically, sexually and psychologically abused. A recent assessment of child labour by Human Rights Watch (2009) confirms that this gloomy picture exists till the current day. The US Dept of State (2009) adds that girls and women employed as household servants often are held in debt bondage (see also section 2.1.2).

Of particular relevance for the young female target group of the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project are the following articles of the Manpower Law:

- (regular salary payment) Entrepreneurs who pay their workers wages late either by design or because of neglect shall be ordered to pay a fine whose amount shall correspond to a certain percentage from the worker's wages (art. 95)
- (overtime compensation) Entrepreneurs who require their workers to work overtime (overtime =more than: a) 7 hours a day and 40 hours a week for 6 workdays in a week; or b) 8 hours a day, 40 hours a week for 5 workdays in a week) are under an obligation to pay overtime (art. 78.2)
- (paid holiday) Entrepreneurs are under an obligation to allow their workers to take a yearly period of leave that is no shorter than 12 workdays if the worker works for 12 months consecutively; and a long period of rest of no less than two months, which shall be awarded in the seventh and eighth year of work each for a period of one month to workers who have been working for six years consecutively at the same enterprise on the condition that they will no longer be entitled to their annual period of rest in two) current years. This ruling shall be applicable every six years of work (art. 79)
- (pay on public holidays) Workers are not obliged to work on formal public holidays. However, entrepreneurs may require their workers to keep on working during formal public holidays if the types and nature of their jobs call for continuous, uninterrupted operation or under other circumstances based on the agreement between the worker and the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs who require their workers to keep on working on formal public holidays are under an obligation to pay overtime pay (art. 85)
- (weekend work compensation) Entrepreneurs are under an obligation to allow their workers to take a rest and leave. The weekly period of rest should be no shorter than one day after six workdays in a week or no shorter than two days after five workdays in a week (art. 79)
- (sickness pay) The entrepreneur shall be obliged to pay the worker's wages if the worker does not perform work because he or she is taken ill so that they cannot perform their work (art. 93.1 of the Act No. 13 of 25 March 2003)
- (maternity leave) A maternity leave is prescribed of a one-and-a-half month period of rest before the time at which they are estimated by an obstetrician or a midwife that the female worker will give birth to a baby and another one-and-a-half month period of rest thereafter. In addition, a female worker who has a miscarriage is entitled to a period of rest of one-and-a-half months or a period of rest as stated in the medical statement issued by the obstetrician or midwife who treats her. During the maternity leave period the female worker shall receive her wages in full (art. 82)
- (no dismissal related to pregnancy) The employer is prohibited from terminating the employment of a worker because she is absent from work because she is pregnant, giving birth to a baby, having a miscarriage, or breast-feeding her baby. Any termination of employment that takes place for reasons referred above shall be declared null and void by law; the entrepreneur shall then be obliged to reemploy the affected worker (art. 153)
- (equal treatment) Every worker has the right to receive equal treatment without discrimination from his or her employer (art. 6)
- (non-discrimination) The employer is prohibited from terminating the employment of a worker because he or she is of different understanding/belief, religion, political orientation, ethnicity, color, race, sex, physical condition or marital status. Any termination of employment that takes

place for reasons referred above shall be declared null and void by law; the entrepreneur shall then be obliged to reemploy the affected worker (art. 153)

- (sexual harassment) Every worker has the right to receive protection against immorality and indecency and treatment that shows respect to human dignity and religious values (art. 86)

Concerning free medical care regarding maternity it can be added that JAMSOSTEK, the social security scheme for the private employees that became law on 1 July 1993, covers Health Care Benefits. These benefits provide comprehensive medical care for employees and their families, including maternity and delivery care.

2.4.2. Labour relations and trade unionism

In this section, we introduce the main actors on the trade union side in Indonesia, while providing some backgrounds on Indonesian labour relations. The emergence of strong unions and spontaneous labour action supporting the struggle against the Dutch was instrumental in enacting a progressive piece of labour legislation, the Labour Act 1948, especially when militant unions began to diverge from the government. The latter explains why in this Act “labour rights” were not linked with active state protection, though in particular it emphasized the protection of women and children. It included the prohibition of child labour, and laid down the limit of working hours to a 40-hour week. It specified that employers should allow their workers to take two weeks’ paid annual leave, and women workers to take three months maternity leave. It contained regulation on labour inspection, and factory committees on health and safety and on vocational training (Suryomenggolo 2009; Tjandra 2008).

In contrast with the country’s tradition of independent trade unionism, Suharto’s New Order sought to contain the union movement through its authoritarian corporatist system of labour relations. The Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions ((K)SPSI, (*Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia*)) developed into a main vehicle of these policies. (K)SPSI resulted in 1985 from a government-sponsored transformation of the All-Indonesia Workers Federation (FBSI, *Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*) and industrial sector unions still existing after, in the aftermath of the 1965 coup, the communist-linked union SOBSI federation was crushed. In the restructure, the industrial unions were replaced by departments within a single new union centre. After the 1985 restructuring, Indonesian-style corporatism had become “exclusionary”, with the state dominating through control and repression. (K)SPSI received support from the regime: institutional, as it held all positions on tripartite and government-controlled bodies on which the workers had representation, and financial. Its coverage was very narrow despite its privileged position. In 1993, when SPSI was restructured as a federation, it represented less than 2% of all workers. Collective bargaining was merely a façade; collective agreements were for a large part bogus agreements. The 1948 Labour Law was dismantled. Factory committees as envisaged by law were largely symbolic. Repression, especially against female unionists, was often harsh. The hard-line Minister of Manpower, Admiral Sudomo, released ministerial regulations legitimising military involvement in labour disputes, culminating in the rape, torture and killing of Marsinah, a young female factory worker who organised a strike in East Java in 1993. Workers excluded by official dispute resolution procedures were ultimately silenced or forced onto the streets. In the 1990s the frequency of –largely spontaneous– strikes and protest actions increased rapidly. (Caraway 2008; Ford 1999, 2000a, 2005; Gardner 2003; Tjandra 2008).

Nevertheless, institutes at some formal distance of the unions and NGOs remained able to run programs in support of women workers (cf. Sunarijati 2006). A temporarily relaxation in government policy led to three “alternative” unions emerging. One of these, the Confederation of Indonesia Prosperity Trade

Union ((K)SBSI, (*Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia*), was founded in 1992 by the famous lawyer Mochtar Pakpahan, who continued to chair SBSI. In the 2000s the federation developed into one of the three main union confederations. After 1994, no new unions were established, and the number of collective agreements remained low (Ford 2000a, 2005; Tjandra 2008).

After the collapse of the Suharto regime, in June 1998 Habibie ratified ILO Convention No. 87, on the Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize, thus abandoning the (K)SPSI monopoly. Yet, the *reformasi* regime still tried to frame Indonesian labour relations within the *Pancasila* model, and to replace the protective legislative framework still existing into a flexible and business-friendly system. A Direct Contact Mission from the ILO was instrumental in drafting the Trade Union Law (No. 21 of 2000), The Manpower Law (No. 13 of 2003), and the Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement Law (No. 2 of 2004) (Tjandra 2008). As indicated in the former section, elements in these laws are quite disputable from a workers' point of view. Anyway, from June 1998 unions and union confederations mushroomed and registered massively, in particular those organising white-collar workers like banking employees and journalists, and public servants, though organizing workers under crisis conditions was a hard task going (Ford 2000a, 2000b). Moreover, the union movement developed in highly fragmented direction. In 2006, three confederations and 87 federations were registered at the national level and thousands of unaffiliated plant-level unions were in existence, among which many "yellow" (Ford 2006b; Caraway 2008). In our Table 16 we have included 83 single unions, by January 2009 (formally) active at national and sectoral levels; 41 are affiliated to the three main confederations: KSPSI (18 unions), KSPI (12 unions), and KSBSI (11 unions), whereas 42 unions are not affiliated to any of these three. Two of three confederations, KSPI and KSBSI, are affiliated to the ITUC. We already discussed briefly KSPSI and KSBSI. KSPI or CITU, the Confederation of Indonesian Trade Union (*Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia*), was founded in 2003, as a merger of a number of unions affiliated to the ICFTU, the precursor of the ITUC, and may be regarded a break-away from KSPSI.

Union density is still quite low. Like elsewhere in Asia, membership figures are notoriously unreliable and difficult to trace; pressed by low wages, many members do not or irregularly pay their dues. According to various sources (a.o. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; various confederation websites; news messages) total union membership in Indonesia may actually vary between 8 and 10 million. This would imply a union density of 8-10% for the labour force at large. The economic context, with high unemployment and (the threat of) extensive subcontracting and firm closures, remains difficult. Internal problems in the unions abound. Leadership's roles are dominant; gaps between knowledge possessed by union leaders and ordinary members are often large. Cooperation between unions is hampered by differences in social status and education. At the national level union relations are fraught with conflict. Splits are frequent; virtually every sizeable union has at least split once. Indonesia's geography is a handicap in organizing through personal contacts (Budiarti 2009; Caraway 2008; Ford 2006a, 2006b, 2008). Official membership figures mentioned by the ITUC (website) are 506,000 for KSPI and 511,000 for KSBSI. For a number of reasons KSPSI may remain considerably larger. First, though associated with the Suharto era, this confederation has inherited some advantages over its rivals, like a good starting position in collective bargaining (given the 50% criterion). Second, according to an observer the quality of union activities and of collective agreements concluded by the new unions is rarely better than those of KSPSI unions. Third, this confederation has done better than others in developing links to the dominant political parties. Fourth, in many workplaces KSPSI union leaders maintain close relations with management, and employers often act in ways that bolster KSPSI and impede the entry of other unions into the workplace. And finally, when collusion does not suffice, KSPSI engages in outright intimidation of rival unions (Caraway 2008; Ford 2005).

Despite the rise in white-collar unionism, notably in the public sector⁹, low-skilled manufacturing seems to remain comparatively best organized; yet, here too union density does not exceed 20%. In spite of their large numbers in manufacturing and in spite of the leading roles Indonesian women have played in union action, women are often overlooked as potential members, and the potential of female members is underestimated as well. Union executives, even in unions with large majorities of female members, comprise almost exclusively of men. If women are represented in union structures, they are generally relegated to traditional “women’s positions” like deputy secretaries or deputy treasurers. Women sections tend to be excluded from major decision-making processes (Ford 2006b, 2008; Ford and Parker 2008).

Collective bargaining remains low profile. According to the ILO, only about 15% of all companies in the formal sector are covered by collective agreements. Many agreements merely duplicate provisions included in labour legislation and regulation. Nevertheless, though scattered, a number of successes in organizing women workers and collective bargaining (in particular) for female workers has been reached. The hotel sector offers hopeful examples. For example, collective agreements for hotels in Jakarta and Bandung by local unions in the hotel workers’ federation affiliated with the IUF global union negotiated by women’s committees include: policies regarding sexual harassment and procedures for handling this issue; extension of health insurance to cover also the husbands/partners and children of women workers; a comprehensive wage scale, bringing transparency concerning equal pay; lactation rooms at the workplace for breastfeeding female employees; flexible working hours for breastfeeding women (Gardner 2003; IUF website).

2.5. Minimum wage and poverty

2.5.1. The statutory minimum wage

The current legal basis for the statutory minimum wage (SMW) in Indonesia is article 88.1 of the Manpower Law. It states that “every worker has the right to earn a living that is decent from the viewpoint of humanity”, art. 88.3 lays down “In order to enable the worker to earn a living that is decent from the viewpoint of humanity (...), the Government shall establish a wages policy that protects the worker”, and art. 89 sets up that the SMWs may consist of provincial or district/city-based minimum wages or sector-based minimum wages within a given province or district/city. The emphasis formally is on decent living standards, from the mid-1990s to be attained through the adoption of an index of minimum living needs (the KHM – *Kebutuhan Hidup Minimum*). The standard was based on regular estimates of the cost of living of a single worker made by regional government Manpower Offices, according to price changes in a basket of 43 items. The minimum wage is to be revised each year, and is set 40 days before it is implemented. Since decentralisation in January 2001 provincial and district authorities, under final responsibility of the central government, establish minimum wages, which vary by province, district, and sector. Thus, there are four types of minimum wages. Provincial authorities determined provincial minimum wage levels based on proposals by tripartite (workers, employers, and government) provincial wage commissions. The provincial minimum wage rates establish a floor for minimum wages within the province. Local districts set district minimum wages using the provincial levels as references. Districts also set minimum wages in some industrial sectors on an ad hoc basis. The

⁹ The public sector unions have not yet joined the national confederations, but did join global union federations (GUFs) like EI, PSI, ITF, UNI and IUF (Budiarti 2009, 14)

various levels have a fixed relationship; for example, the amount of a district minimum wage must be larger than a provincial minimum wage, while the amount of a sectoral provincial / district minimum wage must be 5% larger than a provincial / district minimum wage. Provinces and districts conduct annual minimum wage rate negotiations, which leads to a huge variation in minimum wage rates, even within one province. For example, in 2004 in West Java (Jawa Barat), 27 municipalities or regencies had fixed 24 different rates, ranging from Rupiah 390,000 to 670,000 a month. The annual negotiations also often produced controversy and protests. In November 2008, for example, scores of workers and union members protested a newly introduced joint ministerial decree on minimum wages designed to discourage local administration from raising minimum wage rates beyond the assumed financial capabilities of manufacturing firms (Saget 2006, 21; US Dept of State 2009; ILO Travail website; Bird and Manning 2008; Tjandra 2009; Tjandraningsih 2009).

As with other labour legislation, the minimum wage only covers wage employees; the informal sector is not included. The current minimum wage levels (December 2009) vary between Rupiah 1,216,100 (USD 121) per month for Papua as the highest and Rupiah 1,069,865 (USD 106) for Jakarta as one of the highest, and Rupiah 570,000 (USD 57) per month in East Java as the lowest (WageIndicator Indonesia / minimum wages website). The (unweighted) average for the 30 provinces, two regions and Jakarta is Rupiah 892,160 (USD 89) (Tjandraningsih 2009). For 2008 the average was Rupiah 743,200 and for 2007 Rupiah 673,300 (BPS 2009b), pointing at upratings of respectively 20% for 2008-09 and 10.4% for 2007-08.

A survey in six provinces comparing minimum and average wages by provinces, municipalities and regencies for 2004 learned that the ratio between the two varied from 0.5 (the minimum wage being 50% of the average wage) to 1.66; on average, the ratio was 0.60. As a consequence, the proportion of workers below the minimum wage was very unequally divided across provinces and regencies / municipalities. The share of wage workers below the minimum wage varied across provinces, among employees from 19% in Banten to 32% in Jawa Tengah, and among casual workers from 36% in Bangka Belitung to 63% in East Java (Jawa Timur). In five of the provinces studied about twice as many casual workers as regular employees earned below the minimum wage (Saget 2006, 22). If we compare between the 2008 average minimum wage and the average gross monthly wage for that year (see Table 11), the ratio is 0.76. Yet, this calculation disregards the complexity of minimum wage fixing in Indonesia as well as regional wage differences.

Recently the role of the minimum wage in Indonesia seems to be on the way back. Over 1997-2006 the gap between minimum living needs and the (average) minimum wage levels has widened, both in absolute and in relative figures (Tjandra 2009). Strong increases in 2000-2003, when the government sought to accommodate to (new) union demands, were “corrected” in the three next years (Manning and Roesad 2007). This continued in 2007, with minimum wages after inflation falling by over 10% and real wages overall remaining generally constant (World Bank 2008b, 26). The minimum wage levels remain less than a wage floor: most province-level minimum wage rates have fallen below the government's own calculation of basic minimum needs. It has recently been argued --by adherents of for example the Asian Wage Floor Alliance but also by the US Dept of State (2009) -- that minimum wage levels do not provide a worker and definitely a family with a decent standard of living. On a monthly basis, only a daily food basket for 3,000 calories feeding one adult is priced about Rupiah 390,000; food and non-food costs for three “consumption units” have been calculated at Rupiah 2,335,200, or over 2.5 times the current average minimum wage; calculated in purchasing power parities (PPPs) the gap is somewhat lower but remains large (Schulten 2009; Tjandraningsih 2009).

Concerning compliance and enforcement we note the following. Local manpower officials are responsible for enforcing minimum wage regulations. According to the US Dept of State (2009)

enforcement in 2008 remained inadequate, particularly at smaller companies and in the informal sector. In practice official minimum wage levels applied only in the formal sector. Small businesses take advantage of provisions for exemption to SMW payment, which generally are granted freely by the government. It has been estimated for 2006 that 30% of full-time workers and 50% of full-time casual workers earn less than the minimum wage. The general feeling on the union side is that the minimum wage value is too low, but unions lack the power to enforce a substantial increase. They also have to oppose massive campaigns of the employers' association and the National Planning Body, suggesting that a raise of the SMW is an obstacle for economic development, job creation and inflows of FDI (Tjandra 2009). By contrast, outcomes of research on the effects of the minimum wage on employment in the Indonesian context do not point in one direction, and depend obviously on the business cycle, labour market conditions, firm size and sector (Alisjahbana and Manning 2007, 22). A recent thorough analysis rejects the belief that labour market rigidities, created by a overly generous labour legislation and an aggressive pursuit of minimum wages, constrain the Indonesian economy since 1998 (Chowdhury *et al* 2009).

2.5.2. Inequality and poverty

In international perspective and according to the available statistics, Indonesia has maintained persistently low levels of economic inequality. After 1980 the country experienced the lowest change in income distribution amongst many Asian countries (Mishra 2009, 159). Over more than four decades the Gini coefficient, a measure that rates 0 as perfect equality and 100 as perfect inequality, fluctuated between 0.31 and 0.38. However, from 1999 on the 'Gini' (based on consumption) shows an upward curve, bringing it from 0.31 in 1999 to 0.34 (0.341) in 2005, via 0.35 (0.354) in 2006 to 0.37 (0.374) in 2007 (BPS 2008). In 2005, the share of the poorest 20% in the country's total household expenditure was 7.1%, in international perspective a rather high figure and also suggesting a relatively egalitarian income distribution (*MDG Indicator 1.3*, derived from UN MDG Indicators; Mishra 2009). In spite of the recent move towards larger consumption inequality,¹⁰ it is remarkable that consumption and income inequalities have remained rather low in spite of the country's tremendous economic and social diversity. Moreover, notably the governance problems of the New Order discussed earlier (corruption and cronyism) and the enclave-based investment in Indonesia's natural resources would make up for structural inequalities in the country's consumption and income distribution. The available data does not clearly support this assumption and sometimes even contradicts the logic of these events. However, there are main caveats concerning the data. First, concentration in asset and land ownership is large and still growing in Indonesia, and this is likely to be reflected in rising income inequality. Second, the consumption basket used in the regular consumer surveys underestimates the household consumption of the rich(er), and excludes consumer durables including cars, as well as holidays abroad and the like. A reworking of the Gini coefficients with a consumer basket which includes high-value items leads to a dramatic rise of the 'Gini', for example to over 0.50 in 1999 -- putting Indonesia in the middle-high inequality ranks (Mishra 2009, 175-8). Taking these caveats into account, the finding that poverty in Indonesia remains widespread if measured along the common international yardsticks is less contradictory. For 2005, it was estimated that 53.8% of its population lived below the UN yardstick of USD 2 a day (in PPP terms). Also for 2005 it was estimated that 21.4% of the population had to make

¹⁰ Income inequality is always higher than consumption inequality. For Indonesia this is confirmed by Suryadarma *et al* (2005), calculating the consumption-based 'Gini' for 2004 at 0.35 but its income-based equivalent at 0.44. According to these authors, both indicators showed an upward trend between 2002 and 2004, be it that income inequality only rose in Java and Bali.

ends meet with an income below USD 1.25 a day (UNDP 2008; *MDG Indicator 1.1*, derived from UN MDG Indicators; ADB 2009).

It is not easy to trace the development of the shares of the population under the national poverty line¹¹ on a comparable basis. In the early 1990s the government began to publish official poverty figures.¹² Since 1994 the data are refined as the number of poor people can be related to three-yearly expenditure and consumption data; in 1998 the basis has been revised. Between 1980 and 1996, there has been a massive decrease in the share of the population under the national poverty line, especially in rural areas. Here, that share fell from 32.8% in 1980, via 25.7% in 1984 to 15.3% in 1996, while the already low poverty share in urban areas decreased from 9.5% in 1980 to 7.2% in 1996 (BPS 2009b). In particular the rural poor have benefited from the high economic growth. The poorest 20% saw their real expenditure rise (Suryadarma *et al* 2005). In 1984, the poverty headcount rate in the agricultural sector was 64%, much higher than in the industrial and services sectors. In that year seven in ten poor had a livelihood in agriculture. By 1996, the poverty rate in agriculture had been halved to 29%, though poverty reduction in the other main sectors went even faster, to 13% in the industrial sector and 9% in the services sector (Suryahadi *et al* 2006).

The 1997-98 economic crisis ended the episode of falling poverty rates abruptly and blew up poverty, though it has been disputed to which amount. BPS in 1998 first estimated by then nearly 80 million people or 39.7% of the population to live under the poverty line, while the World Bank found a much lower 18%. A December BPS 1998 survey as to solve the issue computed 24.9% in poverty (website BPS). Following the BPS figures poverty rates obviously rose by 80-100%, meaning that the crisis had pushed around 15 to 20 million people back into poverty. This happened in both rural and urban areas as well as in the three main sectors. In the 1998 survey the share under the poverty line in rural areas had increased to 25.7% and that in urban areas to 21.9%; in agriculture the share increased to nearly 40%, but the poverty rates in industry and services also about doubled, to 24% and 12% (Suryahadi *et al* 2006; BPS 2009b). However, through recalculating the official consumer price index (CPI) into a "price index for the poor", Ravallion and Lokshin (2007) show that the purchasing power of those at the poverty line fell even more sharply in a few months' time than the official figures using the standard CPI indicated. Using the new price index gives a markedly higher poverty rate in 1998 of 36.5% -- 50% higher than the BPS estimate, and three times higher than the poverty rate in 1996. The losses in income were largest for the poorest 20%. Already in 1999, following the Ravallion and Lokshin calculation the share under the poverty rate fell to 15.2%, with income growth rates highest for the poorest and the richest, thus mirroring the downward development earlier.

For a large part of the population the crisis resulted in reduced levels of consumption, increases in the share of the budget spent on food, the spending down of assets, especially those owned by women,

¹¹ Since 1980, the national poverty line is the average of a number of poverty lines per province / special district, divided in urban and rural areas, based on the expenditure of a food bundle (basket) to fulfill a daily consumption of 2,100 calories per capita and the expenditure on the non-food bundle of a reference population. For 2009, the average poverty line for urban areas was set at Rupiah 222,213 per person per month and the average for rural areas at Rupiah 179,835 per person per month (website BPS; BPS 2009b). It should be noted that from the beginning the Indonesian poverty line was set rather low, much lower than for example in Malaysia and the Philippines (cf. Booth 2008). Moreover, it can be disputed on good grounds whether the food bundle or basket currently in use is sufficient for daily nutrition: see section 2.5.1.

¹² Unfortunately, Indonesian income, consumption and housing statistics are nearly fully lacking gender-disaggregated data (cf. Schech and Mustafa 2010, 126), thus seriously frustrating efforts to assess the specific position of women.

taking children off school, et cetera, with the impacts on each type of reaction varying across the income distribution. Concerning school enrollment of young children, for example, the poorest paid the heaviest price, and mostly girls were the first to be kept home (Thomas and Frankenberg 2007). In many provinces and districts the 1998 crisis continued to have a large negative impact on living standards even five years after it began. Though the rebound after the crisis was sharp, a majority of those living below the poverty line in 2002 would not have done so except for the crisis (Ravallion and Lokshin 2007). It is likely that the worldwide crisis of 2008-09 has led to the same pattern of reactions, though less in-depth (cf. Hossain *et al* 2009).

It was found in the four years prior to the 1997-98 crisis that income inequality increased. However, is not fully clear what happened to inequality between 1996 and 1999.¹³ Some state that the Gini coefficient increased during the crisis (cf. Suryadarma *et al* 2005), indicating growing inequality, while others concluded to a decline of the 'Gini', according to one source even from 0.36 to 0.31 (Mishra 2009). Yet, the various sources agree that the share in expenditure of the poorest 20% as well as of the poorest 40% grew in 1996-1999, both in rural and in urban areas (Suryadarma *et al* 2005; Mishra 2009, 154). In 2002, still 68% of the poor had a livelihood in agriculture and 77% lived in rural areas (Suryahadi *et al* 2006; Suryahadi *et al* 2009). In 2007, the share of the poor living from agriculture had slightly decreased, to 65.5%, but with 82% of the poor living in rural areas the concentration of poorness in these areas had even grown (ILO 2009a, 31). By 2007 the incidence of working poor was highest among the casual workers, followed by the unpaid workers (both over 30% poor), whereas the incidence was nearly 30% among those own-account workers assisted by temporary or unpaid family members (ILO 2009a, 32).

Between 2000 and 2008, the overall shares under the poverty line first showed a rather volatile development, with from 2006 on a decline, from 17.8% in 2006 to 15.4% in 2008 (11.9% in the urban areas and 20.6% in the rural areas)(BPS 2009b). Although a positive development, it remains far from SBY's target to reduce poverty to 20 million inhabitants or 8% under the poverty line by 2009. Observers have called this target, be it better underpinned by *Bappenas* than at earlier occasions (Booth 2005, 211-2), "a rather extravagant promise" (Ashcroft and Cavanough 2008, 356). The same observers note that "in 2007 nearly half of Indonesia's population was either poor or highly vulnerable to falling into poverty, by virtue of having per capita consumption levels less than one-third above the national poverty line" (Ashcroft and Cavanough 2008, 357). As we already noted inequality indicated by the 'Gini' moved upwards -- about synchronous for urban and rural areas. In that process inequality remained lower in rural areas: in 2002 and 2004 both income- and consumption-based 'Gini's' were 7 to 9 points lower in these areas than in urban areas (Suryadarma *et al* 2005). It stands to be seen what will be the effects on poverty and inequality of the "price shocks" in recent years experienced by the poorer parts of the population. After large domestic rice price increases in 2005-2006 and again in 2008, in May 2008 the government rose domestic fuel prices, combined with fuel subsidies which likely worked out highly unequal: wealthy people consume much more energy than the poor. A cash transfer program designed to compensate the poor for the higher costs of transport, cooking and lighting was poorly targeted as well, with most likely nearly half of the available funds going to non-poor households (McLeod 2008).

Within provinces and special districts inequality continues to be rather low. Though provincial figures univocally indicate growing inequality since 1999, in 2005 only DI Yogyakarta had reached a Gini ratio

¹³ Synchronous increases or decreases over time of inequality and poverty are not self-evident, as the statistical relation between the two conceptions can be rather complex. The development of the Gini coefficient does not necessarily reflect how shifts in the income distribution impact on poverty.

over 0.40 (0.42). In that year, eight provinces displayed Gini coefficients below 0.30, with the 24 others remaining in the 0.30-0.40 range (Mishra 2009). Also, related to the provincial poverty lines the rates of poor recently remained rather low. In 2008 only 10 provinces had over 20% of their population under the poverty line, with the highest rates in Papua (37%), West Papua (35%), and Maluku (30%) (BPS 2009b). However, the perspective changes if we focus on the variation in the regional Gross Domestic Products (GDP) across provinces. This variation is quite large. In 2005 the GDPs per capita of the two richest provinces, DKI Jakarta and East Kalimantan, were 4.5 times that of the national GDP per capita average and about 16 times that of the poorest province, Gorontalo. Besides Jakarta and East Kalimantan, only six other provinces were above the national GDP per capita: Riau Islands, Riau, Papua, West Papua, Aceh, and Bangka Belitung. Except for Jakarta this ranking exhibits resource-rich provinces on top (Mishra 2009). These richest provinces in terms of GDP per capita vary widely in poverty and inequality rates¹⁴, with the low rates of Jakarta (2005 Gini of 0.27, 4% under the poverty line in 2008) and Riau Islands (also Gini of 0.27, 9% poverty) sharply contrasting with the high rates of Aceh (Gini 0.30, 23.5% poverty) and especially Papua, being among the most disadvantaged Indonesian provinces (Gini 0.39, 37% poverty). Though Yogyakarta showed up with the most unequal income distribution, the district was rather poor with its GDP per capita reaching only two thirds of the national average (BPS 2009b; Mishra 2009).

A special case is Aceh, where the 2004 tsunami had a devastating impact on the regional economy. In 2005 the regional GDP fell by over 10%, and all economic sectors were heavily hit. Total damage and losses were estimated at over USD 4 billion, of which USD 1.4 billion in housing alone. The global community, led by the Indonesian government, mobilized a reconstruction effort with commitments reaching almost USD 8 billion. In the aftermath of the tsunami, poverty in Aceh went up from 28% in 2004 to 33% in 2005. However, already by 2006 there was no significant difference in poverty between areas directly affected by the tsunami and those unaffected. By 2008, the poverty rate had fallen to 23.5%, below the pre-tsunami level, according to the World Bank suggesting that the rise in tsunami-related poverty was short lived and that both reconstruction activities and the end of the longstanding conflict in the province facilitated this decline. Nevertheless, poverty levels in Aceh remain relatively high, especially are in the rural interior. The high provincial GDP per capita, primarily the result of the large gas and oil exploitation, has not translated into lower poverty levels (World Bank 2008b, 30-1; BPS 2009b).

Physical or non-income indicators show a less comforting picture of human development in Indonesia. For example, the percentage of the total Indonesian population suffering from hunger --the proportion of the population below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption as defined by the FAO-- fell between 1990-1992 and 1995-1997 from 19 to 13%, but increased to an average 17% in 2003-2005 (ADB 2009). Other physical indicators suggest that in the 2000s for many Indonesians urban living conditions deteriorated while these conditions in rural areas were rather stable or improving. In 2006 52% of the Indonesian population had access to improved sanitation facilities, above the Asian average in spite of a lack of progress in the last two decades: in 1990 this proportion was 51%, and in 2000 already 52%. However, more detailed analysis learns that both in urban areas and rural areas the incidence of such access decreased: in urban areas from 73% in 1990, via 69% in 2000, to 67% in 2006, and in rural areas from 42% in 1990, via 39% in 2000 to 37% in 2006 (WHO 2009). By contrast, the proportion of the

¹⁴ Poverty statistics are used in Indonesia to allocate (parts of) government funds to local authorities, like special programs for free basic healthcare for poor families and rehabilitating infrastructure (Maksum 2005).

population with access to a safe (in UN terms improved) water source grew, from 72% in 1990, via 77% in 2000 to 80% in 2006. Concerning water, access in rural areas rose, from 63% in 1990 via 68% in 2000 to 71% in 2006, but again that in urban areas fell from 92% in 1990 via 90% in 2000 to 89% in 2006 (WHO 2009; ADB 2009). Moreover, unlike in other Asian countries the amount of the urban population living in slums has not been pushed back after the turn of the century. Urbanisation seems to run out of control. According to official figures the number of slum dwellers in Indonesia grew from 18 million in 1990 to nearly 21 million in 2001, and continued to increase to over 28 million inhabitants in 2005 (UN MDG Indicators). In only four years' time the number of slum dwellers grew by over seven million people! This development may impact negatively on physical indicators like the two explored above.

In the 1990s Indonesia showed a relatively high rate of mobility out of poverty (with poverty measured by the proportion below the low national poverty line). Remarkably enough, the 1997-98 crisis did not affect that rate very negatively. Comparing 1993, 1997 and 2000 data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), a relatively low intergenerational persistence of poverty has been found: a child growing up in a chronically poor household was 35%-points more likely of remaining poor as an adult compared to a child who grew up in a non-(chronically) poor household. Yet, children from poor families are much more likely to live in poverty as adults (Pakpahan *et al* 2009). Scattered information on developments after the turn of the century as presented above may cast doubt whether a rather high mobility out of poverty has continued. It may well be that large amounts of people, city dwellers as well as rural population, have been stuck at income levels till 30% above the official poverty line.

On the human development index (HDI) Indonesia ranked in 2006 no. 109 on a total of 179 countries, with a score of 0.726, in the middle ranks of the countries with medium human development. The period 2000-2006 showed an increase in Indonesia's score of 0.054%-points on the HDI, and the longer term (1980-2006) the large improvement of 0.205%-points. The combined indicators for human development gave the country a ranking higher than the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) indicator: Indonesia's GDP per capita index was 12 places lower than its HDI index. Indonesia's position in the Gender-adjusted Development Index (GDI), ranking no. 93 among 157 countries, in 2006 equaled its HDI ranking. Its GDI value was 99.1% of its HDI value (UNDP 2008). As said, the estimated earned income for men was in 2006 (PPP adjusted) USD 4,729, and for women USD 2,179, suggesting a women to men parity rate of 0.46.¹⁵

For 2008 the Gender Gap Index of the World Economic Forum ranked Indonesia no. 93 of 130 countries. The country's scores on the four main yardsticks used were rather low: for the position of women in

¹⁵ BPS (2009b) has adopted the Human Development Index (HDI) to the Indonesian provinces, as the composite index of four indicators: life expectancy rate, literacy rate, average length of school participation, and per capita expenditures. Starting from an Indonesian average according to BPS of 0.706 for 2007 (0.701 for 2006), Jakarta had clearly the highest HDI (0.766), followed by North Sulawesi (0.747); Riau (0.746); Yogyakarta (0.742); East Kalimantan (0.738), and Island Riau (0.737). The lowest ranking had Papua (0.634), followed by West Papua (0.673); West Kalimantan (0.675); West Sulawesi (0.677), North Maluku (0.678); South Kalimantan (0.680), and Sulawesi Tenggara (0.683). There is a significant difference in the provincial rankings based on the HDI and those based on GDP per capita, indicating the limited importance of within-country GDP rankings for delineating human development. Following 2005 GDP and 2008 HDI data, Papua ranked 5th on the GDP list, but 33rd in the HDI ranking, in HDI terms a negative difference of 28 positions. Aceh ranked no. 7 in the GDP list and no. 17 in the HDI ranking, a negative difference of 10 positions. In contrast, Yogyakarta ranked 20th on the GDP list but 4th in the HDI ranking, a positive difference of 16 positions (data: BPS 2009b; Mishra 2009, 153; the same exercise for 2002: Mishra 2009, 164).

economic participation and opportunity, the country ranked 90th, for educational attainment 97th, for health and survival 82nd, and for political empowerment 80th. Somewhat surprisingly, concerning wage equality for similar work the country ranked 27th (Hausmann *et al* 2008, 21)(see for more about the gender pay gap our section 2.8.1). Finally, the SIGI Gender Equality and Social Institutions Index ranked Indonesia 55th of 102 countries in 2008 (OECD-SIGI website).

2.6. Demographics and female labour force

2.6.1. Population and fertility

Here we underpin the earlier estimates of the working age population, the economically active and the unemployed by estimates of Indonesia's population. Again, these estimates vary, which largely reaches back on gaps in civil registration of births and deaths. For 2000-2007, the World Health Organization (WHO 2009) estimated Indonesia's civil registration coverage concerning births at 55%,¹⁶ and concerning deaths at less than 25%. For 2007, the WHO estimated Indonesia's population at 231,627,000, of which 28% under age 15 and 9% over age 60. The median age was estimated at 27 years. BPS, the country's statistical bureau, with 225,642,000 used a more conservative projection; its estimated share under age 15 was 27.5%, the share over age 60 nearly 8%. The CIA World Factbook¹⁷ estimates are somewhat higher: taking into account the estimated population growth for 2007-2009, its July 2009 population estimate of 240,271,522 is 1% above the WHO equivalent of the population size, and even 3.7% above the 2009 BPS estimate of 231,370,000. The WHO (2009) estimated the Indonesian population growth over 1987-1997 at 1.6% average yearly, slowing down to an average 1.3% per year in 1997-2007. Most recent figures point at a further slow-down of population growth. The CIA World Factbook sets the 2009 growth rate at 1.14%, and the UN (UN Data) estimates the growth rate for 2005-2010 at 1.2% per year.

As the CIA Factbook estimates Indonesia's recent population growth slightly higher than the WHO does, its 2009 figures include a somewhat higher share of its population under age 15 (28.1%) and a higher median age (27.6 years, of which 27.1 years for males and 28.1 for females). Of course, the absolute population figures remain large in the world's fourth largest country by population size. Following the CIA World Factbook, by 2009 it regards 34.3 million males and 33.1 million females of 0-14 years, and –as noted– a working age population of 79.5 million males and 78.9 million females, totaling 158.4 million. Also by 2009, an estimated 6.0% of the population was 65 years and over: 6.3 million males and 8.0 million females. Again according to this source, in the current population at large there are slightly more females (120,222,000) than males (120,048,000), keeping both shares at 50.0% and the sex ratio at 1.00 male/females. In 2008 the average household size was 4.0 (BPS 2009b).

Population density varies widely in Indonesia. In 2008 nearly 133 million or over 56% of its population lives on Java, but this island accounts for only 6.8% of the country's total surface (BPS 2009b). We already noted that Indonesia is urbanising at high speed. Whereas in 1970 only 17% of its population lived in urban areas, its urbanisation rate increased to 31% in 1990, 42% in 2000, 50% in 2007 and 52% in

¹⁶ The standard definition includes the percentage of children less than five years of age who were registered at the moment of the survey. The numerator of this indicator includes children whose birth certificate was seen by the interviewer or whose mother or carer says the birth has been registered.

¹⁷ Or, as a matter of fact, the US Census Bureau.

2008. The growth rate of urban areas has for 2005-2010 been estimated at 3.3% yearly, one of the world's highest rates. In the same period the rural population is expected to decrease by 1.1% yearly (WHO 2009; UN Data). The country's largest urban agglomeration and only "megacity" is Jakarta, currently with about 9.2 million inhabitants (UN Data).

The birth rate estimated for 2009 is 18.84 births per 1,000 of the population, the death rate 6.25 deaths per 1,000. The current sex ratio at birth is estimated at 1.05 male/female (CIA World Factbook). BPS estimates the total fertility rate (TFR, the number of births a woman would have if she survived to age 50) for 2007 at 2.17; it has shown a considerable decrease, dropping from 3.1 in 1990 to 2.5 in 2000. against this backdrop, the estimates circulating internationally are remarkably high. For 2009, the CIA World Factbook estimates the Indonesian TFR at 2.31, whereas for 2005-2010 the UN expects stabilisation at the 2.2 level (UN Data).

Life expectancy at birth has also increased substantially, from 60 years in 1990, via 66 years in 2000 to 70.1 years in 2006, the latter figure divided in 72.0 years for females and 68.2 years for males (WHO 2009; UNDP 2008). For 2008, BPS (2009b) gives a life expectancy at birth of 70.5. For 2009, the CIA World Factbook estimates are even higher, notably for females (73.4 years, against 68.3 years for males), whereas for 2005-2010 the UN (UN Data) expects life expectancy for women to be 72.7 years and for men to be 68.7 years. For 2000-2005, the probability of not surviving to age 40 was, with an estimated 8.7% of the relevant age cohort, quite low (UNDP 2008).

Indonesia has succeeded in pushing back child mortality to a considerable extent. In 2004 neonatal mortality (deaths during the first 28 days of life per 1000 live births) stood at 17 per 1,000 live births, in international comparison a rather low rate. The infant mortality rate (probability of dying between birth and age 1 per 1,000 live births) stood at 26.8 in 2008 (BPS 2009b), rather low too and implying substantial progress as the rate for 1990 was 60 and that for 2000 36. The Indonesian average for the under 5 mortality rate (probability of dying between birth and age 5 per 1,000 live births) by 2007 was 31, one of Asia's lowest rates and the result of an impressive decrease, down from 91 per 1,000 in 1990 and 48 in 2000 (ADB 2009; WHO 2009; UN Data). The birth rate has developed in a similar way. With 18.84 deaths per 1,000 live births the CIA World Factbook estimated for 2009 a rather low rate.

For an indication of the situation of our target group, the adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women 15-19 of age) is of special importance. The 1990s witnessed a 10%points decline of the adolescent fertility rate, accompanied by a trend of delaying marriage which was promoted by the government (Situmorang 2003). However, after the turn of the century the rate seems to go up slightly, from 46 in 2000 to an estimated 51 (UN MDG Indicators) or 54 (ADB 2009; WHO 2009) – whatever the exact rate, it is in the low-to-moderate range worldwide but rather high in Asian perspective (WHO 2009; ADB 2009).

The context of the adolescent fertility rate deserves some extra attention. The Marriage Law of 1974 gives authorization to 16-year-old girls and 19-year-old boys to get married; a girl who marries has adult legal status. Yet, the Child Protection Law states that persons under age 18 are children. Notably in rural areas and among low-income families early marriage prevails; it is common practice to marry 16-year-old girls to men who are much older. A 2004 United Nations report estimated that 13% of all Indonesian girls between 15 and 19 of age were married, divorced or widowed. Though arranged marriages, very common until the late 1970s, have been largely replaced by "love marriages", socio-cultural and religious pressures to get married and have children remain strong. There is still a strong stigma attached to premarital pregnancy. As the government only provides reproductive health services to married women and men, unmarried teenagers experiencing pregnancy may seek illegal and risky

abortions. And though the Indonesian family planning program has gained international recognition, it has been exclusively directed toward married couples and families. Various reports of around 2000 estimated two million abortion cases per year in Indonesia, with 30-40% of these concerning adolescents (Situmorang 2003; Utomo 2003; OECD-SIGI website; US Dept of State 2009).

2.6.2. Health

One of the major health risk factors for young people in Indonesia, though considerably less widespread than in the African countries we covered in other DECISIONS FOR LIFE country reports, is HIV/AIDS. By 2007, the estimated HIV adult prevalence rate (of those aged 15-49) was 161 per 100,000, or 0.16%. By then, in Indonesia 270,000 people lived with HIV/AIDS. HIV in Indonesia is very much a man's disease, and about 20% or over 540,000 people of those suffering are female. There are severe concentrated epidemics among Indonesia's injection drug users (IDUs) and sex workers, and growing epidemics among their partners and clients. Injecting drug use continues to be the primary mode of transmission, accounting for 59% of HIV infections, and heterosexual transmission accounted for 41% in 2006. Less than one in five IDUs consistently use both sterile needles and condoms (CIA World Factbook; WHO 2009; ADB 2009; wikipedia HIV/AIDS in Indonesia).

In 2007 the low proportion of 15% of those in the Indonesian population with advanced HIV infection had access to antiretroviral (ART) drugs, and for that year no progress was reported in this field: the MDG target of universal access to have achieved treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it seems far away. The US Dept of State (2009) reported for 2008 that stigma and discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS were pervasive. It noted that the Indonesian government encouraged tolerance, took steps to prevent new infections, and provided free ART drugs, although with numerous administrative barriers. The government's position of tolerance was adhered to unevenly at all levels of society; for example, prevention efforts often were not aggressive for fear of antagonizing religious conservatives, and in addition to barriers to access to free ART drugs, potential recipients had to pay medical fees that put the cost beyond the reach of many. Reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS is also hampered by lack of knowledge. The share of the population aged 15-24 with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS is extremely low: for 2003 was estimated at 0% for males and 1% for females. Moreover, condom use at high risk sex is very low too. Since the early 1990s the proportion of those 15-49 of age reporting condom use at such conditions has hardly increased. It was estimated at 2.1% in 2007 (data: UNAIDS 2007; CIA World Factbook; WHO 2009; Wilson and Claeson 2009).

We already came across large inequalities in various fields of life in Indonesia; the country's health disparities are also considerable. This situation is to be continued as long as government spending on health remains rather low. The 2008 budget of the central Indonesian departments on health and education was 8% of GDP, lower than in most other Asian countries (Booth 2008). According to the World Health Organization, government expenditure on health alone was only 1.25% in 2006 (WHO 2009). We limit ourselves here to two issues related to birth: the percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel, and the under 5 mortality rate. In 2002-03, the percentage of births attended by skilled staff was 73%, considerable progress compared to 1990-1999 when this proportion was only 43%.¹⁸ This general share hides considerable differences according to the urban/rural division, the income level of

¹⁸ The UN MDG Indicators website showed more actual figures, also indicating progress but slower. According to this source, the percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel was 50% in 1991, 55% in 2000, 58% in 2005, and 61.4% in 2007. For 2007 (BPS 2009b) mentions higher rates: 66.8% for first births, 72.5% for last births.

the family at stake, and the education level of the mother. The incidence of skilled health personnel was 55% in rural areas and 79% in urban areas, whereas it was 40% among the lowest 20% in the income distribution and 94% among the wealthiest 20%. As for the education level of the mother, the rates were 32% births attended by skilled health personnel for mothers with the lowest level and 86% for those with the highest level. As said, the under 5 mortality rate (probability of dying between birth and age 5 per 1,000 live births) by 2007 stood at an average 31, with a large spatial difference: in rural areas this rate was 1.5 times that in urban areas. The socio-economic differences were even larger: among the poorest 20% the rate was 3.5 times that among the 20% highest in the income distribution, and among mothers with the lowest education level twice the rate among mothers with the highest level (WHO 2009; ADB 2009).

2.6.3. Women's labour market share

Table 7 presents an overview of the female employment shares by industry, for employees (paid employment). The table shows that female employees (those in paid employment) in 2008 formed a majority in only one industry, the restaurant and hotel sector (52%), whereas they formed majorities among all females employed in four industries: besides hotels and restaurants (56%) also in education (55%), in health and social work (57%), and in private households (76%). These much higher shares in the labour force at large, which were also visible in most other industries (except construction, public administration, and other community services), mean that relatively many women were working here as self-employed or family workers. Women also made up nearly half of the employees (44%) and of the total labour force (49%) in wholesale and retail, and also of the employees in public service (47%).

Table 7 Female employment shares by industry, employees and total labour force, Indonesia, 2008

	employees		labour force	
	x mln.	%	x mln.	%
agriculture, hunting, forestry	2,51	17.1	15,32	38.5
fishing	0,02	4.2	0,16	8.8
mining	0,01	8.1	0,13	12.3
manufacturing	0,59	20.8	5,42	43.2
utilities	0,00	3.3	0,02	8.5
construction	0,01	2.7	0,13	2.3
transport, storage, communication	0,16	7.0	0,71	11.6
wholesale and retail	1,92	44.0	8,44	49.2
restaurants, hotels	0,58	51.8	2,27	55.8
finance	0,00	20.0	0,24	34.2
real estate, renting, business	0,03	24.0	0,19	25.3
public administration, defense	0,00	47.1	0,52	20.7
education	0,01	30.4	1,80	54.7
health, social work	0,01	32.7	0,44	57.0
other community services	0,22	28.6	1,19	28.3
private households	0,01	26.8	1,71	76.4
Total	6,05	24.4	38,65	37.7

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta
0.00 (x mln.) = less than 5,000

Table 8 (next page) shows that in 2008 still about 40% of women employed worked in agriculture; this concerned over 15 million women. Wholesale and retail was the second largest employer of female

employees, with a share of over nearly 32%, as well as in the labour force at large with nearly 22%, followed by manufacturing, with 10% of female employees and 14% of all females employed. Both sectors contain large amounts of women, in 2008 respectively over 8 million women active in wholesale and retail and over 5 million in manufacturing. Less than half of all women in paid employment (2.9 million or 48%) worked in services, broadly defined and including government and work for private households. The two columns at the right clarify that with nearly 45% the services share in the total female labour force is slightly lower. In international perspective, 48 and 45% females in services are rather low shares. It turns out that nearly 44% of all female employees and 30.5% of the total female labour force worked in commercial services. It may be expected that currently in Indonesian urban areas about one in three female workers does so in commercial services. It has to be noted that, with slightly more than 1%, the share of health and social work in total female employment is extremely low in international perspective, but in line with Indonesia's low government expenditure on health (section 2.6.2).

Table 8 Shares of industries in female employment, employees and total labour force, Indonesia, 2008

	employees		labour force	
	x mln.	%	x mln.	%
agriculture, hunting, forestry	2,51	41.5	15,32	39.6
fishing	0,02	0.2	0,16	0.4
mining	0,01	0.2	0,13	0.3
manufacturing	0,59	9.8	5,42	14.0
utilities	0,00	0.0	0,02	0.0
construction	0,01	0.2	0,13	0.3
transport, storage, communication	0,11	1.9	0,71	1.8
wholesale and retail	1,92	31.8	8,44	21.7
restaurants, hotels	0,58	9.5	2,27	5.9
finance	0,00	0.0	0,24	0.6
real estate, renting, business	0,03	0.5	0,19	0.5
public administration, defense	0,00	0.0	0,52	1.3
education	0,01	0.1	1,80	4.6
health, social work	0,01	0.1	0,44	1.1
other community services	0,22	3.7	1,19	3.1
private households	0,01	0.2	1,71	4.4
Total	6,05	100.0	38,65	100.0

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta
0.00 (x mln.) = less than 5,000

Table 9 (next page) shows an overview of the female employment shares by occupational group in 2008, again both for employees and for the labour force at large.

Table 9 Shares of occupational groups in female employment, employees and total labour force, Indonesia, 2008

	employees		labour force	
	x mln.	%	x mln.	%
legislators, senior officials, managers	0,22	3.5	0,38	1.0
professionals	0,10	1.6	2,08	5.4
technicians, associate professionals	0,03	0.6	0,56	1.5
clerks	0,08	1.4	1,57	4.1
service and sales workers	2,31	38.2	9,79	25.3
skilled agricultural workers	2,47	40.8	13,49	34.9
craft and related trades	0,51	8.5	4,03	10.4
plant & machine operators, assemblers	0,04	0.8	0,83	2.1
elementary occupations	0,27	4.6	5,91	15.3
Total	6,05	100.0	38,65	100.0

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta

With 22% respectively 24% in 2008, the Indonesian shares of female legislators, senior officials and managers among employees respectively the labour force at large were lower than in many countries at the same level of development (cf. UNDP 2008). The same held for the overall shares somewhat lower in the organisational hierarchy among technicians and associate professionals (among which nurses and teachers in primary education), whereas the share of 53% among all professionals employed (including many teachers in secondary and tertiary education) is relatively high. Jointly with service and sales workers, these were the only groups with female majorities, that is to say in the labour force at large. Again, like in most industries, except for legislators, senior officials and managers the female shares in the labour force at large were (much) larger than those among employees, pointing at considerable numbers of women working in these occupations as self-employed or family worker. This seems quite noteworthy for other higher qualified occupations than legislators et cetera. According to the occupational statistics, this was in extremis the case among professionals. Less than 100,000 of all 2,08 million female professionals were registered as being in paid employment, against 1,82 million employers and own-account workers. About the same division was visible for technicians and associate professionals: only 34,000 in paid employment against 423,000 employers and own-account workers (all data: ILO Laborsta).

According to Table 10 (next page), in 2008 the three occupational groups ranking highest in organisational hierarchies had a very modest share in female employment: they accounted for only 5.7% of female employees respectively 7.9% of the female labour force at large. Skilled agricultural workers clearly took the largest single share, accounting for 38% of all female employees and 35% of all females in the total labour force. Irrespective of employment status, the service and sales occupations ranked second. In the employee ranks, the craft and related trades ranked third with 8.5%, as did the elementary occupations among all employed females (15.3%).

Table 10 Shares of occupational groups in female employment, employees and total labour force, Indonesia, 2008

	employees		labour force	
	x mln.	%	x mln.	%
legislators, senior officials, managers	0,22	3.5	0,38	1.0
professionals	0,10	1.6	2,08	5.4
technicians, associate professionals	0,03	0.6	0,56	1.5
clerks	0,08	1.4	1,57	4.1
service and sales workers	2,31	38.2	9,79	25.3
skilled agricultural workers	2,47	40.8	13,49	34.9
craft and related trades	0,51	8.5	4,03	10.4
plant & machine operators, assemblers	0,04	0.8	0,83	2.1
elementary occupations	0,27	4.6	5,91	15.3
Total	6,05	100.0	38,65	100.0

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta

Below, we shortly describe developments in large sectors with special attention to the position of women.

2.6.4. Agriculture

The division of employment across the main sectors changed drastically between in the last four decades, with agriculture losing much of its importance. Whereas in 1971 about two thirds (67%) of Indonesian employment could be found in agriculture, 9% in manufacturing and mining and 24% in services, in 2008 these shares had changed into 39%, 13% and 48% respectively (our Table 5; Suryahadi *et al* 2009). In the 1997-98 crisis, the population massively took refuge to agriculture for livelihood. In 1997-98 employment in agriculture grew by 13%, whereas non-agricultural employment declined by nearly 5%, in urban areas even by nearly 10% (BPS 1999). Yet, this was not enough to interrupt the long-term trend. The contribution of agriculture to the country's GDP has decreased even more drastically, from 44% in 1971 to less than 14% in 2008. This low share is a clear indication of the low incomes on average derived from agriculture in Indonesia (Cuevas *et al* 2009). Though showing a yearly output growth in 2004-2008 of 3.6%, agriculture remained under the Indonesian average of 5.9% output growth (ILO 2009a). The diminishing importance of agriculture is reflected at provincial level. In 1975, in 20 provinces agriculture contributed more than 40% of the provincial GDP, but in 2004 only four provinces were left in which that was the case: Central Sulawesi (45%); East Nusa Tenggara (43%); Central Kalimantan (42%), and Bengkulu (just over 40%)(Mishra 2009).

Strong income and population growth has resulted in a significant increase in food demand. The consumption of rice per person is declining since 1990, while wheat consumption per person nearly doubled. Though rice remains by far the most important agricultural commodity in Indonesia, the growth in domestic rice production has slowed since the mid-1990s, also as the availability of arable land has become a major constraint. Rice production in Indonesia is still dominated by small-scale farms on tiny plots of land: more than half of Indonesia's farmers own less than 0.5 hectares land. In the last few years, much of the extra revenue from high prices and large crops was eaten up by increased input costs, leaving farmers little better off. Farmers are supposed to have access to subsidised fertiliser from the government. However, the task of getting the reduced-price product to its intended recipient across the vast Indonesian archipelago is often too much. The problem of land fragmentation, poor bureaucracy and infrastructure will continue to dog Indonesia's agricultural sector (website PRlog /

Business Monitor International; Bond *et al* 2007). However, the government seems to invest little in the modernisation of agriculture other than suggesting “interesting investment opportunities” –notably on the outer islands-- to foreign investors. The ILO recently (2009a, 36) stated that “Government expenditures on energy subsidies in Indonesia are approximately six times larger than public investment in agriculture, indicating scope for reallocation of investment that could promote agricultural productivity and beneficial structural change”, adding that investment anyway should be channeled to higher productivity industries. Under the prevailing conditions in Indonesian agriculture it is unlikely that many young women living in urban areas and trying to make a career can rely on a “fall-back scenario” in which they can go back to their families living from agriculture.

2.6.5. Mining and manufacturing

Between 1971 and 2002 both the employment and GDP shares of industry (mining and manufacturing) were on the increase, but between 2002-2008 they have been falling. Whereas in 1971 6.5% of the country’s employment was in manufacturing, this share topped at 13.2% in 2002 before falling to 12.4% in 2008. The GDP share of manufacturing showed the same pattern over time, though at a higher level: 8.8% in 1971, 30.7% in 2002, 27.9% in 2008. The employment share of mining gradually fell from 2.5% in 1971 to just over 1% in 2008; though its GDP share in 2005 had decreased to 9%, strong growth brought that share back to 11% in 2008 (BPS 2008, 2010; Mishra 2009; ILO 2009a; Cuevas *et al* 2009). Between 2004 and 2008, manufacturing output grew by 4.4% yearly and mining by only 1.9%, like agriculture below the 5.9% Indonesian average (ILO 2009a; BPS 2009a). As shown in Table 5, in 2008 manufacturing and mining jointly employed 13.6 million people, of which 5.5 million women. Table 7 clarifies that only about 600,000 of these women, less than 11% of 5.5 million, were employees in formal labour. A majority of female employees in manufacturing can be found in craft and related occupations and a minority in elementary occupations (Table 9). As we will see in section 2.8.1 (Table 13), average women’s wages in manufacturing are low, except for agriculture, fishing and private households the lowest of all sectors. Moreover, they are subject to a gender pay gap of over 30%.

In 1971, only four provinces with mining enclaves (Riau, South Sumatra, East Kalimantan, and Papua) showed a share larger than 40% of mining and manufacturing in the regional GDP’s. By contrast, in 2004 eight provinces had an industrial GDP share larger than 40%, including the densely populated provinces of West and Central Java, with a joint population (excluding Jakarta) of 74 million (Mishra 2009).¹⁹ In the 2000s, Indonesia’s oil and gas production has declined significantly, owing to aging oil fields and lack of investment in new equipment. As a result, Indonesia is now a net importer of oil products. By contrast, the non-oil and gas mining industry is booming. Although mineral production traditionally centered on bauxite, silver, and tin, Indonesia is expanding its copper, nickel, gold, and coal output for export markets (wikipedia The economy of Indonesia).

Manufacturing is heavily concentrated on Java, with about three-quarters of non-oil and gas manufacturing located there. Almost 90% of the textile industry is located on Java (Wu 2007; Mishra 2009; BPS 2009; wikipedia). In 2008, about three in five employed in manufacturing worked in urban

¹⁹ Yet, in spite of its low employment share the contribution of mining remains substantial. In 2004, its contribution to the national GDP was 16%. If we just count the contribution of manufacturing to regional GDPs, in 2004 only West Java with 43% crossed the 40% mark. By 2004 the share of mining was still large in the GDPs of five provinces: Papua (54%); East Kalimantan (42%); Riau (37%); Aceh and South Sumatra (both 32%) (authors’ calculations based on Table 12 in Mishra 2009).

areas (BPS 2009a). In particular from 1985 on, Indonesia attracted quite some FDI in low-wage, labour intensive “runaway industries.” Thousands of mainly young female workers, aged 16 to 25, entered the workforce in textile, garment, footwear and furniture industries producing for export; they also replaced male workers. In the late 1990s, the textile, garment and footwear sub-sectors, with about 80% female workers, accounted for 55% of Indonesia’s manufacturing exports. Most large Indonesian-owned firms had some involvement with foreign parties (Tjandraningsih 2000), but multinational enterprises (MNEs) also enlarged their direct investment. From an average 223,000 in 1986-91, MNE employment in Indonesian manufacturing grew to 937,000 in 2000-01. By then, MNEs accounted for 21% of employment in large and medium-sized plants (20 or more employees) in manufacturing at large, but in some sectors their share was higher, like in electric and precision machinery (65%; 157,000 employed in MNEs); in footwear (46%; 116,000), and in apparel (25%; 123,000). Shortly after the crisis, employment in MNEs in chemicals, transport machinery, and electric and precision machinery expanded; except the last one, these are industries with low female shares (Takii and Ramstetter 2005).

Notably the low-wage industries have growingly been integrated in global supply chains led by large MNEs, with intricate tiers of local suppliers and subcontractors (Kimura 2005). The last impulse for the expansion of such female employment in Indonesia was in the 1997-98 crisis and shortly beyond, when young women replaced retrenched male factory workers as they constituted a cheaper supply of labour (Jones and Holmes 2009). Around the turn of the century, female employment in labour-intensive industries was at its top. For example, in 2001 Nike employed 104,000 people in Indonesia, in large majority women (Van Tulder and Van der Zwart 2006, 282-3).²⁰ In the course of the 2000s, female employment in low-cost manufacturing came under pressure. More than three million Indonesians, of which about two million or two in five women employed in manufacturing, still directly rely on garments, footwear and furniture production for their livelihood. However, employment in these industries is declining. Indonesia’s share in the global markets for products like textile and garments is falling, with the country losing out to notably China²¹ and Vietnam. These countries have fewer labour protection regulations than Indonesia (Booth 2008; Caraway 2009). The abolishment, as of 2005, of the international quota system in textiles meant a major blow for Indonesia’s textile and garments industry. The country’s smaller firms are struggling in an increasingly competitive market place and becoming increasingly shut out of their industry’s value chains, while multinational buyers have begun to place more of their orders with larger companies (Wu 2007; Lake 2008). Already in the 1990s inward FDI shifted back towards more capital-intensive industries. Especially here foreign firms tended to outperform domestic producers in terms of productivity. It has been argued that these foreign firms pay

²⁰ In that year the American market leader for the first time openly acknowledged the abominable working conditions in Indonesian factories. NGOs have offered evidence that the textile industry working for the sports sector is the example of the worldwide race to the bottom regarding wages and working conditions (Van Tulder and Van der Zwart 2006, 283). Global standards, including (linked) core labour and trade standards, growingly affect the governance of supply chains, especially where it concerns wages, working conditions and unionization of women. Also, campaigns like *Play Fair (at the Olympics)* have increased public awareness of the existence of the race to the bottom in fields like manufacturing sports outfits (cf. ITUC 2009c, 2009d). However, it may be questioned whether these standards and campaigns are able to redress the growing inequality and informalisation of work in countries like Indonesia where enforcement structures and practices are that weak, in particular in covering the lowest subcontracting tiers (cf. Nadvi 2008; Palpacuer 2008).

²¹ Especially the systematized exploitation of young women workers through China’s “dormitory labour regime” has brought about competitive advantage for the new world economic power (cf. Pun 2005).

higher wages than domestic firms for workers of a given education level, and also pay a higher premium for higher education.²² This may be so, but given the capital-intensive character of these investments only relatively small groups of Indonesian workers, mostly men, took profit of these advantages. We have to conclude that for the time being the prospects in manufacturing for girls and young women in Indonesia are not bright, maybe except for some professional and technical occupations.

2.6.6. Commerce

In the 2000s, and especially between 2004 and 2008, the Indonesian service sector has expanded rapidly. In these last five years, transport and communication showed an average yearly growth of 14.4%, with the communication sector alone growing by a remarkable 27% yearly, owing largely to the growing use of mobile phones. Trade, hotels and restaurants, as well as finance, real estate and business services grew by over 7% per year (ILO 2009a, 33). We already saw that in 2008 41% of Indonesia's total labour force and 45% of the female labour force were employed in services, broadly defined. By 2007, transport and communication, wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, and finance, real estate and business services jointly contributed 29.3% to the Indonesian GDP (Cuevas *et al* 2009) – compared to their much higher employment share an indication of relatively low wages and other income components. As we will see in section 2.8.1 (Table 13), average women's wages in commercial services vary widely, with averages in finance, real estate and other business roughly doubling those in wholesale and retail and in hotels and restaurants. Except for hotels and restaurants, however, there is hardly any gender pay gap. Service employment is concentrated in urban settings. In 2008, about 12 million people, nearly two in three (65%) of those employed in wholesale and retail, restaurants and hotels worked in urban areas, leaving 35% for rural areas. For transport, storage and communication the share of urban workers was nearly three in five (59%) (BPS 2009a).

We now focus on commerce i.e. on the wholesale and retail trades – in Indonesia a comparatively large source of employment. In particular between 2001 and 2005 the commerce sector jointly with hotels and restaurants created many new jobs – almost 1.7 million, on which about one third were regular wage jobs (Manning and Roesad 2006, 148). More recently growth seems to have dampened. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 5 in 2008 wholesale and retail employed 17.2 million people, of which nearly half (8.5 million) women. Table 7 specifies that only 1.92 million of these women, 22.5% of 8.5 million, were employees in formal labour. Besides a small group of female employers, all others are either own-account workers or unpaid family members in family-owned businesses. Casual workers are hardly to be found in commerce (Cuevas *et al* 2009). A large majority of the female employees will be service and sales workers, though the figures also indicate that a minority in service and sales occupations is employed in other sectors (Table 9).

In 2008-2009, the retail industry in Indonesia has suffered from falling purchasing power, in particular caused by the increased fuel prices. In particular the poor were buying smaller quantities of food (cf. Hussain *et al* 2009). Demand for consumer goods is reported to remain more stable in the major cities, in

²² Even taking account of differences between foreign and domestic plant characteristics, such as size and use of inputs, wages in foreign-owned plants have been found to be 12% to 20% higher than in private domestic plants (Arnold and Javorcik 2009; Lipsey and Sjöholm 2004; Sjöholm and Lipsey 2006).

particular Jakarta, Surabaya and Bandung. Modern retailers, for a large part foreign firms²³, in contrast to traditional retail, have grown here considerably in the last two decades, mostly through starting up “Modern Markets” (mini-, super- and hypermarkets). In the period 2004 to 2008 the total turnover of “Modern Markets” in Indonesia grew massively, by almost 40% yearly, with the strongest increase in hypermarket turnover. The rapid urbanization, coupled with rising land costs and a shift of the middle class to new housing estates on the outskirts of the large cities, have helped to spread modern retail to large shopping malls in these outskirts, selling combinations of supermarket items, clothing and durables (Mutebi 2007). In 2008-09, however, competition in the major cities was regarded as growingly fierce, and consequently leading modern retailers started to expand to major cities outside Java, such as Medan, Makassar, Manado, Balikpapan, and Denpasar. Concentration is large in the “Modern Market” segment. In the supermarket category, six major players (Hero, Carrefour, Superindo, Foodmart, Ramayana, and Yogya + Griya) in 2009 controlled 76% of the Indonesian market and in the hypermarket category only three controlled 89%, with Carrefour alone taking 50%; in 2008, the French retail giant grew through the take-over of Indonesian retailer Alfa Retailindo Tbk PT. In most urban centres, the expansion of supermarkets has impacted significantly on employment in traditional markets, with weak management showing up as the Achilles heel of traditional traders. Both wage rates and working conditions seem to have deteriorated, with in particular working hours of women prolonged (Suryadarma *et al* 2007; Pandin 2009; website Euromonitor). The latter fits with the evidence in our Table 15 (section 2.8.2), showing an average working week of over 49 hours of women working in retail in 2008, over five hours more than the 2000 average.

If the Indonesian economy rebounds and purchasing power of large parts of the population will increase, wholesale and retail employment may offer good opportunities for low- and middle-level educated girls and women. In urban centres employment in small family businesses will be under pressure of the continued expansion of super- and hypermarkets; next to the major cities, this will likely be the case in smaller towns. Wages and working conditions of female retail staff, in particular working hours, deserve the attention of trade unionists, NGO campaigners and labour inspectors.

2.6.7. Services

As can be computed from Table 5, commercial services other than wholesale and retail (transport and communication; restaurants and hotels; finance, real estate, renting and other business) in 2008 deployed 11.8 million Indonesians, of which 3.4 million women (29%). Table 7 clarifies that only about 770,000 of these women, nearly 23% of 3.4 million, were employees in formal labour. Like in commerce, nearly all others are working as unpaid family members in family-owned businesses. Moreover, an unknown number of employed respectively employees working in (commercialized) other community services should be added. As far as they were in informal employment, in 2007 80% of them were casual labourers (Cuevas *et al* 2009). Below, we first focus on tourism – a category that partly cuts across the industry division we just produced: employment depending on tourism includes travel and tourism providers such as airlines, hotels, car rental companies and tour agents, thus parts of transport, hotels and restaurants, and other commercial services.

²³ Before the 1998 crisis, the Indonesian government heavily protected domestic retail trade through restrictions on FDI. When the government embarked on the IMF-supported reform programme, all bans on FDI in wholesale and retail trade were lifted, though foreign investors are required to establish partnerships with local investors if they want to operate throughout the country (Mutebi 2007, 370).

One of the most important sources of employment in services in Indonesia is tourism. Its employment partly cuts across the industry categories just mentioned. Between 2000 and 2007, international visitor arrivals oscillated around five million. More importantly, Indonesia's tourism destinations (Bali perhaps being an exception) are heavily dependent on the growing domestic market. It can be assumed that the foreign visitor share of the total is probably 5%. Thus, domestic visitor totals in Indonesia are likely to exceed 100 million per annum. Due to the strength of the domestic visitor market, the contribution of tourism to Indonesia's GDP has grown significantly from 2000 to 2007. Total employment attributed to tourism (direct and indirect) for 2007 was set at 6,45 million, and direct employment at 3,86 million people. In the period 2007-2009, tourism fared rather well. In 2007 and 2008, international arrivals grew by 13% yearly, as to fall in 2009 by 1.1%. At the same time, domestic tourism continued to grow fiercely, resulting in a contribution of the tourism sector to the country's GDP of 8% in 2009. The World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) envisages for 2010-2014 yearly growth rates between 6 and 16%. For 2009, direct and indirect employment is estimated at 6,74 million, with a projected growth to 7,25 million in 2014, the respective figures for direct employment being 4,03 and 4,33 million. A lingering problem is that the demand of the tourism sector for skilled labour outstrips its supply. Respondents to a 2009 opinion leader survey for Indonesia concluded that low wages and unfavourable working conditions, as well as low barriers to entry especially in the informal sector, were undermining the formal tourism sector. Also, the need was emphasized for standardization and increased capacity in the education and training system. The ILO, too, stresses the need for skills development: training should focus on developing managerial ability, entrepreneurship, information technology, English language capabilities, general business skills and professionalism. From various sides the need for "green" tourism has been emphasized: urgent for Indonesia but also a challenge (ILO 2009b; Inside Indonesia).

In 2008, over 85% of the total 1.2 million employed in finance, insurance, real estate and business services worked in urban areas (BPS 2009a). As Table 7 shows, 34% of the finance labour force is female; including real estate, renting and other business the female share falls to 30%. The wages for women in finance are relatively high, and the gap with male wages is rather small (Table 13). With less than 1% of all employed, the finance sector remains comparatively small. Within the sector at large, banking activities dominate; as yet insurance services are nearly negligible. However, also the future direction of banking is rather insecure. After the 1997-98 crisis, it became clear that the Indonesian state banks were run recklessly, while foreign-owned banks were more prudently managed– a main argument for the IMF to press for the privatization of state banks. Privatization happened by attracting investors for strategic alliances and by selling shares to the public -- at bottom prices. Moreover, the government often lost control in the new alliances. Obviously, the crisis experience has deterred most banks from business lending, and in the early 2000s they mainly focused on consumer credit (Vander Stichele 2005). Yet, currently still less than half of Indonesians save at banks, and less than one in five borrow from banks. Based on these and other findings, the World Bank does a number of recommendations on improving access to financing, notably for SMEs and the poor in the regions outside Java, in the framework of broad-based policies to raise incomes (World Bank 2009d). Unless an expansion in this direction takes place, the Indonesian finance sector will continue to be rather underdeveloped, with employment prospects for girls and young women in the sector remaining limited as well.

2.6.8. Government

With about 2.5 million in 2008 employed in public administration and defense, Indonesia's civil service is not very large. For much of the New Order era with less than 2% of the population the number of permanent civil servants was relatively small. Over 40% were school teachers or health workers.

However, over the 1970s and early 1980s there was a rapid growth in the number of temporary officials employed by regional governments. Over time many of them became permanent, and by 1997 the number of permanent civil servants was estimated to be 4.1 million, more than double the 1980 figure. Since then, it has been the strategy to reduce the number of civil servants in general administrative positions, especially those with low levels of education (Booth 2005, 213-4). Between 1997 and 2008 the size of the civil service has been slimmed down with 490,000 employees or 12%. In this process, the female employment share, with 22% already small, has been decreased to just over 20%: whereas the number of males in 2000-2008 fell with 11%, that of their female colleagues declined by 15% (data: Booth 2005; ILO Laborsta). Moreover, the female share in the higher ranks of the civil service (Echelons I-IV) is only 11% (Schech and Mustafa 2010). Like in other developing countries the civil service is rather traditional and a male bullwark. A prominent “Indonesia watcher” comments, “The civil service, especially its senior ranks, is still largely a product of the Suharto era, and is likely to resist measures that are perceived to threaten its traditional role” (Booth 2005, 198). There are some signs of change in the archipelago, but unlike in many countries this has not yet resulted in a larger female share.

Wages in the Indonesian civil service have long been subject to controversy. Like in most developing countries, the perception of the general public has been for many years that civil servants are very well paid, if not over-paid. By contrast, government officials and policy analysts maintain that Indonesia's civil servants are poorly paid and have been so for decades, running the risk of being sensitive to bribery. Under Suharto it was common practice that newly recruited staff was paid only a low basic wage (*gaji pokok*), implying that higher levels could only be filled by promotion from within – a practice that helped to strengthen the New Order system by creating strong incentives for employees to act as their superiors wanted them to (McLeod 2006, 381). Especially for senior civil servants, honoraria from development projects were and are a major source of additional income. “Moreover, various forms of corrupt practice are so ingrained in the civil service culture that expunging them will be almost impossible” (Booth 2005, 215). Results from two official household surveys as of 1998-99 showed a difference between layers of the civil service. They learned that lower-ranked civil servants, with high school education or less (three in four government staff), earned more than their private sector counterparts. However higher-ranked civil servants (Echelons I-IV), the quarter with more than high school education, earned less than they would in the private sector. Nevertheless, on average the gap was rather small and comparable with public/private differentials in other countries (Filmer and Lindauer 2001). The 2008 average monthly wages we found (Table 13, section 2.8.1) show that these averages for the civil service are at the level of those in the finance sector, though for women somewhat lower because of a larger gender pay gap.

2.7. Education and skill levels of the female labour force

2.7.1. Literacy

The adult literacy rate –those age 15 and over that can read and write – for Indonesia in 1999-2006 was, according to the UNDP Human Development Indicators, 91.0%. With 91.4% for 2000-2007 the average is again slightly higher – again, as the adult literacy rate in 1990-1999 stood at 81.5% (WHO 2009). In 1999-2006 the female literacy rate of 87.4% opposed a male rate of 94.7%, resulting in 92% women to men parity (UNDP 2008). For 2008, BPS mentions a 95.4% literacy rate for adult men and a 89.1% literacy rate for adult women, bringing women to men parity slightly over 93%. Statistics of the national bureau show that by 2008 in 22 of 33 provinces and special districts the female literacy rate was over 90%. In 14

provinces and special districts women were less than 4% points behind men; and in nine provinces – representing over 45 million inhabitants-- women had a literacy rate of over 95% (authors' calculations based on BPS 2009b²⁴).

For 2006 the youth (15-24-year-olds) literacy rate was with 96.7% about 5% points higher than the overall rate, divided in 97.0% for young males and 96.3% for young females, implying a women to men parity ratio of 99% (*MDG Indicator 2.3*, derived from UN MDG Indicators and based on UNESCO data).

Roughly spoken, this high level of youth literacy was already reached in 1991, with an overall rate of 96.2, a male rate of 97.4 and a female rate of 95.1, implying 98% parity (ADB 2009). Whereas the male rate slightly fell, the female slightly improved.

2.7.2. Education of girls

Combined gross enrollment in education in Indonesia was in 2006 overall 68.2%: females 66.8%, males 69.5% -- or a women to parity of 96% (UNDP 2008). Since 1993, nine years of education are compulsory, six years at elementary level and three at middle school, Children ages 6-11 attend *Sekolah Dasar* (SD, elementary school); based on the Constitution, this level is compulsory for all Indonesian citizens. *Sekolah Menengah Pertama* (SMP) or middle school is also part of primary education. After three years of schooling and graduation, students may move to high school or college, or cease education. After graduation from high school or college, students may attend higher education: universities; institutes, or academies/colleges (wikipedia). In 2008, the mean years of schooling were 7.1 years for female adults and 8.0 years for males. The means were highest for females in DKI Jakarta (9.7 years), followed by North Sulawesi (8.7), and Riau, East Kalimantan, and Maluku (all 8.2). In one but all provinces and special districts the male means were higher than the female ones; the one exception was Gorontalo, with 7.0 years for females and 6.8 for men (BPS 2009b). Though since the 1970s the government has increased its education budget, to 16.5% of its total budget recently, its spending level is still relatively low compared to its East Asian neighbours.²⁵ Moreover, there is a structural unbalance in central and local spending. Local governments provide the bulk of the financing (70%) for education, but it is almost entirely devoted to teacher salaries and salary scales are fixed by the central government. In contrast, the central government dominates the investment budget, although local governments are in charge of running, building and rehabilitating schools (Bank Dunia / World Bank 2007, 11-12). In 2008, the Ministry of National Education (MONE) has taken a significant step in reducing the cost of education to households with its plan to provide textbooks for free over the Internet, thereby cutting the costs of a long book supply chain. Yet, as we saw the Internet currently covers one in eight Indonesians and so this approach poses quite some challenges (World Bank 2008b, 28).

Already by the end of the 1980s, Indonesia proved to be remarkable successful in primary education enrollment, even compared with the “miracle economies” of South-East Asia (Mishra 2009). The country seems on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of Universal Primary Education (UPE) by 2015. The net enrollment rate in primary education, with 96.7% in 1991 already high, increased to an overall 97.3% over 2005, with 95.6% for girls, resulting in 97% girls to boys parity. A further growth of the overall figure to 98.0% in 2007 has been reported, but the main impetus was the increase of boys’

²⁴ The highest female literacy rates were those in North Sulawesi (98.9%), DKI Jakarta (98.0%); Riau (96.5%), Maluku (96.3%), Central Kalimantan (96.2%), South Sumatera (95.7%), North and West Sumatera (both 95.5%), and Gorontalo (95.2%) (BPS 2009b).

²⁵ Moreover, the law requires the government to allocate at least 20% of the budget to education (Resosudarmo and Yusuf 2009, 306).

enrollment with 1.1% point to 100%, while girls' enrollment remained at 96%, of course bringing down the parity rate to 96% as well (ADB 2009; WHO 2009; UN MDG Indicators). The 2008 overall enrollment rate for 7-12 aged has been reported at 97.8% (BPS 2009b). A second important indicator concerning primary educational advancement is the primary completion rate, indicating which share of the children who have enrolled in the first grade of primary education can be expected to reach the last grade. With 98.8% in 2006, the Indonesian primary completion rate has recently remained quite high, with girls' completion rate (98.9%) even a fraction higher than boys' (98.7%). The latter division has been like this throughout the 2000s (UN MDG Indicators). However, recent reports stress the poor quality of much of Indonesia's primary education. And, as a World Bank report states, "(...) 100% enrollment rates may not contribute to poverty reduction and growth if the quality of primary education is poor. Many primary schools lack adequate infrastructure and have teachers who do not have the minimum teaching requirements. The spending mix among programs should be altered in favor of infrastructure rehabilitation, teacher training and quality inputs" (Bank Dunia / World Bank 2007, 2).

A vague sign concerning the quality of education is also that a substantial proportion of children in both primary and secondary education are "over-age", or in a lower grade than prescribed for their age. In 2002-03 this was the case with over 10% at ages 10, 11 and 12 in urban areas up to nearly 20% in rural areas for the same ages, and even with 30% for those aged 13 in rural areas (UNICEF 2005). More detailed analyses show that the decisive factor is not the urban / rural divide but the unequal income distribution. In 2007, the drop-out rates of primary school were 1.7% among children of the poor and 0.4% among children of the non-poor, increasing to respectively 11.2% and 2.8% for the drop-out rates of junior high school (BPS 2009b). The educational level of the parents plays a role too. For example, in a sample less than 10% of the mothers were without formal education, but 24% of the children out of school had a mother without formal education. The education of the father or the household head has a similar effect on a child's school attendance. Yet, in contrast to India the gender of the household head had no effect on school attendance (UNICEF 2005, 53-4).

In 2006, 99% of primary educated formally (!) made the transition to secondary education. Yet, the proportion that leaves school during this transition is considerable, whereas the drop-out ratio increases further during the secondary school ages. Five reasons for the high drop-out during transition to secondary school have been traced. The first is, not surprisingly, low household expenditure, implying the inability to pay for education. Second, girls have a lower probability of continuing, which may be related to the other factors. Third, religious background plays a role: children from Muslim families have a lower probability of continuing. Fourth, having schools in the vicinity is a positive factor, whereas higher employment opportunities in the community work out negatively on school enrollment (Suryadarma *et al* 2006a)²⁶. It may be taken for granted that recently almost 40% left secondary school without graduation. This share is considerably larger in rural areas. In 2002-03, 48% of secondary school children living in rural areas dropped out, compared to 30% in urban areas. In 2006 the secondary net enrollment rate was 59% (ILO 2009a).²⁷ Here, girls' progress has been remarkable. In 2007 the women to men enrollment ratio in secondary education reached 101%, coming from 83% in 1991 and 95% in 2000 (ADB 2009; UIS website; UN MDG Indicators).

²⁶ Child labour is not fully incompatible with attending school. In 1998-99 approximately half of those aged 5-14 and subject to child labour in Indonesia were still enrolled in school. In fact, some children may not be able to go to school without working. Among the remaining that did not attend schools, around 45% were school dropouts, while the rest 5% had never or not yet enrolled in school (Priyambada *et al* 2005).

²⁷ As comparable earlier figures are not available, progress cannot be traced.

The urban – rural divide is large in educational facilities. In 2003 96% of villages in urban areas had at least a primary school, 59% had a junior secondary school, and 44% had one or more senior secondary schools. In contrast, while 88% of villages in rural areas had a primary school, only 26% and 8% had junior and senior secondary schools respectively. Although it is possible that secondary level schools provide services to more than one village, the very low rates show that the gap in school availability between urban and rural areas remains marked. Though the gap at the secondary level is less apparent if the regions are disaggregated into Java and Bali and outside Java and Bali, the gap at the primary level is more pronounced: less than 1% of Java and Bali villages had no primary school, against almost one in five villages outside these two islands. Consequently, the enrollment rates also varied widely across the urban/rural divide and across regions. As for urban versus rural regions, in 2004 the differences were largest in senior secondary education, with in urban areas 60% enrolled against 34% in rural areas. In junior secondary education, the rates were 74% and 60% respectively. The differences between Java and Bali on the one hand and the rest of Indonesia on the other had become rather small: the largest difference was that at junior secondary level, with enrollment rates of 68% and 64% respectively (Suryadarma *et al* 2006b). Concerning the enrollment rates for 13-15 of age, by 2008 set at 84.4%, eight provinces and special districts had reached scores over 90%: Aceh; North Sumatra; Riau; Riau islands; DKI Jakarta; DI Yogyakarta, East Kalimantan, and Maluku (BPS 2009b). Nevertheless, the World Bank urges Indonesia to focus more on junior secondary education: “Allocations to junior secondary education are only 15% of total education spending (...) Allocating additional resources to the junior secondary level of education would have a high rate of return, even higher than in primary education”. The Bank also notes that “Teachers earnings are lower than those of other workers and civil servants with similar education levels and do not adequately compensate secondary school teachers and teachers working in remote areas” (Bank Dunia / World Bank 2007, 2-3).

Again in 2007, the tertiary gross enrollment rate was 18%, with equal shares for both genders thus with women to men parity reaching 100%. In tertiary education too, women’s position improved remarkably in the 2000s, with women to men parity increasing from 76% in 2001 (ADB 2009; UIS website; UN MDG Indicators). Combining various statistics, we can estimate that by 2007 among women aged 20-24, besides 54% formally employed, about 12% is continuing to study. This latter share has substantially increased, from 3.0% in 1971 and 7.2% in 1990 to the current percentage (cf. Utomo 2003; UIS website). In spite of girls and young women closing the education gap, larger gender gaps continue to exist in employment, payment, in daily life and in politics.

2.7.3. Female skill levels

Table 11 (next page) presents the division of the economically active population of Indonesia by gender and educational attainment,²⁸ based on the 2008 Labour Force Survey and following the ISCED division.²⁹

²⁸ Note that these levels indicate the educational/skill levels of the economically active, *not* the skills demanded in the workplace. We did not find Indonesian statistics concerning the latter, but it may well be that the gender gap in skills demanded and in job levels is considerably larger than Tables 11 and 12A/B suggest.

²⁹ The outcomes of the own division by educational attainment of the labour force of BPS differ somewhat, and show a slightly lower educational profile than our Table: for August 2008, the share of those not having completed primary school (ISCED X-0) was set at 18.4%, those having only completed primary school (ISCED 1) 35.8%, and the joint share of those having completed

Table 11 **Total economically active population by highest level of education completed and by gender, total labour force, Indonesia, 2008**

	all		women		men	
	x mln	%	x mln	%	mln	%
no education completed (ISCED X-0)	19,13	17.1	8,90	20.8	10,23	14.8
primary level (ISCED 1)	38,86	34.7	14,76	34.5	24,10	34.9
secondary level, first stage (ISCED 2)	21,01	18.8	7,32	17.1	13,69	19.8
secondary level, second stage (ISCED 3)	24,96	22.3	8,14	19.0	16,82	24.3
secondary level, vocational training (ISCED 4/5)	1,47	1.3	0,88	2.1	0,59	0.9
tertiary level (ISCED 5A-6)	1,77	1.6	0,85	2.0	0,92	1.3
tertiary level (ISCED 5B-7)	4,75	4.2	1,94	4.5	2,81	4.0
Total	111,95	100.0	42,81	100.0	69,14	100.0

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO, Laborsta (Labour Force Survey 2008)

The table displays that the female labour force is more segmented than the male labour force. On the one hand a larger share of female workers had no education at all completed (nearly 21% against nearly 15%), but on the other hand the share of working females educated at the three highest levels was also higher than that of men: 8.6% against 6.2%, bringing women to men parity here at 139%. At the primary level, the difference is minimal, whereas there are comparatively more men educated at secondary level. The average male level is higher. If we attach a 1 to 7 ranking to the seven levels, starting with 1 for ISCED X-0, the average female rating is 3.42, against a male average of 4.02.

Tables 12A and 12B (next page) detail the division of the economically active population by educational attainment for both genders by age group. In the last column we include ratings as elucidated above, though here –forced by the basic statistics– for six instead of seven educational levels. The ratings clarify that the youngest three cohorts of females make the difference: by 2008 they had a substantially higher average educational level than their male peers. Among the working females aged 25-29 years 16% had an education completed higher than ISCED 3 level, and among those aged 20-24 this was 11%. In 2008, over 1,49 million girls and women 15-29 of age in employment had acquired such educational level, against only 1,13 million males (authors' calculations based on ILO Laborsta). The ILO (2009, 38) supports these conclusions by stating, “whereas the male workforce is slightly better educated than the female workforce if one considers all the age groups, women workers in their 20s are better educated than their male counterparts. While 16.1% of female workers in the 25–29 age bracket had college education or above in 2008, only 8.3% of male workers achieved that education level”, adding: “This gap widened during the period between 2004 and 2008, from 3.9% points to 7.8% points.”

junior high school, senior high school or college –the current BPS terminology-- at 45.8% (BPS 2009b).

Table 12A Employment of men by age group and highest level of education completed, total labour force, Indonesia, 2008

ISCED	X-0	1	2	3	4/5	5-7	total		rating
shares								x mln.	
15-19	9	37	33	21	0	0	100	4,82	4.43
20-24	6	26	26	38	1	3	100	8,01	5.18
25-29	6	28	25	32	1	7	100	9,66	5.20
30-34	8	34	22	29	1	6	100	9,26	4.98
35-39	9	34	21	28	1	7	100	8,67	4.98
40-44	14	35	16	26	1	8	100	7,65	4.82
45-49	21	40	14	17	1	7	100	6,58	4.30
50-54	25	42	13	13	1	6	100	5,50	4.02
55-59	29	44	12	10	1	4	100	3,60	3.70
60-64	38	42	10	7	1	2	100	2,30	3.28
>64	49	37	8	4	1	1	100	3,00	3.00
Total	15	35	20	24	1	5	100	69,14	4.60

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO, Laborsta

Table 12B Employment of women by age group and highest level of education completed, total labour force, Indonesia, 2008

ISCED	X-0	1	2	3	4/5	5-7	total		rating
shares								x mln.	
15-19	6	31	36	27	0	0	100	3,34	4.67
20-24	5	22	23	39	4	7	100	5,33	5.60
25-29	7	29	22	26	3	13	100	5,71	5.47
30-34	10	38	19	22	2	9	100	5,40	4.92
35-39	16	39	17	19	2	7	100	5,39	4.55
40-44	25	40	11	15	2	7	100	4,87	4.17
45-49	32	42	10	8	2	6	100	4,28	3.73
50-54	38	41	9	6	2	4	100	3,26	3.42
55-59	44	39	9	5	1	2	100	2,12	3.10
60-64	55	33	8	3	0	1	100	1,42	2.72
>64	64	27	8	1	0	0	100	1,70	2.43
Total	21	35	17	19	2	6	100	42,80	4.40

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO, Laborsta

Partly based on earlier sections, we can now produce an estimate of the size of our target group for Indonesia, the girls and young women aged 15-29, working in urban areas in commercial services -- that is, wholesale and retail as well as commercial services more narrowly defined, like finance, insurance, and restaurants and hotels (tourism). The total size of the female labour force aged 15-29 in Indonesia was in 2008 nearly 14.4 million. Of this group, about 52% or 7.5 million lived and worked in urban areas. Of these 7.5 million, approximately one in three or 2.5 million girls and young women can be estimated to belong to our target group as they worked in commercial services. We may suppose that about 50% or 1.25 million girls and young women did so formally in regular wage employment, with the others working as self-employed, family workers or casual wage-earners. Some 1 to 1.2 million (depending on the economic conditions) girls and young women will enter into commercial services employment in the next five years.

2.8. Wages and working conditions of the target group

2.8.1. Wages

Large income differences in Indonesia show up in particular between workers of different type (employment status). In 2007, according to the National Labour Force Survey the average net monthly income for employees was Rupiah 1.087,533, against Rupiah 665,693 for own-account workers, Rupiah 614,794 for casual workers not in agriculture, and Rupiah 400,781 for casual workers not in agriculture (Cuevas *et al* 2009). However, we are not able to differentiate by type / status of employment in the figures concerning gross monthly wages by industry and gender as officially recorded in August 2008 that we present in Table 13 (next page). The table reveals large wage disparities both by industry and by gender. Let us first have a look at industries. Average monthly wages are clearly lowest in agriculture and in private households. If the total average monthly wages (Rupiah 977,000 or USD 88 in 2008) are indexed 100, then agricultural wages average 54 and wages in private households 56. For women agricultural wages are even comparatively lower. If we index average female wages (814,000 Rupiah or USD 73) 100, then female agricultural wages average 44 and wages in private households 61. With an index of 89 (women 83), wages in manufacturing are also below average, as do wages in other community, social and personal services (general index 85, for women 92), as do hotels and restaurants (general and female indices both 93) and, for men, construction. Remarkably enough, wholesale and retail, in international research one of the “usual suspects” when it comes to low wages, is in the middle ranks, slightly below the general average (index 99) and even above the female average (index 110).

For both sexes the highest wages are paid in the finance sector, with in total paying near the average wage rate (index 189) and for females paying more than double that rate (index 217), closely followed by public administration and utilities, and --only for men-- by mining. At some distance follow health and social work; real estate and other business, and education. Not surprisingly, the correlation between these wage differences and educational levels is rather high. Agriculture has very low average education levels, whereas in 2004 these levels were highest in --in this order-- public administration; utilities; wholesale/retail/hotels/restaurants; transport et cetera; parts of manufacturing (textiles and apparel); construction; mining, and other parts of manufacturing, notably food and beverage production (Robertson *et al* 2005, Table 5). The relative high average educational level in wholesale/retail/hotels/restaurants may help to explain why in Indonesia these industries are not clearly “usual suspects” concerning pay (Though we will show in the next section that women and men in these sectors almost made the longest working weeks, so that their hourly wage rates are ranked lower than their monthly wages).

Table 13 Average gross monthly wages by industry and gender, Indonesia, 2008 (August)
(x 1,000 Rupiah)

	total	women	men	m/w gap
agriculture	532	380	611	37.8
fishing	752	589	763	22.8
mining	1,752	976	1,818	46.3
manufacturing	869	678	993	31.7
utilities	1,830	1,380	1,871	26.2
construction	899	1,097	895	-22.6
transport, storage, communication	1,232	1,225	1,233	0.6
wholesale and retail	963	897	1,002	10.5
hotels and restaurants	904	751	1,019	26.3
finance	1,847	1,770	1,887	6.2
real estate, renting, business	1,555	1,574	1,549	-1.6
public administration, defence	1,835	1,685	1,874	10.0
education	1,435	1,339	1,552	13.7
health, social work	1,577	1,450	1,776	18.4
other community, social and personal services	833	752	854	11.9
private households	549	499	751	33.6
Total	977	814	1,055	22.8

Source: ILO Laborsta

A second issue, quite important for the purpose of the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project, concerns the wage differentials by gender. Although the Indonesian law provides for equal rights, also in 2008 a gender pay gap³⁰ is clearly existing: see the outcomes in the most right column. Though most other countries under scrutiny in our project show larger overall gender pay gaps, with nearly 23% this gap in Indonesia is still considerable.³¹ In all but three industries women earn clearly less than men, the exceptions being construction (with relatively well-paid women most likely mainly in office jobs), real estate et cetera, and (with a slightly lower average female wage) transport et cetera, again with women most likely mainly in office jobs. In most of the services sector, broadly defined, the gender pay gap is below average, with the exception of the hotel and restaurant sector, showing 26% difference. Large gender differences show up in sectors jointly covering about 60% of the country's female employment: agriculture; mining and manufacturing; utilities, and private households. Most likely the gender gap in education plays a growing role in maintaining the gender pay gap. The gap in hourly average wages between workers with a primary education and those with a university degree is widening, and this in particular works out to the detriment of women. The wage ratio between the two categories of workers

³⁰ We use the international standard formula for the gender pay (or wage) gap: $((\text{wage men} - \text{wage women}) : \text{wage men}) \times 100$.

³¹ By 2007 the total gender pay gap for employees was 25.5% (averages Rupiah 1,109,641 for men and Rupiah 826,878 for women), the income gap for own-account workers 31.8% (averages Rupiah 713,324 for men and Rupiah 487,713 for women), for casual workers in agriculture 30.6% (averages Rupiah 419,997 for men and Rupiah 291,420 for women), and for casual workers not in agriculture 40.2% (averages Rupiah 631,873 for men and Rupiah 377,956 for women)(Cuevas *et al* 2009, 25). Due to composition effects, with 22.8% the economy-wide gender pay / income gap (be it for 2008 and computed with gross averages) is lower.

was 1 to 3.5 in 1998, but it reached 1 to 4.4 in 2008. The gap between those who attained senior high school and those with a university degree also grew, reaching 1 to 2.2 in 2008 (ILO 2009a, 37-8).

2.8.2. Working conditions

There are hardly any adequate Indonesian statistics concerning aspects of working conditions like occupational health and safety. As, in contrast, Indonesian statistics provide rather good evidence on working hours, we concentrate here on this major issue in working conditions. Table 14 gives an overview of the distribution of hours usually worked by gender, as far as that information was available³², for the total labour force, the paid employees and the self-employed. Though –covering 2003– the data is somewhat older, the picture to be derived from the table still seems relevant. It shows that over half of all males in the labour force (54%) and two in five females (41%) made long hours i.e. worked 45 hours a week or more; among employees, these shares were with 55% respectively 44% even higher. In the total labour force, 11% of both sexes even usually (!) worked 60 hours or more a week. Especially self-employed worked such very long hours: more than one in four male self-employed (27%) did so and nearly one in four women (23%). The most recent official figures for 2009 include 20.6 million men or 31.7% of the male labour force working excessive hours, defined as more than 48 hours per week, against 9.4 million women, or 23.6%. These shares were slightly less than those of 2008, which were 31.8% and 24.5% respectively (BPS 2010).

Table 14 Employment by employment status, working week (distribution of hours usually worked) and gender, Indonesia, 2003

hours	total labour force			paid employees			self-employed		
	total	men	women	total	men	women	total	men	women
0	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2
1-4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5-9	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
10-14	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	3
15-19	2	2	4	2	2	3	3	3	4
20-24	5	3	7	4	4	7	6	5	9
25-34	11	10	15	10	8	13	14	12	18
35-44	28	29	28	30	30	29	26	26	27
45-54	32	35	24	37	40	30	21	24	13
55-59	8	8	6	7	7	6	9	10	7
60-74	9	9	8	6	6	6	13	14	11
75+	2	2	3	2	2	2	4	3	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
x mln.	48,94	34,25	14,69	32,04	22,35	9,69	16,90	11,90	5,00

Source: authors' calculations based on ILO, Laborsta

Table 15 (next page) presents average working week figures for employees detailed by industry and gender, for 2000 and 2008. For both years the average hours women made were less than those of men, and that was the case in all industries. Nevertheless, often the working hours of female employees were also quite long, with private households on top (51.4 hours in 2008), followed by wholesale and retail (49.2 hours) and hotels and restaurants (47.8 hours). What is more, between 2000-2008 in these three industries the working week of female employees was prolonged to a considerable extent. This was also

³² Data covered 53% of the male and 39% of the female labour force in 2003. It is not unlikely that the share of long working weeks was even higher among those not captured in the statistics.

the case in seven other industries, be it mostly less extreme. Six industries showed shorter working hours for females, among which finance and real estate et cetera. As a result, the average working week of all female employees went up by no less than 4.2 hours, or over 12%! Their male colleagues also saw their working weeks prolonged, even in more industries (13 of 16), but in most industries to a lesser extent, which resulted in an average working week prolonged by 1.7 hours or 4%. This development of working hours, to be assessed negatively from a social viewpoint, suggests that in the course of the 2000s also in the ranks of paid employees a growing number of Indonesians met problems to make ends meet.

Table 15 Average working week (hours usually worked, employees) by industry and gender, Indonesia, 2000 and 2008

	total		men		women	
	2000	2008	2000	2008	2000	2008
agriculture	30.0	32.9	33.4	35.6	25.0	28.7
fishing	43.9	44.0	45.4	45.4	30.2	29.2
mining	43.8	44.4	45.7	45.6	35.0	35.2
manufacturing	43.1	43.8	45.9	46.5	39.2	40.3
utilities	43.1	44.0	43.3	44.2	41.0	42.0
construction	46.5	47.0	46.7	47.0	40.9	44.6
transport, storage, communication	50.9	49.1	51.0	49.9	48.3	42.6
wholesale and retail	46.5	49.4	48.4	49.6	44.0	49.2
hotels and restaurants	46.2	50.0	49.7	52.6	44.0	47.8
finance	42.5	43.7	42.9	45.0	41.5	41.0
real estate, renting, business	42.0	42.3	43.0	43.9	39.1	37.7
public administration, defence	41.1	41.7	41.6	42.4	39.3	38.5
education	34.3	34.5	36.1	37.1	32.2	32.5
health, social work	41.4	40.8	40.9	42.0	41.8	40.1
other community, social and personal services	41.0	43.1	44.7	45.4	35.1	37.3
private households	49.0	51.6	45.3	47.0	51.4	53.0
Total	38.4	41.0	41.1	42.8	34.0	38.2

Source: ILO Laborsta

3. Basic information for WageIndicator Questionnaire

3.1. Introduction

Preparations for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE Activities 1.03a and 1.03b have resulted in a number of lists, grouped in this Chapter and to be used in the WageIndicator web-survey for country-specific questions and their analyses. This basic information can be used on-line, but if needed also off-line. The lists contain information on Indonesia's trade unions (section 3.2), educational categories and ISCED levels (3.3), regions (3.4), ethnic groups (3.5.1) and languages (3.5.2).

3.2. List of trade unions

The country's trade union movement has already been introduced under Labour relations (section 2.3).. Below, a full list can be found of the trade unions, designed for use in the web-survey.

Table 16 List of trade unions in Indonesia (by 1/1/2009)

ba_IN	ba_IN	Source label	Source label	Translation	Translation
360100	360101	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Tourism Workers' Union (PAR SPSI)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Tourism Workers' Union (PAR SPSI)
360100	360102	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Printing, Publication and Media Information Workers' Union (PPMI SPSI)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Printing, Publication and Media Information Workers' Union (PPMI SPSI)
360100	360103	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Agriculture and Plantation Worker's Union (PP)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Agriculture and Plantation Worker's Union (PP)
360100	360104	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Construction and Public Works Workers' Union (BPU)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Construction and Public Works Workers' Union (BPU)
360100	360105	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Business, Bank, Insurance, Services and Profession Workers' Union (NIBA)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Business, Bank, Insurance, Services and Profession Workers' Union (NIBA)
360100	360106	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Pharmaceutical and Health Workers' Union (FARKES)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Pharmaceutical and Health Workers' Union (FARKES)
360100	360107	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Land, Lake, Ferry, River Transportation and Indonesian Telecommunication Workers' Union (ADDFEST)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Land, Lake, Ferry, River Transportation and Indonesian Telecommunication Workers' Union (ADDFEST)
360100	360108	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Steel, Electronic and Machine Workers' Union (LEM)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Steel, Electronic and Machine Workers' Union (LEM)
360100	360109	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Food and Allied Workers' Union (RTMM)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Food and Allied Workers' Union (RTMM)
360100	360110	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Indonesian Education Workers' Union (PKI)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Indonesian Education Workers' Union (PKI)
360100	360111	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Union (TSK)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Union (TSK)
360100	360112	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Wood and Forestry Workers' Union (KAHUT)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Wood and Forestry Workers' Union (KAHUT)
360100	360113	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Indonesian Transport Workers' Union (SPTI)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Indonesian Transport Workers' Union (SPTI)
360100	360114	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Chemical, Energy and Mines Workers' Union (KEP)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Chemical, Energy and Mines Workers' Union (KEP)
360100	360115	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian	IDN Indonesia Press Workers' Union	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh	Indonesia Press Workers' Union

		Trade Unions (KSPSI)	(PEWARTA)	Indonesia (KSPSI)	(PEWARTA)
360100	360116	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Indonesian Maritime Workers' Union (SPMI)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Indonesian Maritime Workers' Union (SPMI)
360100	360117	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Federation of Indonesian Indonesian Migrant Workers' Union (F SP-TKI LN)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Federation of Indonesian Indonesian Migrant Workers' Union (F SP-TKI LN)
360100	360118	IDN Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPSI)	IDN Indonesian Seafarers Union (KPI)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (KSPSI)	Indonesian Seafarers Union (KPI)
360200	360201	IDN Confederation of Indonesian Trade Union Congress (KSPI)	IDN KSPI Textile, Garment and Leather Workers Unions (SPTSK)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI)	Textile, Garment and Leather Workers Unions (SPTSK)
360200	360202	IDN Confederation of Indonesian Trade Union Congress (KSPI)	IDN KSPI Workers' Unions of KAHUTINDO	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI)	Workers' Unions of KAHUTINDO
360200	360203	IDN Confederation of Indonesian Trade Union Congress (KSPI)	IDN KSPI Association of Indonesian Trade Unions (ASPEK Indonesia)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI)	Association of Indonesian Trade Unions (ASPEK Indonesia)
360200	360204	IDN Confederation of Indonesian Trade Union Congress (KSPI)	IDN KSPI Chemical, Energy and Mining Workers' Unions (F-KEP)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI)	Federasi Serikat Pekerja Kimia, Energy, Pertambangan, Minyak, Gas Bumi dan Umum
360200	360205	IDN Confederation of Indonesian Trade Union Congress (KSPI)	IDN KSPI Indonesian Metal Workers' Unions (SPMI)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI)	Indonesian Metal Workers' Unions (SPMI)
360200	360206	IDN Confederation of Indonesian Trade Union Congress (KSPI)	IDN KSPI Indonesian Industrial Labour Unions (GASBIINDO)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI)	Indonesian Industrial Labour Unions (GASBIINDO)
360200	360207	IDN Confederation of Indonesian Trade Union Congress (KSPI)	IDN KSPI FARKES (Health and Pharmacy) Reformation	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI)	FARKES (Health and Pharmacy) Reformation
360200	360208	IDN Confederation of Indonesian Trade Union Congress (KSPI)	IDN KSPI Indonesian Cement Industry Workers' Union (ISI)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI)	Indonesian Cement Industry Workers' Union (ISI)
360200	360209	IDN Confederation of Indonesian Trade Union Congress (KSPI)	IDN KSPI Printing, Publication and Media-Information Workers' Union (PPMI)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI)	Printing, Publication and Media-Information Workers' Union (PPMI)
360200	360210	IDN Confederation of Indonesian Trade Union Congress (KSPI)	IDN KSPI Tourism Workers' Union (SP PAR)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI)	Tourism Workers' Union (SP PAR)
360200	360211	IDN Confederation of Indonesian Trade Union Congress (KSPI)	IDN KSPI Indonesian Teachers Association (PGRI)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI)	Indonesian Teachers Association (PGRI)
360200	360212	IDN Confederation of Indonesian Trade Union Congress (KSPI)	IDN KSPI Federation of National Unions (F-SPN)	Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI)	Federation of National Unions (F-SPN)
360300	360301	IDN Confederation of Indonesia Prosperity Trade Union (KSBSI)	IDN KSBSI Federation of Seafare and Fishery Indonesia Prosperity Trade Union	Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (KSBSI)	Federasi Buruh Pelabuhan, Pelaut dan Nelayan
360300	360302	IDN Confederation of Indonesia Prosperity Trade Union (KSBSI)	IDN KSBSI Federation of Education, Training and Public Service	Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (KSBSI)	Federasi Pendidikan, Pelatihan dan Pegawai Negeri
360300	360303	IDN Confederation of Indonesia Prosperity Trade Union (KSBSI)	IDN KSBSI Federation of Construction, Civil and Informal Workers Union	Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (KSBSI)	Federasi Konstruksi, Umum dan Informal
360300	360304	IDN Confederation of Indonesia Prosperity Trade Union (KSBSI)	IDN KSBSI Federation of Mining and Energy	Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (KSBSI)	Federasi Pertambangan dan Energi

360300	360305	IDN Confederation of Indonesia Prosperity Trade Union (KSBSI)	IDN KSBSI Federation of Transport and Delivery Workers	Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (KSBSI)	Federasi Transportasi dan Angkutan
360300	360306	IDN Confederation of Indonesia Prosperity Trade Union (KSBSI)	IDN KSBSI Federation of Garment, Crafting, Textile, Leather and Shoes	Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (KSBSI)	Federasi Garmen, Kerajinan, Tekstil, Kulit dan Sepatu
360300	360307	IDN Confederation of Indonesia Prosperity Trade Union (KSBSI)	IDN KSBSI Federation of Forestry, Wood and Agriculture Trade Union	Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (KSBSI)	Federasi Serikat Buruh Kehutanan, Perikanan dan Perkebunan
360300	360308	IDN Confederation of Indonesia Prosperity Trade Union (KSBSI)	IDN KSBSI Federation of Food, Drink, Tourism, Restaurant, Hotel and Tobacco	Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (KSBSI)	Federasi Serikat Buruh Makanan, Minuman, Pariwisata, Restaurant, Hotel dan Tembakau
360300	360309	IDN Confederation of Indonesia Prosperity Trade Union (KSBSI)	IDN KSBSI Federation of Chemical, Pharmacy and Health Workers Union	Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (KSBSI)	Federasi Kimia dan Kesehatan
360300	360310	IDN Confederation of Indonesia Prosperity Trade Union (KSBSI)	IDN KSBSI Federation of Metal, Machinery and Electronics Workers	Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (KSBSI)	Federasi Logam, Mesin dan Elektronik
360300	360311	IDN Confederation of Indonesia Prosperity Trade Union (KSBSI)	IDN KSBSI Federation of Financial, Information, Trade and Banking	Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (KSBSI)	Federasi Niaga, Informatika, Keuangan dan Perbankan
360400	360401	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of the Reform of the All Indonesian Workers Unions (FSPSI Reform)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of the Reform of the All Indonesian Workers Unions (FSPSI Reform)
360400	360402	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated The Federation of All Indonesia Democratic Unions (FSBDSI)	Non-Afiliasi	The Federation of All Indonesia Democratic Unions (FSBDSI)
360400	360403	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated The Indonesian Moslem Union (SARBUMUSI)	Non-Afiliasi	The Indonesian Moslem Union (SARBUMUSI)
360400	360404	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated The Brotherhood of Indonesian Moslem Workers (PPMI)	Non-Afiliasi	The Brotherhood of Indonesian Moslem Workers (PPMI)
360400	360405	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated The Federation of Indonesian Free Trade Unions (GASPERMINDO)	Non-Afiliasi	The Federation of Indonesian Free Trade Unions (GASPERMINDO)
360400	360406	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Indonesian Finance and Banking Workers Organizations (FOKUBA)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Indonesian Finance and Banking Workers Organizations (FOKUBA)
360400	360407	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated The Marhaen Labour Union (KBM)	Non-Afiliasi	The Marhaen Labour Union (KBM)
360400	360408	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Indonesian National Workers Union (KPNI)	Non-Afiliasi	Indonesian National Workers Union (KPNI)
360400	360409	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated The Indonesian National Labour Union (KBKI)	Non-Afiliasi	The Indonesian National Labour Union (KBKI)
360400	360410	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Association of Indonesian Private Education Workers (ASOKADIKTA)	Non-Afiliasi	Association of Indonesian Private Education Workers (ASOKADIKTA)
360400	360411	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Justice Workers Unions (SPK)	Non-Afiliasi	Justice Workers Unions (SPK)
360400	360412	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Independent Unions (GSBI)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Independent Unions (GSBI)

360400	360413	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Indonesian Civil Servants Corps (KORPRI)	Non-Afiliasi	Indonesian Civil Servants Corps (KORPRI)
360400	360414	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of State Enterprises Union (FSP BUMN)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of State Enterprises Union (FSP BUMN)
360400	360415	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Solidarity and Free Trade Unions (SBM)	Non-Afiliasi	Solidarity and Free Trade Unions (SBM)
360400	360416	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated National Workers Unions (SPNI)	Non-Afiliasi	National Workers Unions (SPNI)
360400	360417	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of All Indonesian Workers' Organizations (GOBSI)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of All Indonesian Workers' Organizations (GOBSI)
360400	360418	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Association of Indonesian Education Workers (ASOKADIKNA)	Non-Afiliasi	Association of Indonesian Education Workers (ASOKADIKNA)
360400	360419	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Welfare, Justice and Unity Workers' Establishment Unions (SPKP)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Welfare, Justice and Unity Workers' Establishment Unions (SPKP)
360400	360420	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Indonesian Society Worker's Union (SPRI)	Non-Afiliasi	Indonesian Society Worker's Union (SPRI)
360400	360421	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Maritime and Fishermen Union of Indonesia (SBMNI)	Non-Afiliasi	Maritime and Fishermen Union of Indonesia (SBMNI)
360400	360422	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated National Front for Indonesian Workers' Struggle (FNPBI)	Non-Afiliasi	National Front for Indonesian Workers' Struggle (FNPBI)
360400	360423	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Indonesian Union (SPI)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Indonesian Union (SPI)
360400	360424	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Independent Union Association (GSBM)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Independent Union Association (GSBM)
360400	360425	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Independent Workers Union (FPBI)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Independent Workers Union (FPBI)
360400	360426	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Workers Unions' Struggle (FSBP)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Workers Unions' Struggle (FSBP)
360400	360427	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Independent Journalist Alliance (AJI)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Independent Journalist Alliance (AJI)
360400	360428	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Workers' Unions of PT Rajawali Nusantara Indonesia (GSPRNI)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Workers' Unions of PT Rajawali Nusantara Indonesia (GSPRNI)
360400	360429	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Independent Trade Unions [hotel, restaurant, plaza, apartment, catering and tourism] (F-SPM)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Independent Trade Unions [hotel, restaurant, plaza, apartment, catering and tourism] (F-SPM)
360400	360430	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Indonesian Free Trade Unions New (GASPERMINDO Baru)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Indonesian Free Trade Unions New (GASPERMINDO Baru)

360400	360431	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Indonesian Trade Unions 2000 (GSBI 2000)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Indonesian Trade Unions 2000 (GSBI 2000)
360400	360432	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Karya Utama Workers' Union (F SP-BKU)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Karya Utama Workers' Union (F SP-BKU)
360400	360433	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Nusantara Plantation Workers' Union (F SP BUN)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Nusantara Plantation Workers' Union (F SP BUN)
360400	360434	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated DPP Marhenis Workers Movement	Non-Afiliasi	DPP Marhenis Workers Movement
360400	360435	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Moslem Workers' Union (SERPI)	Non-Afiliasi	Moslem Workers' Union (SERPI)
360400	360436	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Independent Union (F-SPM)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Independent Union (F-SPM)
360400	360437	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Moslem Workers Congress (KOSBI)	Non-Afiliasi	Moslem Workers Congress (KOSBI)
360400	360438	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Indonesian National Workers Unity (KBNI)	Non-Afiliasi	Indonesian National Workers Unity (KBNI)
360400	360439	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated Federation of Indonesian Struggle Union (F-SBIP)	Non-Afiliasi	Federation of Indonesian Struggle Union (F-SBIP)
360400	360440	IDN Non-Affiliated	IDN Non-Affiliated All Indonesian Informal Workers Unity (PERPISI)	Non-Afiliasi	All Indonesian Informal Workers Unity (PERPISI)
9999		IDN Other		Lain - lain	

3.3. List of educational categories and ISCED levels

Below, a full list of the educational categories used in Indonesia, designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.

Table 17 List of educational categories in Indonesia (by 1/1/2009)

ba_IN	Master label	Translation	ISCED
360001	IDN Pre-primary (playgroup)	Kelompok Bermain	0
360002	IDN Kindergarten	Taman Kanak-kanak/Raudlatul Atfal/Bustanul Atfal	0
360003	IDN Primary school	Sekolah Dasar (SD)/Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI)	1
360004	IDN Junior secondary, general	Sekolah Menengah Pertama (SMP)/Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs)	2
360005	IDN Senior secondary, general	Sekolah Menengah Atas (SMA)/Madrasah Aliyah (MA)	3
360006	IDN Senior secondary, technical/vocational	Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan (SMK)	3
360007	IDN Diploma I programmes	Diploma Satu	5
360008	IDN Diploma II programmes	Diploma Dua	5
360009	Diploma III programmes	Diploma Tiga (Sarjana Muda)	5
360011	IDN University degree stream	Program Sarjana (Strata Satu)	5
360012	IDN Specialist I programmes	Program Keahlian/Kejuruan satu tahun	5
360013	IDN Master's programmes	Program Magister (Strata Dua)	5
360014	IDN Specialist II programmes	Program Keahlian/Kejuruan dua tahun	6
360015	IDN Doctorate programmes	Program Doktor (Strata Tiga)	6

3.4. List of regions

Below, a full draft list of the regions in Indonesia, designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.

Table 18 List of regions in Indonesia (by 1/1/2009)

ba_IN	ba_IN	Source label	Source label	Translation	Translation
3600100000	3600100131	IDN Bali	IDN Bali Denpasar	Bali	Denpasar
3600100000	3600100232	IDN Bali	IDN Bali Singaraja	Bali	Singaraja
3600100000	3600109632	IDN Bali	IDN Bali A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Bali	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3600100000	3600109704	IDN Bali	IDN Bali A village (less than 10,000)	Bali	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3600100000	3600109805	IDN Bali	IDN Bali Rural area	Bali	Daerah pedesaan
3600200000	3600200132	IDN Banten	IDN Banten Cikupa	Banten	Cikupa
3600200000	3600200231	IDN Banten	IDN Banten Cilegon	Banten	Kota Cilegon
3600200000	3600200331	IDN Banten	IDN Banten Serang	Banten	Kota Serang
3600200000	3600200431	IDN Banten	IDN Banten Tangerang	Banten	Kota Tangerang
3600200000	3600200532	IDN Banten	IDN Banten Pondokaren	Banten	Pondokaren
3600200000	3600200632	IDN Banten	IDN Banten Rangkasbitung	Banten	Rangkasbitung
3600200000	3600200732	IDN Banten	IDN Banten Serpong	Banten	Serpong
3600200000	3600200832	IDN Banten	IDN Banten Teluknaga	Banten	Teluknaga
3600200000	3600209632	IDN Banten	IDN Banten A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Banten	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3600200000	3600209704	IDN Banten	IDN Banten A village (less than 10,000)	Banten	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3600200000	3600209805	IDN Banten	IDN Banten Rural area	Banten	Daerah pedesaan
3600300000	3600300131	IDN Bengkulu	IDN Bengkulu Bengkulu	Bengkulu	Bengkulu
3600300000	3600309532	IDN Bengkulu	IDN Bengkulu A town (100,000 - 1 million)	Bengkulu	Sebuah kota (100.000 - 1 juta)
3600300000	3600309632	IDN Bengkulu	IDN Bengkulu A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Bengkulu	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3600300000	3600309704	IDN Bengkulu	IDN Bengkulu A village (less than 10,000)	Bengkulu	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3600300000	3600309805	IDN Bengkulu	IDN Bengkulu Rural area	Bengkulu	Daerah pedesaan
3600400000	3600400131	IDN Gorontalo	IDN Gorontalo Gorontalo	Gorontalo	Gorontalo
3600400000	3600409532	IDN Gorontalo	IDN Gorontalo A town (100,000 - 1 million)	Gorontalo	Sebuah kota (100.000 - 1 juta)
3600400000	3600409632	IDN Gorontalo	IDN Gorontalo A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Gorontalo	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3600400000	3600409704	IDN Gorontalo	IDN Gorontalo A village (less than 10,000)	Gorontalo	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3600400000	3600409805	IDN Gorontalo	IDN Gorontalo Rural area	Gorontalo	Daerah pedesaan
3600500000	3600500107	IDN Jakarta	IDN Jakarta Jakarta	Jakarta	Jakarta
3600500000	3600500202	IDN Jakarta	IDN Jakarta The suburbs of Jakarta	Jakarta	Daerah pinggiran kota Jakarta
3600600000	3600600331	IDN Jambi	IDN Jambi Jambi	Jambi	Jambi
3600600000	3600609531	IDN Jambi	IDN Jambi A town (100,000 - 1 million)	Jambi	Sebuah kota (100.000 - 1 juta)
3600600000	3600609632	IDN Jambi	IDN Jambi A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Jambi	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3600600000	3600609704	IDN Jambi	IDN Jambi A village (less than 10,000)	Jambi	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3600600000	3600609805	IDN Jambi	IDN Jambi Rural area	Jambi	Daerah pedesaan
3600700000	3600700132	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Astanajapura	Jawa Barat	Astanajapura
3600700000	3600700231	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Cianjur	Jawa Barat	Cianjur
3600700000	3600700331	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Cibinong	Jawa Barat	Cibinong

3600700000	3600700431	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Cikarang	Jawa Barat	Cikarang
3600700000	3600700531	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Ciputat	Jawa Barat	Ciputat
3600700000	3600700602	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java The suburbs of Bandung	Jawa Barat	Daerah pinggiran kota Bandung
3600700000	3600700731	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Garut	Jawa Barat	Garut
3600700000	3600700831	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Karawang (Krawang)	Jawa Barat	Karawang
3600700000	3600700907	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Bandung	Jawa Barat	Kota Bandung
3600700000	3600701031	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Bekasi	Jawa Barat	Kota Bekasi
3600700000	3600701131	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Bogor	Jawa Barat	Kota Bogor
3600700000	3600701231	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Cirebon	Jawa Barat	Kota Cirebon
3600700000	3600701331	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Depok	Jawa Barat	Kota Depok
3600700000	3600701431	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Sukabumi	Jawa Barat	Kota Sukabumi
3600700000	3600701531	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Tasikmalaya	Jawa Barat	Kota Tasikmalaya
3600700000	3600701632	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Palimanan	Jawa Barat	Palimanan
3600700000	3600709632	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Jawa Barat	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3600700000	3600709704	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java A village (less than 10,000)	Jawa Barat	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3600700000	3600709805	IDN Western Java	IDN Western Java Rural area	Jawa Barat	Daerah pedesaan
3600800000	3600800132	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Adiwerna	Jawa Tengah	Adiwerna
3600800000	3600800232	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Batang	Jawa Tengah	Batang
3600800000	3600800332	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Brebes	Jawa Tengah	Brebes
3600800000	3600800431	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Cilacap	Jawa Tengah	Cilacap
3600800000	3600800531	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Klaten	Jawa Tengah	Klaten
3600800000	3600800631	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Magelang	Jawa Tengah	Kota Magelang
3600800000	3600800731	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Pekalongan	Jawa Tengah	Kota Pekalongan
3600800000	3600800831	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Salatiga	Jawa Tengah	Kota Salatiga
3600800000	3600800901	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Semarang	Jawa Tengah	Kota Semarang
3600800000	3600801031	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Surakarta	Jawa Tengah	Kota Surakarta
3600800000	3600801131	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Tegal	Jawa Tengah	Kota Tegal
3600800000	3600801232	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Kudus	Jawa Tengah	Kudus
3600800000	3600801332	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Kuningan	Jawa Tengah	Kuningan
3600800000	3600801431	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Pemalang	Jawa Tengah	Pemalang
3600800000	3600801531	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Purwokerto	Jawa Tengah	Purwokerto
3600800000	3600809632	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Jawa Tengah	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3600800000	3600809704	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java A village (less than 10,000)	Jawa Tengah	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3600800000	3600809805	IDN Central Java	IDN Central Java Rural area	Jawa Tengah	Daerah pedesaan
3600900000	3600900132	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Banyuwangi	Jawa Timur	Banyuwangi
3600900000	3600900202	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java The suburbs of Surabaya	Jawa Timur	Daerah pinggiran kota Surabaya
3600900000	3600900332	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Gresik	Jawa Timur	Gresik
3600900000	3600900431	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Jember	Jawa Timur	Jember

3600900000	3600900532	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Jombang	Jawa Timur	Jombang
3600900000	3600900631	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Kediri	Jawa Timur	Kediri
3600900000	3600900731	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Blitar	Jawa Timur	Kota Blitar
3600900000	3600900831	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Madiun	Jawa Timur	Kota Madiun
3600900000	3600900931	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Malang	Jawa Timur	Kota Malang
3600900000	3600901032	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Mojokerto	Jawa Timur	Kota Mojokerto
3600900000	3600901131	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Pasuruan	Jawa Timur	Kota Pasuruan
3600900000	3600901231	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Probolinggo	Jawa Timur	Kota Probolinggo
3600900000	3600901307	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Surabaya	Jawa Timur	Kota Surabaya
3600900000	3600901431	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Taman	Jawa Timur	Taman
3600900000	3600901531	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Waru	Jawa Timur	Waru
3600900000	3600909632	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Jawa Timur	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3600900000	3600909704	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java A village (less than 10,000)	Jawa Timur	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3600900000	3600909805	IDN Eastern Java	IDN Eastern Java Rural area	Jawa Timur	Daerah pedesaan
3601000000	3601000131	IDN Western Borneo	IDN Western Borneo Pontianak	Kalimantan Barat	Kota Pontianak
3601000000	3601000232	IDN Western Borneo	IDN Western Borneo Singkawang	Kalimantan Barat	Kota Singkawang
3601000000	3601009632	IDN Western Borneo	IDN Western Borneo A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Kalimantan Barat	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3601000000	3601009704	IDN Western Borneo	IDN Western Borneo A village (less than 10,000)	Kalimantan Barat	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3601000000	3601009805	IDN Western Borneo	IDN Western Borneo Rural area	Kalimantan Barat	Daerah pedesaan
3601100000	3601100132	IDN Southern Borneo	IDN Southern Borneo Banjarbaru	Kalimantan Selatan	Kota Banjarbaru
3601100000	3601100231	IDN Southern Borneo	IDN Southern Borneo Banjarmasin	Kalimantan Selatan	Kota Banjarmasin
3601100000	3601100332	IDN Southern Borneo	IDN Southern Borneo Kotabaru	Kalimantan Selatan	Kotabaru
3601100000	3601100432	IDN Southern Borneo	IDN Southern Borneo Martapura	Kalimantan Selatan	Martapura
3601100000	3601109632	IDN Southern Borneo	IDN Southern Borneo A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Kalimantan Selatan	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3601100000	3601109704	IDN Southern Borneo	IDN Southern Borneo A village (less than 10,000)	Kalimantan Selatan	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3601100000	3601109805	IDN Southern Borneo	IDN Southern Borneo Rural area	Kalimantan Selatan	Daerah pedesaan
3601200000	3601200132	IDN Central Borneo	IDN Central Borneo Palangkaraya	Kalimantan Tengah	Kota Palangka Raya
3601200000	3601200232	IDN Central Borneo	IDN Central Borneo Sampit	Kalimantan Tengah	Sampit
3601200000	3601209632	IDN Central Borneo	IDN Central Borneo A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Kalimantan Tengah	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3601200000	3601209704	IDN Central Borneo	IDN Central Borneo A village (less than 10,000)	Kalimantan Tengah	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3601200000	3601209805	IDN Central Borneo	IDN Central Borneo Rural area	Kalimantan Tengah	Daerah pedesaan
3601300000	3601300131	IDN Eastern Borneo	IDN Eastern Borneo Balikpapan	Kalimantan Timur	Kota Balikpapan
3601300000	3601300232	IDN Eastern Borneo	IDN Eastern Borneo Bontang	Kalimantan Timur	Kota Bontang
3601300000	3601300331	IDN Eastern Borneo	IDN Eastern Borneo Samarinda	Kalimantan Timur	Kota Samarinda
3601300000	3601300432	IDN Eastern Borneo	IDN Eastern Borneo Tarakan	Kalimantan Timur	Tarakan

3601300000	3601309632	IDN Eastern Borneo	IDN Eastern Borneo A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Kalimantan Timur	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3601300000	3601309704	IDN Eastern Borneo	IDN Eastern Borneo A village (less than 10,000)	Kalimantan Timur	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3601300000	3601309805	IDN Eastern Borneo	IDN Eastern Borneo Rural area	Kalimantan Timur	Daerah pedesaan
3601400000	3601400131	IDN Bangka Belitung Islands	IDN Bangka Belitung Islands Pangkalpinang	Kepulauan Bangka Belitung	Kota Pangkal Pinang
3601400000	3601400232	IDN Bangka Belitung Islands	IDN Bangka Belitung Islands Sungailiat	Kepulauan Bangka Belitung	Sungailiat
3601400000	3601400332	IDN Bangka Belitung Islands	IDN Bangka Belitung Islands Tanjung Pandan	Kepulauan Bangka Belitung	Tanjung Pandan
3601400000	3601409632	IDN Bangka Belitung Islands	IDN Bangka Belitung Islands A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Kepulauan Bangka Belitung	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3601400000	3601409704	IDN Bangka Belitung Islands	IDN Bangka Belitung Islands A village (less than 10,000)	Kepulauan Bangka Belitung	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3601400000	3601409805	IDN Bangka Belitung Islands	IDN Bangka Belitung Islands Rural area	Kepulauan Bangka Belitung	Daerah pedesaan
3601500000	3601500132	IDN Riau Islands	IDN Riau Islands Batam	Kepulauan Riau	Kota Batam
3601500000	3601500232	IDN Riau Islands	IDN Riau Islands Tanjungpinang	Kepulauan Riau	Tanjung Pinang
3601500000	3601509632	IDN Riau Islands	IDN Riau Islands A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Kepulauan Riau	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3601500000	3601509704	IDN Riau Islands	IDN Riau Islands A village (less than 10,000)	Kepulauan Riau	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3601500000	3601509805	IDN Riau Islands	IDN Riau Islands Rural area	Kepulauan Riau	Daerah pedesaan
3601600000	3601600131	IDN Lampung	IDN Lampung Bandar Lampung (Tanjungkarang)	Lampung	Bandar Lampung (Tanjungkarang)
3601600000	3601600232	IDN Lampung	IDN Lampung Metro	Lampung	Metro
3601600000	3601600332	IDN Lampung	IDN Lampung Terbanggibesar	Lampung	Terbanggibesar
3601600000	3601609632	IDN Lampung	IDN Lampung A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Lampung	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3601600000	3601609704	IDN Lampung	IDN Lampung A village (less than 10,000)	Lampung	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3601600000	3601609805	IDN Lampung	IDN Lampung Rural area	Lampung	Daerah pedesaan
3601700000	3601700131	IDN Moluccas	IDN Moluccas Ambon	Maluku	Kota Ambon
3601700000	3601709632	IDN Moluccas	IDN Moluccas A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Maluku	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3601700000	3601709704	IDN Moluccas	IDN Moluccas A village (less than 10,000)	Maluku	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3601700000	3601709805	IDN Moluccas	IDN Moluccas Rural area	Maluku	Daerah pedesaan
3601800000	3601800132	IDN Northern Moluccas	IDN Northern Moluccas Ternate	Maluku Utara	Kota Ternate
3601800000	3601809632	IDN Northern Moluccas	IDN Northern Moluccas A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Maluku Utara	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3601800000	3601809704	IDN Northern Moluccas	IDN Northern Moluccas A village (less than 10,000)	Maluku Utara	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3601800000	3601809805	IDN Northern Moluccas	IDN Northern Moluccas Rural area	Maluku Utara	Daerah pedesaan

3601900000	3601900131	IDN Aceh	IDN Aceh Banda Aceh	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	Banda Aceh
3601900000	3601900232	IDN Aceh	IDN Aceh Langsa	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	Kota Langsa
3601900000	3601900331	IDN Aceh	IDN Aceh Lhokseumawe	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	Lhokseumawe
3601900000	3601909632	IDN Aceh	IDN Aceh A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3601900000	3601909704	IDN Aceh	IDN Aceh A village (less than 10,000)	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3601900000	3601909805	IDN Aceh	IDN Aceh Rural area	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	Daerah pedesaan
3602000000	3602000132	IDN Western Lesser Sunda Islands	IDN Western Lesser Sunda Islands Bima	Nusa Tenggara Barat	Kota Bima
3602000000	3602000231	IDN Western Lesser Sunda Islands	IDN Western Lesser Sunda Islands Mataram	Nusa Tenggara Barat	Kota Mataram
3602000000	3602000332	IDN Western Lesser Sunda Islands	IDN Western Lesser Sunda Islands Sumbawa Besar	Nusa Tenggara Barat	Sumbawa Besar
3602000000	3602009632	IDN Western Lesser Sunda Islands	IDN Western Lesser Sunda Islands A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Nusa Tenggara Barat	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3602000000	3602009704	IDN Western Lesser Sunda Islands	IDN Western Lesser Sunda Islands A village (less than 10,000)	Nusa Tenggara Barat	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3602000000	3602009805	IDN Western Lesser Sunda Islands	IDN Western Lesser Sunda Islands Rural area	Nusa Tenggara Barat	Daerah pedesaan
3602100000	3602100132	IDN Eastern Lesser Sunda Islands	IDN Eastern Lesser Sunda Islands Ende	Nusa Tenggara Timur	Ende
3602100000	3602100231	IDN Eastern Lesser Sunda Islands	IDN Eastern Lesser Sunda Islands Kupang	Nusa Tenggara Timur	Kupang
3602100000	3602109632	IDN Eastern Lesser Sunda Islands	IDN Eastern Lesser Sunda Islands A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Nusa Tenggara Timur	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3602100000	3602109704	IDN Eastern Lesser Sunda Islands	IDN Eastern Lesser Sunda Islands A village (less than 10,000)	Nusa Tenggara Timur	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3602100000	3602109805	IDN Eastern Lesser Sunda Islands	IDN Eastern Lesser Sunda Islands Rural area	Nusa Tenggara Timur	Daerah pedesaan
3602200000	3602200132	IDN Papua	IDN Papua Jayapura	Papua	Kota Jayapura
3602200000	3602209632	IDN Papua	IDN Papua A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Papua	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3602200000	3602209704	IDN Papua	IDN Papua A village (less than 10,000)	Papua	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3602200000	3602209805	IDN Papua	IDN Papua Rural area	Papua	Daerah pedesaan
3602300000	3602300132	IDN Western Papua	IDN Western Papua Sorong	Papua Barat	Kota Sorong
3602300000	3602300232	IDN Western Papua	IDN Western Papua Manokwari	Papua Barat	Manokwari
3602300000	3602309632	IDN Western Papua	IDN Western Papua A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Papua Barat	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3602300000	3602309704	IDN Western Papua	IDN Western Papua A village (less than	Papua Barat	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)

			10,000)		
3602300000	3602309805	IDN Western Papua	IDN Western Papua Rural area	Papua Barat	Daerah pedesaan
3602400000	3602400132	IDN Riau	IDN Riau Dumai	Riau	Kota Dumai
3602400000	3602400231	IDN Riau	IDN Riau Pekanbaru	Riau	Kota Pekanbaru
3602400000	3602400332	IDN Riau	IDN Riau Selatpanjang	Riau	Selatpanjang
3602400000	3602400432	IDN Riau	IDN Riau Tanjungbalai - Meral	Riau	Tanjungbalai - Meral
3602400000	3602400532	IDN Riau	IDN Riau Tembilahan	Riau	Tembilahan
3602400000	3602409632	IDN Riau	IDN Riau A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Riau	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3602400000	3602409704	IDN Riau	IDN Riau A village (less than 10,000)	Riau	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3602400000	3602409805	IDN Riau	IDN Riau Rural area	Riau	Daerah pedesaan
3602500000	3602500132	IDN Western Sulawesi	IDN Western Sulawesi Mamuju	Sulawesi Barat	Kota Mamuju
3602500000	3602509632	IDN Western Sulawesi	IDN Western Sulawesi A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Sulawesi Barat	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3602500000	3602509704	IDN Western Sulawesi	IDN Western Sulawesi A village (less than 10,000)	Sulawesi Barat	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3602500000	3602509805	IDN Western Sulawesi	IDN Western Sulawesi Rural area	Sulawesi Barat	Daerah pedesaan
3602600000	3602600131	IDN Southern Sulawesi	IDN Southern Sulawesi Makasar (Ujungpandang)	Sulawesi Selatan	Kota Makassar
3602600000	3602600232	IDN Southern Sulawesi	IDN Southern Sulawesi Palopo	Sulawesi Selatan	Kota Palopo
3602600000	3602600332	IDN Southern Sulawesi	IDN Southern Sulawesi Parepare	Sulawesi Selatan	Kota Pare-Pare
3602600000	3602600432	IDN Southern Sulawesi	IDN Southern Sulawesi Watampone (Bone)	Sulawesi Selatan	Kota Watampone
3602600000	3602600532	IDN Southern Sulawesi	IDN Southern Sulawesi Polewali	Sulawesi Selatan	Polewali
3602600000	3602600632	IDN Southern Sulawesi	IDN Southern Sulawesi Singkang	Sulawesi Selatan	Singkang
3602600000	3602600732	IDN Southern Sulawesi	IDN Southern Sulawesi Sombaopu	Sulawesi Selatan	Sombaopu
3602600000	3602609632	IDN Southern Sulawesi	IDN Southern Sulawesi A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Sulawesi Selatan	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3602600000	3602609704	IDN Southern Sulawesi	IDN Southern Sulawesi A village (less than 10,000)	Sulawesi Selatan	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3602600000	3602609805	IDN Southern Sulawesi	IDN Southern Sulawesi Rural area	Sulawesi Selatan	Daerah pedesaan
3602700000	3602700131	IDN Central Sulawesi	IDN Central Sulawesi Palu	Sulawesi Tengah	Palu
3602700000	3602709531	IDN Central Sulawesi	IDN Central Sulawesi A town (100,000 - 1 million)	Sulawesi Tengah	Sebuah kota (100.000 - 1 juta)
3602700000	3602709632	IDN Central Sulawesi	IDN Central Sulawesi A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Sulawesi Tengah	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3602700000	3602709704	IDN Central Sulawesi	IDN Central Sulawesi A village (less than 10,000)	Sulawesi Tengah	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3602700000	3602709805	IDN Central Sulawesi	IDN Central Sulawesi Rural area	Sulawesi Tengah	Daerah pedesaan
3602800000	3602800132	IDN Southeastern Sulawesi	IDN Southeastern Sulawesi Kendari	Sulawesi Tenggara	Kendari
3602800000	3602800232	IDN Southeastern Sulawesi	IDN Southeastern Sulawesi Bau-Bau	Sulawesi Tenggara	Kota Bau-Bau
3602800000	3602809632	IDN Southeastern	IDN Southeastern Sulawesi A small city	Sulawesi Tenggara	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)

		Sulawesi	(10,000 - 100,000)		
3602800000	3602809704	IDN Southeastern Sulawesi	IDN Southeastern Sulawesi A village (less than 10,000)	Sulawesi Tenggara	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3602800000	3602809805	IDN Southeastern Sulawesi	IDN Southeastern Sulawesi Rural area	Sulawesi Tenggara	Daerah pedesaan
3602900000	3602900132	IDN Northern Sulawesi	IDN Northern Sulawesi Bitung	Sulawesi Utara	Kota Bitung
3602900000	3602900231	IDN Northern Sulawesi	IDN Northern Sulawesi Manado	Sulawesi Utara	Kota Manado
3602900000	3602909632	IDN Northern Sulawesi	IDN Northern Sulawesi A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Sulawesi Utara	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3602900000	3602909704	IDN Northern Sulawesi	IDN Northern Sulawesi A village (less than 10,000)	Sulawesi Utara	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3602900000	3602909805	IDN Northern Sulawesi	IDN Northern Sulawesi Rural area	Sulawesi Utara	Daerah pedesaan
3603000000	3603000132	IDN Western Sumatra	IDN Western Sumatra Bukittinggi	Sumatera Barat	Kota Bukittinggi
3603000000	3603000231	IDN Western Sumatra	IDN Western Sumatra Padang	Sumatera Barat	Kota Padang
3603000000	3603009632	IDN Western Sumatra	IDN Western Sumatra A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Sumatera Barat	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3603000000	3603009704	IDN Western Sumatra	IDN Western Sumatra A village (less than 10,000)	Sumatera Barat	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3603000000	3603009805	IDN Western Sumatra	IDN Western Sumatra Rural area	Sumatera Barat	Daerah pedesaan
3603100000	3603100132	IDN Southern Sumatra	IDN Southern Sumatra Baturaja	Sumatera Selatan	Baturaja
3603100000	3603100232	IDN Southern Sumatra	IDN Southern Sumatra Lubuklinggau	Sumatera Selatan	Kota Lubuklinggau
3603100000	3603100301	IDN Southern Sumatra	IDN Southern Sumatra Palembang	Sumatera Selatan	Kota Palembang
3603100000	3603100432	IDN Southern Sumatra	IDN Southern Sumatra Prabumulih	Sumatera Selatan	Kota Prabumulih
3603100000	3603100532	IDN Southern Sumatra	IDN Southern Sumatra Lahat	Sumatera Selatan	Lahat
3603100000	3603100632	IDN Southern Sumatra	IDN Southern Sumatra Tanjungagung	Sumatera Selatan	Tanjungagung
3603100000	3603109632	IDN Southern Sumatra	IDN Southern Sumatra A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Sumatera Selatan	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3603100000	3603109704	IDN Southern Sumatra	IDN Southern Sumatra A village (less than 10,000)	Sumatera Selatan	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3603100000	3603109805	IDN Southern Sumatra	IDN Southern Sumatra Rural area	Sumatera Selatan	Daerah pedesaan
3603200000	3603200132	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Belawan	Sumatera Utara	Belawan
3603200000	3603200231	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Binjai	Sumatera Utara	Binjai
3603200000	3603200332	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Kabanjahe	Sumatera Utara	Kabanjahe
3603200000	3603200432	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Kisaran	Sumatera Utara	Kisaran
3603200000	3603200501	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Medan	Sumatera Utara	Kota Medan
3603200000	3603200632	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Padang Sidempuan	Sumatera Utara	Kota Padang Sidempuan
3603200000	3603200731	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Pematangsiantar	Sumatera Utara	Kota Pematangsiantar
3603200000	3603200832	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Sibolga	Sumatera Utara	Kota Sibolga
3603200000	3603200932	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Tanjungbalai	Sumatera Utara	Kota Tanjung Balai
3603200000	3603201031	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Tebing Tinggi	Sumatera Utara	Kota Tebing Tinggi
3603200000	3603201132	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Kotapinang	Sumatera Utara	Kotapinang
3603200000	3603201231	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Percut	Sumatera Utara	Percut

3603200000	3603201332	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Rantauprapat	Sumatera Utara	Rantau Prapat
3603200000	3603201432	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Sunggal	Sumatera Utara	Sunggal
3603200000	3603201532	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Tanjungmorawa	Sumatera Utara	Tanjungmorawa
3603200000	3603209632	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Sumatera Utara	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3603200000	3603209704	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra A village (less than 10,000)	Sumatera Utara	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3603200000	3603209805	IDN Northern Sumatra	IDN Northern Sumatra Rural area	Sumatera Utara	Daerah pedesaan
3603300000	3603300132	IDN Yogyakarta	IDN Yogyakarta Banguntapan	Yogyakarta	Banguntapan
3603300000	3603300232	IDN Yogyakarta	IDN Yogyakarta Bantul	Yogyakarta	Bantul
3603300000	3603300331	IDN Yogyakarta	IDN Yogyakarta Depok	Yogyakarta	Depok
3603300000	3603300432	IDN Yogyakarta	IDN Yogyakarta Gamping	Yogyakarta	Gamping
3603300000	3603300532	IDN Yogyakarta	IDN Yogyakarta Godean	Yogyakarta	Godean
3603300000	3603300632	IDN Yogyakarta	IDN Yogyakarta Kasihan	Yogyakarta	Kasihan
3603300000	3603300731	IDN Yogyakarta	IDN Yogyakarta Yogyakarta	Yogyakarta	Kota Yogyakarta
3603300000	3603300832	IDN Yogyakarta	IDN Yogyakarta Sewon	Yogyakarta	Sewon
3603300000	3603309632	IDN Yogyakarta	IDN Yogyakarta A small city (10,000 - 100,000)	Yogyakarta	Sebuah kota kecil (10.000 - 100.000)
3603300000	3603309704	IDN Yogyakarta	IDN Yogyakarta A village (less than 10,000)	Yogyakarta	Sebuah desa (kurang dari 10.000)
3603300000	3603309805	IDN Yogyakarta	IDN Yogyakarta Rural area	Yogyakarta	Daerah pedesaan

3.5. List of ethnic groups and languages

3.5.1 Ethnic groups

Below, a list of the ethnic groups distinguished in Indonesia and designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.

Table 19 List of ethnic groups in Indonesia (by 1/1/2009)

ba_IN	Master label	Translation
360001	IDN Javanese	Jawa
360002	IDN Sundanese	Sunda
360003	IDN Madurese	Madura
360004	IDN Minangkabau	Minangkabau
360005	IDN Betawi	Betawi
360006	IDN Bugis	Bugis
360007	IDN Banten	Banten
360008	IDN Banjar	Banjar
360009	IDN Other	Lain

3.5.2 Languages

Below, a draft list of languages spoken in Indonesia and designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.

Table 20 List of languages in Indonesia (by 1/1/2009)

ba_IN	Master label	Translation
360001	IDN Indonesian	Bahasa Indonesia
360002	IDN Javanese	Basa Jawa
360003	IDN Sundanese	Basa Sunda
360004	IDN Madurese	Basa Mathura
360005	IDN Minangkabau	Baso Minang
360006	IDN Buginese	Basa Ugi
360998	IDN Local dialect	Dialek lokal
360999	IDN Other language	Bahasa lain

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5. What is WageIndicator?

WageIndicator has websites in 50 countries. In every country, a national website has a free Salary Check. This Check provides detailed information about the wages, on average earned in a wide range of occupations, taken into account personal characteristics, such as tenure/age, education, supervisory position, region and alike.

Apart from the Salary Check, the websites in many countries have attractive web-tools, such as Minimum Wage Checks, DecentWorkCheck, Gross-Net Earnings Check, and alike. In addition, most websites have content about wages, working conditions, labour standards and related topics. Each country has at least one website. Multilingual countries have two or more websites. In addition, many countries have websites for target groups, for example women or youth. The project website is www.wageindicator.org.

Worldwide, the national WageIndicator websites attract large numbers of web-visitors. The websites are consulted by workers for their job mobility decisions, annual performance talks or wage negotiations. They are consulted by school pupils, students or re-entrant women facing occupational choices, or by employers in small and medium sized companies when recruiting staff or negotiating wages with their employees.

In return for all free information provided, the web-visitors are encouraged to complete a web-survey, which takes 10 to 20 minutes. The survey has detailed questions about earnings, benefits, working conditions, employment contract, training, as well as questions about education, occupation, industry, and household characteristics. This web-survey is comparable across all countries. The web-survey is continuously posted at all WageIndicator websites, of course in the national language(s) and adapted to country-specific issues, where needed. The data from the web-survey are used for the calculations, underlying the Salary Check. For occupations with at least 50 observations in the national database a salary indication can be calculated. The Salary Checks are updated annually.

The project started in 2000 in the Netherlands with a large-scale, paper-based survey to collect data on women's wages. In 2001 the first WageIndicator website with a Salary Check and a web-survey was launched. Since 2004, websites were launched in European countries, in North and South America, in South-Africa, and in countries in Asia. All large economies of the world currently have a WageIndicator website, among which the USA, the Russian Federation, China, India and Brazil. From 2009 onwards, websites are being launched in more African countries, as well as in Indonesia and in a number of post-soviet countries. More information about the WageIndicator Foundation and its activities can be found at www.wageindicator.org.
